1998年5月印度尼西亞騷亂（印尼語：Kerusuhan Mei 1998），又稱黑色五月暴動，在印度尼西亞也稱為1998年悲劇（印尼語：Tragedi 1998）或簡稱為1998年事件（印尼語：Peristiwa 1998），是指從1998年5月4日-8日和12日-15日印度尼西亞發生的大規模暴力、反政府示威和內亂事件。事件主要發生在棉蘭、雅加達、梭羅等城市。
非政府組織「人性志工團」（Volunteers for Humanity）指出印尼的流氓團體（Preman（英語：Preman_(Indonesian_gangster)））──涉及了這些暴力事件，而「印尼黑幫」往往與軍隊有聯繫。許多暴亂發生時，維安部隊和警察很詭異地選擇袖手旁觀，也不回應人們的呼救[1]。
非政府組織「人性志工團」（Volunteers for Humanity）發佈的報告統計，印尼全國共發生168起強暴案件，受害者大多數為華人，年齡從10歲到50歲不等。大多數案件（132件）在大雅加達地區發生。除此之外，超過4,000家商店和賣場遭到摧毀，數千戶民宅和車輛遭到縱火。該報告也記載印尼的死亡人數總計為2,244人，並稱大多數的死者並非華人多為都市中的貧困窮人——他們被誘使前往洗劫商場，但被關在被縱火前商場內[1]。
不過，當年有暴亂親歷者投書指出，暴亂期間至少有三名印尼華人曾向中國大使館求助，但使館人員詢問得知他們是「WNI」（Warga Negara Indonesia，印尼公民）後便拒絕提供幫助。[36]印尼學者廖建裕、中國學者查道炯、新西蘭學者杜建華、新加坡學者徐本欽等皆指出，暴亂期間中國政府無意爲受害的印尼華人提供救援和保護。在5月排華暴動之前，許多印尼以外的華人就批評中國政府應該保護印尼華人，然而北京拒絕進行干預，因為當時北京和雅加達的關係已經相當融洽，北京不想破壞這種關係。有中國駐美外交官私下表示，中國政府不可能向印尼提出抗議或派遣船隻，因為在印尼的大部分華人都是印尼公民，因此沒有充分理由這樣做。5月排華暴亂的嚴重時期，北京的態度也沒有改變。[37]中國政府確實有對在印尼工作和旅行的中國公民採取撤僑措施，並為尋求幫助的台灣和澳門旅行證件持有者提供領事保護，但與之有別的是，中國政府並不願意介入印尼華人的命運。[38]在公開和正式場合，雅加達的事務都不是北京的關注點。北京政府將華人稱為「印尼家庭的一份子」，並沒有義務保護他們。[39]臨近六四天安門事件週年日或許是北京政府保持低調的原因之一，因爲他們擔心中國學生的民族主義情緒會被激起，給中共中央總書記江澤民為首的中共領導層帶來壓力，特別是5月排華暴行或許會重新喚醒人民對六四屠殺的回憶。[40]
1998年5月15日，美國聯邦政府敦促在印尼美國公民立即離開該國，理由是該國發生了30多年來最嚴重的政治暴力事件[104]，同時美國與歐洲國家推遲了一項針對印尼價值為14億美元的緊急援助付款，取消了該國高級軍事代表團計劃前往印度尼西亞的任務，並撤離了使館非必要僱員[105][106][107]。美國政府於《1998年印度尼西亞國家人權報告》中指責蘇哈托政府「嚴重侵犯人權」[108]。聯邦政府批准七千名華人的避難請求，並接受了這批華人居留。[109][110]《紐約時報》率先大量報導了排華暴行[111]，使得此事在全球各地廣為傳播。同年7月開始，華裔美國人於全美各地展開抗議行動。8月7日和8日達到顛峰，全美13座大城同步舉行譴責印尼暴民罪行的示威抗議行動，近兩萬名華人群集全美各地印尼使領館前，要求立即停止排華暴行和嚴懲兇犯等。8月8日上午，在華盛頓特區的印度尼西亞駐美國大使館（英語：Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C.）前，憤怒的口號聲此起彼伏，近千名華裔聚集抗議，並向駐印尼的美國官員遞交抗議信函。[112][113][114][115]
Charlotte Setijadi. Charlotte , 編. Memories of Unbelonging: Ethnic Chinese Identity Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press. Oct 2023. ISBN 9780824894054.
Michael Richardson. Japan's Lack of Leadership Pushes ASEAN Toward Cooperation With China. 《國際先驅論壇報》. 1998-04-17 [2014-06-01]. （原始內容存檔於2014-08-08）. Mr. Tang also gave an assurance in Jakarta that Beijing regarded recent riots that targeted Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority as an internal matter for Indonesia to handle. "We always regard ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as Indonesian nationals and the issue relating to the ethnic Chinese as an internal affair of Indonesia," he said.（英文）
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557-575 [2019-05-13]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-05-13）. Third, prior to the outbreak of the May riots, Beijing's policy reportedly 'was simply to hope the riots wouldn't happen'. (The quotation is attributed to Zhang Yunling, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)
James Jiann Hua To (杜建華). Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart- Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese(PDF). University of Canterbury. 2009: 217–224 [2019-05-13]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-05-13）. Beijing publicly declared that the violence in Indonesia was a domestic issue and would not intervene. China maintained that governments should treat ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality as citizens of their domicile – any action that would suggest otherwise might provoke suspicions of interference in the region.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah , 編. "ASEAN-China Relations Realities and Prospects". China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). 2009: 356–366. ISBN 981-230-342-1. Indeed, unlike the riots in the 1960s, the May 1998 riots were not anti-PRC. It was targeted at the ethnic Chinese and there was no indication that it developed into anti-PRC riots. Although some PRC citizens might have been affected by the riots, the majority happened to be Indonesian citizens. However, under pressure from world opinion, especially from the ethnic Chinese communities outside China, Beijing appeared to change its attitude towards the matter. Nevertheless, the main policy of non-intervention remained.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). "Non-Intervention: The 1998 Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia". The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. 2017: 53–68. ISBN 9789814762656. Even before the May 1998 violence, many Chinese outside Indonesia criticized the PRC government, some even suggesting that Beijing should protect the Chinese there. However, Beijing had refused to intervene. Beijing–Jakarta ties had been quite cordial before the May riots and Beijing had no desire to jeopardize the relationship.... Privately, a Chinese diplomat in the United States noted that Beijing would not be able to protest or send ships to Indonesia because 「there is no good reason to do so as the majority of the Chinese in Indonesia are Indonesian citizens.」... Understandably, the embassy was cautious in doing so as this too might affect Sino–Indonesian relations. When serious anti-Chinese riots took place in Jakarta, Surakarta, and other areas between 13 May and 15 May 1998, Beijing's attitude remained unchanged.
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557–575 [2019-05-13]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-05-13）. China did take measures to evacuate its citizens (including Hong Kong passport holders) working and travelling in Indonesia and offered consular protection to Taiwan and Macao travel document holders who would seek assistance from its diplomatic missions in Indonesia. The obvious distinction here is that China did not appear willing to get involved with the fate of the Indonesian Chinese.
James Jiann Hua To (杜建華). Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart- Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese(PDF). University of Canterbury. 2009: 217–224 [2019-05-13]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-05-13）. Publicly and officially, Jakarta's domestic affairs were not the concern of Beijing. Beijing referred to ethnic Chinese as "members of the Indonesian family," whom it had no obligation to protect.
Shee Poon Kim (徐本欽). China's responses to the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia. Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. 2000. ISBN 981-04-2483-3. The timing of the anti-Chinese riots came at a sensitive period for the Chinese leadership, who feared that nationalistic feelings among the Chinese students in Beijing would be stirred up, putting pressure on the Jiang Zemin leadership, particularly since the state of the May anti-Chinese riots could rekindle the memory of the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen massacre.
James Jiann Hua To (杜建華). Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart- Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese(PDF). University of Canterbury. 2009: 217–224 [2019-05-13]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-05-13）. In May 1998, 1200 OC were killed, dozens of OC women raped, and properties torched as the Suharto regime ended. Beijing was slow to react, and by making only a brief mention in the state controlled media, it did not have to address it as a matter of foreign policy. Those who tried to protest were rendered silent, and any news coverage quickly suppressed.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah , 編. ASEAN-China Relations Realities and Prospects. "China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development" (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). 2009: 356–366. ISBN 981-230-342-1. The first official reaction of Beijing to the May 1998 riots occurred in late July 1998. However, the first reaction by a PRC official to the incident was on 6 July. Chen Shiqiu, the new Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, visited East Kalimantan to investigate the possibility of investing in the area, especially in the palm oil business. During his visit, he was asked by Indonesia reporters on his view of the May riots.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah , 編. ASEAN-China Relations Realities and Prospects. "China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development" (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). 2009: 356–366. ISBN 981-230-342-1. He was quoted as saying that China was "concerned with the incident" and wanted the Indonesian Government "to investigate the matter thoroughly". He told the reporters that he met B.J. Habibie twice: the first time when Habibie as still vice-president and the second time, when Habibie was president. During the meeting Chen said that he discussed the riots and "hoped that the riots will not recur." Chen clearly stated that, "according to the international law as well as the law of the two countries, it was the responsibility of the Indonesian Government to protect its own citizens, including the citizens of Chinese descent. " There was no official protest on the part of Bejing.
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557–575 [2019-05-13]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-05-13）. Beginning in August through November, China made a series of public pronouncements to express its displeasure with the Indonesian government over the latter's handling of the May riots. Also in August, China agreed to sell 50,000 tons of rice to Indonesia and provided Indonesia with a $3 million grant of medicines and pharmaceuticals. It also went ahead to execute a $200 million economic loan package – agreed in April 1998 – to Indonesia. In November, a Chinese trade delegation visited Jakarta, on schedule, to discuss Chinese investment projects in Indonesia.
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557–575 [2019-05-13]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-05-13）. In November China's diplomatic action culminated when President Jiang Zemin raised the suffering of the Indonesian Chinese in the May riots with Indonesian President B. J. Habibie at the China–ASEAN dialogue meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Jiang further made a point by speaking to a group of Indonesian business leaders and repeated the pledge that China would "never try to use people of Chinese origin living in Indonesia to seek political or economic gain there". Thereafter, the issue of the May riots disappeared from China's news media.
