气候变化政治（英语：Politics of climate change）指的是不同群体为应对气候变化所具的不同观点（如因应策略的歧异、利益冲突、科学认知的差距及政治考量）。气候变化主要是由人类经济活动所排放的温室气体造成，特别是由燃烧化石燃料、制造水泥和生产钢铁等，加上农业和林业的土地利用及土地利用改变所产生。自第一次工业革命以来，化石燃料为经济和开发活动提供重要的能源。科学界普遍认为气候政策有其必要（参见关于气候变化的科学共识），但居中心地位的化石燃料和碳密集型产业却对此种气候友善政策予以强烈抵制。
各国制定自己的减排计划，很大程度上是1991年引入的自愿性承诺和审查（英语：pledge and review）制度，但在京都议定书签署之前（1997年）已被放弃，京都议定书的重点是达成一致的"由上而下"的排放目标。这种自愿性做法在哥本哈根会议重新出现，并在2015年《巴黎协定》中得到进一步重视，但承诺被改称为国家自订贡献（英语：Nationally Determined Contributions），承诺应每隔5年重新提交一次。这种方法的效果还有待观察。[11]一些国家在2021年于苏格兰格拉斯哥召开的第26届联合国气候变化大会前后提交数量更高的国家自订贡献。签署国于同一会议中也通过碳交易的会计规则。[12]
为气候而罢课（瑞典语：Skolstrejk för klimatet）亦称周五为未来而战（英语：Fridays for Future （FFF））、青年需要良好气候（Youth for Climate）、气候罢课（Climate Strike/Climatestrike）或青年为气候罢课（Youth Strike for Climate），是项由学生在周五罢课，参加示威活动的国际运动，诉求是政治领导人该采取行动以缓解气候变化，以及化石燃料行业该转而生产再生能源。
瑞典学生格蕾塔·童贝里于2018年8月在瑞典议会外举著书写“Skolstrejk för klimatet”（“为气候而罢课”）的牌子进行举抗议活动，随后世界各地展开宣传和广泛的组织活动。[36][37]
在2019年9月进行的气候罢课（Global Week for Future），总计在150多个国家/地区共举行过4,500起罢课，集中在9月20日（2019年联合国气候行动峰会前三日）星期五和9月27日星期五，也包含有在两日之间的活动。 于9月20日的罢课是世界史上最大规模的为气候而罢课，聚集大约400万名抗议者，其中许多是学童，德国的参与者有140万名。[45]
一些气候友善政策在立法过程中受到环境和/或左派压力团体和政党的阻挠。例如于2009年，澳大利亚绿党投票反对碳污染减排计划（英语：Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme），因为他们认为该计划没有施加足够高的碳价。在美国，草根环境组织塞拉俱乐部助阵，阻止2016年气候税法案通过，因为他们认为该法案缺乏社会正义。在美国各州实施的一些碳定价尝试已被左派政客阻止，因为这些是透过碳定价（又称限额与交易机制 cap and trade）而非税收来执行的。[123]
太阳辐射调节是另一项减少全球暖化的技术，透过于平流层中注入气溶胶，人们普遍认为这将有效降低全球平均气温。然而许多气候科学家认为这种技术的前景不受欢迎，并警告说，副作用包括由于阳光和降水量减少可能会导致农业产量下降，以及可能出现局部气温上升和其他天气干扰。根据美国气候学家迈克尔·曼（英语：Michael E. Mann）的说法，利用太阳辐射调节来降低地球升温，是种降低制定减排政策意愿的另一手法。[126][51][127]
气候融资的成长：近年来于气候变化领域中的资金流动开始增加，融资机制有所开展。在墨西哥坎昆举行的2010年联合国气候变化大会，呼吁创立绿色气候基金，由发达国家向发展中国家提供大量资金，以支持调适和缓解技术。资金将透过双边和多边官方发展援助、全球环境基金、联合国气候变化纲要公约等多种管道转移。[178]此外也有越来越多的公共资金为发展中国家应对气候变化提供更大的助力。例如气候韧性试点计划（Pilot Program for Climate Resilience），目的在为一些低收入国家制定综合和扩大规模的气候变化调适方法，及为未来资金流动预作准备。除发展中国家和发达国家对"共同但有区别的责任（英语：common but differentiated responsibilities）（CBDR）概念"有不同的解释之外，气候变化资金的挹注也可能会改变对发展中国家的传统援助机制。[179][180]发展中国家因而必须改变治理结构，将传统的捐赠与受援关系扬弃。在这类情景中，了解气候变化领域资金流动的政治经济过程对于有效的管理资源转移和应对气候变化会非常重要。[174]
Dessler (2020), broadly agrees that this more collaborative approach was key to success at Paris, though warned that one of the main parties which drove the change (China) had by 2018 returned to a less friendly approach, seeking to magnify differences between developed and less developed nations.
In addition to the normal collective action problems, other difficulties have included: 1.) The fact that fossil fuel use has been common across the economy, unlike the relatively few firms that controlled manufacture of products containing the CFCs, which had been damaging the Ozone layer. 2.) Incompatible views from different nations on the level of responsibility that highly developed countries had in assisting less developed controls to control their emissions without inhibiting their economic growth. 3.) Difficulty in getting humans to take significant action to limit a threat that is far away in the future. 4.) The dilemma between the conflicting needs to reach agreements that could be accepted by all, versus the desirability for the agreement to have significant practical effect on human activity. See e.g. Dryzek (2011) Chpt. 3, and Dessler (2020) Chpt. 1, 4 & 5.
Whether it actually is cheaper depends on various factors like the fluctuating price of fossil fuels on the global market, the endowments that the Jurisdiction enjoys (sunlight, amount of flowing water etc. ) and if the new renewable energy infrastructure is replacing an existing fossil fuel plant, on the timescale under consideration, which determines whether construction costs can be offset.
Much media coverage on these lines was paid for by the fossil fuel industry, with Koch Industries one of the more prominent companies involved. Yet in the early 2010s the Koch brothers pushed for taxes on households with solar panels selling excess energy back to the Grid, leading Michael Mann to suggest that preference for small government may not have been their primary motivation. See Mann (2021) Chpt 6, p. 124-127
Hoggan, James; Littlemore, Richard. Climate Cover-Up: The Crusade to Deny Global Warming. Vancouver: Greystone Books. 2009 [2010-03-19]. ISBN 978-1-55365-485-8. See, e.g., p31 ff, describing industry-based advocacy strategies in the context of climate change denial, and p73 ff, describing involvement of free-market think tanks in climate-change denial.
Poushter, Jacob; Fagan, Moira; Gubbala, Sneha. Climate Change Remains Top Global Threat Across 19-Country Survey. pewresearch.org. Pew Research Center. 2022-08-31. （原始内容存档于2022-08-31）. — Other threats in the survey were: spread of false information online, cyberattacks from other countries, condition of the global economy, and spread of infectious diseases.
Lewis, Joanna I. Green Industrial Policy After Paris: Renewable Energy Policy Measures and Climate Goals. Global Environmental Politics. November 2021, 21 (4): 42–63. ISSN 1526-3800. S2CID 240142129. doi:10.1162/glep_a_00636.
Yale Climate Connections, 6 January 2020 ["Fossil Fuel Political Giving Outdistances Renewables 13 to One; During the Latest Midterm Election Cycle, the Fossil Fuel Industry Paid at Least $359 Million for Federal Campaign Donations and Lobbying"] The figures listed in this article include only known industry spending at the federal level; they do not include political contributions at the state and local levels and "dark money" spending.
Weart 2015a harvnb模板错误: 无指向目标: CITEREFWeart2015a (帮助): Global Warming Becomes a Political Issue (1980–1983)互联网档案馆的存档，存档日期2016-06-29.; "In 1981, Ronald Reagan took the presidency with an administration that openly scorned their concerns. He brought with him a backlash that had been building against the environmental movement. Many conservatives denied nearly every environmental worry, global warming included. They lumped all such concerns together as the rants of business-hating liberals, a Trojan Horse for government regulation." For details, see Money for Keeling: Monitoring CO2互联网档案馆的存档，存档日期2016-06-29.
Editorial. Adaptation trade-offs. Nature Climate Change. November 2015, 5 (11): 957. Bibcode:2015NatCC...5Q.957.. doi:10.1038/nclimate2853. See also Sovacool, B. and Linnér, B.-O. (2016), The Political Economy of Climate Change Adaptation, Palgrave Macmillan UK.
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Oreskes, Naomi. BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change. Science. December 2004, 306 (5702): 1686. PMID 15576594. doi:10.1126/science.1103618. Such statements suggest that there might be substantive disagreement in the scientific community about the reality of anthropogenic climate change. This is not the case. [...] Politicians, economists, journalists, and others may have the impression of confusion, disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, but that impression is incorrect.
America's Climate Choices: Panel on Advancing the Science of Climate Change; National Research Council. Advancing the Science of Climate Change. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 2010. ISBN 978-0-309-14588-6. doi:10.17226/12782. （原始内容存档于29 May 2014）. (p1) ... there is a strong, credible body of evidence, based on multiple lines of research, documenting that climate is changing and that these changes are in large part caused by human activities. While much remains to be learned, the core phenomenon, scientific questions, and hypotheses have been examined thoroughly and have stood firm in the face of serious scientific debate and careful evaluation of alternative explanations. * * * (p21-22) Some scientific conclusions or theories have been so thoroughly examined and tested, and supported by so many independent observations and results, that their likelihood of subsequently being found to be wrong is vanishingly small. Such conclusions and theories are then regarded as settled facts. This is the case for the conclusions that the Earth system is warming and that much of this warming is very likely due to human activities.
Understanding and Responding to Climate Change(PDF). United States National Academy of Sciences. 2008 [30 May 2010]. （原始内容存档(PDF)于2013-04-23）. Most scientists agree that the warming in recent decades has been caused primarily by human activities that have increased the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Lynas, Mark; Houlton, Benjamin Z.; Perry, Simon. Greater than 99% consensus on human caused climate change in the peer-reviewed scientific literature. Environmental Research Letters. 2021-10-19, 16 (11): 114005. Bibcode:2021ERL....16k4005L. S2CID 239032360. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/ac2966.
Myers, Krista F.; Doran, Peter T.; Cook, John; Kotcher, John E.; Myers, Teresa A. Consensus revisited: quantifying scientific agreement on climate change and climate expertise among Earth scientists 10 years later. Environmental Research Letters. 2021-10-20, 16 (10): 104030. Bibcode:2021ERL....16j4030M. S2CID 239047650. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/ac2774.
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Editorial. Adaptation trade-offs. Nature Climate Change. November 2015, 5 (11): 957. Bibcode:2015NatCC...5Q.957.. doi:10.1038/nclimate2853. See also Sovacool, B. and Linnér, B.-O. (2016), The Political Economy of Climate Change Adaptation, Palgrave Macmillan UK.
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