伊朗原则主义派

原则主义派席次
行政部门
总统	否
部长	3 / 18 （17%）
副总统	2 / 12 （17%）
议会
发言人	是
席次	83 / 290 （29%）
司法机构
司法总监	是
状态	优势
监督机构
专家会议	66 / 88 （75%）
宪法监督委员会	优势
国家利益委员会	优势
城市议会
德黑兰	0 / 21 （0%）
马什哈德	0 / 15 （0%）
伊斯法罕	0 / 13 （0%）
卡拉季	0 / 13 （0%）
库姆	12 / 13 （92%）
设拉子	1 / 13 （8%）
大不里士	3 / 13 （23%）
亚兹德	2 / 11 （18%）
扎黑丹	0 / 11 （0%）
拉什特	1 / 9 （11%）

原则主义派
原则主义派
议会领袖	阿里·拉里贾尼; 卡泽姆·贾拉利
意识形态	保守主义; 伊斯兰主义; 政治伊斯兰; 神权主义; 教法学家监护派系：; 民粹主义; 古典保守主义; 实用主义; 伊斯兰原教旨主义
政治立场	右翼
宗教信仰	什叶派
	伊朗政治; 政党 · 选举

原则主义派（波斯语：اصول‌گرایان‎，罗马化：Osul-Garâyân），也被称作伊朗保守派^[11]^[12]、保守-强硬派^[13]或伊朗右翼^[12]^[14]^[15]，伊斯兰革命之后与改革派构成两大主要政治阵营。某些欧美媒体称其为“强硬派”，通常指的是阵营中的某些极右派系^[16]，但阵营也包含部分中间倾向的派系 ^[17]。

事实速览 原则主义派, 议会领袖 ...

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事实速览 行政部门, 总统 ...

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在伊朗政治中，“原则”指的是支持伊朗最高领袖，并倡导保护伊斯兰革命早期的守旧派意识形态。^[18]侯赛因·穆萨维指出，伊朗原则主义派构筑了伊朗绝大多数的右翼/保守主义，倾向于宗教主义，且比起改革派，他们与库姆的教权组织有更多联系。^[19]原则主义派声明，会始终保持对伊斯兰教和守旧派伊斯兰革命的忠诚，服从最高领袖的命令和法基赫的监护。^[20]该阵营反对国际社会方面否认、改变当今伊朗守旧派政治体制的现状^[7]，且还大力支持目前伊朗国内的守旧派政权之形式。^[21]

目前原则主义派在专家会议、宪法监督委员会和司法机构中占据主导权。^[20]

20 sources

派系

极端保守派，也被称作强硬派、新保守主义派—由伊斯兰革命卫队等党派组成^[22]该派支持伊斯兰政府，对欧美国家具有更强的对抗性。^[22]代表人物为前伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德。^[23]

传统保守派，伊斯兰革命中协助组建了新政府，与鲁霍拉·穆萨维·何梅尼有传统的连接。^[22]该派支持伊斯兰政府并倡导文职统治。^[24]

3 sources

选举结果

总统选举

更多信息 年份, 候选人 ...

年份	候选人	得票	%	排名
1997	阿里·阿克巴·纳塔格-努里	7,248,317	24.87	2nd
2001	阿赫马德·塔瓦克里	4,387,112	15.58	2nd
2005/1	马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德	5,711,696	19.43	2nd
	穆罕默德·巴吉尔·卡利巴夫	4,095,827	13.93	4th
	阿里·拉里贾尼	1,713,810	5.83	5th
Total		11,521,333	39.19	决胜投票
2005/2	马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德	17,284,782	61.69	1st
2009	马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德	24,527,516	62.63	1st
2009	穆赫辛·礼萨伊	678,240	1.73	3rd
Total		25,205,756	64.36	当选
2013	穆罕默德·巴吉尔·卡利巴夫	6,077,292	16.56	2nd
	赛义德·贾利利	4,168,946	11.36	3rd
	穆赫辛·礼萨伊	3,884,412	10.58	4th
	阿里·阿克巴·韦拉亚提	2,268,753	6.18	6th
Total		16,399,403	44.68	失败
2017	埃卜拉希姆·赖西	15,835,794	38.28	2nd
2017	莫斯塔法·米尔-萨利姆	478,267	1.16	3rd
Total		16,314,061	39.44	失败

关闭

政党和组织

下面列出了伊朗目前还在活跃的原则主义党派：

两个社会（非正式）
- 战斗教士联盟
- 库姆神学院教师学会
伊玛目和领袖路线追随者阵线
- 伊斯兰联盟党
- 伊斯兰工程师协会
伊斯兰革命稳定阵线
发展与正义党

参考文献

[1]
Bodaghi, Ehsan. 'National dialogue' initiative indicates shifting political sands in Iran. Al-Monitor. 2017-05-04 [2017-06-17]. （原始内容存档于2020-02-07）.
[2]
Rohollah Faghihi, Iran's parliament shows its true colors, Al-Monitor, 2016-11-04 [2017-05-25], （原始内容存档于2020-02-07）
[3]
Mehdi Mozaffari, What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2007, 8 (1): 17–33, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622, In fact, Iranian ‘Islamists’ of our day call themselves ‘Usul gara’, which literally means ‘fundamentalist’, but in a positive sense. It designates a ‘person of principles’ who is the ‘true Muslim’.
[4]
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Women's Rights, Shari'a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran, International Journal of Politics Culture and Society (New York), 2013, 26 (3): 237–253, doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x, “Principlism” or osul-gera’i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari‘a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari‘a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.
[5]
Mohseni, Payam. Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation. Brumberg, Daniel; Farhi, Farideh (编). Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Indiana University Press. 2016: 47. ISBN 978-0253020680.
[6]
Melody Mohebi, The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan: 129–131, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6
[7]
Robert J. Reardon, Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation: 81–82, 2012, ISBN 978-0833076373
[8]
Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press: 135, 2002, ISBN 9780815629788
[9]
Freedom in the World: Iran, Freedom House, 2017 [2017-05-25], （原始内容存档于2017-05-17）
[10]
Iran conservatives tighten grip on top oversight body, Agence France-Presse (Yahoo), 2017-08-14 [2017-08-14], （原始内容存档于2019-02-21）
[11]
Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown. The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. 2013: 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. “Conservative” is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as “principlist” is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eslahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congrous groups and individuals.
[12]
Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush. Glossary of the most commonly-used Persian terms and abbreviations. Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989-2009 (学位论文). Martin, Vanessa (Supervisor). Royal Holloway, University of London: 11. 2012 [2019-03-17]. （原始内容存档于2020-11-28）. Open access material licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
[13]
李国富. 展望伊朗总统鲁哈尼第二任的内外政策. 当代世界. doi:10.19422/j.cnki.ddsj.2017.07.014.
[14]
Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan. Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. 2012-08-31: 108. ISBN 9781908433022. |entry=被忽略 (帮助)
[15]
Robin B. Wright (编), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press: 37, 2010, ISBN 978-1601270849
[16]
Masoud Kazemzadeh, Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran, Middle Eastern Studies, 2008, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, In Western sources, the term ‘hard-liners’ is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves ‘Osul-gara’. The word ‘osul’ means ‘fundamentals’, or ‘principles’ or ‘tenets’. And the suffix ‘gara’ means ‘those who uphold or promote’. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves ‘Ommat Hezbollah’. ‘Ommat’ is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. ‘Hezbollah’ literally means ‘Party of Allah’. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as ‘mohafezeh-kar’ (‘conservative’). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms ‘eqtedar-gara’ (authoritarian) and ‘tamamiyat-khah’ (totalitarian) for what many Western observers have termed ‘hard-liners’. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners ‘eqtedar-gara’.
[17]
Banafsheh Keynoush, Iran after Ahmadinejad, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (New York), 2012, 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hardliners but also more centre-right factions.
[18]
Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi. Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope. Bloomberg. 2013-06-16 [2015-03-10]. （原始内容存档于2020-11-11）.
[19]
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press: 486, 2012, ISBN 9780870033025
[20]
SHAUL, BAKHASH. Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. 2011-09-12 [2015-03-10]. （原始内容存档于2017-08-22）.
[21]
Etel Solingen (编), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press: 222, 2012, ISBN 9781107010444
[22]
Sherrill, Clifton. After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?. Orbis. 2011, 55 (4): 631–47. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.07.002.
[23]
伊朗：“新保守派”在崛起_网易新闻. news.163.com. [2019-03-17].^{[永久失效链接]}
[24]
Thaler et. al. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. 2010. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.

[1] [1]
Bodaghi, Ehsan. 'National dialogue' initiative indicates shifting political sands in Iran. Al-Monitor. 2017-05-04 [2017-06-17]. （原始内容存档于2020-02-07）.

[2] [2]
Rohollah Faghihi, Iran's parliament shows its true colors, Al-Monitor, 2016-11-04 [2017-05-25], （原始内容存档于2020-02-07）

[Islamism-3] [3]
Mehdi Mozaffari, What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2007, 8 (1): 17–33, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622, In fact, Iranian ‘Islamists’ of our day call themselves ‘Usul gara’, which literally means ‘fundamentalist’, but in a positive sense. It designates a ‘person of principles’ who is the ‘true Muslim’.

[4] [4]
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Women's Rights, Shari'a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran, International Journal of Politics Culture and Society (New York), 2013, 26 (3): 237–253, doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x, “Principlism” or osul-gera’i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari‘a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari‘a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.

[5] [5]
Mohseni, Payam. Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation. Brumberg, Daniel; Farhi, Farideh (编). Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Indiana University Press. 2016: 47. ISBN 978-0253020680.

[mm-6] [6]
Melody Mohebi, The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan: 129–131, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6

[CI-7] [7]
Robert J. Reardon, Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation: 81–82, 2012, ISBN 978-0833076373

[8] [8]
Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press: 135, 2002, ISBN 9780815629788

[FH-9] [9]
Freedom in the World: Iran, Freedom House, 2017 [2017-05-25], （原始内容存档于2017-05-17）

[10] [10]
Iran conservatives tighten grip on top oversight body, Agence France-Presse (Yahoo), 2017-08-14 [2017-08-14], （原始内容存档于2019-02-21）

[11] [11]
Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown. The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. 2013: 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. “Conservative” is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as “principlist” is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eslahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congrous groups and individuals.

[SRD-12] [12]
Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush. Glossary of the most commonly-used Persian terms and abbreviations. Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989-2009 (学位论文). Martin, Vanessa (Supervisor). Royal Holloway, University of London: 11. 2012 [2019-03-17]. （原始内容存档于2020-11-28）. Open access material licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

[13] [13]
李国富. 展望伊朗总统鲁哈尼第二任的内外政策. 当代世界. doi:10.19422/j.cnki.ddsj.2017.07.014.

[14] [14]
Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan. Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. 2012-08-31: 108. ISBN 9781908433022. |entry=被忽略 (帮助)

[15] [15]
Robin B. Wright (编), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press: 37, 2010, ISBN 978-1601270849

[16] [16]
Masoud Kazemzadeh, Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran, Middle Eastern Studies, 2008, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, In Western sources, the term ‘hard-liners’ is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves ‘Osul-gara’. The word ‘osul’ means ‘fundamentals’, or ‘principles’ or ‘tenets’. And the suffix ‘gara’ means ‘those who uphold or promote’. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves ‘Ommat Hezbollah’. ‘Ommat’ is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. ‘Hezbollah’ literally means ‘Party of Allah’. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as ‘mohafezeh-kar’ (‘conservative’). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms ‘eqtedar-gara’ (authoritarian) and ‘tamamiyat-khah’ (totalitarian) for what many Western observers have termed ‘hard-liners’. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners ‘eqtedar-gara’.

[17] [17]
Banafsheh Keynoush, Iran after Ahmadinejad, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (New York), 2012, 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hardliners but also more centre-right factions.

[Bloomberg-18] [18]
Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi. Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope. Bloomberg. 2013-06-16 [2015-03-10]. （原始内容存档于2020-11-11）.

[19] [19]
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press: 486, 2012, ISBN 9780870033025

[Tehran_Bureau-20] [20]
SHAUL, BAKHASH. Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. 2011-09-12 [2015-03-10]. （原始内容存档于2017-08-22）.

[21] [21]
Etel Solingen (编), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press: 222, 2012, ISBN 9781107010444

[sherill-orbis-22] [22]
Sherrill, Clifton. After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?. Orbis. 2011, 55 (4): 631–47. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.07.002.

[23] [23]
伊朗：“新保守派”在崛起_网易新闻. news.163.com. [2019-03-17].^{[永久失效链接]}

[24] [24]
Thaler et. al. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. 2010. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.

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