Animalism (philosophy)

Not to be confused with animism or Animal Farm.

In the philosophical subdiscipline of ontology, animalism is a theory of personal identity that asserts that humans are animals.^[1] The concept of animalism is advocated by philosophers Eric T. Olson, Peter van Inwagen, Paul Snowdon, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov and David Wiggins.^{[2][page needed]} The view stands in contrast to positions such as John Locke's psychological criterion for personal identity or various forms of mind–body dualism, such as Richard Swinburne's account.

Thinking-animal argument

A common argument for animalism is known as the thinking-animal argument. It asserts the following:^[3]

1. A person that occupies a given space also has a Homo sapiens animal occupying the same space.
2. The Homo sapiens animal is thinking.
3. The person occupying the space is thinking.
4. Therefore, a human person is also a human animal.

Use of term in ethics

A less common, but perhaps increasing, use of the term animalism is to refer to the ethical view that all or most animals are worthy of moral consideration.^[4] It may be similar, though not necessarily, to sentientism.

See also

• Human evolution