1931年,庫爾特·哥德爾證明了哥德爾不完備定理:總可以構造出「哥德爾算式」使給定的一致形式系統(如高級符號操作系統)無法證明之。雖然構造的哥德爾算式是真語句,但在給定系統內卻是無法證明的(哥德爾算式的真假取決於給定系統的一致性;對微妙地不一致系統應用同樣的過程看似可行,但實際上會產出錯誤的「哥德爾算式」)。[來源請求]更推測性地說,哥德爾猜想,人類思維最終可以正確判斷任何有根據的數學語句(包括所有哥德爾算式)的真假,因此人類思維不能還原為一種機械。[34]哲學家John Lucas (1961起)和羅傑·彭羅斯(1989起)一直倡導這種哲學上的反機械論。[35]
Müller, Vincent C. Philosophy of AI: A structured overview. Nathalie A. Smuha (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence. 2023-07-24 [2023-11-07]. (原始內容存檔於2023-07-24).
Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar, Artificial Intelligence, Zalta, Edward N. (編), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2018, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018 [2018-09-18], (原始內容存檔於2019-11-09)
See Russell & Norvig 2003,第3頁 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help), where they make the distinction between acting rationally and being rational, and define AI as the study of the former.
Russell & Norvig (2003, pp. 48–52)認為恆溫容器是智能體的最簡單形式,即所謂「反射智能體」。關於恆溫容器在哲學中作用的深入論述,請參Chalmers (1996, pp. 293–301) "4. Is Experience Ubiquitous?" subsections What is it like to be a thermostat?, Whither panpsychism?, and Constraining the double-aspect principle.
Gödel, Kurt, 1951, Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their implications in Solomon Feferman, ed., 1995. Collected works / Kurt Gödel, Vol. III. Oxford University Press: 304-23. - 在本講座中,哥德爾利用不完備定理得出了以下結論:(a) 人的思維不是一致有限機,或(b) 存在其無法決定解的存在性的丟番圖方程。哥德爾認為(b)不可信,於是人類思維不等同於一致有限機:人類思維的能力超過任何有限機。他承認這只是一種猜想,因為人們永遠無法推翻(b)。不過,他認為這個不相干的結論是「確切的事實」。
Stuart J. Russell; Peter Norvig. 26.1.2: Philosophical Foundations/Weak AI: Can Machines Act Intelligently?/The mathematical objection. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach 3rd. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 2010. ISBN 978-0-13-604259-4. ……即使我們承認計算機在證明方面有局限性,也沒有證據表明人類可以不受之影響。
Mark Colyvan. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press, 2012. From 2.2.2, 'Philosophical significance of Gödel's incompleteness results': "The accepted wisdom (with which I concur) is that the Lucas-Penrose arguments fail."
Turing 1950 under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness". See also Russell & Norvig 2003,第952–3頁 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help), where they identify Searle's argument with Turing's "Argument from Consciousness."
Searle 1980 under "1. The Systems Reply (Berkeley)", Crevier 1993,第269頁 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFCrevier1993 (help), Russell & Norvig 2003,第959頁 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFRussellNorvig2003 (help), Cole 2004,4.1. Among those who hold to the "system" position (according to Cole) are Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil and Georges Rey. Those who have defended the "virtual mind" reply include Marvin Minsky, Alan Perlis, David Chalmers, Ned Block and J. Cole (again, according to Cole 2004)
Searle 1980 under "2. The Robot Reply (Yale)". Cole 2004,4.3 ascribes this position to Margaret Boden, Tim Crane, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Stevan Harnad, Hans Moravec and Georges Rey
Searle 1980 under "3. The Brain Simulator Reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.)" Cole 2004 ascribes this position to Paul and Patricia Churchland and Ray Kurzweil
Searle 1980 under "5. The Other Minds Reply", Cole 2004,4.4. Turing 1950 makes this reply under "(4) The Argument from Consciousness." Cole ascribes this position to Daniel Dennett and Hans Moravec.
Turing 1950 under "(1) The Theological Objection", although he also writes, "I am not very impressed with theological arguments whatever they may be used to support"
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Dreyfus, Hubert; Dreyfus, Stuart, Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer, Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986
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Harnad, Stevan, What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument?, Bishop, M.; Preston, J. (編), Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument, Oxford University Press, 2001 [2023-11-07], (原始內容存檔於2011-10-26)
Haraway, Donna (1985). A Cyborg Manifesto.
Haugeland, John, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985.
Horst, Steven, The Computational Theory of Mind, Zalta, Edward N. (編), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2009 [2023-11-07], (原始內容存檔於2018-09-11).
Kaplan, Andreas; Haenlein, Michael, Siri, Siri in my Hand, who's the Fairest in the Land? On the Interpretations, Illustrations and Implications of Artificial Intelligence, Business Horizons, 2018, 62: 15–25, S2CID 158433736, doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.004
Kurzweil, Ray, The Singularity is Near, New York: Viking Press, 2005, ISBN 978-0-670-03384-3.
Lucas, John, Minds, Machines and Gödel, Anderson, A.R. (編), Minds and Machines, 1961 [2023-11-07], (原始內容存檔於2007-08-19).
Malabou, Catherine (2019). Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains. (C. Shread, Trans.). Columbia University Press.