History of foreign relations of China

This article is about the foreign relations of China. For the foreign relations of the Republic of China after 1949, see Foreign relations of Taiwan.

History of foreign relations of China covers diplomatic, military, political and economic relations in History of China from 1800 to the modern era. For the earlier period see Foreign relations of imperial China, and for the current foreign relations of China see Foreign relations of China.

During the period from 1800 to 1925, China's foreign policy was largely shaped by the country's efforts to resist Western imperialism and maintain its territorial integrity. Some of the key features of China's foreign relations in this period include:

• Unequal treaties: In the 19th century, China was forced to sign a series of unequal treaties with Great Britain, the U.S., France and other Western powers (and also Japan), which granted extraterritorial rights to foreigners and opened China's ports to foreign trade. China's foreign policy during this period was characterized by a desire to resist these treaties and regain control over its own affairs.
• Isolationism: China was largely isolated from the rest of the world during this period, with limited contact with other countries outside of its immediate neighbors. This was partly due to China's self-imposed isolationist policies, as well as the fact that Western powers had a major presence only in a few treaty ports such as Shanghai, China was engaged in several small wars with Britain, France and Japan.

China's foreign policy between 1925 and 1949 was marked by significant political upheaval and a shifting relationship with the outside world. Main points of China's foreign policy during this period:

• Anti-Imperialism: In the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, China's foreign policy became increasingly focused on anti-imperialism and national liberation. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong and the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek both sought to resist foreign domination and establish a unified, independent China. This led to the strengthening of nationalist sentiment and the rise of anti-foreign sentiment throughout the country.
• Second Sino-Japanese War: Japan's invasion of China in 1937 marked a turning point in China's foreign policy. The CCP and the KMT resisted the Japanese.
• Alignment with the Soviet Union: Following Mao's establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's foreign policy became closely aligned with the Soviet Union and the Communist movement. The CCP saw the Soviet Union as a key ally in the struggle against imperialism and sought to model China's development after the Soviet Union's socialist system. This led to increased cooperation between the two countries in areas such as trade, military assistance, and ideological exchange.
• Efforts for occupation Mongolia, Tibet and Eastern Turkistan for establishment of the new borders equal to those of the coolapsed Manchu Qing Empire.

Following 1949:

• China was close to the USSR at first, and fought a major war against the United States and South Korea (and the UN) in 1950–1953. However, by the 1960s China and the USSR were enemies and both were trying to build support worldwide/ while simultaneously supporting anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
• Diplomatic Recognition: China struggled for several decades to gain recognition from the international community. In 1971, the United Nations finally recognized the PRC and expelled the Republic of China (Taiwan). Since then, China has established diplomatic relations with almost all countries in the world.
• Chinese economic reform: In the late 1970s, China embarked on a program of economic reforms and opening-up. This led to increased engagement with the global economy and the development of China as a major economic power. China sought to increase trade and investment ties with other countries, and became an active member of international economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization.
• Assertiveness and Expansion: Since 2000, China has become more assertive in its foreign policy, as it seeks to expand its influence in the world. China has sought to strengthen its military presence in the South China Sea, expand its Belt and Road Initiative, and promote Chinese values and culture globally. This has led to tensions with India and the United States.

Qing Dynasty

Main article: History of the Qing dynasty

See also: List of diplomatic missions of the Qing dynasty and Dates of establishment of diplomatic relations with the Qing dynasty

By the mid 19th century, Chinese stability had come under increasing threat from both domestic and international sources. Social unrest and serious revolts became more common while the regular army had was too weak to deal with foreign military forces. Chinese leaders increasingly feared the impact of Western ideas. John Fairbank argues that in 1840 to 1895 China's response to the worsening relations with Western nations came in four phases. China's military weakness was interpreted in the 1840s and 1850s as a need for Western arms. Very little was achieved in this regard until the 1860s. Since the 1860s the Self-Strengthening Movement started and there was a focus on acquiring Western technology—as Japan was doing very successfully at the same time, but China gradually lagged behind. The 1870s to 1890s were characterized with efforts to reform and revitalize the Chinese political system more broadly. There was steady moderate progress, but efforts to leap forward such as the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898 roused the conservatives who stamped out the effort and executed its leaders. There was a rise in Chinese nationalism, as a sort of echo of Western nationalism, but that led to a quick defeat in war with Japan in 1895. An intense reaction against modernization set in at the grassroots level in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.^[1]

Opium Wars

See also: First Opium War and Second Opium War

European commercial interests sought to end the trading barriers, but China fended off repeated efforts by Britain to reform the trading system. Increasing sales of Indian opium to China by British traders led to the First Opium War (1839–1842). The superiority of Western militaries and military technology like steamboats and Congreve rockets forced China to open trade with the West on Western terms.^[2]

The Second Opium War also known as the Arrow War, in 1856-60 saw a joint Anglo-French military mission including Great Britain and the French Empire win an easy victory. The agreements of the Convention of Peking led to the ceding of Kowloon Peninsula as part of Hong Kong.^[3]

French political cartoon from 1898 depicts helpless China being carved up and divided among the great powers: Britain, Germany, Russia, France and Japan.

Unequal treaties

Main article: Unequal treaty

A series of "unequal treaties", including the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the treaties of Tianjin (1858), and the Beijing Conventions (1860), forced China to open new treaty ports, including Canton (Guangzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), and Shanghai. The treaties also allowed the British Empire to set up Hong Kong as a Crown colony and established international settlements in the treaty ports under the control of foreign diplomats. China was required to accept diplomats at the capital in Peking, provided for the free movement for foreign ships in Chinese rivers, kept its tariffs low, and opened the interior to Christian missionaries. Manchu leaders of the Qing government found the treaties useful, because they forced the foreigners into a few limited areas, so that the vast majority of Chinese had no contact whatsoever with them or their dangerous ideas. The missionaries, however, ventured more widely but they were widely distrusted and made very few converts. Their main impact was setting up schools and hospitals.^[4] Since the 1920s, the "unequal treaties" have been a centerpiece of angry Chinese grievances against the West in general.^[5]

Suzerain and tributaries

See also: List of tributaries of Imperial China

For centuries China had claimed suzerain authority over numerous adjacent areas. The areas had internal autonomy but were forced to give tribute to China while being theoretically under the protection of China in terms of foreign affairs. By the 19th century the relationships were nominal, and China exerted little or no actual control.^[6] The great powers did not recognize China's fiefdom and one by one seized the supposed suzerain areas. Japan moved to dominate the Korean Empire (and annexed it in 1910)^[7] and seized the Ryukyus;^[8] France took Vietnam;^[9] Britain took Burma^[10] and Nepal; Russia took parts of Siberia. Only Tibet was left, and that was highly problematic since the Tibetans, as most of the supposed suzerainty, had never accepted Chinese claims of lordship and tribute.^[11] The losses humiliated China and marked it as a repeated failure.

Christian missionaries

Further information: Christianity in China and Jesuit China missions

Catholic missions began with the Jesuit China missions from France and Italy in the 16th century. For a while were highly successful in placing intellectuals and scientists in the royal court. The Pope, however, prohibited the priests from making accommodations to Confucianism or paganism. The Jesuits left, but returned in 1842. Converts were from the lower social strata, and numbered about 240,000 in 1840 and 720,000 in 1901. The Jesuits opened Aurora University in Shanghai in 1903 to reach an elite audience.^[12] German missionaries arrived in the late 19th century, and Americans arrived in force in the 1920s, largely to replace the French.^[13]

Beginning in Protestant missionaries started to come, to include thousands of men, their wives and children, and unmarried female missionaries. These were not individual operations, they were sponsored and financed by organized churches in their home country. The 19th century is one of steady geographical expansion, which was reluctantly allowed by the Chinese government every time it lost a war. At first they were limited to the Canton area. In the 1842 treaty ending the First Opium War missionaries were granted the right to live and work in five coastal cities. In 1860, the treaties ending the Second Opium War opened up the entire country to missionary activity. Protestant missionary activity exploded during the next few decades. From 50 missionaries in China in 1860, the number grew to 2,500 (counting wives and children) in 1900. 1,400 of the missionaries were British, 1,000 were Americans, and 100 were from Continental Europe, mostly Scandinavia.^[14] Protestant missionary activity peaked in the 1920s and thereafter declined due to war and unrest in China, As well as a sense of frustration among the missionaries themselves. By 1953, all Protestant missionaries had been expelled by the communist government of China.^[15]

In long-term perspective, the major impact of the missions was not the thousands of converts out of million of people, but introducing modern medical standards, and especially building schools for the few families eager to learn about the outside world.^[16] The hospitals not only cured sick people, they taught hygiene and care of children.^[17] They lessened the hostility of Chinese officials.^[18][19] The key leader of the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen spent four-year in exile in Hawaii, where he studied in Christian schools and eventually converted.^[20]

When missionaries returned home they typically preached a highly favorable view toward China, and a negative view toward Japan, helping promote public opinion in the West that increasingly supported China. At the local level across China, for the vast majority of the population, missionaries were the only foreigners they ever saw. Outside the protected international centers, they came under frequent verbal attack, and sometimes violent episodes. This led the international community to threaten military action to protect missionaries, as their diplomats demanded the government provide more and more protection. Attacks reached a crescendo during the Boxer Rebellion, which had a major anti-missionary component. The Boxers killed over 200 foreign missionaries and thousands of Chinese Christians. Dr. Eleanor Chesnut was killed by a mob in 1905.^[21] Likewise nationalist movements in the 1920s and 1930s also had an anti-missionary component.^[22]

Sino-French War (1884–1885)

First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)

Main article: First Sino-Japanese War

A weakened China lost wars with Japan and gave up nominal control over the Ryukyu Islands in 1870 to Japan. After the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894 it lost Formosa to Japan. After the Sino-French War of 1884–1885, France took control of Vietnam, another supposed "tributary state." After Britain took over Burma, as a show of good faith they maintained the sending of tribute to China, putting themselves in a lower status than in their previous relations.^[23] To affirm this, Britain agreed in the Burma convention in 1886 to continue the Burmese payments to China every 10 years, in return for which China would recognise Britain's occupation of Upper Burma.^[24]

Chinese generals in Pyongyang surrender to the Japanese, October 1894.

Japan after 1860 modernized its military after Western models and was far stronger than China. The war, fought in 1894 and 1895, was fought to resolve the issue of control over Korea, which was yet another suzerain claimed by China and under the rule of the Joseon Dynasty. A peasant rebellion led to a request by the Korean government for China to send in troops to stabilize the country. The Empire of Japan responded by sending its own force to Korea and installing a puppet government in Seoul. China objected and war ensued. It was a brief affair, with Japanese ground troops routing Chinese forces on the Liaodong Peninsula and nearly destroying the Chinese navy in the Battle of the Yalu River.^[25]

Treaty of Shimonoseki

China, badly defeated, sued for peace and was forced to accept the harsh Treaty of Shimonoseki Signed on April 17, 1895.^[26] China became responsible for a financial indemnity of £30 million. It had to surrender To Japan the island of Taiwan and the Pescatore Islands. Japan received most favored nation status, like all the other powers/ Korea became nominally independent, although the Empire of Japan and the Russian Empire were vying for control. The most controversial provision ceded the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. However this was not acceptable. Russia, taking the self-appointed mantle of protector of China, worked with Germany and France to intervene and forced Japan to withdraw from Liaodong Peninsula.^[27] To pay the indemnities, British French and Russian banks loaned China the money, but they also gained other advantages. Russia in 1896 was given permission to extend its Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria to reach Vladivostok, a 350-mile shortcut. The new Chinese Eastern Railway, was controlled by the Russians, and became a major military factor for them In controlling key parts of Manchuria. Later in 1896 Russia and China made a secret alliance, whereby Russia would work to prevent further Japanese expansion at China's expense. In 1898 Russia obtained a 25-year lease over the Liadong Peninsula in southern Manchuria, including the ice free harbor of Port Arthur, their only such facility in the East. An extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur greatly expanded Russian military capabilities in the Far East.^[28]

British cartoon shows the victory of "little" Japan over "large" China. in 1894.

Reforms in 1890s

One of the government's main source of income was a five percent tariff on imports. The government hired Robert Hart (1835–1911), a British diplomat to run it from 1863. He set up an efficient system based in Canton that was largely free of corruption, and expanded it to other ports. The top echelon of the service was recruited from all the nations trading with China. Hart promoted numerous modernising programs.^[29] His agency established a modern postal service and supervision of internal taxes on trade. Hart helped establish its own embassies in foreign countries. He helped set up the Tongwen Guan (School of Combined Learning) in Peking, with a branch in Canton, to teach foreign languages, culture and science. In 1902 the Tongwen Guan was absorbed into the Imperial University, now Peking University.^[30][31]

Hundred Days Reform fails in 1898

The Hundred Days Reform was a failed 103-day national, cultural, political, and educational reform movement from 11 June to 22 September 1898. It was undertaken by the young Guangxu Emperor and his reform-minded supporters. Following the issuing of over 100 reformative edicts, a coup d'état ("The Coup of 1898", Wuxu Coup) was perpetrated by powerful conservative opponents led by Empress Dowager Cixi. The Emperor was locked up until his death and key reformers were exiled or fled.^[32][33]

Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908) was in control of imperial policy after 1861; she had remarkable political skills but historians blame her for major policy failures and the growing weakness of China. Her reversal of reforms in 1898 and especially support for the Boxers caused all the powers to join against her. Late Qing China remains a symbol of national humiliation and weakness in Chinese and international historiography. Scholars attribute Cixi's "rule behind the curtains" responsible for the ultimate decline of the Qing dynasty and its capitulatory peace with foreign powers. Her failures hastened the revolution to overthrow the dynasty.^[34]

Boxer rebellion

Main article: Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion (1897–1901) was an anti-foreigner movement by the Righteous Harmony Society in China between 1897 and 1901. They attacked and often killed missionaries, Christian converts, and foreigners. They held the international diplomats in Peking under siege. The ruler of China, the Dowager Empress Cixi, supported the Boxers and the Chinese government paid the penalty. The uprising was crushed by the ad hoc Eight Nation Alliance of major powers.^[35][36] On top of all the damage and pillage, China was forced to pay annual installments of an indemnity of $333 million American dollars to all the victors—actual total payments amounted to about $250 million.^[37] Robert Hart, the inspector general of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, was the chief negotiator for the peace terms. The indemnity, despite some beneficial programs, was "nothing but bad" for China, as Hart had predicted at the beginning of the negotiations.^[38]

Manchuria

See also: Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchuria Railway

Manchuria was a contested zone with Russia and Japan taking control away from China and in the process going to war themselves in 1904–1905.^[39]

Republican China

Main article: Republic of China (1912–1949)

The Republican Revolution of 1911 overthrew the imperial court and brought an era of confused politics. Yuan Shikai became president in 1912 and, with support from regional war lords, tried to be a dictator. He showed little interest in foreign affairs apart from obtaining loans from Europe. When he suddenly died in 1916 the national government was left in chaos.^[40]

When World War I broke out in 1914, China officially entered the war and played a small role. Japan seized the German possessions in China. In January 1915 Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands. The goal was to greatly extend Japanese control of Manchuria and of the Chinese economy.^[41][42] The Chinese public responded with a spontaneous nationwide boycott of Japanese goods; Japan's exports to China fell by 40%. Britain was officially a military ally of Japan but was affronted and no longer trusted Japan. With the British tied down on the Western Front against Germany, Japan's position was strong. Nevertheless, Britain and the United States forced Japan to drop the fifth set of demands that would have given Japan a large measure of control over the entire Chinese economy and ended the Open Door Policy. Japan and China reached a series of agreements which ratified the first four sets of goals on 25 May 1915. Japan gained a little at the expense of China, but Britain refused to renew the alliance and American opinion turned hostile. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 resulted in the Versailles Treaty that allowed Japan to retain territories in Shandong that had been surrendered by Germany in 1914. Chinese students launched the May Fourth Movement in 1919, inspiring a nationwide nationalistic hostility against Japan and the other foreign powers.^[43]

After 1916 almost all of China was in the hands of regional warlords. Until 1929 the Nationalist government was a small rump establishment based in Beijing, with little or no control over most of China. However it did control foreign affairs, and was recognized by foreign countries. It receive the customs revenue; the money was largely used to pay off old debts, such as the indemnities for the Boxer Rebellion. It managed to negotiate an increase in the customs revenue, and represented China in international affairs such as the Paris peace conference. It tried with limited success to renegotiate the unequal treaties. Britain and the other powers continue to control Shanghai and the other port cities until the late 1920s.^[44][45]

In 1931, Japan seized control of Manchuria over the objections of the League of Nations. Japan quit the League, which was helpless.^[46] The most active Chinese diplomat was Wellington Koo.^[47]

In 1938, Chiang Kai-Shek's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a "Map of National Shame" which listed Mongolia, parts of Siberia, and Indochina as "lost territories."^[48]: 138

German role

Further information: China-Nazi Germany relations

The German military had a major role in Republican China.^[49] The Imperial German Navy was in charge of Germany's Jiaozhou Bay Leased Territory, and spent heavily to set up modern facilities that would be a showcase for Asia. Japan seized the German operations in 1914 after sharp battles. After World War I, the Weimar Republic provided extensive advisory services to the Republic of China, especially training for the Chinese army. Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, the former commander the German army, organized the training of China's elite National Revolutionary Army units and the fight against communists in 1933–1935.^[50] All military academies had German officers, as did most army units. In addition, German engineers provided expertise and bankers provided loans for China's railroad system. Trade with Germany flourished in the 1920s, with Germany as China's largest supplier of government credit. The last major advisor left in 1938, after Nazi Germany had allied itself with Japan, the great enemy of the Republic of China. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-Shek continued to hope to use Germany as a model for his nation, as his mentor Sun Yat-sen had recommended.^[51][52]

War with Japan: 1937–1945

Main article: Second Sino-Japanese War

Japan invaded in 1937, launching the Second Sino-Japanese War. By 1938, the United States was a strong supporter of China. Michael Schaller says that during 1938:

China emerged as something of a symbol of American-sponsored resistance to Japanese aggression.... A new policy appeared, one predicated on the maintenance of a pro-American China which might be a bulwark against Japan. The United States hoped to use China as the weapon with which to contain Tokyo's larger imperialism. Economic assistance, Washington hoped, could achieve this result.^[53]

Chiang Kai-shek with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Cairo Conference in 1943

Even the isolationists who opposed war in Europe supported a hard-line against Japan. American public sympathy for the Chinese, and hatred of Japan, was aroused by reports from missionaries, novelists such as Pearl Buck, and Time Magazine of Japanese brutality in China, including reports surrounding the Nanjing Massacre, called the 'Rape of Nanking'. By early 1941, the U.S. was preparing to send American planes flown by American pilots under American command, but wearing Chinese uniforms, to fight the Japanese invaders and even to bomb Japanese cities. There were delays and the "Flying Tigers" under Claire Lee Chennault finally became operational days after the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) brought the U.S. into the war officially. The Flying Tigers were soon incorporated into the United States Army Air Force, which made operations in China a high priority, and generated enormous favorable publicity for the China in the U.S.^[54]

After Japan took Southeast Asia, American aid had to be routed through British India and over the Himalayan Mountains at enormous expense and frustrating delay. Chiang's beleaguered government was now headquartered in remote Chongqing. Roosevelt sent Joseph Stilwell to train Chinese troops and coordinate military strategy. He became the Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, served as U.S. commander in the China Burma India Theater, was responsible for all Lend-Lease supplies going to China, and was later Deputy Commander of South East Asia Command. Despite his status and position in China, he became involved in conflicts with other senior Allied officers, over the distribution of Lend-Lease materiel, Chinese political sectarianism and proposals to incorporate Chinese and U.S. forces in the 11th Army Group (which was under British command).^[55] Madame Chiang Kaishek, who had been educated in the U.S., addressed the U.S. Congress and toured the country to rally support for China.^[56] Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act and Roosevelt moved to end the unequal treaties. Chiang and Mme. Chiang met with Roosevelt and Churchill at the Cairo Conference of late 1943, but promises of major increases in aid did not materialize.^[57]

The perception grew that Chiang's government, with poorly equipped and ill-fed troops was unable to effectively fight the Japanese or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China Hands advising Stilwell argued that it was in American interest to establish communication with the Communists to prepare for a land-based counteroffensive invasion of Japan. The Dixie Mission, which began in 1943, was the first official American contact with the Communists. Other Americans, led by Chennault, argued for air power. In 1944, Generalissimo Chiang acceded to Roosevelt's request that an American general take charge of all forces in the area, but demanded that Stilwell be recalled. General Albert Coady Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell, Patrick J. Hurley became ambassador, and Chinese-American relations became much smoother. The U.S. had included China in top-level diplomacy in the hope that large masses of Chinese troops would defeat Japan with minimal American casualties. When that hope was seen as illusory, and it was clear that B-29 bombers could not operate effectively from China, China became much less important to Washington, but it was promised a seat in the new UN Security Council, with a veto.^[58]

Civil War

Main articles: Chinese Civil War and Cross-Strait relations

When civil war threatened, President Harry S. Truman sent General George Marshall to China at the end of 1945 to broker a compromise between the Nationalist government and the Communists, who had established control in much of northern China. Marshall hoped for a coalition government, and brought the two distrustful sides together. At home, many Americans saw China as a bulwark against the spread of communism, but some Americans hoped that the Communists would remain on friendly terms with the United States.^[59] Mao Zedong had long admired the U.S.—George Washington was a hero to him—and saw it as an ally in the Second World War. He was bitterly disappointed when the U.S. would not abandon the Nationalists, writing that "the imperialists who had always been hostile to the Chinese people will not change overnight to treat us on an equal level." His official policy was "wiping out the control of the imperialists in China completely."^[60] Truman and Marshall, while supplying military aid and advice, determined that American intervention could not save the Nationalist cause. One recent scholar argues that the Communists won the Civil War because Mao Zedong made fewer military mistakes and Chiang Kai-shek antagonized key interest groups. Furthermore, his armies had been weakened in the war against Japanese. Meanwhile, the Communists promised to improve the ways of life for groups such as farmers.^[61]

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's policy was opportunistic and utilitarian. He offered official Soviet support only when the People's Liberation Army had virtually won the Civil War. Sergey Radchenko argues that "all the talk of proletarian internationalism in the Sino-Soviet alliance was but a cloak for Soviet expansionist ambitions in East Asia".^[62]

People's Republic of China

See also: List of wars involving the People's Republic of China

Countries of the world indicating decade diplomatic relations commenced with the People's Republic of China: 1949/1950s (dark red), 1960s (red), 1970s (orange), 1980s (beige), 1990s/2000s (yellow) and 2010s/2020s (green). Countries not recognized by or not recognizing the PRC are in grey.

International recognition

See also: Dates of establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China

Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has worked vigorously to win international recognition and support for its position that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, including Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, (Taiwan), the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and islands in the South China Sea.

The early PRC operated under the principle of "cleaning the house before inviting guests," meaning that it would seek to "clean up" colonial influences before it sought recognition from states that it deemed as Western imperialists.^[63]: 51

Upon its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China was recognized by Eastern Bloc countries. On 4 January 1950, Pakistan became the first Muslim country to recognize China.^[64] Among the first Western countries to recognize China were the United Kingdom (6 January 1950), Switzerland (17 January 1950^[65]) and Sweden (14 February 1950^[66]). The first Western country to establish diplomatic ties with China was Sweden (on 9 May 1950).^[67] Until the early 1970s, the Republic of China government in Taipei was recognized diplomatically by most world powers and held China's permanent seat in the UN Security Council, including its associated veto power. After the Beijing government assumed the China seat in 1971 (and the ROC government was expelled), the great majority of nations have switched diplomatic relations from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, following the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the U.S. did so in 1979. In 2011, the number of countries that had established diplomatic relations with Beijing had risen to 171, while 23 maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (or Taiwan).^[68] (See also: Political status of Taiwan).

People's diplomacy

Soon after its founding, the People's Republic of China institutionalized its view of people's diplomacy (renmin waijiao).^{[69]: 8–9} People's diplomacy was expressed through the slogan, "influence the policy through the people."^[69]: 9 Pursuant to its people's diplomacy, China sent doctors, scientists, and athletes to developing countries in Asia to cultivate ties.^[69]: 9 This form of people's diplomacy was often executed through the communist party's International Liaison Department.^[69]: 9 People's diplomacy with the capitalist countries sought to cultivate informal, non-state ties in the hope of developing "foreign friends" who would lobby their governments to improve relations with China.^[69]: 9

Mao-era foreign policies

During the Mao era, China's foreign relations were rooted in Chinese leadership's perceptions of the international socialist movement's purpose.^[70]: 21 In their view, the primary concern of worldwide revolutionary activities should be anti-imperialism, and the economic development brought by socialism would result in a shift in the global balance of power.^[70]: 21

Articles 54 and 56 of the Common Program stated that China's foreign relations would be based on respect for mutual sovereignty.^[71]: 469

The terminology of "the Cold War" was not prominent in Chinese discourse during the Mao era.^[70]: 20 From the dominant Chinese view, the conflict between capitalism and socialism that existed from the late 1940s into the 1970s had not gone "cold."^{[70]: 20–21}

In the 1947-1962 era, Mao emphasized the desire for international partnerships, on the one hand to more rapidly develop the economy, and on the other to protect against attacks, especially by the U.S. His numerous alliances, however, all fell apart, including the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Albania. He was unable to organize an anti-American coalition. Furthermore, Mao was insensitive to the fears of alliance partners that China was so big, and so inwardly directed, that their needs would be ignored.^[72]

During the Mao era, China's foreign policy bureaucracy was small.^[48]: 175 Strategic decisions and security issues were handled in a top-down style.^[48]: 175 With Mao in overall control and making final decisions, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai handled foreign-policy and developed a strong reputation for his diplomatic and negotiating skills.^[73] Zhou stressed discipline in the diplomatic corps, maintaining that "there is no small matter in diplomacy." Despite his diplomatic skills, Zhou's bargaining position was undercut by the domestic turmoil initiated by Mao.^{[48]: 174–175}

The 1954 Geneva Conference, which sought to resolve issues from the Korean War and the Indochina War, was the PRC's first significant involvement in an international diplomatic event.^[74]: 185

The Bandung Conference in 1955, at which Zhou led the Chinese delegation, was an important milestone for China's foreign relations.^[75]: 80 China developed its foreign relations with many newly independent and soon-to-be independent countries.^[75]: 80 China termed this cooperative approach the "Bandung Line."^[76]: 25 This was the beginning of China's official discourse of South-South cooperation.^[77]: 74 China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were incorporated into the Ten Principles of Bandung.^[75]: 80

After the Sino-Soviet split, Moscow and Beijing sometimes sponsored rival Communist parties around the world, which expended energy fighting each other. China announced its Three Worlds Theory at the United Nations in 1974.^[77]: 74 China's focus on the Third World portrayed as the legitimate leader of the global battle against imperialism and capitalism.^[78][79] It urged Third World countries not to side with either the United States or the Soviet Union, viewing both of those count as coveting hegemony over the Third World.^[70]: 21 Mao described Africa and Latin America as the "First Intermediate Zone," in which China's status as a non-white power might enable it to compete with and supersede both United States and Soviet Union influence.^[80]: 48

Soviet Union and Korean War

Main articles: Korean War, Sino–Soviet relations, China–North Korea relations, and Cold War

After its founding, the PRC's foreign policy initially focused on its solidarity with the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc nations, and other communist countries, sealed with, among other agreements, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in 1950 to oppose China's chief antagonists, the West and in particular the U.S. The 1950–53 Korean War waged by China and its North Korea ally against the U.S., South Korea, and United Nations (UN) forces has long been a reason for bitter feelings. After the conclusion of the Korean War, China sought to balance its identification as a member of the Soviet bloc by establishing friendly relations with Pakistan and other Third World countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.^[81]

China's entry into the Korean War was the first of many "preemptive counterattacks". Chinese leaders decided to intervene when they saw their North Korean ally being overwhelmed and no guarantee American forces would stop at the Yalu River.^[82]

Break with Moscow

Main article: Sino-Soviet split

By the late 1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become so divisive that in 1960, the Soviets unilaterally withdrew their advisers from China. The two then began to vie for allegiances among the developing world, for China saw itself as a natural champion through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement and its numerous bilateral and bi-party ties. In the 1960s, Beijing competed with Moscow for political influence among communist parties and in the developing world generally. In 1962, China had a brief war with India over a border dispute. By 1969, relations with Moscow were so tense that fighting erupted along their common border. Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and clashes in 1969 on the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese competition with the Soviet Union increasingly reflected concern over China's own strategic position. China then lessened its anti-Western rhetoric and began developing formal diplomatic relations with West European nations.^[83]

In a March 22, 1969 meeting on the Sino-Soviet border clashes, Mao stated that in foreign relations, China was "now isolated" and "we need to relax a little".^[84]: 287 Later that year, China began to restore its embassies, which had been disrupted by the Cultural Revolution, to normal functioning.^[84]: 287

1970s and 1980s

In October 1971, the United Nations expelled the Republic of China and admitted the People's Republic of China as the government of China.^[85] Between 1971 and 1972, twenty-five countries began diplomatic recognition of the PRC.^[86]: 165

A visit by Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to Beijing culminated in the signing of a joint statement on September 29, 1972, and normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC.^[48]: 48 Japan stated that it was aware of its responsibility for causing enormous damage to the Chinese people during World War II and China renounced its demand for war reparation from Japan.^[48]: 48 Avoiding political disputes over this traumatic history facilitated immediate strategic cooperation.^[48]: 48 The Japanese agreed with the Chinese view on the political status of Taiwan, namely "that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."^[48]: 48

In the 1970s and 1980s, China sought to create a secure regional and global environment for itself and foster good relations with countries that could aid its economic development. During the time of Mao, China was a closed country. After his death, authorities led by Deng Xiaoping began initiating reforms. Along with Deng's policy of reform and opening up, Deng involved more parties in foreign policy decision-making, decentralizing the foreign policy bureaucracy.^{[48]: 175–176} Deng's approach attempted to build broad consensus and required enormous efforts to achieve compromises acceptable to all relevant stakeholders on an issue.^{[48]: 175–176} This decentralized approach led to consideration of a great number of interests and views, but also fragmentation of policy institutions and extensive bargaining between different bureaucratic units during the policy-making process.^[48]: 176

In 1983, 74-year-old Li Xiannian became President of China, nominal head of state of China under Deng Xiaoping and one of the longest serving politicians in the leadership of China. He visited many countries and thus began opening China to the world. In 1985, Li Xiannian was the first president of China to visit the U.S. President Li also visited North Korea. 1986 saw the arrival of Queen Elizabeth II in an official visit.^[87] To this end, China looked to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.

China maintained its consistent opposition to "superpower hegemonism", focusing almost exclusively on the expansionist actions of the Soviet Union and Soviet proxies such as Vietnam and Cuba, but it also placed growing emphasis on a foreign policy independent of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While improving ties with the West, China continued to closely follow the political and economic positions of the Third World Non-Aligned Movement, although China was not a formal member.

China grew concerned about the strong Soviet influence in Vietnam, fearing that Vietnam could become a pseudo-protectorate of the Soviet Union.^[48]: 55 Vietnam's claim to be the world's third largest military power following its victory in the Vietnam War also increased Chinese apprehensions.^[48]: 55 In the Chinese view, Vietnam was pursuing a regional hegemonic policy in an attempt to control Indochina.^[48]: 55 On 25 December 1978, Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea, overrunning most of the country, deposing the Khmer Rouge regime favored by China, and installing Heng Samrin as the head of the new Cambodian government.^{[48]: 55–56} The move antagonized China, which now viewed the Soviet Union as capable of encircling its southern border.^[48]: 56 China launched an invasion of Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese war. On Match 6, 1979, China declared that its punitive mission had been achieved and withdrew.

Chinese anxiety about Soviet strategic advances was heightened following the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Sharp differences between China and the Soviet Union persisted over Soviet support for Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia—the so-called "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.^[88][89]

Since the 1980s, China's foreign policy has been peace-seeking with a focus on optimizing mutual economic interests between states.^[90]: 45 It has generally sought to maintain good relationships with countries that may be opposed to each other, for example in its cultivation of relationships with both Israel and the Arab states.^[91] During the 1980s, Deng began formulating a good neighboring policy to capitalize on regional activism.^[48]: 66 Under this policy, China no longer considered a neighboring country's ideological tendencies as a critical factor in foreign policy, and instead focused on developing international relationships with its neighbors regardless of their respective ties to the United States or the Soviet Union.^{[48]: 66–67} Thus, in 1988, China signed an agreement with Mongolia regarding borders, despite the fact that China's government had long viewed neighboring Mongolia as a Soviet satellite.^[48]: 67

1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre

Main articles: 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre and Reactions to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre

In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, various countries imposed sanctions, cancelled aid, banned sales of military equipment, or cut back diplomatic ties.^{[48]: 62 [92]} In response to these efforts to isolate China, Deng articulated the "twenty-four character guidelines" for China to adopt in its international affairs: observe carefully (冷静观察), secure China's positions (稳住阵脚), calmly cope with the challenges (沉着应付), hide China's capacities and bide its time (韬光养晦), be good at maintaining a low profile (善于守拙), and never claim leadership (绝不当头).^[48]: 62 China's approach focused on learning to live with the fact of United States hegemony.^[48]: 62

Although the crackdown hurt relations with Western countries, it had relatively little impact on China's relations with its Asian neighbors.^[48]: 67 Most of these neighboring countries did not have better human rights records than China and were generally sympathetic to China in light of the pressure it received from Western countries.^[48]: 67 Even in the wake of the crackdown, China's foreign relations with its neighbors generally improved.^[48]: 67

1990s

In the 1990s, China adopted conservative negotiating tactics in its territorial disputes, deemphasizing the use of confrontation and instead relying on legal agreements and diplomatic measures.^[48]: 67

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, China also opened diplomatic relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union.^[93] In the post-Cold War environment, President Jiang Zemin continued Deng's good neighboring policy, under the principles of stabilizing the periphery, expanding diplomacy, and altering the situation.^[48]: 66 China had considered the Soviet Union its principal security threat, and its dissolution reduced the importance of security considerations in China's perceptions of South and Central Asian geo-politics.^[94] China began rebuilding relations with its Central Asian countries, with their economic ties growing during the 1990s and subsequently.^{[48]: 172–175}

Beginning in 1992, China began to balance its relationships with North and South Korea.^[48]: 69 It normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992 while continuing its strategic relationship with North Korea.^[48]: 69

To combat the threat of militant Islam-fueled separatism in Xinjiang and to cement relations with the Central Asian states following the Soviet Union's dissolution, China signed the 1996 Treaty of Enhancing Military Mutual Trust in the Border Areas with nearby Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan at a meeting in Shanghai.^[48]: 70 The group of nations began meeting in 1997 as the "Shanghai Five" (and continuing into the 2000s as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation).

China increased its reputation among its neighbors during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.^[48]: 68 Other Asian countries harshly affected by the crisis sought the United States or Japan to bail them out of the difficult economic conditions.^[48]: 68 As the United States and Japan moved slowly, China made a highly regarded symbolic gesture by refusing to devalue its own currency (which presumably would have touched off a series of competitive devaluations with serious consequences for the region).^[48]: 68 Instead, China contributed $4 billion to neighboring countries via a combination of bilateral bailouts and contributing to IMF bailout packages.^[48]: 68 In 1999, as a result of these actions, the World Bank described China as a "source of stability for the region" in one of its reports.^[48]: 68

Beginning in the late 1990s, China began to articulate its new security concept: that no single state, even the most powerful, is capable of coping with all security challenges alone.^[48]: 71

Relations with the United States in the 1990s

The 1990s presented several challenges in China-United States relations, although there were positive developments for China including the United States' de-linking of China's most favored nation status from its human rights record. In July 1993, the Yinhe incident prompted Jiang's adoption of the "sixteen-characters formula" for working with the United States: "enhancing confidence, reducing troubles, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation."^[48]: 63 During the Yinhe incident, the United States Navy stopped a Chinese container ship, the Yinhe, based on incorrect suspicions that the ship contained chemical weapon precursors bound for Iran.^[48]: 63 Although China denied the allegation, the United States unilaterally cut off the Yinhe's GPS, causing it to lose direction and forcing it to anchor on the high seas for twenty-four days.^[48]: 63 The Yinhe ultimately agreed to an inspection which found no chemical weapon precursors.^[48]: 63 Despite China's request for a formal apology, the United States refused to apologize and refused to pay compensation.^[48]: 63 Despite the humiliation of the Yinhe incident, Jiang adopted a posture of diplomatic good will to the United States, including the sixteen-characters formula.^[48]: 63

Tensions also followed the United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999,^{[48]: 63–64} which the United States claimed occurred by mistake. The bombing created outrage among Chinese people, who did not accept the United States claim that the bombing was accidental.^{[48]: 63–64} For several days, Beijing was rocked by massive anti-US demonstrations. Deeming the importance of the bilateral relationship too great to be harmed by the embassy bombing, President Jiang sought to calm the Chinese public outrage.^{[48]: 63–64}

21st century

Since its founding in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is the primary multi-lateral coordination mechanism between China and the African states.^[95]: 56 Chinese foreign aid is a significant area of interaction within FOCAC.^[95]: 84 Through FOCAC, China provides aid in the forms of debt forgiveness, aid grants, concessional loans, and interest-free loans.^[95]: 84

In 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan began regular meetings under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.^[48]: 70 China takes a leadership role in the organization, which focuses on defeating the "three evils" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism.^[48]: 70

China was active in the Six-Party talks in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s.^[48]: 71 China hoped to play a lead role in developing the Six-Party Talks into a lasting multilateral security mechanism for northeast Asia, but ultimately the talks failed.^[48]: 75 China's efforts in the unsuccessful tasks nonetheless raised its international standing.^{[48]: 73–74}

Founded in 2004, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) serves as the major multi-lateral cooperation mechanism between China and the Arab League states.^[95]

In 2008, China revised its policies towards pariah states, articulating a new view that it was willing to condition its diplomatic protection of pariah countries, forcing them to become more acceptable to the international community.^[48]: 76

Under Xi Jinping Administration, China has adopted a new foreign policy doctrine called "Major Country Diplomacy" (Chinese: 大国外交) which has replaced the earlier Deng Xiaoping era slogan of "keep a low profile" (Chinese: 韬光养晦) and has legitimized a more active role for China on the world stage, particularly with regards to reform of the international order, engaging in open ideological competition with the West, and assuming a greater responsibility for global affairs in accordance with China's rising power and status.^[96] During the first five years of Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping’s leadership the budget for diplomacy doubled.^[97]

The aggressive style of Chinese diplomacy which emerged in the 21st century has been termed “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy."^[98][99] The phrase is derived from the patriotic Chinese movie Wolf Warrior and its sequel Wolf Warrior 2, the film's tagline was "Even though a thousand miles away, anyone who affronts China will pay."^[100] Efforts aimed at incorporating Chinese diaspora into China's foreign policy have also intensified with an emphasis placed on ethnic loyalty over national loyalty.^[101]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi kept an extensive schedule of phone and video foreign meetings as part of his "cloud diplomacy" (云外交), which received prominent attention in Chinese media, similar to in-person foreign visits.^[48]: 15

China has been criticized for its aggressive diplomatic response to the COVID-19 outbreak^[102][103] which included spreading misinformation about how other countries were handling the outbreak.^[104]

Social media

Engagement on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter has become an integral component of Chinese diplomacy.^[105] From April 2019 to April 2020 the output of Chinese diplomat's Twitter accounts increased fourfold.^[106]

See also

• China portal

• International relations (1814–1919)
  • Diplomatic history of World War I
  • International relations (1919–1939)
  • Diplomatic history of World War II
  • Cold War
• China–United States relations
• History of Sino-Russian relations
• Ten Major Relationships, Mao's policy speech of 1956
• Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China
  • Foreign relations of Imperial China
  • Foreign relations of Hong Kong
  • Foreign relations of Macao
  • Foreign relations of Taiwan

Notes

1. John King Fairbank, "China's Response to the West: Problems and Suggestions." Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale. Journal of World History. Cuadernos de Historia Mundial 3.2 (1956): 381.
2. Brian Catchpole, A map history of modern China (1976), pp 21-23.
3. John Yue-wo Wong, Deadly dreams: Opium and the Arrow war (1856-1860) in China (Cambridge UP, 2002).
4. Ssu-yü Teng and John King Fairbank, China's response to the West: a documentary survey, 1839-1923(1979) pp 35-37, 134-35.
5. Dong Wang, "The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China," Pacific Affairs (2003) 76#3 pp 399-425.
6. Amanda J. Cheney, "Tibet Lost in Translation: Sovereignty, Suzerainty and International Order Transformation, 1904–1906." Journal of Contemporary China 26.107 (2017): 769-783.
7. Andre Schmid, "Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article." Journal of Asian Studies 59.4 (2000): 951-976. online^{[dead link‍]}
8. Ying-Kit Chan, "Diplomacy and the Appointment of officials in Late Qing China: He Ruzhang and Japan’s Annexation Of Ryukyu." Chinese Historical Review 26.1 (2019): 20-36.
9. Robert Lee, France and the exploitation of China, 1885-1901 (1989).
10. Anthony Webster, "Business and empire: A reassessment of the British conquest of Burma in 1885." Historical Journal 43.4 (2000): 1003-1025.
11. Wendy Palace (2012). British Empire and Tibet 1900-1922. Routledge. p. 257. ISBN 9781134278633.
12. Jean-Paul Wiest, "Bringing Christ to the nations: shifting models of mission among Jesuits in China." The Catholic historical review 83.4 (1997): 654-681.
13. John Harney, "Enshrining the Mission: The Bishop Sheehan Memorial Museum and Vincentian Visions of China." American Catholic Studies (2015): 45-69. Online Archived 2019-08-28 at the Wayback Machine
14. Larry Clinton Thompson, William Scott Ament and the Boxer Rebellion: Heroism, Hubris, and the Ideal Missionary (2009), p. 14; Jane Hunter, The Gospel of Gentility (1984), p. 6
15. Nicolas Standaert, "New trends in the historiography of Christianity in China." Catholic Historical Review 83.4 (1997): 573-613.
16. Miwa Hirono, Civilizing missions: International religious agencies in China (Springer, 2008).
17. Michelle Renshaw, "'Family-Centred Care' in American Hospitals in Late-Qing China." Clio Medica 86.1 (2010).
18. Xu Guangqiu, "The Impact of Medical Missionaries on Chinese Officials: Dr. Peter Parker and the Canton Hospital, 1835-1855" Journal of Presbyterian History (2019) 97#1 pp 16-28.
19. Hu Cheng, "The Modernization of Japanese and Chinese Medicine (1914-1931)." Chinese Studies in History 47.4 (2014): 78-94.
20. Irma Tam Soong, "Christianity and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's schooling in Hawai'i, 1879-83." Chinese America: History and Perspectives (2010) pp. 75-86.
21. Guangqiu Xu (2017). American Doctors in Canton: Modernization in China, 1835-1935. Taylor & Francis. p. 32. ISBN 9781351532778.
22. Lin Su (2017). China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy. Routledge. p. 49. ISBN 9781351952095.
23. Alfred Stead (1901). China and her mysteries. LONDON: Hood, Douglas, & Howard. p. 100. Archived from the original on 6 June 2017. Retrieved 19 February 2011. burma was a tributary state of china british forward tribute peking.(Original from the University of California)
24. William Woodville Rockhill (1905). China's intercourse with Korea from the XVth century to 1895. LONDON: Luzac & Co. p. 5. Archived from the original on 9 May 2016. Retrieved 19 February 2011. tribute china.(Colonial period Korea; WWC-5)(Original from the University of California)
25. Perry, John Curtis (1964). "The Battle off the Tayang, 17 September 1894". The Mariner's Mirror. 50 (4): 243–259. doi:10.1080/00253359.1964.10657787.
26. Frank W. Ikle, "The Triple Intervention. Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism." Monumenta Nipponica 22.1/2 (1967): 122-130. online Archived 2019-08-26 at the Wayback Machine
27. Catchpole, A map history of modern China (1976), pp 32-33.
28. Rhoads Murphey, East Asia (1997) p 325.
29. Jung Chang, Empress Dowager Cixi (2013) p. 80
30. Robert Bickers, "Revisiting the Chinese maritime customs service, 1854–1950." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36.2 (2008): 221-226.
31. Henk Vynckier and Chihyun Chang, "'Imperium In Imperio': Robert Hart, the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, and its (Self-)Representations," Biography 37#1 (2014), pp. 69-92 online Archived 2019-08-28 at the Wayback Machine
32. Luke S.K. Kwong, "Chinese politics at the crossroads: Reflections on the Hundred Days Reform of 1898." Modern Asian Studies 34.3 (2000): 663-695.
33. Young-Tsu Wong, "Revisionism Reconsidered: Kang Youwei and the Reform Movement of 1898" Journal of Asian Studies 51#3 (1992), pp. 513-544 online Archived 2019-08-28 at the Wayback Machine
34. Ying-kit Chan, "A Precious Mirror for Governing the Peace: A Primer for Empress Dowager Cixi." Nan Nü 17.2 (2015): 214-244. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/15685268-00172p02
35. Catchpole, A map history of modern China (1976), pp 34-35.
36. Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion : The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900 (2000). Online Archived 2018-12-12 at the Wayback Machine
37. Ji Zhaojin (2016). A History of Modern Shanghai Banking: The Rise and Decline of China's Financial Capitalism. Routledge. p. 75. ISBN 9781317478072.
38. Frank H.H. King, "The Boxer Indemnity—‘Nothing but Bad’." Modern Asian Studies 40.3 (2006): 663-689.
39. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (1985).
40. Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-K'Ai (1962) pp. 147–160, 173–77.
41. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-K'Ai (1962) pp. 185–195.
42. Zhitian Luo. "National humiliation and national assertion: The Chinese response to the twenty-one demands." Modern Asian Studies 27.2 (1993): 297-319.
43. Joseph T. Chen, "The May Fourth Movement Redefined." Modern Asian Studies 4.1 (1970): 63-81 online.
44. Klaus Mühlhahn, Making China Modern (2019) pp 251-252.
45. Robert T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931 (1933) p. 310.
46. Alison Adcock Kaufman, "In Pursuit of Equality and Respect: China’s Diplomacy and the League of Nations." Modern China 40.6 (2014): 605-638 online Archived 2018-11-08 at the Wayback Machine.
47. Stephen G. Craft, V.K. Wellington Koo and the emergence of modern China (University Press of Kentucky, 2015).
48. Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-3088-8. OCLC 1331741429.
49. William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford UP, 1984).
50. Hsi‐Huey Liang, "China, the Sino‐Japanese conflict and the Munich crisis." Diplomacy & Statecraft 10.2-3 (1999): 342-369.
51. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China in the world since 1750 (2012) pp. 133–135.
52. Robyn L. Rodriguez, "Journey to the East: The German Military Mission in China, 1927-1938" (PhD Diss. The Ohio State University, 2011) online
53. Michael Schaller, The US Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (1979) p 17.
54. Martha Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger (2003)
55. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45 (1971), pp. 231–232.
56. Laura Tyson Li, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady (2006).
57. Jonathan Fenby, Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost (2005) pp 408-14, 428-433.
58. Herbert Feis, China Tangle: American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (1953) pp 376-79.
59. Daniel Kurtz-Phelan (2018). The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947. W. W. Norton. pp. 7, 141. ISBN 9780393243086.
60. He Di, "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States" China Quarterly No. 137 (March 1994), pp. 144-158, quotations on page 147. online Archived 2019-08-28 at the Wayback Machine
61. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (2012) p 291
62. Sergey Radchenko, "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Emergence of the Chinese Communist Regime, 1946–1950: New Documents, Old Story." Journal of Cold War Studies 9.4 (2007): 115-124.
63. Meng, Wenting (2024). Developmental Piece: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding. Ibidem. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9783838219073.
64. Hussain, Syed Rifaat (2016). "Sino-Pakistan Ties". The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform. Thomas Fingar. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 118. ISBN 978-0-8047-9764-1. OCLC 939553543.
65. Bilateral relations between Switzerland and China Archived 2014-10-02 at the Wayback Machine (page visited on 19 August 2014).
66. Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Gothenburg. 中国与瑞典的关系. www.fmprc.gov.cn (in Chinese). Gothenburg, Sweden: Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Gothenburg. Archived from the original on 2 March 2009. Retrieved 4 September 2014. 瑞典于1950年1月14日承认新中国
67. Xinhua (2007-06-11). "China-Sweden relations continue to strengthen". China Daily. Archived from the original on 2014-08-19. Retrieved 2014-08-22.
68. "Background Note: China". Bureau of Public Affairs. U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 21 January 2017. Retrieved 10 March 2011.
69. Minami, Kazushi (2024). People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9781501774157.
70. Meyskens, Covell F. (2020). Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108784788. ISBN 978-1-108-78478-8. OCLC 1145096137. S2CID 218936313.
71. Leung, Beatrice; Wang, Marcus J. J. (2016-05-03). "Sino–Vatican Negotiations: problems in sovereign right and national security". Journal of Contemporary China. 25 (99): 467–482. doi:10.1080/10670564.2015.1104921. ISSN 1067-0564.
72. Michael Yahuda, Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao (1983) pp 120-22.
73. Yahuda, Towards the End of Isolationism (1983) p 18.
74. Qian, Ying (2024). Revolutionary Becomings: Documentary Media in Twentieth-Century China. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231204477.
75. Shinn, David H.; Eisenman, Joshua (2023). China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-21001-0.
76. Lampton, David M. (2024). Living U.S.-China relations: From Cold War to Cold War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-5381-8725-8.
77. Laikwan, Pang (2024). One and All: The Logic of Chinese Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ISBN 9781503638815.
78. Westad, Restless Empire ch 9
79. John W. Garver, China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic (2nd ed. 2018), pp 85, 196-98, 228-231, 264.
80. Crean, Jeffrey (2024). The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History. New Approaches to International History series. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-23394-2.
81. Chen Jian, China's road to the Korean War (1994)
82. Freedberg Jr., Sydney J. (26 September 2013). "China's Dangerous Weakness, Part 1: Beijing's Aggressive Idea Of Self-Defense". breakingdefense.com. Breaking Media, Inc. Archived from the original on 29 September 2013. Retrieved 27 September 2013.
83. Dong Wang, "The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962." Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series (2005) online.
84. Li, Hongshan (2024). Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.-China Relations in the Cold War. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/li--20704. ISBN 9780231207058. JSTOR 10.7312/li--20704.
85. Hale, Erin. "Taiwan taps on United Nations' door, 50 years after departure". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2024-12-08.
86. Liff, Adam P.; Lee, Chaewon (2024). "Korea-Taiwan "Unofficial" Relations after 30 Years (1992-2022): Reassessing Seoul's "One China" Policy". In Zhao, Suisheng (ed.). The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 9781032861661.
87. Anderson, Kurt (7 May 1984). "History Beckons Again". Time. Archived from the original on 22 August 2013. Retrieved 19 August 2011.
88. Michael B. Yahuda, End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao (1983).
89. Michael Yahuda, "Deng Xiaoping: the statesman." The China Quarterly 135 (1993): 551-572 online Archived 2019-02-10 at the Wayback Machine.
90. Atatüre, Süha (2023). "The US and China as Main Powers in Multipolar World Order 2.0". China and Eurasian Powers in a Multipolar World Order 2.0: Security, Diplomacy, Economy and Cyberspace. Mher Sahakyan. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-003-35258-7. OCLC 1353290533.
91. Marquis, Christopher; Qiao, Kunyuan (2022). Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 251. doi:10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k. ISBN 978-0-300-26883-6. JSTOR j.ctv3006z6k. OCLC 1348572572. S2CID 253067190.
92. Klien, Susanne (2018-10-24). Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective (1 ed.). Routledge. p. 89. doi:10.4324/9781315811055. ISBN 978-1-315-81105-5. S2CID 239920118.
93. Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy After Tiananmen," Current History 89#548 (September. 1990), 245-52.
94. Fingar, Thomas (2016). "China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform". The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform. Thomas Fingar. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 16. ISBN 978-0-8047-9764-1. OCLC 939553543.
95. Murphy, Dawn C. (2022). China's Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's Alternative World Order. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-3060-4.
96. Smith, Stephen (16 February 2021). "China's "Major Country Diplomacy"". Foreign Policy Analysis. doi:10.1093/fpa/orab002. Retrieved 21 September 2021.
97. Loh, Dylan M.H (12 June 2020). "Over here, overbearing: The origins of China's 'Wolf Warrior' style diplomacy". hongkongfp.com. Retrieved 31 July 2020.
98. NAKAZAWA, KATSUJI. "China's 'wolf warrior' diplomats roar at Hong Kong and the world". nikkei.com. Nikkei Asia Review. Archived from the original on 28 May 2020. Retrieved 27 May 2020.
99. Wu, Wendy (24 May 2020). "Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi defends 'wolf warrior' diplomats for standing up to 'smears'". www.scmp.com. SCMP. Archived from the original on 27 May 2020. Retrieved 27 May 2020.
100. Jiang, Steven; Westcott, Ben (29 May 2020). "China is embracing a new brand of foreign policy. Here's what wolf warrior diplomacy means". www.cnn.com. CNN. Archived from the original on 29 May 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
101. Wong, Brian. "How Chinese Nationalism Is Changing". thediplomat.com. The Diplomat. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
102. Zhai, Keith; Lun Tien, Yew (31 March 2020). "In China, a young diplomat rises as aggressive foreign policy takes root". www.reuters.com. Reuters. Archived from the original on 2020-04-22. Retrieved 2020-05-30.
103. Bengali, Shashank (4 May 2020). "'Put on a mask and shut up': China's new 'Wolf Warriors' spread hoaxes and attack a world of critics". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 5 May 2020. Retrieved 4 May 2020.
104. Palmer, James (15 April 2020). "Why Chinese Embassies Have Embraced Aggressive Diplomacy". foreignpolicy.com. Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 26 April 2020. Retrieved 4 May 2020.
105. Feng, Zhaoyin (29 December 2019). "China and Twitter: The year China got louder on social media". BBC News. Retrieved 31 July 2020.
106. Scott, Mark (29 April 2020). "Chinese diplomacy ramps up social media offensive in COVID-19 info war". www.politico.eu. Retrieved 30 July 2020.

Further reading

• Athwal, Amardeep. China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics (Routledge, 2007) online.
• Bickers, Robert. The Scramble for China: Foreign devils in the Qing empire, 1832-1914 (Penguin, 2016). online review p 342ff Archived 2022-05-08 at the Wayback Machine
• Bolt, Paul J., and Sharyl Cross. China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics (Oxford UP, 2018).
• Cole, Bernard d. China’s Quest For Great Power (Naval Institute Press, 2013), stress on military and naval power
• Dian, Matteo. Contested memories in Chinese and Japanese foreign policy (Elsevier, 2017). online
• Garver, John W. China's quest: the history of the foreign relations of the people's Republic of China (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2018), a major comprehensive scholarly history since 1945. excerpt
• Goh, Evelyn. The struggle for order: Hegemony, hierarchy, and transition in post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford UP, 2013).
• Kirby, William C. "The internationalization of China: Foreign relations at home and abroad in the Republican era." The China Quarterly 150 (1997): 433–458. online
• Mackerras, Colin. "Fifty Years of Australian Diplomatic Relations with China: Some Reflections." Asian Studies Review 47.1 (2023): 109–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2022.2135481
• Shambaugh, David. China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford UP, 2013), its recent economic role in world affairs
• Sutter, Robert G. Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War(3rd ed. Rowman & Littlefield, 2012)

Relations with United States

• Cohen, Warren I. America’s Response To China: A History Of Sino-American Relations (6th ed. Columbia UP, 2019) 2010 edition online
• Garver, John W. China's quest: the history of the foreign relations of the people's Republic of China (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2018), chapters 3, 9, 11, 21, 23, 24.
• MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: the week that changed the world (Random House, 2008).
• Kirby, William C., et al. Normalization of US-China relations: an international history (Harvard University Asia Center Publications Program, 2005).
• Wang, Dong. The United States and China: A history from the eighteenth century to the present (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021).