Huadu (Taiwan)

Republic of China independence (Chinese: 中華民國獨立; pinyin: zhōnghuá mínguó dúlì; Wade–Giles: Chung¹hua² Min²kuo² tu²li⁴), abbreviated in Chinese as Huadu (Chinese: 華獨; pinyin: huá dú; Wade–Giles: hua² tu²; lit. 'Chinese independence')^[2] is a stance on the status of Taiwan that posits Taiwan and its outlying islands are presently an independent state (i.e. a distinct sovereign state from the People's Republic of China) under the name "Republic of China". Huadu supporters reject the One China principle, instead positing that:

1. There is a Taiwanese state whose formal name is the Republic of China for historical reasons, and/or;
2. There are de facto two Chinese states which coexist as part of a unitary nation with both having the name "China" and de jure claiming sovereignty over all of China.

Free area of the Republic of China, which huadu supporters posit is the territory of a sovereign state separate from mainland China

Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China.

—Lai Ching-te, 15 August 2023^[1]

The Taiwanese nationalist movement is largely divided into Huadu, which favors retaining "China" as part of the Taiwanese state's formal name to maintain legal ambiguity over the political status of Taiwan; and Taidu (Chinese: 台獨 or 臺獨; pinyin: tái dú), a syllabic abbreviation of "Taiwan independence" (Chinese: 台灣獨立 or 臺灣獨立; pinyin: táiwān dúlì) that proposes a more radical departure from the status quo by making a formal declaration of independence to create a de jure "Republic of Taiwan".^[2] Huadu politics is generally favored by the moderate pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)^[a] while more radical groups such as the Taiwan Statebuilding Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union favor a declaration of independence. DPP politicians such as Lai hold that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China.^[4] DPP huadu supporters tend to see huadu politics as a pragmatic way to assert Taiwan's independence without unnecessarily aggravating the PRC government.^[5][6]

In addition to independence activists, some politicians in the Kuomintang (KMT) party also support Huadu.^[7] They generally oppose "one country, two systems" as well as further steps toward de jure independence.^[8][9] 'Light blue' former KMT Chair Johnny Chiang insisted on the abolition of the 1992 Consensus which was based on "one China".^[10]

See also

• Status quo
• Taiwanization
• Two Chinas
• Pro-Republic of China
• Four-Stage Theory of the Republic of China
• Taiwan independence movement#Support for status quo
• Third Society Party

Notes

1. Before 1996, the DPP was closer to Taidu than Huadu.^[3]

References

1. Wang, Cindy; Weber, Joel (15 August 2023). "Taiwan's Election Is All About War". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 20 August 2023. Retrieved 13 January 2024.
2. "We're all pro-Taiwan independence now". Taiwan News. 16 January 2023. Retrieved 10 February 2024. Broadly speaking, they are divided into two camps: "Taiwan" independence (台獨 or 臺獨, taidu) and "Republic of China (ROC)" independence (華獨, huadu). The basic difference between the two is between renaming the country Taiwan or maintaining Taiwan as an independent nation under the ROC name and maintaining the constitution.
3. Xiaokun Song (2009). Between Civic and Ethnic: The Transformation of Taiwanese Nationalist Ideologies (1895-2000). VUBPRESS. p. 199.
4. Nachmann, Lev. "No, Taiwan's President Isn't 'Pro-Independence'". The Diplomat. James Pach. Archived from the original on 28 October 2020. Retrieved 27 July 2020.
5. "What is ROC Independence versus Taiwanese Independence?". New Bloom Magazine. 2 February 2016. Retrieved 1 October 2024.
6. "Taiwan: The Future of the 'Republic of China'". The Diplomat. 20 February 2024. Retrieved 1 October 2024. The question is whether the Lai administration will maintain this "Republic of China, Taiwan." If the new president chooses not to maintain it, then he will likely opt for so-called "Taiwanese independence" (台独), which says that Taiwan is Taiwan.
7. "九二共識普拉斯（上）：國民黨內部曾提過「華獨」，為何最終沒有採用？". The News Lens (in Chinese). 27 April 2021. Retrieved 15 February 2024.
8. Fabry, Mikulas (2 January 2024). "The Effect of 'One China' Policies of Foreign States on the International Status of Taiwan". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 35 (1): 90–115. doi:10.1080/09592296.2024.2303855. In contrast, the 2005 law designed to forestall Taiwanese 'secession', which also outlined a positive agenda aimed at convincing the Taiwanese of the benefits of peaceful unification, left out the third part.
9. "Xi's Top Taiwan Hand Targets 'Hostile Forces' in Taiwan's 'Green' and 'Blue' Camps". Global Taiwan Institute. 12 January 2022. Retrieved 18 September 2024. In fact, Wang notes that in its latest political platform, the KMT simultaneously stated its opposition to both "Taiwan independence" and "one country, two systems."
10. "We're all pro-Taiwan independence now". Taiwan News. 16 January 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2024.