分析哲学（英语：英语：analytic philosophy/analytical philosophy），为以概念分析为主要方法的哲学派别，相对于欧陆传统。二十世纪初兴起，盛行于英美哲学界，提出对传统哲学的挑战与抗衡。分析哲学，重视于厘清语言与逻辑的语言，与分析现有知识。[1] 自二十世纪初至今，分析哲学是英语国家的大学哲学系主流，包括英国、美国、澳洲等。[2][3]
分析哲学通常重视语言的作用，在哲学史中被称为语言学转向。论证常使用形式逻辑与数学、甚至自然科学的方法[4][5][6]。分析哲学传统通常将将问题拆分成小部分，“通过以解答小问题来得出对更宏大问题的答案”[7]。
奥地利哲学家维特根斯坦于1921年发表《逻辑哲学论》，提出所有语言能够表达的概念都可以被语言表达清楚。书中认为全部有认知意义的语句都有逻辑形式及真假值，而复杂语句可以分拆成更简单的原子句子。[8]
逻辑实证论，是以验证原则为核心的哲学运动，一如早期维特根斯坦，主张只有通过观察或逻辑可以验证的陈述才具有有意义的真理或事实内容。20世纪20年代末，维也纳学派与柏林学派为核心，使哲学更接近经验科学。1960年代末衰落，在科学哲学方面，引发了科学实在论与工具主义间的辩论。逻辑实证论影响了英语世界的分析哲学传统，及科学哲学与社会科学。
二战结束后，维特根斯坦抛弃逻辑原子论，其《哲学研究》的立场倾向于日常语言哲学，认为语言本身的意思并不重要，人亦不应该探究语言要如何使用才是正确的。他认为语言应该是观察，人怎样用语言，语言就有什么意思，“意义即用法”[9]。其导师伯特兰·罗素仍然坚持逻辑原子论，并认为日常语言论是荒谬的。
G. E. 摩尔在1903年发表《伦理学原理》，以语义探究伦理学，开创元伦理学。摩尔探究伦理学的概念“好”（good），认为“好”的概念无法与任何经验事实（例如令人愉悦）等价，因此认为“好”无法定义，并借此指出了伦理自然主义的谬误。[10]
A. J. 艾耶1946年的著作《语言、真理与逻辑》提出情绪主义，用逻辑实证主义的检验原则否定伦理学。该书认为道德价值“好”，不可以用经验检证。他指出道德句子表达的是情绪，而非认知意义，因此非真非假，没有真值。[11]不过，21世纪有哲学家质疑逻辑实证主义的基础。林火旺认为，艾耶情绪主义的论证基础有问题。艾耶情绪主义的论证基础是“检证原则”，但“检证原则”不可以检证出“检证原则”本身。因为“检证原则”主张如果有意义的命题不是分析命题，就是可以检证的综合命题。当“检证原则”尝试检证“检证原则”本身，就会得出“检证原则”本身是没有认知意义[12]。
美国哲学教授爱德蒙德·葛梯尔1963年提出葛梯尔问题，研究“知”的定义，什么情况人才算“知”。他提出了如果一个人的结论的前提皆为假，但恰巧结论为真，那人算不算知道结论的问题。[13]
"Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers. Practitioners of types of philosophizing that are not in the analytic tradition—such as phenomenology, classical pragmatism, existentialism, or Marxism—feel it necessary to define their position in relation to analytic philosophy." John Searle (2003), Contemporary Philosophy in the United States in N. Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed., (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1. See, e.g., Avrum Stroll, Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 5: "[I]t is difficult to give a precise definition of 'analytic philosophy' since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems." Also, see Stroll (2000), p. 7: "I think Sluga is right in saying 'it may be hopeless to try to determine the essence of analytic philosophy.' Nearly every proposed definition has been challenged by some scholar. [...] [W]e are dealing with a family resemblance concept."
See Hans-Johann Glock, What Is Analytic Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 205: "The answer to the title question, then, is that analytic philosophy is a tradition held together both by ties of mutual influence and by family resemblances."
sacrifice. [17] Philoneos’ concubine went along for the sacrifice. When they were in Peiraieus, Philoneos sacrificed, of course. And when he had completed the sacrifice, the female wondered how to administer the drug to them, before or after dinner. And as she considered the matter she concluded that after dinner was better; she was also acting on the instructions of this Klytaimestra, my brother’s mother. [18] The full account of the dinner would be too longwinded for me to tell and you to hear. I shall try to give as brief an account as I can of the rest, of how the poison was administered. After dinner, naturally, since one was sacrificing to Zeus of Possessions and entertaining the other, and one was about to go on a voyage and was dining with a close friend, they made a libation and offered incense for their future. [19] And while Philoneos’ concubine was pouring the libation for them – as they offered prayers which would never be fulfilled, gentlemen – she poured in the poison. Thinking she was being clever, she gave more to Philoneos in the belief perhaps that if she gave him more she would win more affection from him – she had no idea that she was my stepmother’s dupe until disaster struck – while she poured less in our father’s drink. [20] They for their part after pouring their libations took their final drink, holding in their hands their own killer. Philoneos died at once on the spot; our father was afflicted with a sickness from which he died after twenty days. For this the assistant who carried out the act has the reward she deserved, though she was not to blame – she was put on the wheel and then handed over to the public executioner; the guilty party, the one who planned it, will soon have hers, if you and the gods will it. [21] Note how much more just my plea is than my brother’s. I urge you to avenge the dead man, who is the victim of an irreparable wrong. For the dead man my brother will offer no request, though he deserves your pity and support and vengeance for having his life taken in a godless and inglorious manner before his time by the last people who should have done this. [22] His plea will be for the murderess, a plea which is unprincipled, unholy, which deserves neither fulfilment nor attention either from the gods or from you; he will seek with his plea (to induce you not to convict her for her crimes) though she could not induce herself not to devise them.* But you must give your support not to those who kill but to the victims of deliberate. Trials from Classical Athens. Routledge. 2002-09-11: 47–48. ISBN 978-0-203-13047-6. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2001) [1953]. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell Publishing
Ayer, A. J. (1952) [1936]. "Critique of Ethics and Theology". Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publications. ISBN 0-486-20010-8.
