The MDL was defined and established in the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA), Article I, paragraphs 1–11. The KAA includes provisions regarding the MDL and DMZ; but those provisions do not extend into the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan. The subsequently devised Northern Boundary Line or NLL （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） was neither initially conceived as part of the MDL, nor have the DPRK and UNC agreed to any subsequent extension of the MDL beyond the agreed upon limits of 1953/7/27.
Ryoo, Moo Bong. (2009). "The Korean Armistice and the Islands," （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） p. 5. Strategy research project at the U.S. Army War College; excerpt, "Strategic Consequences of the Agreement. The agreement to retain the five islands under UNC control has shaped many aspects of the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. The most obvious and prominent consequence is the establishment of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The NLL has served as a practical maritime borderline and an effective means to separate the forces and thus prevent military clashes between th two Koreas"; compare Kim, Kwang-Tae. "After Exchange of Fire, N. Korea Threatens More Strikes on South," （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） Time (US). November 23, 2010.
Pak, Hŭi-gwŏn. (2000). The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: a Challenge for Cooperation, p. 108，第108頁，載於Google圖書; excerpt, "Under the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the Military Demarcation Line was drawn across the Korean peninsula. Since no maritime demarcation line was specified in the Armistice Agreement, however, the United Nations Command drew the NLL...."
Karunakar Gupta. How Did the Korean War Begin?. The China Quarterly. 1972,. No. 52 (Oct. - Dec., 1972): pp. 699-716 (18 pages) [2019-10-02]. （原始內容存檔於2020-04-17）. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
......The South Korean story of a counter-attack in the Haeju region is substantiated in a large number of western reports, datelined Seoul,26 June, and referring to events of the previous evening or still in progress. Thus the New York Times of the following day carried a story with this dateline, reporting that "according to the South Korean Office of Public Information," southern troops pushing northwards had captured Haeju. The British Daily Herald quoted American military observers in Seoul as saying that the South Korean forces had penetrated five miles into the North and seized Haeju. Lieutenant-Colonel Malonoy, Acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Military Advisory Group, was reported to have summed up the situation in the following terms: By nightfall (of 25 June) all southern territory west of the Imjin river had been lost to a depth of at least three miles inside the border except in the area of the Haeju counter-attack. Similar reports were carried in the New York Herald Tribune, the Manchester Guardian, and many other British and American newspapers.
......The various accounts from Seoul all require us to suppose that the South Korean army was in a fit state to launch a counter-attack in the Haeju region, from the Ongjin area, in the late afternoon or evening of 25 June, after the North Korean attack which had commenced against the Ongjin Peninsula earlier in the same day. Was this a feasible operation,and was it consonant with the military situation on the ground in the evening of the 25th? Certainly such an operation could have been mounted early on the 25th by the 17th Regiment of the R.O.K. Capital Infantry Division under Colonel Paik In Yup with a fair chance of success, but were his forces still capable of offensive action by the time that the "counter-offensive" was supposedly launched?
......Moreover, early in the morning of the 26th, the South Korean Office of Public Information announced that Southern forces had indeed captured the North Korean town of Haeju. The announcement stated that the attack had occurred that same morning, but an American military status report as of nightfall on the 25th notes that all Southern territory west of the Imjin River had been lost to a depth of at least three miles inside the the attack had occurred that same morning.
---"How Did the Korean War Begin?", Karunakar Gupta
Blum, William Blum. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions since World War II. United States: Common Courage Press. 1995: 500 pp. ISBN 1-56751-253-4.
......Moreover, early in the morning of the 26th, the South Korean Office of Public Information announced that Southern forces had indeed captured the North Korean town of Haeju. The announcement stated that the attack had occurred that same morning, but an American military status report as of nightfall on the 25th notes that all Southern territory west of the Imjin River had been lost to a depth of at least three miles inside the the attack had occurred that same morning.
......Subsequently, the South Korean government denied that its capture of Haeju had actually taken place, blaming the original announcement, apparently, on an exaggerating military officer. One historian has ascribed the allegedly incorrect announcement to "an error due to poor communications, plus an attempt to stiffen South Korean resistance by claiming a victory".
「Killing Hope」，William Blum
此條目介紹的是朝鮮民主主義人民共和國與大韓民國自1945年以來的軍事分界線。關於1953年《朝鮮停戰協定》簽署後雙方沿軍事分界線劃設的非軍事區，請見「朝韓非軍事區」。關於地理上的一條緯線，請見「北緯38度線」。關於同名電視劇，請見「三八線 (電視劇)」。
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