アメリカ合衆国憲法第1条(アメリカがっしゅうこくけんぽうだい1じょう、Article One of the United States Constitution)は、米国連邦政府の立法府である連邦議会を設立する条項である。 第1条の下において、連邦議会は、上院と下院で構成される二院制の立法府である。 第1条は、連邦議会にさまざまな列挙された権限(en:Enumerated powers (United States))と、それらの権限を実施するために「必要かつ適切条項(英語版)」によって法律を成立させる能力を付与している。 第1条はまた、法案を可決するための手続を定め、連邦議会と州がその権限を濫用することを制限している。
権力分立の原則は、連邦議会に関して特に注目に値する。憲法は、連邦議会が第1条において、「ここに付与された」(herein granted)立法権のみを行使できることを宣言している(この条項は、後に、修正第10条によって制限されることとなる。)[5]。権力分立の原則はまた、暗黙のうちに拡張されることによって、連邦議会がその立法権を政府の他の部門のいずれかに対して委任することをも禁止している(委任禁止法理(英語版))[6]。しかし、連邦最高裁判所は、執行府に対して規制権限を委任する際に、連邦議会が「明確性原則」(intelligible principle)を規定する限り、連邦議会は執行府に対して規制権限を委任する裁量を有すると判断した[7]。連邦政府の各部門に割り当てられた権限は、当該部門に留保されなければならず、当該部門によってのみ示されなければならないというのが、委任禁止法理の中心をなす考え方である[8]。委任禁止法理は、現在、連邦議会による権限の委任を狭く解釈する方法として主に使用されており[9]、裁判所が何を許可するかについて連邦議会が「様子見をする」(test the water)意図を明確に示さない限り、確実になしうる権限のみを委任することを連邦議会が意図していたと裁判所は推定している[10]。
同年9月8日、憲法制定会議は、上院の弾劾手続に関する陪審裁判の決議案を承認し、さらに,バージニア邦選出の代議員ジョージ・メイソンが提出した決議案、すなわち、弾劾手続の対象を反逆罪及び収賄罪のみならず「その他の重罪及び軽罪(en:High crimes and misdemeanors))」にも拡大する決議案も承認した。この決議案が承認された後、マディソンは、連邦最高裁判所ではなく上院が弾劾手続に関する陪審を務めることに対して反対を表明し、上院から弾劾の権限を奪う決議案を提出したが、失敗に終わった。一方、ペンシルベニア邦選出の代議員ガバヌーア・モリスは、裁判所が弾劾手続を行うには人数が少なすぎるという理由で反対を主張した[58]。
ハミルトンは、憲法制定会議で承認されたモデルは、イギリスの弾劾手続(en:Impeachment in the United Kingdom)に倣ったものであり、イギリスのモデルが複数の州憲法で採用されていることに注目し[62]、人民の直接選挙によって選出された議員ではなく、州議会によって選出された議員で構成される上院こそが、人民の直接選挙によって選出された議員で構成される下院が提起した告発に対する弾劾の公平な陪審として機能する際に、十分に独立したものとなると主張した[63]。一方、ハミルトンは、選挙で選ばれておらず任期が終身の者によって構成される連邦最高裁判所が行う弾劾裁判について、下院による無限定で尽きることのない弾劾の範囲を裁定するのに必要な正統性を連邦最高裁判所が有しないのではないかと疑問視した。それどころか、ハミルトンは、弾劾裁判所が「検察官が犯罪の定義をする際の厳格な規則によって拘束されることなく」、「社会において最も著名な人物」に対する罪状について評決を下すものであるがゆえ、弾劾裁判が本質的に有する政治的性質は、必然的に、多数の裁判所を必要としており、「少数の人物に信頼を委ねることを禁じている」と主張した[64]。
各州が選挙の「方法」を規律する最も重要な方法のひとつは、選挙区を画定する権限である。理論的には、連邦議会が各州の選挙区を画定することができるのであるが[73]、連邦議会は、このレベルでの権限を行使していない。しかしながら、連邦議会は、州に対し、選挙区を画定する際に、一定の慣行に従うことを求めている。現在、州は、小選挙区制を採用することが義務付けられており、これによって、州は、下院の代表の数と同数の選挙区に分割される(すなわち、下院の代表が1名のみの州でない限り、州全体から特別の選挙によって代表を選出することはできず、また、各選挙区から1名以上の代表を選出することもできない。)[74]。連邦最高裁判所は、「その立法機関によって」という文言について、州知事の拒否権[75]や、憲法にそれが規定されている州においてはイニシアチブの手続[76]をも含むものであると解釈してきた。しかしながら、この結論は、独立州議会理論(英語版)(Independent State Legislature Theory)による批判を受けることとなったが、連邦最高裁判所は、2023年のムーア対ハーパー事件(英語版)によって、独立州議会理論を否定している[77][注釈 3]。
連邦議会が初めて全国選挙の規制権限を行使したのは、1842年に第27議会(英語版)が下院議員の選挙区選挙を義務付ける法律を可決したときのことである[78]。その後、連邦議会は、区割りの要件として、隣接していること、コンパクトであること、実質的に人口が平等であることを順次追加することによって、要件を拡大した。これらの基準は、後に、1929年の議席再配分法によって、全て削除されることとなったが[1][79]、連邦最高裁判所は、平等保護条項[24]に基づき、州に対して再び人口要件を課し、隣接していることと、コンパクトであることという他の「伝統的な」選挙区画定基準を充たさない選挙区については、疑わしいものであると判断している[80]。一人区の要件は、1967年に連邦議会によって可決されたen:Uniform Congressional District Actによって、強化されている[81][82]。
1865年、連邦議会は、上院議員選挙をめぐる州議会の行き詰まりが欠員を生じさせている状況に対して、救済策を立法化した。この法律は、指定された日に各州議会の両院が合同会議を開き、その後、上院議員が選出されるまでの間、会議を毎日開くことを義務付けている。選挙について規律する最初の包括的な連邦法は、参政権の付与にあたって、人種差別に対する修正第15条の保障を実行するための手段として、1870年に施行された。1870年の執行法(en:Enforcement Act of 1870)及びその後の法律においては、虚偽の有権者登録、賄賂、法的権利を欠く投票、虚偽の投票報告、選挙に関わる公務員に対する全ての妨害、選挙に関わる公務員が州法又は連邦法によって規定されている義務を怠ることが、連邦犯罪とされた。また、有権者登録の場所や選挙の場に立ち会い、違法な登録や投票をしようとする者に対して異議を述べ、票の集計に立ち会い、有権者の登録や票の集計を署名によって確認する権限を有する者が連邦裁判所裁判官によって任命される旨の規定が設けられた[1]。
本条項は、金銭に関連する全ての法案について庶民院(en:House of Commons of Great Britain)において第一読会を開かなければならないというイギリス議会の慣習に由来している。この慣習は、「財布の権限(英語版)」を国民に最も近い立法機関が有するようにすることを意図したものであったが、アメリカにおいては上院がこれらの法案を修正することを可能として、イギリスの慣習を修正するに至った。本条項は、大邦と小邦との間の大妥協(コネチカット妥協)の一部を構成していた。大邦は、上院における小邦の偏った権限に対して不満を抱いていたため、本条項は、理論的には、上院における代表性の欠如を相殺し、小邦出身の上院議員に対して同等の投票権を認めることによって大邦に対して埋め合わせをする役割を担っている[89]。
See Atkins v. United States,556F.2d1028, 1062(Ct. Cl.1977)(“The purpose of the [Vesting Clause] is to locate the central source of legislative authority in Congress, rather than the Executive or the Judiciary.”). , abrogated on other grounds byen:INS v. Chadha,462U.S.919(1983).
See en:J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,276U.S.394(1928), 406 ("Our Federal Constitution... divide[s] the governmental power into three branches. The first is the legislative, the second is the executive, and the third is judicial, and the rule is that in the actual administration of the government Congress... should exercise the legislative power, the President... the executive power, and the courts or the judiciary the judicial power....")
See en:United States v. Lopez,514U.S.549(1995), 592 ("[Certain] comments of Hamilton and others about federal power reflected the well-known truth that the new Government would have only the limited and enumerated powers found in the Constitution.... Even before the passage of the Tenth Amendment, it was apparent that Congress would possess only those powers 'herein granted' by the rest of the Constitution.").
See Touby v. the United States,500U.S.160(1991), 165 ("From [the language of this section of the Constitution] the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government.").
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409 ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer a statutory scheme] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
See en:Mistretta v. United States,488U.S.361(1989), 373 n.7 (nondelegation doctrine takes the form of "giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional").
UAW v. Occupational Health & Safety Admin.,938F.2d1310, 1317(D.C. Cir.1991)(“In effect [the nondelegation doctrine as a principle of statutory interpretation is used by the courts to] require a clear statement by Congress that it intended to test the constitutional waters.”). ; cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,485U.S.568(1988), 575 ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.... This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it." (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,440U.S.490(1979), 499–501, 504, and Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden,112U.S.261(1884)))); en:United States v. Bass,404U.S.336(1971), 349 ("[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.").
en:Barenblatt v. United States,360U.S.109(1959), 111 ("The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it has similarly been utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national purse, or whether to appropriate."); e.g., 3 Annals of Congress 490–94 (1792) (House committee appointed to investigate the defeat of Gen. St. Clair by Indians empowered to "call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.").
See en:McGrain v. Daugherty,273U.S.135(1927), 174–75 ("[T]he power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. It was so regarded and employed in American Legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified.... A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information-which not infrequently is true-recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period the power of inquiry, with enforcing process, was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate-indeed, was treated as inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking... that the constitutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised.").
See en:Watkins v. United States,354U.S.178(1957), 187 ("The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste."); Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111 ("The scope of the power of inquiry... is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.").
See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 170 ("[N]either house of Congress possesses a ‘general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen’;... the power actually possessed is limited to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular house ‘has jurisdiction’ and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; [and] if the inquiry relates to ‘a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial proceeding’ it is not within the range of this power, but must be left to the courts, conformably to the constitutional separation of governmental powers...." (quoting Kilbourne, 103 U.S. at 193)); see also Sinclair v. United States,279U.S.263(1929), 295 ("Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits...."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Gaudin,515U.S.506(1995).
en:Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875) ("[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one....").
See en:Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("[Voting] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.").
See en:Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969) ("No less rigid an examination [than close scrutiny] is applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and age. Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives.") (emphasis added).
en:Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–9, 14 (1964) ("[C]onstrued in its historical context, the command... that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's.... The history of the Constitution... reveals that those who framed the Constitution meant that... it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.... It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise-equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people-for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others."); e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (striking down Texas districting plan with a population deviation between the largest and smallest district of 4.13% of the population of an "ideal" district); see Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) ("[T]he State [must] make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small.... We can see no nonarbitrary way to pick a cutoff point at which population variances suddenly become de minimis.... Equal representation for equal numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to elected representatives. Toleration of even small deviations detracts from these purposes."); see also en:Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (invalidating a New Jersey congressional districting plan where the deviation between the largest and smallest districts was less than the Census's margin of error, when the state could offer no acceptable explanation for the differences); Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (total deviation of 19 people from largest to smallest district (646,380 to 646,361) struck down since alternatives with smaller deviations were available); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (court selected districting plan where 18 of 20 districts contained 571,530 people and the other two had 571,531).
E.g., 17 Annals of Cong. 870–902, 904–20, 927–47, 949–50, 1059–61, 1231–33, 1234–38 (1807) (House seated William McCreery despite him not satisfying Maryland law requiring Representatives to reside in their district).
See en:Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (invalidating House's decision not to seat a Member accused of misuse of funds) ("[I]n judging the qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution.").
See Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D. Neb. 1968) ("There being no such requirement in the Constitution itself, a state cannot require that a Representative live in the District from which he was nominated."); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445, 448 (N.M. 1968) ("[The New Mexico statute,] by requiring that each candidate for representative in Congress be a resident of and a qualified elector of the district in which he seeks office, adds additional qualifications to becoming a candidate for that office.... [W]e must hold the provisions of the Federal Constitution prevail and that this statute unconstitutionally adds additional qualifications."); Hellman v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908, 912 (Md. 1958) (same); cf. en:U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (state may not impose term limits on its congressional delegation).
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 783 (invalidating provision in the Arkansas Constitution imposing term limits on the State's congressional delegation) ("Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service[, such as term limitations,] would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to be changed, that text must be amended."); see also en:Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) (invaliding a Missouri constitutional term providing for labels printed on the election ballot next to the names of candidates who had not pledged to support term limits).
Cf. en:Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619 (1842) (dictum) ("[Congress] has, on various occasions, exercised powers which were necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly given, and duties expressly enjoined thereby. The end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary implication, that the means to accomplish it are given also; or, in other words, that the power flows as a necessary means to accomplish the end. Thus, for example, although the constitution has declared, that representatives shall be apportioned among the states according to their respective federal numbers; and for this purpose, it has expressly authorized congress, by law, to provide for an enumeration of the population every ten years; yet the power to apportion representatives, after this enumeration is made, is nowhere found among the express powers given to congress, but it has always been acted upon, as irresistibly flowing from the duty positively enjoined by the constitution.").
See Whelan v. Cuomo, 415 F. Supp. 251, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("The historical record of the Constitutional Convention supports several conclusions[,]... [including that] Congress was given considerable flexibility in determining the actual number of representatives so long as the total did not exceed one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants.").
See 3 Annals of Cong. 539 (1792) (President Washington's veto of apportionment legislation that would not have exceeded a national average of 1 for every 30,000 inhabitants, but did exceed that ratio for some states); see also U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana (Montana II), 503 U.S. 442, 449–50 (Congress's response to Washington's veto was enacting legislation providing for 1 representative per 33,000 of the national population, which avoided exceeding 1 per 30,000 in those states).
The United States Code only indirectly provides for a House with 435 members. After each decennial census, the president must submit to Congress a statement "showing the whole number of Persons in each State" and, based on this population figure, the number of Representatives the State would have received in the 83rd Congress (1951–53). 合衆国法典第2編第2a条 2 U.S.C.§2a (2006). Each state then receives as many representatives in the House as the president's report provides, until the next decennial census. Id. § 2a(b). The size of the House of Representatives in the 83rd Congress was 435. Thus, the en:United States Code currently does not expressly use the number "435", but instead ties the current size of the House to the "then existing number of Representatives" in the 83rd Congress, which was fixed at 435 by legislation that is now omitted from the United States Code. Compare 合衆国法典第2編第2条 2 U.S.C.§2 (1926) ("[A]fter the third day of March, nineteen hundred and thirteen, the House of Representatives shall be composed of four hundred and thirty-five members.") with 合衆国法典第2編第2条 2 U.S.C.§2 (1934) (section omitted). It has been omitted from every subsequent edition of the United States Code, through the present edition (2012).
Cf. 1 Asher C. Hinds, Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States § 187, at 113 (1907) ("The Speaker is always a Member of the House....").
Cf. en:Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (construing the Senate's "sole power" to "try all impeachments" to mean that the Senate's impeachment procedures are left to its discretion and concluding generally that Congress's impeachment powers are outside judicial review).
Mader,George(2016).“Binding Authority: Unamendability in the United States Constitution—A Textual and Historical Analysis”.en:Marquette Law Review99(4): 841–891.
See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230–31, 233–36 (holding that the Senate's sole power to try impeachments made its judgment conclusive as to what constituted an adequate impeachment trial) ("We think that the word 'sole' is of considerable significance. Indeed, the word 'sole' appears only one other time in the Constitution-with respect to the House of Representatives' "sole Power of Impeachment." The commonsense meaning of the word 'sole' is that the Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted. The dictionary definition bears this out.... The history and contemporary understanding of the impeachment provisions support our reading of the constitutional language.... [T]he Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen to have any role in impeachments.... [J]udicial review would be inconsistent with the Framers' insistence that our system be one of checks and balances.... Judicial involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, is counterintuitive because it would eviscerate the 'important constitutional check' placed on the Judiciary by the Framers. [It would be an improper reading of the Constitution to] place final reviewing authority with respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is meant to regulate.... In addition to the textual commitment argument,... the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability.... [O]pening the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.'" (citations omitted)).
Hamilton,Alexander(2003).“No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued”.InRossiter, Clinton.The Federalist Papers.Signet Classics.pp.394–395.ISBN9780451528810
Hamilton,Alexander(2003).“No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued”.InRossiter, Clinton.The Federalist Papers.Signet Classics.p.394.ISBN9780451528810
Hamilton,Alexander(2003).“No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued”.InRossiter, Clinton.The Federalist Papers.Signet Classics.pp.395–396.ISBN9780451528810
Hamilton,Alexander(2003).“No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued”.InRossiter, Clinton.The Federalist Papers.Signet Classics.p.396.ISBN9780451528810
Hamilton,Alexander(2003).“No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued”.InRossiter, Clinton.The Federalist Papers.Signet Classics.p.397.ISBN9780451528810
Cf. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 300 (1936) ("While the Senate in one sense acts as a court on the trial of an impeachment, it is essentially a political body and in its actions is influenced by the views of its members on the public welfare."); Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 36 (Comm. Print 2019) ("the fundamental character of impeachment. In Justice Story's words, ...is ""a proceeding purely of a political nature. It is not so much designed to punish an offender, as to secure the state against gross official misdemeanors. It touches neither his person, nor his property; but simply divests him of his political capacity.""" (citing 2 Story, Commentaries @ 272)), reprinted in 3 Lewis Deschler, Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 94‒661 ch. 14, app. at 2269 (1977).
See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69, 71 n.2 (1997) ("The [Elections] Clause is a default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices. Thus it is well settled that the Elections Clause grants Congress 'the power to override state regulations' by establishing uniform rules for federal elections, binding on the States. '[T]he regulations made by Congress are paramount to those made by the State legislature; and if they conflict therewith, the latter, so far as the conflict extends, ceases to be operative.' The Clause gives Congress 'comprehensive' authority to regulate the details of elections, including the power to impose 'the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.' Congressional authority extends not only to general elections, but also to any 'primary election which involves a necessary step in the choice of candidates for election as representatives in Congress.') (citations omitted); United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 284 (W.D. La. 1963) ("'[T]he manner of holding elections'... must be read as referring to the entire electoral process, from the first step of registering to the last step, the State's promulgation of honest returns.").
合衆国法典第2編第7条 2 U.S.C.§7 (2006) (prescribing "Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November" as the date for electing Representatives); id. § 1 (elections for senators to be held on same date as elections for representatives); see also 合衆国法典第3編第1条 3 U.S.C.§1 (2006) (prescribing "Tuesday next after the first Monday in November" as the date for electing presidential electors).
See en:Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Article I, § 4, while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal elections, permitted Congress to 'make or alter' those districts if it wished.").
See, e.g., en:Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) ("[L]egislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification," is subject to strict scrutiny.).
Rushing, J. Taylor(October 1, 2008).“Senate easily passes bailout”.2024年2月9日閲覧。“The Senate's action was a dramatic and rare move that circumvented a constitutional requirement that tax legislation must originate in the House”