1945年10月25日，依照盟軍最高統帥麥克阿瑟元帥發佈的《一般命令第一號》，命令台灣日軍向同盟國在台灣地區的受降代表人國民政府主席兼國民政府軍事委員會委員長蔣中正投降[a]，在台北公會堂舉行受降典禮，受降典禮台上懸掛著同盟國英、中、美、蘇四國「同等大小」的國旗。主導二戰同盟國事務的美國總統杜魯門表示：「美國的行動明確表示不損害這個島嶼（臺灣）未來身分地位的政治解決。這個島嶼的實際地位是經由太平洋盟軍的勝利而取自日本的領土。就像其他這樣的領土一樣，在直到有國際行動來決定它的未來前，『它的身分地位不能被固定下來』。同盟國要求中華民國政府在該島嶼上接受日軍的投降，這就是中國人現在在該島嶼上的原因。」[21]1961年8月4日，中華民國行政院長陳誠在美國紐約聯合國大會發表演說，旅美台灣人前往示威抗議，批評陳誠無法替台灣人說話（can't speak for Formosans），並訴求台灣人民決定自己的命運（Self-determination for Formosans）。
1948年秋，中國國民黨在國共內戰中節節敗退、每況愈下，蔣介石及國民黨高層開始將資產、技術人員、家屬等轉移至臺灣，準備在其失守中國大陸時撤往臺灣，將臺灣當作最後的反共基地[42][43]:548。至此，美國已對蔣政權失去信心。對於國民黨人員陸續抵臺，美國駐台北總領事克倫茨（Kenneth C. Krentz）向美國國務院發出警告表示，如果蔣介石及其政府部門遷臺，必將危及臺灣的和平與安全。美國國務院也持相同意見。為阻止蔣介石遷臺，美國方面在臺灣接觸了先後擔任臺灣省主席的魏道明和陳誠[43]:548。
1950年6月25日，韓戰爆發，為了堅守西太平洋的反共防線，美國政府一改先前的消極態度—杜魯門於兩天後發表「韓戰聲明」(Korean War Statement)，除了宣佈台灣海峽中立化，派遣第七艦隊協防台海外。美國總統杜魯門同時表示：「台灣若遭共產勢力占領，將會對太平洋區域及美國於此區之維和勢力造成直接威脅……台灣未來的地位，必須等待太平洋地區的安全恢復，以及對日本的和平條約成立，或經過聯合國討論後，再作決定。」此即為台灣地位未定論的起源。[13]
1952年4月28日，《中華民國與日本國間和平條約》（簡稱《中日和約》）簽訂。當中第二條依循《舊金山和約》的規定，再次聲明「日本國業已放棄對於台灣、澎湖群島以及南沙群島及西沙群島的一切權利、權利根據與要求。」但仍舊未表明台灣主權的移轉對象，僅強調已無處分台灣主權的權限。當時負責《中日和約》簽訂的外交部長葉公超於1952年在立法院接受立委質詢時說明：「在現行情況下，日本沒有權利把台灣和澎湖群島轉移給我們，即使日本有意如此，我們也不能接受。」（資料來源：Despatch No.31 from the American Embassy in Taipei to the Department of State, July 23, 1952, Enclosure 2, at p.2.）（美國專家譚慎格在「重估『一個中國』政策」一書引用1952年7月23日美國大使館給國務院的資料）
1955年1月25日，加拿大外交部長（英語：Minister of Foreign Affairs (Canada)）萊斯特·皮爾遜在國會下議院說：「在這個局勢緊張且危險的地區，『臺灣和澎湖』與『國民黨所控制的中國沿海島嶼』之間的地位，我想是可以正確區分的；後者無可爭議地是中國領土的一部份；前者，臺灣和澎湖，在1945年之前的五十年是日本殖民地且在更早之前有過多變的歷史，則不是。……停戰談判不需要涉及爭議領土之最終處置的任何問題。」[97]
美國政府（包括美國國務院與美國國會）多次申明僅參照中美建交公報的英文本。1979年2月時的副國務卿華倫·克里斯多福即表明美國認為英文才是對美國有拘束力的條文（We regard English text as being the binding text. We regard the word 'acknowledge' as being the word that is determinative for the US）。該公報文字「The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.」指美國政府認知瞭解「臺海兩岸當時共同的立場」（非單指中華人民共和國的立場），即「只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部份」，但並不予以承認，亦不挑戰，認知不代表承認[149][150][151][152]。
2004年12月，江永芳發表於《福坦莫國際法期刊（英語：Fordham International Law Journal）》：「1945年8月，當美國將軍麥克阿瑟（駐日盟軍總司令）指派中華民國政府接受在臺日軍投降之時，中華民國政府仍然控制著很大一部份中國領土。但1949年時，這個政府對於絕大部份中國領土的控制在一場內戰中喪失給了中國共產黨並逃難到臺灣，處於中國領土之外」「是美國指派蔣介石的中華民國政府代表它佔領和管理臺灣島，因此五十年過後，中華民國政府仍然擔任著美國代理者的角色。時間的流逝不會改變，也仍未改變，委託者和代理者的法律關係。」[180]
2008年6月12日，許慶雄說，如果認為台灣可以在國際社會都不知道的情況下偷偷宣布獨立建國，那就違背國際法法理，因為國家不可能在神不知鬼不覺之中完成獨立建國；「台灣已經成為獨立國家，但全世界都不知道，只有台灣人民自己知道」，這是不可能的；「國家必須具備領域、人民、政府等要素；但像中華民國台灣這樣支配某些地域、人民且有政府的組織型態，卻不一定是國家。即使具備成為國家的要素，如果沒有『意志』建國、積極主動持續向國際社會『宣布獨立』（Declaration of Independence）以表明建國的決心，就不可能成為主權國家。」[187]
由臺灣旅美法學家陳隆志（現任美國紐約法學院教授）[189]與其師哈羅德·拉斯威爾教授合著的《Formosa, China and the United Nations》一書（1967年出版），對臺灣的國際法律地位有詳細的討論，認為當時台灣的國際法律地位未定，至於決定的方式則是要依據住民自決的原則，由台灣的住民依據自己的意願，來決定自己的前途。
其中第二點、台灣的國際法律地位過去未定，現在仍未定。因為領土的轉移須以正式的國際和平條約為根據。美國與日本對於台灣主權的歸屬所採取的立場也是根據《舊金山對日和約》。直到現在，美國承認「世界只有一個中國」，但是這個中國現在並不包括台灣在內——亦即「一個中國，但不是現在」（One China, but Not Now）。
In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all 'right, title and claim' to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China.
2. 福爾摩沙可以說是一個領域被中華民國政府管理和佔領，但並非正式承認為中華民國的一部份。
Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China.
America and China's tumultuous relationship over the past sixty years has trapped the inhabitants of Taiwan in political purgatory. During this time the people on Taiwan have lived without any uniformly recognized government. In practical terms, this means they have uncertain status in the world community which infects the population's day-to-day lives.
美國與中國過去60年間爭吵不休之關係，讓台灣住民（the inhabitants of Taiwan）陷入政治煉獄中。在此期間，台灣人民（the people on Taiwan）生活在無普遍承認的政府統治之下。以實務角度言之，他們在國際社會中並無確定的地位（uncertain status），已影響到這些人的日常生活。
President Carter recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the government of China, and derecognized the Republic of China, located on Taiwan. See S. Kan, Cong. Research Serv., China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei 1, 10 (Oct. 10, 2014). As to the status of Taiwan, the President "acknowledge[d] the Chinese position" that "Taiwan is part of China," id., at 39(text of U. S.–PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
(Jan. 1, 1979)), but he did not accept that claim.
卡特總統承認PRC是中國政府，且撤銷對位置在台灣的ROC的承認，見(S. Kan, Cong. Research Serv., China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 「One China」 Pol (Oct. 10, 2014).) 對於台灣的狀態，總統用「認知中國的立場」為「台灣是中國的一部分」， id., at 39(text of U. S.–PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations(Jan. 1, 1979))，但他沒有接受這個主張。
1.(f.) The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.
Warren R. Austin to Trygve Lie, August 25, 1950，第3頁第4點，1950年8月25日，美國總統杜魯門就台灣問題給美國駐聯合國代表奧斯汀的信，美國杜魯門圖書館與博物館網站 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館），（英文）."The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Vol. VIII, The Far East. Washington: 美國政府印務局（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1971: 358–359（英語）. In particular, it is considered that exemption from Japanese jurisdiction was not intended to be accorded the estimated 20,000 persons in Japan claiming to be Taiwanese; these persons throughout the war were enemy nationals and according to Japanese law still retain Japanese nationality, excepting only those who have individually divested themselves thereof in accordance with established procedure......It should, however, be pointed out that from the legal standpoint the transfer of Taiwan's Sovereignty remains to be formalized; assumably a treaty of cession will in due course be negotiated which will effect such transfer and which may contain provisions in regard to appropriate change in the national status of Taiwan's residents.
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Vol. VII, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1972: p. 433（英語）. Formosans stress American responsibility through Cairo decision and have published intent to appeal for American help in seeking UN intervention pending final transfer sovereignty to China. Responsible island-wide group preparing formal petition and has so advised Consulate. One such petition received addressed to General Marshall. Possibilities of interim administration under SCAP openly discussed. ...... American prestige high and intervention profoundly desired by Formosans who believe representations at Nanking and direct intervention here justifiable for UN under present Japanese de jure sovereignty status. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Tillman Durdin（英語：Tillman Durdin）. Formosa Killings Are Put at 10,000. New York Times (New York). 1947-03-29 [2015-01-25]. （原始內容存檔於2015-03-08） （英語）. Formosans are reported to be seeking United Nations' action on their case. Some have approached foreign consuls to ask that Formosa be put under the jurisdiction of Allied Supreme Command or be made an American protectorate. Formosan hostility to the mainland Chinese has deepened. Two women who described events at Pingtung said that when Formosans assembled to take over the administration of the town they sang "The Star Spangled Banner." 含有連結內容需訂閱查看的頁面 (link)
Tillman Durdin（英語：Tillman Durdin）. Formosans' Plea for Red Aid Seen. New York Times (New York). 1947-03-30 [2015-03-06]. （原始內容存檔於2015-03-08） （英語）. All foreign witnesses of the slaughters, looting and wholesale imprisonment of natives by Chinese troops and police agree that bitter hostility has been fanned among Formosans......China's possession of the island has not been formalized by international treaty. This cannot come about until the peace pact with Japan is concluded. Formosans know this and some are talking of appealing to the United Nations to put the island under an international mandate. They stress that China has no more historical claim to Formosa than the Japanese, Dutch and Portuguese, who had early trading interests there. 含有連結內容需訂閱查看的頁面 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 30 June 1947 vol 439 c938 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "It is the view of His Majesty's Government that formal transfer of territories formerly owned or annexed by Japan must await the eventual Peace Conference with Japan."
CIA. Probable Developments in Taiwan(PDF): pp. 1–4. 1949-03-14 [2015-03-08]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2015-02-15） （英語）. From the legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the Republic of China. Pending a Japanese peace treaty, the island remains occupied territory......neither the US, or any other power, has formally recognized the annexation by China of Taiwan......There is a strong sentiment in Taiwan favoring autonomy, but the situation is complicated by the conflicting interests of the native Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist element. The Taiwanese bitterly resent the performance of the Nationalist administration on Taiwan since VJ-day. The Chinese rulers have exploited the native population to the limit, without regard for their welfare or the preservation of the island's resources......The Nationalist Army, Navy and Air Force are not only inefficient, but their loyalty and will to fight are questionable. In addition, such a refugee regime would be unstable because of the hostility of the local population which, in these circumstances, would be increasingly susceptible to Communist influence. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1974: 342（英語）. ......should a refugee Chinese government or a Chinese government in exile be set up in Taiwan, which is not yet legally Chinese territory, it is probable that the British Government would simply appoint a British Consulate in Tamsui as an office of the British Embassy in China.
The Future of Formosa. The Economist (London: The Economist Group). 1949-07-16: 124. General Chiang's journey from his stronghold in Formosa to the Philippines has made more urgent than before the question of future of Formosa, which until a peace treaty is signed with Japan remains in international law Chinese-occupied Japanese territory. ...... The situation is further complicated by the tensions which have existed between the Formosans and the intruders from the mainland since the capitulation of Japan. The Formosans rose in revolt in 1947, but were suppressed with great severity. ...... Nobody so far has paid any attention to the wishes of Formosa's inhabitants, but it is arguable that should be considered. The agreements made with the Nationalist Government about the provisional postwar occupation of Formosa would lapse if recognition were at any time to be withdrawn from it, unless these agreements were specifically to be renewed in favour of a Communist China; meanwhile, ultimate authority would revert to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers as part of his responsibility for all Japanese territory.
The Chinese in Formosa. The Economist (London: The Economist Group). 1949-07-23: 195. When plans were made during the Pacific war for disposing of Japan's colonial empire, it was not expected that there would be any trouble over the return of the island of Formosa to China. Japan had annexed Formosa from China in 1895, as part of the spoils of victory in the Sino-Japanese war of the previous year; the population was almost entirely Chinese-speaking and on ethnic grounds, as well as on the basis of former posses[s]ion, China appeared to have an indisputable claim to the reversion of the territory. When, therefore, Japan surrendered in 1945, it was not only agreed that China should undertake the military occupation of Formosa, but China was regarded as having incorporated it as a province of the Chinese Republic even in advance of any formal cession by Japan—which could not be effected until the conclusion of a peace treaty.
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 14 November 1949 vol 469 c1679 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "Any change in the legal status of Formosa can only be formally effected in a treaty of peace with Japan."
Memorandum by Voorhees to Johnson, 14 December 1949, Formosa file, RG 6, box 8, MacArthur Memorial, NARA（英文） "Formosa remains legally a part of Japan until a treaty of peace. At Potsdam, it was agreed that Japanese areas other than the four main islands should be assigned respectively to certain of the Allies for control until a treaty could be made. Under this plan Formosa was assigned to China......until there is a treaty of peace the Nationalist Government of China is merely a custodian......"
TNA: CAB 129/41/6 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館）, Formosa, 03 July 1950, p. 2 （英文） "In 1943 Formosa was part of the territory of the Japanese Empire and His Majesty's Government consider that Formosa is still de jure part of that territory......On 25th October, 1945, as a result of an Order issued on the basis of consultation and agreement between the Allied Powers concerned, the Japanese Forces in Formosa surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon, with the consent of the Allied Powers, administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the Republic of China."
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VII, Korea. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 383（英語）. Even though declarations in regard to the intention of the US and UK toward the return of Formosa to China had been made at Cairo and even though these declarations of intentions had been confirmed by the Potsdam pronouncements with which the USSR was associated, the fact was that the title to Formosa had not passed to China. I myself seriously doubted the legal authority of two or three powers to convey title for Formosa to China and that actually China could not be vested with the title to Formosa except by the terms of an international agreement or peace settlement with Japan or alternatively in accordance with and pursuant to a lawfully made decision of the UN. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 26 July 1950 vol 478 c60W （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "His Majesty's Government have recognised de jure the Chinese Central People's Government as the legitimate Government of China, and as such entitled to enjoy the rights of the Chinese State. Formosa is still de jure Japanese territory and there is no Government of Formosa as such. Following on the surrender of Japan, the Chinese Government of the day assumed, with the consent of the remaining Allies, the provisional administration of the territory pending the final determination of its status at a peace settlement......because of the provisional nature of the present administration of Formosa, it is the hope of His Majesty's Government that the disposal of Formosa will be decided, as has always been contemplated, in connection with the peace settlement, with Japan."
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 398（英語）. There come to mind number of factors, generally unenvisaged at time Cairo Declaration, which lead us not to accept that Declaration as necessarily last word on subj Formosa. (a) Commitments by USSR in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of Natl Govt of Chi) have been grossly flouted; (b) Record of Chi Natl Govt in Formosa, which assumed responsibility fol VJ-Day, has not been satis; (c) It appears to us to be one thing to turn Formosa over to Rep of Chi as constituted at time Cairo Declaration; quite another to turn it over to Peiping regime which is acting in support of Moscow conspiracy against free nations; (d) In view drastic change in situation in Chi and hostile totalitarian regime now established Peiping, are democratic countries not entitled to question the turning of Formosa over to such regime without consulting Formosans or applying principles of UN Charter applicable to dependent peoples?...... 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Letter Dated 50/08/25 from the Representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-General Concerning Formosa(PDF). United Nations: p. 4. 1950-08-25 [2015-02-18]. （原始內容存檔於2021-01-09） （英語）. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the Island. The actual status of the Island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIII: 1950. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1950: pp. 607–608（英語）. Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act......The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position or privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly 8 million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 588（英語）. On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIV: 1951. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1951: pp. 65–66（英語）. That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put forward by the Soviet Government, that the views of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also, the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international agreement. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: p. 883（英語）. The conversation then turned to territorial and security problems and President Quirino emphasized the deep interest of his country in the future of Formosa and expressed disagreement with what he understood would be the United States' position that the future of Formosa should be determined in the first instance by only Big Four. President Quirino intended that the Philippiones should be a party to any determinination of the future of Formosa and that in his opinion some form of United Nations trusteeship might be the most satisfactory solution. Mr. Dulles stated that the original position of the United States had been tentative only; that the United States would certainly wish to consider carefully the views of the Philippine Government on this matter and that he too had long been of the personal opinion that a United Nations trusteeship might be the best solution. However, the Chinese Nationalist Government was completely opposed to any such solution and it would therefore be useful to seek some other formula and in this regard the suggestions of the Philippine Government would be most welcome 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 886–887（英語）. Mr. Spender's second point was with regard to Formosa. He said that if the intention was to confirm the National Government's title to the island Australia would have serious reservations. The Australian Government has no desire to recognize the Chinese Communist regime but is very unhappy over continued recognition of the National Government, and would be reluctant to strengthen that Government by giving it Formosa. Ambassador Dulles said that Formosa presented a difficult problem. It was not our intention to confirm the National Government's title to Formosa. Mr. Spender suggested that the best solution might be to require Japan to renounce title without indicating to whom title had been transferred. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 953, 954（英語）. It is the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the Central People's Government of China should be invited to participate in any negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan......With respect to the second point, that is the renunciation by Japan of claims to Formosa in favor of China without specifying what China. Sir Oliver said that he thought our language, which provided for the renunciation of Formosa by Japan, but without specifying who should have it was a little bit vague......Ambassador Dulles said that this, too, presented us with many problems but that we would consider the British views carefully. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 977, 978（英語）. As the Government of the United States does not recognize the Central People's Government of China it would not find it possible to invite that regime to participate in negotiations with it for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan......With respect to Formosa, Mr. Dulles emphasized the view of the United States that a Treaty with Japan should do nothing which would of itself and suddenly eliminate all international concern over the disposition of Formosa; nor did it appear wise to the United States Government that Japan by a Treaty should be compelled to take action which might in fact result in Japan itself becoming embroiled in a controversy or being given an opportunity to claim that the “China” to which Formosa had been turned over was not the “China” to which the Japanese had intended, by the Treaty, Formosa should be turned over. Mr. Dulles then reviewed at some length the United States general position with regard to Formosa and the undesirability of turning over to a Communist regime the island and people of Formosa without some attempt being made to determine the desires of the people of that island...... 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Transcript of Second Day of MacArthur's Testimony. New York Times (New York). 1951-05-05: p. 4 [2015-01-28]. （原始內容存檔於2015-03-08） （英語）. It has not, sir. Legalistically it is still a part of defeated Japan. The disposition of the various segments of the Empire of Japan has not yet been formally determined. There were certain agreements that were entered into, as I understood it, at Yalta and other places, but legalistically Formosa is still a part of the Empire of Japan. ...... The Allies turned over what you might call the administration and the trusteeship of Formosa to China, just as Japan was turned over to us, and it is still in that status. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link) 含有連結內容需訂閱查看的頁面 (link)
Department of State. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1951: p. 93. The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands. The future of Formosa was referred to in the Cairo Declaration but that Declaration also contained provisions in respect to Korea, together with the basic principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambitions. Until China shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and principles, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the problem of Formosa. In due course a solution must be found, in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, however, it would be wrong to postpone making peace with Japan. We therefore came to the conclusion that the proper treatment of Formosa in the context of the Japanese peace treaty was for the treaty to provide only for renunciation of Japanese sovereignty. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: p. 1349（英語）. FYI word “terrs” shld not be employed in way to imply Formosa is for purposes of Treaty already legal Dept China. Such action wld make difficult any possible future UN action; also it is not believed to be matter to be determined only by bilat Sino-Jap arrangement. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1985: p. 770（英語）. ......Formosa and the Pescadores had a distinctive juridical status under the Japanese Peace Treaty. They were not technically under Chinese sovereignty since Japan had made no cession in favor of China......once we mad a security treaty with Nationalist China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, it would be necessary for them to refrain from offensive operations from their “privileged sanctuary”. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1985: p. 811（英語）. ......Japan never ceded sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores to China. Japan renounced its own sovereignty but left the future title undefined. Thus the United States as principal victor of Japan has an unsatisfied interest in these former Japanese islands. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXI: 1954. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1954: p. 896（英語）. The legal position is different, as I think I pointed out in my last press conference, by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these island. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore, the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 20 December 1954 vol 535 c2431 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "The position with regard to Formosa is that Japan has renounced her sovereignty over it, but in our view it has not become part of China."
Department of External Affairs（英語：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. Current Notes on International Affairs. Vol. 26. Canberra: Department of External Affairs（英語：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. 1955: p. 57 （英語）. In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made between the position of Formosa and Pescadores, and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands; the latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that are not...... Negotiations for a cease fire need not involve any question of the final disposition of the territory in dispute. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 01 February 1955 vol 536 c901 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "It contained merely a statement of common purpose. ...... The question of future sovereignty over Formosa was left undetermined by the Japanese Peace Treaty."
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 04 February 1955 vol 536 c159W （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "......This Declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never taken place, because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences amongst the Powers as to the status of these entities. ......In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese. Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined. The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the coast of China are in a different category from Formosa and the Pescadores since they undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."
James Reston（英語：James Reston）. New Formosa Bid. New York Times (New York). 1955-02-06 [2015-03-12]. （原始內容存檔於2015-03-08） （英語）. ......Secretary of State Dulles prepared to go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow to urge Senate ratification of the mutual assistance treaty with the Republic of China. The Administration clarified its position on the legal status of Formosa, and was prepared to make clear to the Senate that ratification of the treaty with President Chiang Kai-shek would not give him legal sovereignty over Formosa and Pescadores...... ......Some prominent Democrats have suggested that the signing of a mutual defense agreement with President Chiang will change the legal status of these territories and give the Nationalists sovereignty over them. Mr. Dulles will reject this argument when he testifies on the treaty this week. He will assert that the Administration does not regard the sovereignty of Formosa and the Pescadores as having been settled. His view is that the treaty will not give General Chiang sovereignty over these islands. Ths position of the Administration is that these territories were handed over to the Allied and associated powers of World War II by Japan, which had held them since 1895, and that General Chiang was merely asked to administer them for the Allied and associated powers pending a final decision as to their ownership...... 含有連結內容需訂閱查看的頁面 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 04 May 1955 vol 540 c1867 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."
Department of External Affairs（英語：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. Current Notes on International Affairs. Vol. 26. Canberra: Department of External Affairs（英語：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. 1955: p. 176 （英語）. As to the juridical status of Formosa, this was something yet to be determined, and would no doubt some day be determined by the United Nations or under United Nations machinery. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 09 February 1955 vol 536 c216w （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "I have been unable to trace any such proclamation. Unilateral declarations could not affect the legal status of Formosa......"
TNA: CAB 129/73/38 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館）, Formosa, 11 February 1955, p. 1–2 （英文） "In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces pursuant to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and General Order No. 1 issued by the Japanese Government at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated September 2, 1945. But this was not a cession nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupancy, responsible to the whole body of the Allies, pending a peace treaty with Japan or, if the status of Formosa was not finally settled by that treaty (which it was not), then pending an eventual settlement about Formosa—which has not yet taken place. The arrangements did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese."
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 04 May 1955 vol 540 cc1870–1 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "The document in question was the Cairo Declaration. That was couched in the form of a statement of intention, and as it was merely a statement of intention, it is merely binding in so far as it states the intent at that time, and therefore it cannot by itself transfer sovereignty......The case of Formosa is different. The sovereignty was Japanese until 1952. The Japanese Treaty came into force, and at that time Formosa was being administered by the Chinese Nationalists, to whom it was entrusted in 1945, as a military occupation......That position has been made quite clear by the statement the Prime Minister made in the House on 4th February, which has been quoted by the hon. and learned Member. Therefore I shall not repeat it. In reply—I quote the concluding passages of his statement—he said: "Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined." ......the fact is that Formosa is not under Chinese sovereignty. That does not mean that the Chinese Nationalists have no right to be there. Their presence springs from their military occupancy in which they were placed by the Allied Powers in 1945, pending future arrangements."
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. Vol. II, China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1986: p. 619（英語）. ......Even the juridical position of Taiwan is in doubt. The United States also has an interest in Taiwan which we got away from Japan. Japan has merely renounced sovereignty over Taiwan which has not been disposed of by the peace treaty and not ceded to anyone. Consequently the United States could assert a legal claim until Taiwan is disposed of by some means. We cannot, therefore, admit that the disposition of Taiwan is merely an internal problem. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 19 November 1958 vol 595 c1140–1 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "......the Cairo Declaration, which was reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration, was merely a statement of common purpose. Both were made at a time when there was only one entity claiming to represent China. Since then there has been a civil war in China and opinions differ as to who now represents the Government of China. The problem of Formosa has become an international one, in which a number of nations are concerned, and it cannot be solved merely by reference to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations."
Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963. Vol. XXII, Northeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英語：United States Government Printing Office）. 1996: p. 698. ISBN 0160452066（英語）. He recalled that the legal status of the island of Formosa was not determined at the San Francisco Peace Conference, at which Japan merely renounced her sovereignty. He repeated a suggestion he had made to Ambassador Stevenson, that a conference of those nations which attended the San Francisco Conference be called to determine the legal status of Formosa. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
United Nations General Assembly Sixteenth Session Official Records(PDF). United Nations: p. 1070. 1961-12-15 [2015-03-20]. （原始內容存檔於2021-01-08） （英語）. I wish, however, to make it clear that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined. It therefore follows in its view that the question as to who should represent Formosa in the United Nations is also undetermined. The vote which I cast in favour of the draft resolution and of the amendment does not prejudice the position of Her Majesty's Government on this point. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 23 June 1966 vol 730 c130W （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "Her Majesty's Government believe that the China seat in the United Nations should be occupied by representatives of the Chinese People's Republic. As for Formosa, it is our view that sovereignty over this island is undetermined."
HC Deb（英語：Hansard） 19 December 1966 vol 738 cc185–6W （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館） （英文）. "Our position on the status of Formosa was outlined on 28th November by my noble Friend Lord Caradon in his explanation of our vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of Chinese representation in that organisation. A copy186W of his statement is in the Library. It remains our view that sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined."
Interview with Harvey Feldman (PDF). The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. 2001: 69–70 [2020-08-02]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2019-04-24）.
Emma Chanlett-Avery; Derry Dumbaugh; William H. Cooper. Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy(PDF). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: p. 6. 2008-12-19 [2015-03-08]. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2014-12-28） （英語）. ......after Japan's defeat in 1945, Taiwan and the Pescadores were assigned to the Republic of China for purposes of post-war occupation. Taiwan was still under this occupation four years later, when the ROC government fled to Taiwan after the communist victory in the civil war on mainland China. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
Shirley A. Kan; Wayne M. Morrison. U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues(PDF). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: p. 4. 2014-12-11. （原始內容存檔(PDF)於2015-06-28） （英語）. The United States has its own “one China” policy (vs. the PRC's “one China” principle) and position on Taiwan's status. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan nor Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. ...... The United States did not state a stance on the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States simply “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
House of Commons. Foreign Affairs - Tenth Report - Taiwan. London: Foreign Affairs Select Committee（英語：Foreign Affairs Select Committee）. 2000-11-22 [2015-11-10]. The official British position was set out in a 1972 agreement with China, under which the United Kingdom “acknowledged the position of the government of the PRC that Taiwan was a province of the PRC and recognised the PRC Government as the sole legal Government of China.”
Chen Lung-chu, W. M. Reisman. Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title. Yale Law Journal（英語：Yale Law Journal） (The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.). March 1972, 81 (4): 611–612 [2015-02-15]. （原始內容存檔於2021-01-07） （英語）. At the conclusion of World War II, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Command in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, authorized the Nationalist Chinese authorities to accept the surrender of Formosa from the Japanese and to undertake temporarily military occupation of the island as a trustee on behalf of the Allied Powers.
Y. Frank Chiang. One-China Policy and Taiwan. Fordham International Law Journal（英語：Fordham International Law Journal） (Fordham University School of Law). December 2004, 28 (1): 27, 80 [2015-02-19]. （原始內容存檔於2021-01-07） （英語）. In August 1945, when U.S. General MacArthur (as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) assigned the R.O.C government to receive the surrender of the Japanese commanders in Taiwan, the R.O.C. government was still in control of a large part of China's territory. But, by 1949, that government had lost control over most of China's territory to the Chinese Communists in a civil war and taken refuge in Formosa, outside of China's territory.....It was the United States that assigned Chiang Kai-shek's R.O.C. government to occupy and administer the island of Taiwan on its behalf. So, fifty years later, the R.O.C. government still acts as an agent of the United States. The passage of time will not change, and has not changed, the legal relationship of agent and principal.
New Jersey v. New York, 523 US 767 (1998). US Supreme Court. 1998-05-26 [2010-01-29]. （原始內容存檔於2021-01-07）. Even as to terra nullius, like a volcanic island or territory abandoned by its former sovereign, a claimant by right as against all others has more to do than planting a flag or rearing a monument. Since the 19th century the most generous settled view has been that discovery accompanied by symbolic acts give no more than "an inchoate title, an option, as against other states, to consolidate the first steps by proceeding to effective occupation within a reasonable time.8 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 146 (4th ed.1990); see also 1 C. Hyde, International Law 329 (rev.2d ed.1945); 1 L. Oppenheim International Law §§222-223, pp. 439-441 (H. Lauterpacht 5th ed.1937); Hall A Treatise on International Law, at 102-103; 1 J. Moore, International Law 258 (1906); R. Phillimore, International Law 273 (2d ed. 1871); E. Vattel, Law of Nations, §208, p. 99 (J. Chitty 6th Am. ed. 1844).
Henckaerts, Jean-Marie. The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and political considerations. Kluwer Law International. 1996: 337 [2010-08-14]. ISBN 90-41-10929-3. （原始內容存檔於2014-09-26）. p7. "In any case, there appears to be strong legal ground to support the view that since the entry into force of the 1952 ROC-Japan bilateral peace treaty, Taiwan has become the de jure territory of the ROC. This interpretation of the legal status of Taiwan is confirmed by several Japanese court decisions. For instance, in the case of Japan v. Lai Chin Jung, decided by the Tokyo High Court on December 24, 1956, it was stated that 『Formosa and the Pescadores came to belong to the Republic of China, at any rate on August 5, 1952, when the [Peace] Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China came into force…』」 p8. 「the principles of prescription and occupation that may justify the ROC's claim to Taiwan certainly are not applicable to the PRC because the application of these two principles to the Taiwan situation presupposes the validity of the two peace treaties by which Japan renounce its claim to Taiwan and thus makes the island terra nullius."
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