关于科学哲学的许多核心问题,包括科学能否揭示不可观察事物的真相,以及科学推理是否完全合理,相关议题领域为“归纳问题”(英语:Problem of induction;德语:Induktionsproblem),对此哲学家之间没有达成共识。除了这些关于整个科学领域的普遍问题之外,科学哲学家还考虑适用于特定科学(例如生物学或物理学)的问题。一些科学哲学家还利用当代科学成果来得出关於哲学本身的结论。
虽然与科学有关的哲学思想至少可以追溯到亚里士多德时代,但一般科学哲学只是在20世纪逻辑实证主义运动后才作为一门独特的学科出现,该运动旨在制定标准以确保所有哲学陈述意义并客观地评估它们。查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯和卡尔·波普尔从实证主义转向建立一套现代科学方法论标准。托马斯·库恩1962年的著作《科学革命的结构》(英语:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) 也是形成性的,它挑战了科学进步的观点,即基于固定的系统实验方法稳定、累积地获取知识,而是认为任何进步都与“范式”相关,即集合在特定历史时期定义一门科学学科的问题、概念和实践。[1]
随后,威拉德·范奥曼·奎因等学者推广了真理融贯论;该学说认为如果一个理论将观察作为一个连贯整体有意义的一部分,那么它就是有效的。斯蒂芬·杰·古尔德 (Stephen Jay Gould) 等一些思想家试图将科学建立在公理假设中,例如均变论。少数哲学家,尤其是保罗·费耶阿本德,认为不存在“科学方法”这样的东西,因此应该允许所有有关科学的方法,包括明确的超自然方法。另一种思考科学的方法涉及从社会学的角度研究知识是如何被创造的,该领域或称科学建构论(英语:Constructivism),这种方法由大卫·布鲁尔和巴里·巴恩斯(S. Barry Barnes)等学者为代表。最后,欧陆哲学的一个传统从对人类经验的严格分析的角度来看待科学。
演绎-律则模型(英语:Deductive-nomological model)(D-N模型)是一个早期的,有影响力的科学解释的理论。它说,一个成功的科学解释必须能从一个科学定律推断出某个现象的发生[8]。这种观点受到了很多的批评,导致人们想出几个普遍承认的反例[9]。如果待说明事物不能从任何律则推导出(因为它基于偶然,或者不能完全从已知条件预测),这时候澄清“(科学)解释”是什么意思就特别具有挑战性。韦斯利·C·萨尔蒙(英语:Wesley C. Salmon)发展了一个模型,其中一个好的科学解释必须和要解释的结果在统计学上相关[10][11]。其他人则认为,一个好的解释的关键,是能统一不同的现象或能提供因果机制[11]。
Encyclopædia Britannica: Thomas S. Kuhn互联网档案馆的存档,存档日期2015-04-17.. "Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important."
Laudan, Larry. The Demise of the Demarcation Problem. Adolf Grünbaum, Robert Sonné Cohen, Larry Laudan (编). Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. Springer. 1983. ISBN 90-277-1533-5.
"Pseudoscientific – pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific", from the Oxford American Dictionary, published by the Oxford English Dictionary; Hansson, Sven Ove (1996)."Defining Pseudoscience", Philosophia Naturalis, 33: 169–176, as cited in "Science and Pseudo-science" (页面存档备份,存于互联网档案馆) (2008) in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Stanford article states: "Many writers on pseudoscience have emphasized that pseudoscience is non-science posing as science. The foremost modern classic on the subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science(英语:Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science). According to Brian Baigrie (1988, 438), "[w]hat is objectionable about these beliefs is that they masquerade as genuinely scientific ones." These and many other authors assume that to be pseudoscientific, an activity or a teaching has to satisfy the following two criteria (Hansson 1996): (1) it is not scientific, and (2) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific".
For example, Hewitt et al. Conceptual Physical Science Addison Wesley; 3 edition (July 18, 2003) ISBN 978-0-321-05173-8, Bennett et al. The Cosmic Perspective 3e Addison Wesley; 3 edition (July 25, 2003) ISBN 978-0-8053-8738-4; See also, e.g., Gauch HG Jr. Scientific Method in Practice (2003).
A 2006 National Science Foundation report on Science and engineering indicators quoted Michael Shermer(英语:Michael Shermer)'s (1997) definition of pseudoscience: '"claims presented so that they appear [to be] scientific even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility"(p. 33). In contrast, science is "a set of methods designed to describe and interpret observed and inferred phenomena, past or present, and aimed at building a testable body of knowledge open to rejection or confirmation"(p. 17)'.Shermer M. Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company. 1997. ISBN 0-7167-3090-1. as cited by National Science Foundation; Division of Science Resources Statistics. Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Understanding. Science and engineering indicators 2006. 2006 [2015-10-01]. (原始内容存档于2011-08-22).
"A pretended or spurious science; a collection of related beliefs about the world mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method or as having the status that scientific truths now have," from the Oxford English Dictionary, second edition 1989.
Levin, Michael. What Kind of Explanation is Truth?. Jarrett Leplin (编). Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1984: 124–1139. ISBN 0-520-05155-6.
Putnam, Hilary. Mathematics, Matter and Method (Philosophical Papers, Vol. I). London: Cambridge University Press. 1975.
Putnam, Hilary. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978.
Boyd, Richard. The Current Status of Scientific Realism. Jarrett Leplin (编). Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1984: 41–82. ISBN 0-520-05155-6.
Stanford, P. Kyle. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press. 2006. ISBN 978-0-19-517408-3.
Winsberg, Eric. Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth. Synthese. September 2006, 152: 1–19. doi:10.1007/s11229-004-5404-6.
Douglas Allchin, "Values in Science and in Science Education," in International Handbook of Science Education, B.J. Fraser and K.G. Tobin (eds.), 2:1083–1092, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1988).
Bacon, FrancisNovum Organum (The New Organon), 1620. Bacon's work described many of the accepted principles, underscoring the importance of empirical results, data gathering and experiment. Encyclopædia Britannica (1911), "Bacon, Francis" states: [In Novum Organum, we ] "proceed to apply what is perhaps the most valuable part of the Baconian method, the process of exclusion or rejection. This elimination of the non-essential, ... , is the most important of Bacon's contributions to the logic of induction, and that in which, as he repeatedly says, his method differs from all previous philosophies."
Smith, L.D. Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance. Stanford University Press. 1986: 314 [2017-04-26]. ISBN 978-0-8047-1301-6. LCCN 85030366. (原始内容存档于2016-05-01). The secondary and historical literature on logical positivism affords substantial grounds for concluding that logical positivism failed to solve many of the central problems it generated for itself. Prominent among the unsolved problems was the failure to find an acceptable statement of the verifiability (later confirmability) criterion of meaningfulness. Until a competing tradition emerged (about the late 1950's), the problems of logical positivism continued to be attacked from within that tradition. But as the new tradition in the philosophy of science began to demonstrate its effectiveness—by dissolving and rephrasing old problems as well as by generating new ones—philosophers began to shift allegiances to the new tradition, even though that tradition has yet to receive a canonical formulation.
Bunge, M.A. Finding Philosophy in Social Science. Yale University Press. 1996: 317 [2017-04-26]. ISBN 978-0-300-06606-7. LCCN lc96004399. (原始内容存档于2016-06-04). To conclude, logical positivism was progressive compared with the classical positivism of Ptolemy, Hume, d'Alembert, Compte, John Stuart Mill, and Ernst Mach. It was even more so by comparison with its contemporary rivals—neo-Thomisism, neo-Kantianism, intuitionism, dialectical materialism, phenomenology, and existentialism. However, neo-positivism failed dismally to give a faithful account of science, whether natural or social. It failed because it remained anchored to sense-data and to a phenomenalist metaphysics, overrated the power of induction and underrated that of hypothesis, and denounced realism and materialism as metaphysical nonsense. Although it has never been practiced consistently in the advanced natural sciences and has been criticized by many philosophers, notably Popper (1959 [1935], 1963), logical positivism remains the tacit philosophy of many scientists. Regrettably, the anti-positivism fashionable in the metatheory of social science is often nothing but an excuse for sloppiness and wild speculation.
Popper, Falsifiability, and the Failure of Positivism. 2000-08-07 [2014-01-07]. (原始内容存档于2014-01-07). The upshot is that the positivists seem caught between insisting on the V.C. [Verifiability Criterion]—but for no defensible reason—or admitting that the V.C. requires a background language, etc., which opens the door to relativism, etc. In light of this dilemma, many folk—especially following Popper's "last-ditch" effort to "save" empiricism/positivism/realism with the falsifiability criterion—have agreed that positivism is a dead-end.
Kuhn, T. S. [Postscript]. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd. ed.. [Univ. of Chicago Pr]. 1996: 176. ISBN 0-226-45808-3. A paradigm is what the members of a community of scientists share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.
Ashman, Keith M.; Barringer, Philip S. (编). After the Science Wars. London, UK: Routledge. 2001 [2015-10-29]. ISBN 0-415-21209-X. (原始内容存档于2021-04-05). The 'war' is between scientists who believe that science and its methods are objective, and an increasing number of social scientists, historians, philosophers, and others gathered under the umbrella of Science Studies.
Bickle, John; Mandik, Peter; Landreth, Anthony. Zalta, Edward N. , 编. The Philosophy of Neuroscience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010 [2017-12-21]. (原始内容存档于2013-12-02)(Summer 2010 Edition)
Recent examples include Okasha S. (2006), Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, and Godfrey-Smith P. (2009), Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Popper, Karl, (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, ISBN 978-0-415-04318-2
van Fraassen, Bas. The Scientific Image. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1980. ISBN 0-19-824424-X.
Shaw, Jeffrey M. (2014) Illusions of Freedom: Thomas Merton and Jacques Ellul on Technology and the Human Condition. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock. ISBN 978-1-62564-058-1.
Ziman, John (2000). Real Science: what it is, and what it means. Cambridge, Uk: Cambridge University Press.
Chu, Dominique (2013), The Science Myth---God, society, the self and what we will never know, ISBN 978-1-78279-047-1