Il est coauteur du livre The Philosophy of Science(ISBN0-262-52156-3) utilisé dans les cours de philosophie des premier et deuxième cycles. La thèse de doctorat de Boyd sous la direction de Hilary Putnam est intitulée A recursion-theoretic characterization of the ramified analytical hierarchy.
A Recursion-Theoretic Characterization of the Ramified Analytical Hierarchy, mit Gustav Hensel und Hilary Putnam, in: Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 141 (Jul., 1969), 37-62 (Dissertationsthema)
Realism and Scientific Epistemology. Unpublished 1971
Determinism, Laws and Predictability in Principle, Philosophy of Science 39 (1972): 431-50.
Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence. in: Nous 7 (1973):1–12.
Approximate Truth and Natural Necessity, in: The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 73, No. 18, Seventy-Third Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Oct., 1976), 633-635
Metaphor and Theory Change in: A. Ortony (Hg.): Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail. In: Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, ed. N. Block, vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1980.
Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology, PSA 80, vol. 2 (Philosophy of Science Association) (ed R. N. Giere / P. D. Asquith) (1982).
On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism, Erkenntnis (1983) 19:45–90.
Observations, Explanatory Power and Simplicity, in: Observation, Experiment and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, ed. Achinstein and Hannaway (1985).
Lex Orandi est Lex Credendi, in: Images of Science: Scientific Realism Versus Constructive Empiricism, ed. Churchland and Hooker, Chicago 1985.
The Logician's Dilemma: Deductive Logic, Inductive Inference and Logical Empiricism, Erkenntnis (1985).
Realism and the Moral Sciences. Unpublished 1987
How to be a Moral Realist, in: Moral Realism, ed. Sayre McCord, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1988.
What Realism implies and What It Does Not, in: Dielactica (1989)
Realism, Conventionality, and 'Realism About, in: Boolos (Hg.): Meaning and Method, Cambridge 1990
Realism, Approximate Truth and Philosophical Method, in: Wade Savage (Hg.): Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. 14. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1990)
Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds, in: Philosophical Studies 61 (1991), 127-148
Metaphor and Theory Change, in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Ortony, New York 1993.
Kinds as the "Workmanship of Men. Realism, Constructivism, and Natural Kinds, in: Julian Nida-Rümelin (Hg.) Rationalität, Realismus, Revision: Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. Berlin: de Gruyter (1999).
Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realizations: Comments on Millikan's ‘Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences’, in: Philosophical Studies
Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa, in: R. Wilson (Hg.): Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, Cambdrige: MIT Press