1931年,库尔特·哥德尔证明了哥德尔不完备定理:总可以构造出“哥德尔算式”使给定的一致形式系统(如高级符号操作系统)无法证明之。虽然构造的哥德尔算式是真语句,但在给定系统内却是无法证明的(哥德尔算式的真假取决于给定系统的一致性;对微妙地不一致系统应用同样的过程看似可行,但实际上会产出错误的“哥德尔算式”)。[来源请求]更推测性地说,哥德尔猜想,人类思维最终可以正确判断任何有根据的数学语句(包括所有哥德尔算式)的真假,因此人类思维不能还原为一种机械。[34]哲学家John Lucas (1961起)和罗杰·彭罗斯(1989起)一直倡导这种哲学上的反机械论。[35]
Müller, Vincent C. Philosophy of AI: A structured overview. Nathalie A. Smuha (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence. 2023-07-24 [2023-11-07]. (原始内容存档于2023-07-24).
Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar, Artificial Intelligence, Zalta, Edward N. (编), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2018, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018 [2018-09-18], (原始内容存档于2019-11-09)
See Russell & Norvig 2003,第3页 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help), where they make the distinction between acting rationally and being rational, and define AI as the study of the former.
Russell & Norvig (2003, pp. 48–52)认为恒温容器是智能体的最简单形式,即所谓“反射智能体”。关于恒温容器在哲学中作用的深入论述,请参Chalmers (1996, pp. 293–301) "4. Is Experience Ubiquitous?" subsections What is it like to be a thermostat?, Whither panpsychism?, and Constraining the double-aspect principle.
Gödel, Kurt, 1951, Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their implications in Solomon Feferman, ed., 1995. Collected works / Kurt Gödel, Vol. III. Oxford University Press: 304-23. - 在本讲座中,哥德尔利用不完备定理得出了以下结论:(a) 人的思维不是一致有限机,或(b) 存在其无法决定解的存在性的丢番图方程。哥德尔认为(b)不可信,于是人类思维不等同于一致有限机:人类思维的能力超过任何有限机。他承认这只是一种猜想,因为人们永远无法推翻(b)。不过,他认为这个不相干的结论是“确切的事实”。
Stuart J. Russell; Peter Norvig. 26.1.2: Philosophical Foundations/Weak AI: Can Machines Act Intelligently?/The mathematical objection. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach 3rd. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 2010. ISBN 978-0-13-604259-4. ……即使我们承认计算机在证明方面有局限性,也没有证据表明人类可以不受之影响。
Mark Colyvan. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press, 2012. From 2.2.2, 'Philosophical significance of Gödel's incompleteness results': "The accepted wisdom (with which I concur) is that the Lucas-Penrose arguments fail."
Turing 1950 under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness". See also Russell & Norvig 2003,第952–3页 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help), where they identify Searle's argument with Turing's "Argument from Consciousness."
Searle 1980 under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993,第269页 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFCrevier1993 (help), Russell & Norvig 2003,第959页 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help), Cole 2004,4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004)
Searle 1980 under "2. The Robot Reply (Yale)". Cole 2004,4.3 ascribes this position to Margaret Boden, Tim Crane, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Stevan Harnad, Hans Moravec and Georges Rey
Searle 1980 under "3. The Brain Simulator Reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.)" Cole 2004 ascribes this position to Paul and Patricia Churchland and Ray Kurzweil
Searle 1980 under "5. The Other Minds Reply", Cole 2004,4.4. Turing 1950 makes this reply under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness." Cole ascribes this position to Daniel Dennett and Hans Moravec.
Turing 1950 under "(1) The Theological Objection", although he also writes, "I am not very impressed with theological arguments whatever they may be used to support"
Dreyfus, Hubert, What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, 1972, ISBN 978-0-06-011082-6
Dreyfus, Hubert, What Computers Still Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, 1979.
Dreyfus, Hubert; Dreyfus, Stuart, Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer, Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986
Fearn, Nicholas, The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions: A Philosophical Adventure with the World's Greatest Thinkers, New York: Grove Press, 2007
Harnad, Stevan, What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument?, Bishop, M.; Preston, J. (编), Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument, Oxford University Press, 2001 [2023-11-07], (原始内容存档于2011-10-26)
Haraway, Donna (1985). A Cyborg Manifesto.
Haugeland, John, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985.
Horst, Steven, The Computational Theory of Mind, Zalta, Edward N. (编), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2009 [2023-11-07], (原始内容存档于2018-09-11).
Kaplan, Andreas; Haenlein, Michael, Siri, Siri in my Hand, who's the Fairest in the Land? On the Interpretations, Illustrations and Implications of Artificial Intelligence, Business Horizons, 2018, 62: 15–25, S2CID 158433736, doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.004
Kurzweil, Ray, The Singularity is Near, New York: Viking Press, 2005, ISBN 978-0-670-03384-3.
Lucas, John, Minds, Machines and Gödel, Anderson, A.R. (编), Minds and Machines, 1961 [2023-11-07], (原始内容存档于2007-08-19).
Malabou, Catherine (2019). Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains. (C. Shread, Trans.). Columbia University Press.