1998年5月印度尼西亚骚乱（印尼语：Kerusuhan Mei 1998），又称黑色五月暴动，在印度尼西亚也称为1998年悲剧（印尼语：Tragedi 1998）或简称为1998年事件（印尼语：Peristiwa 1998），是指从1998年5月4日-8日和12日-15日印度尼西亚发生的大规模暴力、反政府示威和内乱事件。事件主要发生在棉兰、雅加达、梭罗等城市。
非政府组织“人性志工团”（Volunteers for Humanity）指出印尼的流氓团体（Preman（英语：Preman_(Indonesian_gangster)））──涉及了这些暴力事件，而“印尼黑帮”往往与军队有联系。许多暴乱发生时，维安部队和警察很诡异地选择袖手旁观，也不回应人们的呼救[1]。
非政府组织“人性志工团”（Volunteers for Humanity）发布的报告统计，印尼全国共发生168起强暴案件，受害者大多数为华人，年龄从10岁到50岁不等。大多数案件（132件）在大雅加达地区发生。除此之外，超过4,000家商店和卖场遭到摧毁，数千户民宅和车辆遭到纵火。该报告也记载印尼的死亡人数总计为2,244人，并称大多数的死者并非华人多为都市中的贫困穷人——他们被诱使前往洗劫商场，但被关在被纵火前商场内[1]。
不过，当年有暴乱亲历者投书指出，暴乱期间至少有三名印尼华人曾向中国大使馆求助，但使馆人员询问得知他们是“WNI”（Warga Negara Indonesia，印尼公民）后便拒绝提供帮助。[33]印尼学者廖建裕、中国学者查道炯、新西兰学者杜建华、新加坡学者徐本钦等皆指出，暴乱期间中国政府无意为受害的印尼华人提供救援和保护。在5月排华暴动之前，许多印尼以外的华人就批评中国政府应该保护印尼华人，然而北京拒绝进行干预，因为当时北京和雅加达的关系已经相当融洽，北京不想破坏这种关系。有中国驻美外交官私下表示，中国政府不可能向印尼提出抗议或派遣船只，因为在印尼的大部分华人都是印尼公民，因此没有充分理由这样做。5月排华暴乱的严重时期，北京的态度也没有改变。[34]中国政府确实有对在印尼工作和旅行的中国公民采取撤侨措施，并为寻求帮助的台湾和澳门旅行证件持有者提供领事保护，但与之有别的是，中国政府并不愿意介入印尼华人的命运。[35]在公开和正式场合，雅加达的事务都不是北京的关注点。北京政府将华人称为“印尼家庭的一分子”，并没有义务保护他们。[36]临近六四天安门事件周年日或许是北京政府保持低调的原因之一，因为他们担心中国学生的民族主义情绪会被激起，给中共中央总书记江泽民为首的中共领导层带来压力，特别是5月排华暴行或许会重新唤醒人民对六四屠杀的回忆。[37]
1998年5月15日，美国联邦政府敦促在印尼美国公民立即离开该国，理由是该国发生了30多年来最严重的政治暴力事件[101]，同时美国与欧洲国家推迟了一项针对印尼价值为14亿美元的紧急援助付款，取消了该国高级军事代表团计划前往印度尼西亚的任务，并撤离了使馆非必要雇员[102][103][104]。美国政府于《1998年印度尼西亚国家人权报告》中指责苏哈托政府“严重侵犯人权”[105]。联邦政府批准七千名华人的避难请求，并接受了这批华人居留。[106][107]《纽约时报》率先大量报导了排华暴行[108]，使得此事在全球各地广为传播。同年7月开始，华裔美国人于全美各地展开抗议行动。8月7日和8日达到颠峰，全美13座大城同步举行谴责印尼暴民罪行的示威抗议行动，近两万名华人群集全美各地印尼使领馆前，要求立即停止排华暴行和严惩凶犯等。8月8日上午，在华盛顿特区的印度尼西亚驻美国大使馆（英语：Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C.）前，愤怒的口号声此起彼伏，近千名华裔聚集抗议，并向驻印尼的美国官员递交抗议信函。[109][110][111][112]
Charlotte Setijadi. Charlotte , 编. Memories of Unbelonging: Ethnic Chinese Identity Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press. Oct 2023. ISBN 9780824894054.
Michael Richardson. Japan's Lack of Leadership Pushes ASEAN Toward Cooperation With China. 《国际先驱论坛报》. 1998-04-17 [2014-06-01]. （原始内容存档于2014-08-08）. Mr. Tang also gave an assurance in Jakarta that Beijing regarded recent riots that targeted Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority as an internal matter for Indonesia to handle. "We always regard ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as Indonesian nationals and the issue relating to the ethnic Chinese as an internal affair of Indonesia," he said.（英文）
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557-575 [2019-05-13]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2019-05-13）. Third, prior to the outbreak of the May riots, Beijing's policy reportedly 'was simply to hope the riots wouldn't happen'. (The quotation is attributed to Zhang Yunling, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)
James Jiann Hua To (杜建华). Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart- Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese(PDF). University of Canterbury. 2009: 217–224 [2019-05-13]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2019-05-13）. Beijing publicly declared that the violence in Indonesia was a domestic issue and would not intervene. China maintained that governments should treat ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality as citizens of their domicile – any action that would suggest otherwise might provoke suspicions of interference in the region.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah , 编. "ASEAN-China Relations Realities and Prospects". China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). 2009: 356–366. ISBN 981-230-342-1. Indeed, unlike the riots in the 1960s, the May 1998 riots were not anti-PRC. It was targeted at the ethnic Chinese and there was no indication that it developed into anti-PRC riots. Although some PRC citizens might have been affected by the riots, the majority happened to be Indonesian citizens. However, under pressure from world opinion, especially from the ethnic Chinese communities outside China, Beijing appeared to change its attitude towards the matter. Nevertheless, the main policy of non-intervention remained.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). "Non-Intervention: The 1998 Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia". The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. 2017: 53–68. ISBN 9789814762656. Even before the May 1998 violence, many Chinese outside Indonesia criticized the PRC government, some even suggesting that Beijing should protect the Chinese there. However, Beijing had refused to intervene. Beijing–Jakarta ties had been quite cordial before the May riots and Beijing had no desire to jeopardize the relationship.... Privately, a Chinese diplomat in the United States noted that Beijing would not be able to protest or send ships to Indonesia because “there is no good reason to do so as the majority of the Chinese in Indonesia are Indonesian citizens.”... Understandably, the embassy was cautious in doing so as this too might affect Sino–Indonesian relations. When serious anti-Chinese riots took place in Jakarta, Surakarta, and other areas between 13 May and 15 May 1998, Beijing's attitude remained unchanged.
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557–575 [2019-05-13]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2019-05-13）. China did take measures to evacuate its citizens (including Hong Kong passport holders) working and travelling in Indonesia and offered consular protection to Taiwan and Macao travel document holders who would seek assistance from its diplomatic missions in Indonesia. The obvious distinction here is that China did not appear willing to get involved with the fate of the Indonesian Chinese.
James Jiann Hua To (杜建华). Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart- Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese(PDF). University of Canterbury. 2009: 217–224 [2019-05-13]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2019-05-13）. Publicly and officially, Jakarta's domestic affairs were not the concern of Beijing. Beijing referred to ethnic Chinese as "members of the Indonesian family," whom it had no obligation to protect.
Shee Poon Kim (徐本钦). China's responses to the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia. Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. 2000. ISBN 981-04-2483-3. The timing of the anti-Chinese riots came at a sensitive period for the Chinese leadership, who feared that nationalistic feelings among the Chinese students in Beijing would be stirred up, putting pressure on the Jiang Zemin leadership, particularly since the state of the May anti-Chinese riots could rekindle the memory of the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen massacre.
James Jiann Hua To (杜建华). Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart- Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese(PDF). University of Canterbury. 2009: 217–224 [2019-05-13]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2019-05-13）. In May 1998, 1200 OC were killed, dozens of OC women raped, and properties torched as the Suharto regime ended. Beijing was slow to react, and by making only a brief mention in the state controlled media, it did not have to address it as a matter of foreign policy. Those who tried to protest were rendered silent, and any news coverage quickly suppressed.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah , 编. ASEAN-China Relations Realities and Prospects. "China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development" (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). 2009: 356–366. ISBN 981-230-342-1. The first official reaction of Beijing to the May 1998 riots occurred in late July 1998. However, the first reaction by a PRC official to the incident was on 6 July. Chen Shiqiu, the new Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, visited East Kalimantan to investigate the possibility of investing in the area, especially in the palm oil business. During his visit, he was asked by Indonesia reporters on his view of the May riots.
Leo Suryadinata (廖建裕). Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah , 编. ASEAN-China Relations Realities and Prospects. "China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development" (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). 2009: 356–366. ISBN 981-230-342-1. He was quoted as saying that China was "concerned with the incident" and wanted the Indonesian Government "to investigate the matter thoroughly". He told the reporters that he met B.J. Habibie twice: the first time when Habibie as still vice-president and the second time, when Habibie was president. During the meeting Chen said that he discussed the riots and "hoped that the riots will not recur." Chen clearly stated that, "according to the international law as well as the law of the two countries, it was the responsibility of the Indonesian Government to protect its own citizens, including the citizens of Chinese descent. " There was no official protest on the part of Bejing.
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557–575 [2019-05-13]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2019-05-13）. Beginning in August through November, China made a series of public pronouncements to express its displeasure with the Indonesian government over the latter's handling of the May riots. Also in August, China agreed to sell 50,000 tons of rice to Indonesia and provided Indonesia with a $3 million grant of medicines and pharmaceuticals. It also went ahead to execute a $200 million economic loan package – agreed in April 1998 – to Indonesia. In November, a Chinese trade delegation visited Jakarta, on schedule, to discuss Chinese investment projects in Indonesia.
Daojiong Zha (查道炯). "China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues"(PDF). The Pacific Review. 2000, (Vol. 13 No. 4): 557–575 [2019-05-13]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2019-05-13）. In November China's diplomatic action culminated when President Jiang Zemin raised the suffering of the Indonesian Chinese in the May riots with Indonesian President B. J. Habibie at the China–ASEAN dialogue meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Jiang further made a point by speaking to a group of Indonesian business leaders and repeated the pledge that China would "never try to use people of Chinese origin living in Indonesia to seek political or economic gain there". Thereafter, the issue of the May riots disappeared from China's news media.
