Battle of Breitenfeld (1631)

Not to be confused with Battle of Breitenfeld (1642).

The Battle of Breitenfeld (German: Schlacht bei Breitenfeld; Swedish: Slaget vid Breitenfeld) or First Battle of Breitenfeld (in older texts sometimes known as Battle of Leipzig), was fought at a crossroads near Breitenfeld approximately 8 km north-west of the walled city of Leipzig on 17 September (Gregorian calendar), or 7 September (Julian calendar, in wide use at the time), 1631.^[b][a] A Swedish-Saxon army led by King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and Saxon Elector John George I defeated an Imperial-Catholic League Army led by Generalfeldmarschall Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly. It was the Protestants' first major victory of the Thirty Years War.

Battle of Breitenfeld
Part of the Thirty Years' War
Gustavus Adolphus at the battle of Breitenfeld, painting by J. J. Walther, 1632 painting in the Musée historique de Strasbourg.
Date 17 September 1631 (N.S.) 7 September 1631 (O.S.) Location Breitenfeld,[a] Electorate of Saxony (today part of Leipzig, Saxony, Germany) 51°25′04″N 12°22′40″E Result Swedish-Saxon victory
Belligerents
Swedish Empire Electorate of Saxony	Holy Roman Empire Catholic League
Commanders and leaders
Gustavus Adolphus Gustav Horn Johan Banér John George I Hans Georg von Arnim	Count of Tilly (WIA) Gottfried zu Pappenheim  (WIA) Egon von Fürstenberg
Strength
40,150[1] 22,800 Swedes 17,350 Saxons 66 guns[1]	31,400[1] 14,700 Imperials 15,700 Catholic League 1,000 irregulars 27 guns[2]
Casualties and losses
5,550 Sweden: 3,550 killed or wounded[3] Saxony: 2,000 killed or wounded[3]	16,600[note 1] 7,600 killed[4] 6,000 captured[4] 8,000 dead, deserted or captured over the following days:[4] 3,000 surrendered in Swedish-Saxon pursuit; 5,000 deserted or killed by Saxon peasants.[5]
Breitenfeld Location within Saxony Show map of Saxony Breitenfeld Breitenfeld (Germany) Show map of Germany

Sweden entered the Thirty Years' War in 1628 in an attempt to prevent the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II from expanding his power to the Baltic Sea and threaten Swedish territory. King Gustavus Adolphus landed with a Swedish army in the Duchy of Pomerania in 1630 to intervene in favor of the German Protestants. In the spring of 1631, Field Marshal Tilly had assembled an army to restore Imperial control over northern Germany. Already that summer, Tilly invaded the Electorate of Saxony, whose Elector John George I chose to enter into an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus. With their united troops totalling 40,150 men, the Protestant armies marched to Leipzig to meet Tilly's army, which numbered 31,400 men.

The three armies met outside the village of Breitenfeld in early September 1631. At the start of the battle, the Saxon army was knocked off the battlefield by the imperial cavalry, whereupon Tilly with his infantry tried to engage the Swedish army with a pincer movement. Through quick improvisation and the flexibility and firepower among the Swedish troops, they were able to regroup and launch a series of counterattacks against Tilly's troops. When Gustavus Adolphus performed a broad counteroffensive with his cavalry, Tilly was forced to retreat from the battlefield, losing two-thirds of his army after the battle.

The Swedish-Saxon victory at Breitenfeld allowed Gustavus Adolphus to launch a campaign against southern Germany. It was the King's most notable military victory and cemented his reputation of being one of the greatest military commanders in modern history.^[6] His army at Breitenfeld utilized an early form of combined arms and mobile units, combined with superior discipline, organizational flexibility and initiative. As the war progressed, several armies, including the imperial army, began to adopt the Swedish military doctrine.

Background

Main article: Thirty Years War

Map of the Holy Roman Empire in 1618.

The Thirty Years' War was an interweaving of several larger and smaller interlinked conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in Europe. The first spark of the war was the Protestant revolt in Bohemia, which occurred after the much-publicized defenestration of Prague in May 1618. The war was fueled by several internal and external tensions against the Habsburg monarchy. The religious division between the Catholic and Protestant states within the Holy Roman Empire came to develop during the course of the war into a minor world war between the great powers of Europe. During the second half of the war, Catholic France would find itself at war with both the Habsburgs and Catholic Spain. Spain, in turn, had been involved in the Eighty Years' War against the Netherlands for a long time. Sweden and Russia were in conflict with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Later, Denmark–Norway, the Electorate of Saxony and other smaller German states and imperial cities also became involved in the conflict with the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II. At the end of the Bohemian Revolt (1618–1622), the war transitioned into the Palatinate-Danish phase (1623–1629). Through a successful campaign in Northern Germany, the Imperial Army under Generalissimo Albrecht von Wallenstein was able to defeat the Danish Army. Denmark's withdrawal from the war in 1629 led to a de-escalation of the hostilities. Ever since the outbreak of the war, the Protestant states in Germany were forced to endure severe hardships. Against the background of the strengthened position of the Emperor and the Catholic side, the Edict of Restitution was issued in March 1629, which would have brought a killing blow to the independence of the Protestant states. It was against this background, as well as after the signing of the separate treaty with Poland in September 1629, that Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, planned his own intervention in the war and came to be a leading figure for the Protestant co-religionists in Northern Germany.^[7][8][9]

Swedish landing in Pomerania

Main article: Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years' War

Landing of Gustav II Adolf in Pomerania (1630) by an unknown artist.

Northern Germany were within Sweden's immediate sphere of interest. If the Catholic armies were able to build up a fleet in the Baltic Sea, they could become a large threat to Swedish territory. The conflict escalated following Sweden's intervention in the war, which then spread further along different fronts both within and outside of Europe's borders. Gustavus Adolphus initially laid out the outlines of a diplomatic solution to the conflict, which were intended to satisfy the interests of the Protestants in Northern Germany. After fruitless negotiations with Ferdinand II in Danzig in the spring of 1630, it proved impossible for the King to reach a satisfactory settlement. Despite continued and far-reaching offers, Gustavus Adolphus also initially failed to reach an agreement with Elector John George I of Saxony. As a member of the Electoral College, Saxony held a dominant position among the Protestant estates within the Imperial Diet. During the Elector's meeting in Regensburg in August 1630, the Electoral College, who saw the Emperor's growing power as a threat, forced the dismissal of Wallenstein and the reduction of both the Imperial and Catholic League's armies respectively.^[10][11][12]

Speaking to the Riksdag of the Estates in 1628 and 1629, Gustavus Adolphus emphasized about the necessity of Sweden's entry into the war. This was partly done in defense of the Protestant faith, but also due to the imperial naval armaments in Northern Germany, which could pose a great threat to Swedish territory.^[13] After the entire Riksdag approved the king's declaration of war, on June 17, 1630, the King and his army of 13,200 men boarded the Swedish fleet at Älvsnabben in the Stockholm archipelago; the fleet consisted of 60 warships and 200 smaller boats. On June 25, 1630, the fleet rounded Cape Perd on Rügen and the king landed with his army at Peenemünde in Usedom two days later. Their landing went unopposed on the Imperial side, whose few garrisons in the general area quickly retreated to Wolgast. Wallenstein was dismissed as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army in September 1630. Before leaving his post, Wallenstein's last action was to reinforce the garrisons in Pomerania and Mecklenburg with 30,000 men. As these provinces were poor and deprived of means to support these troops, they were unable to be deployed over a large defense perimeter.^{[14][15][16][17][18]}

From the Baltic Sea, Gustavus Adolphus could supply his army through regular deliveries of supplies from the Swedish mainland. During the first month after the landing, the Swedes occupied the city of Kammin and the islands of Rügen, Usedom and Wollin. They captured the Pomeranian capital of Stettin on July 20, whose garrison surrendered without resistance.^[19] Through the Treaty of Stettin, concluded on August 25, Duke Bogislav XIV of Pomerania was forced to enter into an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus and assist with supplying the King's army. Furthermore, the king received subsidies from the deposed dukes of Mecklenburg, whose territories had previously been occupied by Wallenstein and thus saw the Swedish King as their liberator. At the beginning of August, Swedish Major General Dodo zu Knyphausen besieged Wolgast with his 5,000 men, which he was able to capture after three weeks on August 25. Shortly afterwards, Knyphausen also tried to besiege the coastal town of Kolberg. When both Kolberg and the nearby town of Greifswald put up stubborn resistance, Knyphausen was forced to withdraw at the end of 1630. Through the summer campaign of 1630, the Swedish bridgehead along the German Baltic Sea coast was consolidated, while the Swedish army was strengthened through the recruitment of mercenaries from the surrounding area.^{[20][21][22][23]}

Swedish campaigns in Mecklenburg and Pomerania

Contemporary German newspaper image from the 1630s depicting Gustavus Adolplhus forcing Pope Urban VIII, the symbol of the Catholic faith, to surrender all Protestant cities and fortresses in Germany conquered by the Catholics.

At the beginning of his campaign, Gustavus Adolplhus was in great need of both economic and military support from the Protestant powers in Germany, whose enthusiasm for the Swedish landing was extremely limited. Among the Electorates of Saxony and Brandenburg, including some smaller duchies, Gustavus Adolplhus was regarded as a foreign invader. Only William V, Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, the city of Magdeburg and the dukes of Mecklenburg and Saxe-Weimar declared themselves in favor of the Swedish King.^[24][14][25] On the Catholic side, Ferdinand II had an army totaling 100,000 men, but for logistical reasons the force had been steadily reduced to a field army of 60,000 men. It consisted of 40,000 Imperial soldiers and 20,000 Catholic League soldiers under the joint command of Wallenstein's successor, Generalfeldmarschall Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly. Italian Field Marshal Torquato Conti commanded the Imperial troops in Pomerania. But the absence of Wallenstein created a confusing situation, and the poor condition among Conti's troops made him unable to stop Gustavus Adolplhus's conquests.^[26][23]

Generalfeldmarschall Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial and Catholic League Armies respectively. Engraving by Anthony van Dyck.

After the Swedish army consolidated their territories in Pomerania during the summer of 1630, Gustavus Adolplhus was able to advance towards Mecklenburg. Mecklenburg was invaded at the end of September by 12,000 Swedish soldiers, with their main objective of securing the river crossings over the Elbe. Half of these troops, under the direct command of the King, captured the town of Ribnitz and some minor imperial fortresses before launching a siege of the port city of Rostock. Meanwhile, on 23 October his ally William of Hesse-Kassel was defeated by the Imperial Field Marshal Gottfried Heinrich Graf zu Pappenheim, whose troops had arrived in the lower reaches of the Elbe. At the same time, Colonel Federigo di Savelli succeeded in strengthening Rostock's defenses, thereby deterring the now numerically inferior Swedish troops. Gustavus Adolplhus decided in mid-October to break off the siege and return to Pomerania.^[27][28][29]

This fruitless expedition convinced the King to abandon his attempts to capture the crossings of the Elbe, instead turning his attention to the river Oder further east. During the winter months of 1630 he strengthened his army, which including garrisons numbered over 100,000 men by the end of the year. He now divided his army into four separate army corps.^[30] The largest was the royal army of 30,000 men, under the King's personal command. A corps of 15,000 men led by the king's deputy, Field Marshal Gustav Horn, Count of Pori, advanced along the Oder. Later, Horn's army was reinforced with 11,000 men under Major General Maximilian Teuffel, who by this time had abandoned the siege of Kolberg. A smaller army corps of 2,500 men under Colonel Dietrich von Falkenberg was sent to reinforce the garrison of Magdeburg. Finally, a British expedition of 15,000 men under Marquess James Hamilton, 1st Duke of Hamilton landed at the mouth of the river Peene and prepared to join the King's army. On the Catholic side, Conti with 12,000 imperial soldiers was able to occupy strong fortresses at Gartz and Greifenhagen. Their proximity to Stettin caused great problems for the Swedes, both in holding both banks of the Oder and securing the Swedish lines of communication between Pomerania and Magdeburg.^[31]

On Christmas Day of 1630, Gustavus Adolplhus launched a surprise attack against both Greifenhagen and Gartz. The garrison in Greifenhagen was annihilated, while the garrison of Gartz retreated following a Swedish bombardment of the fortress.^[32] The fleeing troops led by Colonel Hannibal von Schauenberg made it to safety into Brandenburg. Despite his small losses of 500 men throughout the Swedish operation, Conti's troops was forced to evacuate all of Pomerania.^[33][34] Meanwhile, Tilly and his army had arrived at Frankfurt an der Oder in mid-January 1631, having covered a 300 kilometres (190 mi) march in 10 days. Gustavus Adolplhus marched downstream of the Oder and captured the town of Bärwalde on 13 January 1631, where he met with French diplomat Hercule de Charnacé. With him as his counterpart, the King signed the Treaty of Bärwalde on 23 January 1631. Under its terms, Gustavus Adolphus agreed to maintain an army of 36,000 troops, in return for an annual payment of 400,000 Reichsthalers, for a period of five years.^{[35][36][37][38]}

Sieges of Frankfurt (Oder) and Magdeburg

Main articles: Battle of Frankfurt an der Oder and Sack of Magdeburg

Gustavus Adolphus launched his second invasion against the Duchy of Mecklenburg in February 1631. On March 19, 1631, Tilly left Frankfurt an der Oder with his army and headed for the duchy's border. Tilly ruthlessly captured and sacked the rebellious town of Neubrandenburg, while Gustavus Adolphus avoided two direct confrontations with Tilly's army and instead captured the town of Demmin. The King then turned his attention to Frankfurt an der Oder, both to secure the river crossing over the Oder and to deter Tilly from threatening Magdeburg. On learning of the Swedes' plans, Tilly found himself in a dilemma whether to rescue Frankfurt or complete his siege of Magdeburg. On April 13, Gustavus Adolphus' army of 23,000 men arrived outside the walls around Frankfurt (Oder). Knowing of the Imperials' plunder of Neubrandenburg, the King intended to see that Frankfurt would have to pay in the same coin. On the same day, the Swedes launched a furious attack on the city. After a fierce battle, in which 800 Swedish soldiers fell, the city was captured, and 3,000 men from the city's garrison were massacred together with a number of armed citizens. Following the news of the fall of Frankfurt, Tilly immediately returned to Magdeburg with 25,000 men.^{[39][40][41][42]}

Sack of Magdeburg – The Magdeburg maidens, 1866 painting by Eduard Steinbrück.

The territories of the Swedes and the Imperial League in Pomerania after the Swedes' conquest of Kolberg, Landsberg and Frankfurt.

Soon after their conquest of Frankfurt an der Oder, the Swedish troops were able to capture the town of Landsberg. The garrison in Kolberg also capitulated in March 1631, after five months of resistance against the Swedes. Gustavus Adolphus had thus taken control of the entire territory northeast of Frankfurt and was able to exert diplomatic pressure on the Protestant electors. In May 1631, he marched his troops against Potsdam and Berlin, held by his brother-in-law, Elector George William of Brandenburg, and succeeded in capturing the fortress of Spandau. These actions forced the Elector to enter into an alliance with Sweden. The alliance was ratified on June 22, 1631, where Brandenburg agreed to assist Sweden with monthly subsidies. Despite this threat to his northern border, John George of Saxony was still not persuaded or forced to enter into an alliance with Sweden. The Elector instead continued to maintain a policy of strict neutrality in relation to the campaigns that took place outside the borders of his Electorate. This policy hindered both the King's and Tilly's continued warfare.^[43][40]

Since the beginning of April 1631, Magdeburg was besieged by imperial troops. The city's commandant Falkenberg was ordered by Gustavus Adolphus to hold the city for at least two months. Initially, Falkenberg had been able to take advantage of Tilly's hesitation for his siege, by strengthening the city's defenses and reorganizing his 2,500-strong garrison to be supported by 5,000 armed citizens.^[42] But after the fall of Frankfurt, Tilly returned to Magdeburg at the end of April. He systematically attacked the city's outer defenses from several sides, which were gradually abandoned by the Swedish defenders. The Imperial troops dug trenches which, by mid-May, ran only five meters from the city's walls. On May 18, Tilly issued a final ultimatum for surrender to the city, which was subsequently refused by the city's council. On May 19, Tilly held a council of war with his generals where they decided to make a final assault on the city from six directions the following day.^[44] During the morning of 20 May, the city was bombarded by Tilly's guns and Imperial troops broke into the city from several directions. The city was set on fire, Falkenberg and the entire city garrison were massacred, and the Imperial troops pillaged the city for several days while committing cruel acts of violence against the city's 25,000 inhabitants. By the time Tilly ordered an end to the looting on 24 May, Magdeburg was turned into a smoldering ghost town, resulting in the deaths of around 20,000 inhabitants.^{[45][40][46][47]}

Engagements along the Elbe

Main article: Battle of Werben

The destruction of Magdeburg had dire consequences for both Tilly and Gustavus Adolphus. Tilly was unable to support his troops in the vicinity of the city, while the King's failure to rescue the city in time damaged his reputation. Another consequence was that the loss of Magdeburg persuaded the King to abandon his previous cautious method of warfare and instead seek redress for the ruthless massacre of Magdeburg's Protestant population.^[48] The Swedes turned the sack of Magdeburg to good use: broadsides and pamphlets distributed throughout Europe ensured that prince and pauper alike understood how the Emperor, or at least his troops, treated his Protestant subjects.^[49][50]

Tilly marched from Magdeburg to face the army of Gustavus Adolphus. Through fresh recruits and troops from Northern Italy, who had previously been engaged in the Mantuan War of Succession, Tilly's field army was supported by three advancing armies totaling 30,000 men. Tilly decided to divide his field army into two parts: one army under Pappenheim was ordered to guard the vicinity of Magdeburg, while a second led by Tilly himself was to march towards Thuringia to meet Saxe-Weimar's troops. Meanwhile, two Imperial and Catholic League armies under Generals Egon of Fürstenberg-Heiligenberg and Johann von Aldringen, who occupied the Duchy of Württemberg and the city of Ulm, marched from the south while a third army under General Otto Heinrich Fugger, Count of Kirchberg, occupied Hesse.^[51][52]

Gustavus Adolphus now prepared to prevent further imperial depredations by establishing a strong defensive line along the rivers Elbe, Havel and Spree. He also sent smaller detachments to Mecklenburg and Silesia. Pappenheim was by this time exasperated as a result of his stagnant station at Magdeburg. By early July, on his own initiative, he decided to launch a major offensive against Havelberg, Werben and Burg with his 13,000 men, starting from his bridgehead at Havel. The Swedes conducted an immediate counter-attack which in a week drove Pappenheim's troops back to the other side of the Havel, while also capturing the strategically important bridgehead of Tangermünde. Gustavus Adolphus regrouped his army of 30,000 men in an attempt to challenge Tilly's Imperial and Catholic League army, which at the time had not yet converged with their reinforcements coming from the south. In tandem, the King drew up a plan of defense centered around the town of Werben, which the Swedes had recently recaptured from Pappenheim's troops. Meanwhile, Tilly had converged with Pappenheim's army to with their combined 20,000 troops attempt to challenge Gustavus Adolphus in open battle. The King, in turn, had assembled 15,000 men at a heavily fortified camp in Werben.^[53][48][54]

The Swedes' territory in northern Germany in August 1631.

Tilly advanced slowly towards Werben. On 27 July, some of his regiments stationed at Burgstall were chased away by Swedish cavalry units. Distressed by this setback, Tilly arrived with his army outside Werben on 5 August. He was aware that a frontal assault against the strong Swedish camp would end in a massacre of his troops. On the morning of August 6, while a thick fog covered their surroundings, Tilly chose to use the fog as a smoke screen and ordered his troops to advance towards the camp's weakest sections. When the fog suddenly dispersed during the march, Tilly's troops were immediately exposed to Swedish artillery fire and were forced to retreat with heavy casualties. Tilly then arrayed his army in battle formation and stood idle for two days, but Gustavus Adolhpus refused to accept Tilly's challenge. Since the latter did not want to risk a second assault against the strong Swedish position, the imperial troops retreated on August 8. Both Tilly and the King spent the following weeks to reinforce their armies. By the arrival of Fürstenberg's army at the end of August, Tilly had a total of 35,000 men at his disposal, while Gustavus Adolphus's army at the time was numerically inferior.^{[53][55][56][57]}

Preliminaries

The Saxon policy of neutrality continued to hinder Tilly's army. The Electorate blocked the lines of communication between the Imperial and League armies that crossed the Swedish line of defense along the Elbe and Oder. John Georg I also wanted to strengthen his Electorate by issuing a decree for the recruitment of militia regiments, which was met with condemnation from Emperor Ferdinand. Tilly feared that the Elector of Saxony would ally himself with Gustavus Adolphus, who had already entered into an alliance with Brandenburg. In order to present John Georg I with an ultimatum regarding his recruitment, Tilly chose to invade the Electorate in June 1631. The Elector at this time wanted to buy time by engaging in negotiations with Tilly, to avoid a direct counter-offensive. But Tilly chose to quickly end the negotiations and instead begin a siege of Leipzig.^{[58][59][48][60][61][62]}

Contemporary copper engraving depicting the besieged city of Leipzig.

With the imminent threat of an imperial occupation of his Electorate, John Georg I decided on 30 August to enter into an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus. With their combined forces, their aim was now to engage with Tilly's army and stop the siege of Leipzig. At the end of August, Bremen and William V of Hesse-Kassel also chose to join the Protestant alliance.^[48] Gustavus Adolphus and John Georg I united their armies on September 15 at the town of Düben. By this time Tilly's army had already stormed and conquered Leipzig. At this point, only 25 kilometres (16 mi) separated between the combatants. Tilly had no longer the opportunity to avoid a confrontation, and his forces found themselves at a numerical disadvantage as a result of the union between the two Protestant regents. A southern retreat would worsen his situation, as an entry into Bohemia could lead to a declaration of war from Wallenstein, who since the spring of 1631 had begun negotiations with Gustavus Adolphus. Tilly's only hope was to consolidate his position at Leipzig and await for reinforcements. A Catholic League army of 17,000 men under General Aldringen was already advancing from the south. Meanwhile, the Protestant forces, consisting of 30,000 Swedes and 20,000 Saxons, had assembled at Düben.^{[58][63][64][65][66]}

By virtue of his numerical superiority, Gustavus Adolphus felt confident before his upcoming meeting with Tilly's assembled army. He had up until this point deliberately avoided a direct confrontation with the Imperial Army. He ordered Field Marshal Horn to gather intelligence about his opponent at Leipzig. The King's confidence was strengthened by the fact that the Swedish scouts had underestimated the strength of the imperial troops, although he viewed the combat readiness of the Elector's allied Saxon army with great skepticism. Two days after the convergence at Düben, the Swedish army had lost 10 percent of its strength, which included deserters as well as sick and injured soldiers. Tilly's scouts had overestimated their opponent's combined strength. This made Tilly want to avoid a meeting engagement with such a strong enemy force and await reinforcements from Aldringen's army instead.^[48][67]

As a means to stop Tilly's delaying strategy, the impetuous Pappenheim wanted to spur Tilly to immediately advance and crush the Protestant army, which he himself regarded as a large "mob army". Pappenheim pointed out that further delay in the arrival of Aldringen's army would reduce their chance of finally dealing with the "arrogant" Swedish King, whose army they had consistently avoided for some months. Tilly replied that he had less respect for the Saxon troops. But during his previous campaign against the Swedes, he had learned to respect Gustavus Adolphus's military achievements and insisted that they should attack the King's army only at a distinct advantage. Most of his general staff on the other hand, mainly by Fürstenberg and almost all the junior officers, propagated Pappenheim's proposal for an immediate attack. Only a few senior officers agreed with Tilly that they should wait for reinforcements before the upcoming battle.^[48][68] To curtail the internal division in his general staff, Tilly wanted to occupy Pappenheim by sending him on a reconnaissance mission at the head of 2,000 Imperial horsemen. However, Pappenheim in turn wanted to use this mission to provoke his opponent into an open battle. He sent a false report to Tilly that parts of his troops had deserted to Gustavus Adolphus and lured him into a trap, and that his horsemen would perish unless the Imperial-League army came to his rescue. Although Tilly was already aware of Pappenheim's intentions, he did not want to risk losing his Imperial horsemen, and thus decided to march to Pappenheim's location with his entire army. Pappenheim's vision became partially into reality, as his horsemen clashed with the Swedish vanguard led by Sir James Ramsay. Instead of retreating to Leipzig, he suggested to Tilly that the entire army should assemble at the village of Breitenfeld outside of Leipzig.^[69][70]

On September 16, the Swedish and Saxon troops spent the night in full battle formation at the village of Wölchau about 25 kilometres (16 mi) northeast of Leipzig. In the evening, Gustavus Adolphus made plans before the upcoming battle with John Georg I and his own general staff. The staff agreed that the united army should draw Tilly into open battle. On the morning of September 17, Gustavus Adolphus ordered his troops to march south through hilly terrain. Only 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) separated the King's and Tilly's armies. After a two-hour long march, the King's troops arrived at the Lober stream, whose swampy banks they were forced to cross with great difficulty to reach the neighboring village of Podelwitz. Meanwhile, Tilly sent his Croatian and Hungarian cavalry units to disrupt the Swedes' passage through the swampy terrain. Their attack was repulsed when they were fired upon by Swedish musketeers. Tilly used this skirmish to order his army into full combat readiness at a pair of ridges close to Breitenfeld.^[71][69]

Battlefield

The battle took place on a gently sloping field about 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) north of Leipzig. The field covered an area of about 20 km², with crossroads stretched between the villages of Breitenfeld in the west, Seehausen in the east, Podelwitz in the north and Wiederitzsch in the south. The marshy Lober stream flowed behind Podelwitz, which ran from Schladitzer See 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) west of the village. The Swedish army was drawn up in the open field just south of Podelwitz. The Saxon army was deployed on the Swedish army's western flank, between the villages of Zschölkau (3 kilometres (1.9 mi) northeast of Podelwitz) in the north and Göbschelwitz (2 kilometres (1.2 mi) north of Seehausen) in the south. Between Breitenfeld and Seehausen ran the Galgenberg, a pair of gently sloping ridges where Tilly placed his artillery, while his army was lined up just behind the ridges.^[72] Behind his army, just northeast of Wiederitzsch, laid the deciduous Linkelwald forest. Tilly had his army camp between the villages of Eutritsch (3 kilometres (1.9 mi) south of Wiederitzsch) in the east and Möckern (4.5 kilometres (2.8 mi) south of Breitenfeld) in the west. A country road ran from Leipzig to the town of Düben in a north-easterly direction, through the eastern part of the Linkelwald and across the battlefield before crossing the Lober through Zschölkau. The battlefield is today bisected by the Bundesautobahn 14 and Bundesstraße 2 motorways, which have their exit to Leipzig-Mitte between Wiederitzsch and Seehausen.^[66]

Deployment

Main article: Order of battle for the Battle of Breitenfeld (1631)

Swedish army

Order of battle.

The Swedish army was positioned on the far right of the allied formation and was deployed on two offset line formations, with each line being supported by tactical reserves. According to calculations by Swedish military historian Julius Mankell, Gustavus Adolphus commanded a total of around 23,520 Swedish soldiers at the time of the battle.^[73] The army consisted of 8,572 musketeers, 3,440 pikemen, 464 dragoons, 7,700 reiters and 3,344 officers.^[73][74] According to Swedish historian Jan Gletes' studies, Gustavus Adolphus commanded over 22,806 Swedish soldiers at Breitenfeld, which consisted of 14,742 infantry divided between 26 infantry regiments, 7,600 horsemen divided between 17 cavalry regiments and a dragoon regiment of 464 men.^[75][1] Among the soldiers, 4,628 men originated from Sweden and Finland, while 18,178 men were mercenaries enlisted from the German states, the British Isles, and Livonia.^[75]

The Swedish right wing consisted of 5,000 men, with Gustavus Adolphus in command of the first line and General Johan Banér in command of the second. The wing were made up of ten cavalry regiments and Banér's musketeer regiment's 8 companies of 900 men, who were placed in the gaps between the cavalry squadrons. The first line were made up by 12 companies of Nyland Cavalry Regiment (also known as the Hakkapeliitta) with 800 men under General Åke Henriksson Tott, 4 companies of the Östergötland Cavalry Regiment with 150 men under Colonel Klaus Dietrich von Sperreuth, 8 companies with 400 men of the Småland Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Fredrik Stenbock, the Västergötland Cavalry Regiment's 8 companies with 400 men under Lieutenant Colonel Knut Soop,^[76] Lieutenant Colonel Torsten Stålhandske's Hakkapeliitta's 4 companies with 350 men and Colonel Reinhold Wunsch's Hakkapeliitta's 4 companies with 350 men. The first line's reserve consisted of 15 companies of the Rhinegrave's Cuirassier Regiment with 700 men under Colonel Otto Louis of Salm-Kyrburg-Mörchingen. The second line were made up of 4 companies with 150 men of Colonel Sigfrid von Dāmitz's Cuirassier Regiment, 4 companies with 200 men of Colonel Ernst Magnus Dönhoff's Cuirassier Squadron from Courland and 5 companies of 300 men of Lieutenant Colonel Jürgen Aderka's Cuirassier Regiment from Livonia.^{[77][78][79][80][81][82][83]}

The Swedish left wing consisted of 3,750 men, with Field Marshal Gustav Horn in command of the first line and Colonel Adolf Didrik von Efferen-Hall in command of the second. The wing were made up of Colonel Berthold von Waldstein's infantry regiment's 8 companies with 1,000 men, who were placed in the gaps between the squadrons, as well as four cavalry regiments and a dragoon regiment. At the first line, Lieutenant General Wolf Heinrich von Baudissin's Cuirassier Regiment had 12 companies with 600 men and Colonel Moritz Pensen von Caldenbach's Cuirassier Regiment had 8 companies with 650 men. At the second line, there were 5 companies with 250 men of Colonel Nicholas de Courville's Cuirassier Regiment, 12 companies with 800 men of Colonel Efferen-Hall's Cuirassier Regiment and 4 companies with 450 men of Colonel Georg Christoph von Taupadel's German Dragoon Squadron.^{[84][78][85][82][83]}

The Swedish centre consisted of 14,650 men, divided between seven infantry brigades and three cavalry regiments. The first line was commanded by Major General Maximilian Teuffel and the second by Colonel John Hepburn. Teuffel's troops of 8,650 men in the first line consisted of four infantry brigades: the Yellow Brigade's 12 companies of 1,700 men led by himself, which also included an infantry squadron of 4 companies under Colonel Niklas von Chemnitz; Colonel Åke Gustafsson Oxenstierna's brigade of 1,400 men which included the Dalarna Regiment's 7 companies led by himself, the 8 companies from the Skaraborg, Närke and Värmland regiments led by Colonel Axel Lillie, as well as the Savolax Infantry Regiment of 8 companies led by Colonel Claes Hastfer; Colonel Erik Hand's brigade of 1,750 men which included the Östergötland Infantry Regiment's 8 companies led by himself, Dal's Infantry Squadron's 4 companies led by colonel Wilhelm von Salzburg, as well as the Västgöta Regiment's 8 companies led by Colonel Carl Hård af Segerstad; and the Blue Brigade's 24 companies of 1,800 men led by General Hans Georg aus dem Winckel, which included 12 companies of Winckel's "blue" infantry regiment and 12 companies of Colonel Geisbrecht von Hogendorf's "red" infantry regiment. The reserve of the first line consisted of Colonel Johann Philip von Ortenburg's cuirassier regiment of 500 men, Colonels Donald Mackay's and Robert Monro's infantry regiment of 8 companies with 400 men, Colonel Sir James Ramsay's infantry regiment of 8 companies with 350 men and Colonel Sir John Hamilton's infantry regiment of 8 companies with 250 men.^{[84][78][86][80][82][83]}

Hepburn's troops of 6,000 men in the second line were made up of three infantry brigades: the Green Brigade's 24 companies of 2,200 men led by Hepburn himself, which included 8 companies of Hepburn's "Green" Infantry Regiment, Baron Robert Monro of Fouli's Scottish Infantry Regiment of 8 Companies, and Colonel von Bock's musketeer regiment's 8 companies; General Jindřich Matyáš Thurn's brigade of 1,900 men which included 8 companies of Thurn's "Black" Infantry Regiment, 8 companies of Colonel Adolf Theodor von Efferen-Hall's "Black" Infantry Regiment, and 12 companies of Colonel Sigfrid von Dārgitz's "White" Infantry Regiment; as well as Colonel Johann Vitzthum von Eckstädt's brigade of 1,200 men which included 8 companies of Eckstädt's "Orange" Infantry Regiment, 5 companies of Colonel Wilhelm Kasper von Mitschefall's Infantry Squadron, and 8 companies of Lieutenant Colonel John Ruthwenn's Infantry Regiment. The second line's reserve consisted of Colonel Adam Schaffman's Czech and Silesian cuirassier squadron's 4 companies with 400 men and Colonel Andras Kochtitzky the Younger's Slavic and Pomeranian cavalry's 4 companies with 300 men.^{[78][80][82][83]}

Colonel Lennart Torstensson's artillery park was positioned in front of Teuffel's troops in the centre, which consisted of four 24-pounder guns, eight 18-pounder guns and 42 lighter regimental guns. Torstenson placed the heavier pieces in front of the middle of the Swedish centre. 24 regimental guns were placed in front of each brigade on the first line of the centre, while 18 regimental guns were in front of each brigade on the second line.^[74][87][82]

Saxon army

According to Jan Glete, the Saxon army consisted of 17,325 men, of which 12,100 were infantry divided between nine infantry regiments and 5,225 were reiters divided between twelve cavalry regiments.^[88] The army also brought 12 artillery pieces of unknown caliber.^[1] The army was lined up to the left of the Swedish army in traditional formation, as the Saxons had not had time to be trained in Swedish combat techniques. Elector John George was Commander-in-chief with Field Marshal Hans Georg von Arnim-Boitzenburg as his second-in-command.^[87][89]

Friedrich Wilhelm II, Duke of Saxe-Altenburg was in command of the Saxon centre. The centre consisted of nine infantry regiments: Field Marshal Arnim's Militia Regiment with 2,200 men led by himself, Colonel Hans Kaspar von Klitzing's Militia Regiment with 2,200 men, Colonel Hans von Löser's Militia Regiment with 2,200 men, Colonel Moritz Dietrich von Starschedel's Infantry Regiment with 2,200 men, Colonel Siegmund von Wolfersdorf's Foot Regiment, Colonel Karl von Bose's Foot Regiment, the Elector's Infantry Regiment led by Colonel Johann Casimir von Schaumberg, Colonel Johann von der Pforte's Foot Regiment, and Dam Vitzthum's Foot Regiment.^[90][1]

General Hans Rudolf von Bindauf commanded the Saxon left wing, which consisted of six cavalry regiments: Bindauf's Cuirassier Regiment led by himself, Colonel Ernst von Anhalt-Bernburg's Cuirassier Squadron, Colonel Lorenz Hofkirchen's Cuirassier Squadron, Colonel Hans von Löser's Cuirassier Squadron, Duke Johann Philipp of Saxe-Altenburg's Cuirassier Regiment with 1,200 men, and Colonel Bernhard von Pflugk's Cuirassier Regiment with 1,500 men. Field Marshal Arnim was in command of the Saxon right wing, which consisted of six cavalry regiments: Arnim's Life Guard with 200 men led by himself, the Elector's Life Guard with 600 men led by Colonel Dietrich von Taube, Colonel Wolf Adam von Steinau's Cuirassier Regiment with 500 men, Colonel Albrecht von Kalckstein's Cuirassier Regiment, Colonel Wilhelm Leib's Cuirassier squadron, as well as Duke Friedrich Wilhelm's Cuirassier Regiment led by himself.^[90][1]

Imperial-Catholic League Army

The Imperial-Catholic League army, under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, was lined up along a 3.5 kilometres (2.2 mi) long front line in an east–west direction. Among the troops, 14,700 were Imperial soldiers, 15,700 were Catholic League army soldiers, and 1,000 irregular soldiers. In total, the army consisted of 27 artillery pieces, 21,400 infantry divided between fourteen infantry regiments, and 10,000 reiters divided between eleven cuirassier regiments and six harquebusier regiments, including irregular cavalry units. The infantry consisted of 8,600 Imperial soldiers, who formed eight tercios with just over 1,000 men each, and 12,800 League soldiers who formed six more robust tercios of over 2,000 men each. The fourteen tercios were divided into four groups commanded by Tilly, General Matthias Gallas, Colonel Philipp von Pappenheim and Colonel Johan Göss. The majority of the soldiers originated from the German states, while other contingents came from Spain, Wallonia in Habsburg Netherlands and the constituent kingdoms of Italy, Croatia and Hungary.^[91][92]

The Imperial-League right wing consisted of 5,400 soldiers under the command of General Egon von Fürstenberg. The wing were made up of Colonel Johann von Wangler's (German) Imperial Infantry Regiment with 1,200 men and five cavalry regiments: Altsächsisch's (Protestant) Imperial Cuirassier Regiment with 300 men under Colonel Julius Henry, Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, Baumgarten's (Italian) League Cuirassier Regiment with 500 men under Colonel Wilhelm von Baumgarten, Cronberg's League Cuirassier Regiment with 900 men under Colonel Adam Philip von Cronberg, Schönburg's League Cuirassier Regiment with 900 men under General of the Artillery Schönburg and Wengersky's (German) Imperial Harquebusier Regiment with 600 men under Colonel Albrecht Wengersky. The wing also included irregular Croats and Hungarian cavalry units of 1,000 men led by Colonel Johann Ludwig Hektor von Isolani.^[93][91][94]

The Imperial left wing consisted of 5,300 soldiers under the command of Field Marshal Gottfried Heinrich zu Pappenheim. The wing consisted of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp's (German) Imperial Infantry Regiment with 1,500 under Colonel Adolf von Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp, two harquebusier regiments and five cuirassier regiments: Bernstein's (German) Imperial Cuirassier Regiment with 400 under Colonel Wilhelm von Bernstein, Merode's (Spanish) Imperial Harquebusier Regiment with 500 under Colonel Jean de Merode, Saxe-Lauenburg (German) Imperial Cuirassier Regiment with 600 under Colonel Franz Albecht von Saxe-Lauenburg, Piccolomini's (German) Imperial Harquebusier Regiment of 800 man under General Ottavio Piccolomini, Rangoni's (German) Imperial Cuirassier Regiment with 500 men under Colonel Giulio Marchese Rangoni, Strozzi's (Walloon) Imperial Cuirassier Regiment of 500 men under Colonel Giacomo Strozzi, and Trčka's (German) Imperial Cuirassier Regiment with 500 men under Colonel Adam Erdmann Trčka von Lípa.^[93][91][94]

Generalfeldmarschall Tilly was in command of the Imperial-League centre, which included 18,700 troops, with General of the Artillery Otto Friedrich von Schönburg auf Wesel as his second-in-command. The centre was made up of twelve infantry regiments: Baldiron-Dietrichstein's (Spanish-Italian) Imperial Infantry Regiment with 1,100 under Colonel Antoni von Baldiron-Dietrichstein, Blankart's (Westphalian) League Infantry Regiment with 2,000 under Colonel Otto Ludwig von Blankart, Chiesa's (German-Italian) Imperial Infantry Regiment with 1,000 under Colonel Kaspar Francesco Chiesa, Comargo-Reinach's League Infantry Regiment with 2,000 under Colonel Hans Ludwig von Grotta, Fürstenberg's (German) Imperial Infantry Regiment with 1,100 under General Fürstenberg, Gallas' (German-Italian) Imperial Infantry Regiment with 900 under General Matthias Gallas, Geleen's (Bavarian) League Infantry Regiment with 2,000 under Colonel Gottfried Huyn von Geleen, Göss (German) Imperial Infantry Regiment with 900 under Colonel Max von Liechtenstein, Pappenheim's League Infantry Regiment with 2,400 under Colonel Philipp von Pappenheim, Savelli's (German) Imperial Infantery Regiment with 900 men under Colonel Federico Savelli, Tilly's League Infantry Regiment from Würzburg with 2,200 men under Generalfeldmarschall Tilly, and Wahl's League Infantry Regiment with 2,200 men under Colonel Joachim Christian von Wahl.^[93][94]

Tilly placed his reserve of 2,000 men behind his centre, divided between five cavalry regiments under the command of Major General Dietrich Ottmar von Erwitte. The reserve consisted of Erwitte's League Cuirassier Regiment with 600 men, Montecuccoli's (German) Imperial Cuirassier Regiment with 300 men under Colonel Ernesto Montecuccoli, Caffarelli's (Spanish) Imperial Harquebusier Regiment with 300 men under Colonel Francesco de Caffarelli, Colloredo's (German) Imperial Harquebusier Regiment with 400 men under Colonel Giovanni Battista von Colloredo, and Coronini's (German) Imperial Harquebusier Regiment with 400 men under Colonel Johann P. Coronini von Cronberg.^[94]

The Imperial artillery park under General of the Artillery Schönburg consisted of 27 artillery pieces, divided between eleven 32-pounder guns, four 16-pounder guns, one 12-pounder gun, three 8-pounder guns, two 3-pounder guns and six smaller guns.^[2] The heavier pieces were placed in front of the middle of the Imperial-League centre, opposite to the Swedish centre and left wing, while the lighter pieces were placed farther to the right of the centre, opposite to the Saxon army. Gallas', Tilly's, Göss's, and Pappenheim's tercios were lined up on the intervals between the artillery pieces.^[92]

Battle

The battle began at twelve o'clock with an exchange of artillery fire. Tilly's artillery concentrated their fire against the Saxon troops and the Swedish centre and left wing. The Saxons and Swedes returned fire with their own guns. It took some time before Torstenson's heavy artillery were brought into position to launch its own bombardment. The Swedes demonstrated firepower in a rate of fire of three to five volleys to one Imperial volley.^[95] Torstenson later changed direction to aim his guns more accurately against the enemy. Tilly's tercios where easy targets for Torstenson's guns, while the Swedish troops were much sparsely spread and stood "as firm as a wall".^[96][97] During the approximately two-hour long cannonade, about 1,000 Swedish soldiers were killed, about the same number of Saxon soldiers and about 2,000 Imperial-League soldiers.^[98] Colonel von Baumgarten was among the first to die from a Saxon cannonball.^{[99][100][101]}

Both forces on the battlefield remained stationary throughout the cannonade and refused to advance against their adversary. Tilly did not want to abandon the Galgenberg, whose advantageous position Gustavus Adolphus feared to attack. Furthermore, the gunpowder smoke from the cannons and the advance of the troops accumulated large clouds of dust and smoke, which with strong south-westerly winds blew straight into the faces of the Swedish soldiers. To circumvent this and attempt to get the wind on their side, the King ordered his right wing to pivot to the left. This movement was observed by both Tilly and Pappenheim. The latter's cavalry was struck hard by the heavy Swedish artillery fire. The impetuous Pappenheim wanted to immediately unleash his cavalry upon the Swedes, while the latter was busy regrouping their ranks.^[102]

Pappenheim's assault

Otto August Mankell's painting of the battle depicting the cavalry attacks against the Swedish right wing.

Without receiving any orders from Tilly, Pappenheim went on his own initiative with his cuirassiers and attacked the Swedish right wing at two o'clock. He executed a flanking maneuver to avoid the fire of the Swedish guns. His harquebusiers and the Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp regiment advanced behind his cuirassiers. Pappenheim's aim was to employ caracole tactics to penetrate Gustavus Adolphus' front.^[102][101] Banér and the King had by this time fully deployed their troops into lines, and were fully prepared to defend themselves against Pappenheim's assault. As soon as Pappenheim's cuirassiers approached Gustavus Adolphus' front and discharged their pistols at them, the Swedish commanded musketeer platoons fired a concentrated volley at point-blank range. Short after, the Swedish cuirassiers fired their pistols at the approaching Imperial cuirassiers.^[96]

The surprisingly accurate Swedish fire disrupted the charge of the Imperial cuirassiers and forced them to withdraw. Pappenheim regrouped his cuirassiers for a renewed attack, with fire support from musketeers of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp regiment and Piccolomini's and Merode's harquebusiers. While the Swedish musketeers reloaded their muskets, the Swedish cavalry mounted swift counter-charges against Pappenheim's scattered cuirassiers. The horsemen then fell back to their previous positions to avoid the fire from Pappenheim's harquebusiers and musketeers, allowing the Swedish musketeers to fire a new volley at Pappenheim's cavalry. This process was repeated each time Pappenheim made a new attempt to penetrate Gustavus Adolphus' lines.^{[103][104][105][100][106][107]}

"By half three, our cannon a little ceasing, the horsemen on both wings charged furiously one another, our horsemen with a resolution, abiding unloosing a pistol, till the enemy had discharged first, and then at a near distance our musketeers meeting them with a salvo; then our horsemen discharged their pistols, and then charged through them with swords; and at their return the musketeers were ready again to give the second salvo of musket amongst them; the enemy thus valiantly resisted by our horsemen, and cruelly plagued by our platoons of musketeers; you may imagine, how soon he would be discouraged after charging twice in this manner, and repulsed."

— Robert Monro, ^[108]

Within an hour Pappenheim made three frontal caracole attacks, all of which were repulsed by the cooperation between the Swedish musketeers and horsemen. Despite this setback, his offensive power was still strong and he was able to quickly recoil and regroup his dispersed cuirassiers. As the firepower from the King's front proved extremely taxing, he decided to extend his cavalry line leftward and go around the King's front to envelop his right flank. By performing this evasive maneuver, he directed his attacks against the King's right flank, as well as Banér's troops in the second line.^[109] Gustavus Adolphus promptly responded to this threat by ordering his reserves and Banér's units from the second line to reinforce his exposed flank, allowing him to gradually extend his own line rightward. First to deploy on the King's right flank was the Rhinegrave's cuirassiers, later followed by Aderkas' Livonians, Dönhoff's Curonians and Kochtitzky's Slavic and Pomeranian cavalry. Pappenheim made three flanking attacks against the Swedes. The regimental commanders Aderkas and Damitz fell during this action. Both Gustavus Adolphus and Banér encouraged their horsemen and musketeers to remain steadfast. With all his attacks repulsed, Pappenheim fell back with heavy casualties and left his remaining cuirassiers demoralized and exhausted. Meanwhile, the Yellow Brigade launched their own attack and were able to create a gap between Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp's regiment and Piccolomini's harquebusiers on Pappenheim's right flank.^{[103][104][105][110][111][100][112][107]}

The Imperial cavalry attack the Swedish right wing and the Saxon army. The latter is forced to retreat.

Following Pappenheim's seventh repulse at about four o'clock in the evening, Gustavus Adolphus ordered Banér to rally the cavalry of Sperreuth, Stenbock, Soop, Tott, Stålhandske and Wunsch. Banér led them in a broad counter-charge against both Pappenheim's cuirassiers and Piccolomini's and Merode's harquebusiers. His shock attack immediately threw Pappenheim's exhausted cuirassiers back in disarray, with some units under Pappenheim falling back to the Imperial artillery positions at Galgenberg, while others accompanied Piccolomini in his retreat from the battlefield. The Livonian and Curonian cuirassiers pursued Piccolomini's cuirassiers through Breitenfeld and Halle.^{[113][114][111][106][115]}

With Pappenheim's cavalry taken out of action, only Colonel von Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp's infantry regiment remained on this front. The regiment formed into a tercio to stand their ground against attacks from Stålhandske's and Wunsch's Hakkapeliitta. The Finnish horsemen met stubborn resistance, forcing Banér to bring in Ortenburg's cuirassiers and the Yellow Brigade's commanded musketeers at five o'clock, who pulverised the tercio with musketry fire and canister charges from their regimental artillery. Their combined firepower were able to finally bring down the tercio. Out of 1,500 men, only 300 men of the Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp regiment survived after the battle.^{[104][116][114][111][117][106][115]} Colonel von Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp was mortally wounded during this action and was escorted as a Swedish prisoner of war to Eilenburg for treatment. He succumbed to his wounds two days later.^[113][118]

Tilly's main assault and Saxon retreat

Tilly's infantry remained stationary on the Galgenberg while Pappenheim's made his assault against the Swedish right wing. Half an hour after Pappenheim's first charge, Fürstenberg's and Isolani's cavalry, on the Imperial-League right wing, made a direct assault of their own against the Saxon centre and left wing. They were spearheaded by Cronberg's and Schönburg's cuirassier regiments. Schönburg attacked the Saxon Horse Guards, which were quickly routed after a brief struggle. Saxe-Altenburg's and General Bindauf's regiments resolutely defended themselves against Baumgarten's cavalry attack, with the latter soon being reinforced by Cronberg's cavalry. General Bindauf and Colonel Starschedel were both shot to death, resulting in their regiments disintegrating and routing from the battlefield. Colonel Steinau was captured by the Imperial-League troops during the commotion, along with most of his regiment.^{[119][120][121][122][106]}

At three o'clock in the afternoon, Tilly recognized an opportunity for a main assault with his Imperial-League infantry against both the Saxon army and the left flank of the Swedish centre. Tercios spearheaded by Philipp von Pappenheim's and Göss's regiments, supported by Wangler's regiment and Erwitte's reserve cavalry, marched down the Galgenberg and made an oblique advance to the right, concentrating on the Saxon troops. Meanwhile, Gallas' tercios advanced to put pressure on the Swedish centre, while Tilly's tercios acted as a "hinge" between Gallas' and Göss's tercios. The marching tercios were immediately exposed to Torstenson's artillery fire, which tore huge holes among the tightly packed formations.^{[119][123][124]}

Due to the pressure of Fürstenberg's cavalry, coupled with the advance of Tilly's infantry, the rest of the Saxon army started to panic. The greater part of the army routed from the battlefield at four o'clock. Even the Elector John George, who made desperate attempts to incite his troops to fight back, was dragged along in their flight towards Eilenburg. Some Saxon soldiers took the opportunity to plunder their own tross, as well as the nearby Swedish one, who during the rush was also dragged along in the flight. The Saxon artillery was captured by the Imperial cavalry, who used the pieces to bombard both the fleeing Saxon troops and the Swedish left wing. Parts of Fürstenberg's and Isolani's cavalry, whose men cried out "Victoria" in triumph, chased after the Saxons and plundered their abandoned tross. Almost the entire Saxon army fled the battlefield over the course of merely an hour. Only Colonel Taube's Life Regiment and Arnim's Life Guards remained, who later regrouped behind the Swedish left wing. In a short time, the united Protestant army lost a third of its strength, with the remnants now being numerically inferior to Tilly's army.^{[119][125][122][126][121][127][114][124]}

Regroupment

The Imperial-League army pivots to the right for their pincer movement. The Swedish army extends it's left wing with auxiliaries to meet the threat.

Tilly's plan was that his centre would launch a broad frontal assault on Horn's open left flank, with fire support from the Imperial batteries on Galgenberg and the captured Saxon artillery. Both Fürstenberg and Isolani were to support Tilly's infantry assault. They gave strict orders to their cavalry to break off their pursuit of the Saxon troops and to attack the open flank and rear of the Swedish centre. While his both cavalry wings made their assaults, Tilly planned to execute a pincer movement against Horn's troops. If successful, he would outflank the Swedish army on their left flank and ultimately drive them back towards the marchlands at the Lober stream. Arriving at the former position of the Saxons, Tilly slowly pivoted his Imperial-League tercios to the left. The movement of such large amount of troops on the trodden earth stirred up huge clouds of dust. These clouds were spread out with the wind towards the Swedish left wing, thus obscuring the visibility among Tilly's and Horn's troops. The left-turn movement and the difficult visibility resulted with Pappenheim's, Wahl's, Wangler's and Reinach-Comargo's infantry regiments, comprising 7,800 men and about 1,000 soldiers from nearby regiments, being pushed too far to the right. Due to the size of the tercios, the turning maneuver became a very time-consuming process. Many soldiers were crowded together and placed too far back to fully participate in the fighting on the far left.^{[119][123][127][114][128][129][130][124]}

The agile Swedish troops now saw their opportunity. Horn observed the new situation occurring before his eyes and immediately reacted to Tilly's attempt to outflank his troops. He took the initiative by ordering his left flank (Baudissin's and Caldenbach's cuirassiers) to pivot sharply to the left, allowing his rear line (Taupadel's dragoons and Efferen-Hall's and Courville's cuirassiers) to advance and extend his front line on both flanks. Waldstein's commanded musketeers were also lined up in the gaps between the squadrons.^[114][129]

Horn thus re-aligned his troops in a new defensive front at a 90-degree angle, which ran perpendicularly along the country road between Düben and Leipzig. The road was surrounded by deep ditches, which Horn used as a defensive obstacle. His hastily improvised maneuver was carried out in just 15 minutes, and he exploited the surrounding smoke and dust clouds to conceal his deployment. Before the maneuver could be completed, Fürstenberg made an attempt to charge Horn's flank. But since his cavalry, having chased away the Saxon troops, had not yet regrouped his ranks effectively, he was unable to mount a concentrated attack. Thus his attack was quickly repulsed by a concentrated volley from Waldstein's musketeers.^{[131][116][127][130][132]}

Action at Horn's front

Horn was well aware that his thin lines alone could not hold their ground against the crushing force of the Imperial-League infantry, which now numbered some 20,000 men and reinforced by thousands of Fürstenberg's cavalry. While Tilly slowly regrouped his tercios for his decisive infantry assault, he wanted to put pressure on Horn by sending Fürstenberg's remaining cavalry, mainly Baumgarten's and Cronberg's cuirassier regiments, in several columns to attack the Swedish left wing from the flank and the rear. Horn responded to Tilly's regroupment by having Baudissin's and Caldenbach's cuirassiers engage in delaying actions against the Imperial-League infantry, with fire support from Waldstein's musketeers. His aim was to disrupt Tilly's attack preparations in order to buy himself time to call for reinforcements. In some places, Horn's rapid-firing regimental artillery was able to unleash a blast of close-range grapeshots and canister-charges against the slow-moving Imperial-League infantry. At the same time, Efferen-Hall's and Courville's cuirassiers managed to repulse Fürstenberg's cavalry charge. Fürstenberg responded by using the captured Saxon artillery to bombard the Swedish cuirassiers, killing colonel Efferen-Hall and several of his men in the process. Tilly ordered Fürstenberg to renew his attacks on Horn's front, while his infantry moved into fighting positions. When these began to march across the deep trenches, Colonel Caldenbach and his regiment decided to sally out against the Imperial-League infantry in a suicidal assault. Caldenbach and nearly all of his men were killed during this delaying action, however, their assault stalled the advance of several enemy infantry regiments. This gave Horn more time to organize his defense.^{[133][131][127][129][130]}

Battle of Breitenfeld by Carl Wahlbom.

Horn reported his situation to Major General Teuffel, who in turn forwarded the report to Gustavus Adolphus while he was busy with his own defense against Pappenheim's assaults. The King hastened to the centre where he received a direct report from Field Marshal Arnim that the Saxon army had retreated and the entire Imperial-League army had turned their attention towards Horn's isolated troops. The King immediately ordered Teuffel to send auxiliaries to Horn's aid. As Teuffel was about to carry out the King's order, he was killed by a stray bullet fired from Tilly's infantry regiment, who advanced to confront the stationary Blue Brigade. This forced Gustavus Adolphus to alone ride to Colonel Hepburn at the centre's second line. He ordered him to march to Horn's aid with all three brigades of the second line, along with the reserve units from the first and second lines. In columns, Hepburn's, Eckstädt's, and Thurn's brigades and the reserve troops pivoted straight to the left and deployed themselves on Horn's left front, bringing with them their 18 regimental guns. Furthermore, Efferen-Hall's and Courville's cuirassier regiments were reinforced with Schaffman's and Kochtitzky's cavalry companies. With their arrival at his position, Horn was able to dispose of around 10,000 soldiers, whereby his front line could no longer be outflanked by Tilly's onslaught.^{[134][135][136][123][114][137]}

As the Swedish auxiliaries arrived at Horn's front, Philipp von Pappenheim's tercios advanced in columns to confront the Green Brigade. Although Pappenheim's veteran regiments were three times the size of the Green Brigade, the latter had brought several regimental guns and had both the sun and the wind behind their backs. Isolani's Croats employed the caracole to stall the Green Brigade, but they were repulsed by heavy musket volleys and canister shots from Hepburn's regimental guns. When Pappenheim's tercios was within range, Hepburn lined up his Scottish musketeers with their three front ranks kneeling and three rear ranks standing upright. In a short time they were able to fire concentrated platoon volleys, which together with the canister shots from their regimental guns inflicted mounting casualties on Pappenheim's advancing columns. These in turn returned fire with their own muskets.^{[138][139][140]}

First (saith he), giving fire unto three little Field-pieces that I had before me, I suffered not my muskettiers to give their volleyes till I came within Pistollshot of the enemy, at which time I gave order to the first rancks to discharge at once, and after them the other three: which done we fell pell mell into their ranckes, knocking them downe with the stocke of the Musket and our swords.

— Henry Muschamp, Lt. Colonel from Scotland, ^[141]

...[Tilly] received a horrible, uninterrupted pounding from the king's light pieces and was prevented from coming to grips with the latter's forces.

— Raimondo Montecuccoli, Imperial officer, ^[142]

At the same time, Göss' tercios clashed with Eckstädt's brigade and Erwitte's reserve cavalry advanced against Horn's cavalry. Horn's cavalry acted as a "hinge" between Eckstädt's brigade and the Blue Brigade in the centre. As Göss's and Pappenheim's tercios approuched their opponents, the pikemen of both sides clashed against each other, both supported by Baudissin's and Cronberg's cavalry who swept across the open terrain. The musketeers also took part in the fierce melee, using the butt end of their muskets as clubs.^[143] Erwitte's arquebusier regiments also attacked Horn's cavalry with the use of caracole and artillery support. Horn responded to Erwitte's attack with infantry musketry and cavalry countercharges.^{[133][127][144][145][140]}

The fierce fighting along Horn's front accumulated thick clouds of gunpowder smoke and dust, which with strong westerly winds spread across the entire battlefield. These greatly obscured both the commander's ability to survey the battle and the soldiers' ability to recognize their own comrades. At five o'clock in the afternoon, the action at Horn's front had been going on for an hour. Hepburn signaled his musicians to play Scottish marching music to prevent his Scottish troops from getting lost in the smoke.^[143] The repeated and concentrated volleys from Horn's and Hepburn's musketeers, coupled with the heavy cannonade from their regimental artillery, forced the remnants of the Imperial-League infantry to stall their attacks, leading to the men being crowded together and losing their momentum. Despite the heavy resistance, Tilly refused to withdraw and his infantry continued to put up heavy pressure on Horn's troops. But his positions had very limited room to manoeuvre and were slowly being pushed back by strong counterattacks made by Horn's and Hepburn's troops.^{[136][146][95][131][130][144][140]}

Annihilation of the Imperial-League force

Battle of Breitenfeld (1631) by Matthäus Merian the Elder after a drawing by Olof Örnehufvud.

At five o'clock in the afternoon, the battle had been going on for five hours. Following Banér's successful cavalry charge against Pappenheim's cavalry, Gustavus Adolphus noticed a gap had opened up between the Imperial-League centre and the fleeing left wing. He now recognized an opportunity to launch a major counteroffensive to break through Tilly's army. After he had sent auxiliaries to Horn's front, the King rode over to Banér on the right wing to rally his remaining cavalry. He ordered Soop and his Västergötland cavalry to charge against Erwitte's open left flank. Along with Horn's cavalry, Soop's regiment were able to drive Erwitte's cavalry back into Tilly's infantry, causing disorder among the tightly packed tercios.^{[113][147][148][115]}

Meanwhile, the King rode at the head of the Hakkapeliitta and Stenbock's, Sperreuth's and Rheingrave's cavalry. He led them into a flanking charge against the Imperial artillery. Small remnants of Pappenheim's cuirassiers, who had retreated to the Galgenberg, were chased off by the King's cavalry. The Swedes rode up the slopes, cut down the imperial artillerymen and seized their guns. They then rode down the slopes to join up with Soop's cavalry and roll up the remnants of the Imperial-League centre from its left flank.^{[113][147][131][127][149][150][115]}

The Imperial cavalry retreats and the Imperial-League infantry are attacked from multiple directions.

To complete his counter-offensive, Gustavus Adolphus ordered the rest of his right wing and the brigades on the first line of the centre to pivot perpendicularly to the left. This manoeuvre allowed the brigades to occupy the Galgenberg, push back Tilly's Imperial-League infantry, and cut off their line of retreat towards Leipzig. At the same time, Torstenson moved his light artillery forward and Mackay's and Monro's regiments were able to recapture the Saxon artillery. Together with the captured Imperial artillery, the tightly packed Imperial-League infantry were now exposed to a heavy artillery crossfire.^[147][151]

Between six and seven o'clock, Horn made his last cavalry charge against the enemy. Hepburn's brigade led an infantry attack, and the King sent the Blue Brigade to support him.^{[138][152][153]} These two-fold attacks, coupled with the destructive crossfire from the Swedish artillery, finally led to the collapse of Tilly's army. The Imperial-League tercios suffered heavy losses and lost all cohesion. The remnants of Tilly's army was thus forced into a disorderly retreat. The regimental commanders Erwitte, Caffarelli and Philipp Pappenheim where killed during this action, while Coronini became a Swedish prisoner of war. Thus both Erwitte's reserve cavalry and Philipp Pappenheim's regiment fell apart and fled in panic from the battlefield.^{[147][151][140]}

At this point, Tilly had been wounded in the chest and neck by three musket bullets, and received two blows to the head by a German officer, belonging to the Rheingrave's regiment, who attempted to capture him. Tilly was saved when the German officer was shot down by Imperial Colonel Rudolf Maximilian von Sachsen-Lauenburg. Cronberg's and Schönburg's cuirassiers escorted Tilly to safety in Halle.^[146] Meanwhile, Field Marshal Pappenheim managed to return to the fray and tried to gather every remaining cuirassier he could find. But by this time, most of the Imperial cavalry had fled the battlefield. With limited room for maneuver, Pappenheim undertook the task of protecting Tilly's retreat. Scattered Imperial-League troops fled towards Leipzig, Merseburg and Halle. Both the King's and Horn's cavalry launched a determined pursuit, cutting down or capturing any Imperial-League soldiers who failed to escape the battlefield. Large parts of the Swedish army, however, were too exhausted to partake in the pursuit. Tilly's army was thus spared from total annihilation.^{[119][153][154][147][155][121][131][127][149][156][151]}

At six o'clock in the evening, Pappenheim formed tercios at the brow of the Linkelwald forest with the last cohesive remnants of Baldiron-Dietrichstein's, Göss's, Chiesa's and Blankart's regiments. The tercios put up dogged resistance against Tott's and Stenbock's attacking cavalry. Their resistance also gave respite to the remaining Imperial-League troops scattered around the battlefield to escape with their lives. The tercios were subjected to artillery fire from their own artillery pieces, which had now been turned against them by Gustavus Adolphus and Horn's cavalry. By sundown, the 4,100 men^[94] of the four Imperial regiments from the start of the battle had now been reduced to a mere 600 men. The fighting finally subsided during nightfall at nine o'clock in the evening. Under the cover of darkness, Pappenheim was able to retreat from the battlefield along with the last Imperial-League soldiers. The flight proceeded in good order through the Linkelwald and in the direction of Halle. The exhausted Swedish infantry spent the night on the battlefield, while the Swedish cavalry and Taube's Saxon cuirassiers continued their pursuit along the roads towards Leipzig and Halle.^{[154][157][155][131][158][151][140]}

"The battaile thus happily wonne, his Majesty did principally under God ascribe the glory of the (first) victory to the Swedes and Fynnes horsemen, who were led by the valorous Fieldt-Marshall Gustavus Horne; for though the Dutch horsemen did behave themselves valourously divers times that day, yet it was not their fortune to put the enemy to flight; and though there were brave brigades of Swedes and Dutch in the field, yet it was the Scots brigads’ fortune to have gotten the praise for the foote service, and not without cause, having behaved themselves well, being led and conducted by an expert cavalier and fortunat—the valiant Hepburne."

— Robert Monro, ^[152]

Casualties

Commemorative monument at Breitenfeld erected during the bicentenary of the battle. The inscription in German reads: Freedom of belief for the world, saved at Breitenfeld, Gustavus Adolphus, christian and hero.

Imperial-Catholic League Army

The Imperial-League losses were devastating, with between 7,000 and 8,000 men killed,^{[159][160][161][162][163]} or around 7,600 men according to some sources,^{[164][155][165][95][156][149][166]} and around 6,000 men captured.^{[155][165][95][149][167][166][161][163]} Tilly had lost two-thirds of his army in the course of just a few days.

In the following day after the battle, 3,000 fleeing Imperial soldiers surrendered to their Saxon pursuers, who hunted them all the way to Leipzig.^{[159][168][155][167][161][163]} The Imperial-League prisoners of war from the battle were soon recruited into the Swedish ranks, as replacements for the Swedes' own losses.^[169] Up to 5,000 fleeing Imperial-League soldiers either deserted or were killed by vengeful Saxon peasants in the days following the battle.^[155][166] Among the dead were General of the Artillery Schönburg, General Erwitte and colonels Baumgarten, Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp, Caffarelli, and Philipp Pappenheim.^{[162][170][171][159][172]} Furthermore, colonels Blankart, Coronini, Montecuccoli, and Wangler were captured along with a number of lieutenant colonels, rittmeisters and captains.^[173] Field Marshals Tilly and Pappenheim and General Fürstenberg were wounded during the battle.^[162][159]

Tilly also lost his entire artillery park, his war chest, and 120 banners and standards.^[174] The latter were transported as spoils of war to the Riddarholmen Church in Stockholm for public viewing.^[162]

Swedish-Saxon army

Swedish losses amounted to 3,550 men, divided between 2,100 infantry and 1,450 cavalry.^{[173][3][156][160][166]} Among the dead were Major General Teuffel, colonels Efferen-Hall, Caldenbach and Damitz and Lieutenant Colonel Aderkas.^{[162][170][171][159]} Colonel Courville became an Imperial prisoner of war.^[170]

The Saxons lost between 2,000 and 3,000 men.^{[162][167][3][95][171][159]} Most were killed during the artillery barrage at the start of the battle or while they were fleeing from the Imperial cavalry. Among the dead were General Bindauf and Colonel Starschedel.^[162]

Aftermath

Gustav II Adolf at the Battle of Breitenfeld by an unknown artist.

The Catholics had suffered their first major defeat in the war, which had now been going on for 13 years. Mercenary Peter Hagendorf commented on the defeat:^[175]

"What we had stuffed into us at Altmark, we were forced to regurgitate heavily again outside Leipzig."

— Peter Hagendorf., ^[175]

Shortly after the battle, the remnants of Tilly's Imperial-League army were forced to retreat south, divided into two parts. Tilly led his troops towards Nördlingen in the Upper Palatinate, while Pappenheim marched with his troops towards the Weser to ambush Gustavus Adolphus's reserve forces.^[175]

The Swedish victory at Breitenfeld sent shockwaves around Europe, since the German Protestant states won their first and greatest victory since the outbreak of the war. Breitenfeld came to symbolize the Lutherans' revenge for the Magdeburg massacre months before. The victory allowed Gustavus Adolphus to choose direction of his march. On September 15, a council of war was held in Halle to decide on the continued war plans. One option was to go directly towards Vienna and try to bring about a quick end to the war. The parties decided that John Georg I's Saxon troops would march towards the Austrian Hereditary Lands and Vienna, while the Swedes moved south-west towards the Rhine River to engage the remaining Imperial troops. This decision has been discussed and questioned ever since, but it is impossible to know whether a march towards Vienna could have brought about favorable peace terms for the Protestants already in 1632.^[176]

Shortly after the council of war in Halle, Gustavus Adolphus's army first marched to the southwest, encountering only sporadic resistance from scattered imperial troops. On 22 September 1631, he captured the city of Erfurt, followed by Würzburg on 5 October, although the nearby Marienberg Fortress continued to resist. After a determined assault, Marienberg was captured by the Swedes on October 8. On 19 November, Gustavus Adolphus broke camp with 13,000 men, leaving 7,000 men as an occupying force in Würzburg. The king marched down the river Main and captured several towns and fortresses along the way, the garrisons of which went over to the Swedish army in large numbers. Already on November 17, the city of Frankfurt am Main was taken without a fight. The King's army then continued down the Main, reached its outlet in the Rhine, crossed the great river, and captured the Electoral residence of Mainz on December 11, 1631, where they established their winter quarters.^[177]

The totality of the victory confirmed Gustavus Adolphus's military innovations and guaranteed that the Swedes would remain engaged in the war for the foreseeable future. In the long term, the significant loss of forces and the creation of a strong Protestant anti-Imperial force required the Emperor and the Protestant and Catholic princes to rethink on the operational conduct of the war, and the diplomatic avenues they would pursue with it. Gustavus Adolphus's success encouraged several other princes to join the cause of the Swedish king and his few allies. By the month's end, Hanover, the Hessian dukes, Brandenburg and Saxony were officially aligned against the empire, and France had agreed to provide substantially greater funding for Gustavus Adolphus' armies. Although Gustavus Adolphus was killed a year later at the battle of Lützen, the military strength of the alliance had been secured through the addition of new armies. Even when Swedish leadership faltered it did not fail, and the influx of French gold ensured that the hostilities could continue.^[178]

Analysis

A model of a section of a pike and shot formation from the Thirty Years' War on display at the Swedish Army Museum in Stockholm. Consistent (uniform) dress was not common for military troops at the time.

Europe's armies at the beginning of the 17th century primarily used two kinds of military doctrines: the Spanish-German doctrine and the Dutch doctrine. The Spanish-German doctrine, adopted by Johann Tserclaes Tilly at Breitenfeld, was characterized by robust pike and shot tactical formations. These consisted mainly of pikemen and some musketeers and were formed into large squares known as "tercios". Tercios were heavy on the offensive, but difficult to maneuver on the battlefield. The Dutch battleline was more distinctly linear than the Spanish-German equivalent and was characterized by battalions. These were significantly smaller combat units with both pikemen and musketeers, making them easier to maneuver than the tercios. But since these lacked the crushing weight of the tercios in a frontal assault, firepower played a greater role among the Dutch battalions. Cavalry and artillery were of comparatively minor importance in both systems of combat methodology.^[179]

Gustavus Adolphus's Swedish combat methodology was a further development of the Dutch combat methodology and was based on his experiences during the Polish–Swedish War. The smallest combat unit of the King's infantry was the battalion (then called the squadron). Before battle, three to four battalions were combined into a larger combat unit, the brigade. The brigade was powerful enough to both defend against or successfully attack a tercio. Unlike the tercio, the brigade, thanks to its composition of battalions, could maneuver itself much faster and more smoothly on the battlefield. The battleline within Gustavus Adolphus's army was usually divided into two lines, with the brigades formed into line formation side by side in the centre and the cavalry in line formation on both wings. Within each battalion, the pikemen stood in the centre and the musketeers on the wings. A number of musketeer divisions were grouped together with the cavalry.^[180]

The firepower was of vital importance in the army of Gustavus Adolphus. Proportionally, the Swedish musketeers in his battalion were fewer than those in the tercio or the Dutch battalion, but they were used highly effectively. Gustavus Adolphus instructed his musketeers to fire volleys instead of successive fire. He had also developed a new technique of musket fire; the musketeers took up firing positions in three ranks: with the first rank while kneeling, the second rank while crouching and the third rank in a standing position.^[181] A concentrated Swedish volley had a devastating effect and opened the way for a fierce attack from the Swedish pikemen. The ratio of muskets to pikes was 13 to 8. Thus compared to the Dutch formation, Gustavus Adolphus had increased the number of pikes. The Swedish battleline was also more flexible, as the battalions were only six ranks deep. This made it possible for the Swedish units to quickly react to the enemy's movements.^[182] More important, the linear formation allowed most Swedish musketeers to fire at the same time, and allowed the Swedish infantry to match the Imperialist frontage with a smaller number of men.^[183]

A bastioned tercio in battle.

In addition to the musketeers' volley fire and agility during battle, Gustavus Adolphus also used regimental guns that accompanied the troops during their advance and provided devastating firepower at close range. He had moved away from heavy siege artillery into more mobile field pieces, which because of their mobility and rate of fire were much more effective than the former per pound. In addition, the Swedish cavalry before their clash with the enemy cavalry received effective fire support from the nearby musketeer divisions. The cavalry had also learned, after firing their pistols, to charge with their sabres at hand at full gallop. The great firepower of Gustavus Adolphus's musketeers and artillery, combined with the flexibility of its order of battle (the brigades), made the Swedish army very effective in defensive battles.^[184] But the core of his battle methodology, which greatly contributed to the victory at Breitenfeld, was the combined arms of both musketeers and regimental artillery, whose systematic firepower enabled a victorious breakthrough in close combat. This methodology would later be adopted among other armies in Europe and was an important contribution to the development of early modern warfare.^[185]

The casualties suffered by the Imperial-League army at Breitenfeld spoke for a change of the Spanish-German doctrine. When Wallenstein regained his role as commander-in-chief of the army, he engaged Gustavus Adolphus's army at the battle of Lützen in 1632, where he deployed his imperial infantry into battalions of three lines. His battalions were influenced by the Dutch doctrine and he also used Gustavus Adolphus's model of uniting battalions into brigades. The Swedish brigade was also forced to reform as a result of the Swedish defeat at the battle of Nördlingen in 1634.^[186]

See also

• Breitenfeld (1631) order of battle
• Hakkapeliitta
• Björneborgarnas marsch

Notes

1. Includes those killed by the Swedish-Saxon army, captured, and captured in pursuit.

1. The battle was fought at the crossroads villages of Breitenfeld 51°24′N 12°20′E, Podelwitz 51°24′N 12°23′E, and Seehausen 51°24′N 12°25′E
2. 7 September (old style or pre-acceptance of the Gregorian calendar in the Protestant region) 17 September (new style, or Gregorian dating), 1631.

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