Talk:Conatus
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This article was reviewed by Steve Nadler, University of Wisconsin-Madison on 2007-04-23. Comments: ;Steve Nadler, Professor of Philosophy, and Max and Frieda Weinstein-Bascom Professor of Jewish Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison I thought the piece was quite good, although its final sections are much thinner than the earlier ones. Some thoughts: 1. In the initial sentence, you might add 'striving' to the list of terms that translate 'conatus', since it is sometimes translated that way. Also, in that first sentence, what about saying "a term used in early philosophies of psychology and metaphysics to refer to an innate inclination of a THING to continue to exist and enhance itself"? That is a more general way to put the point, and leaves open the possibility that the thing is either mind, matter or a unity of both. 2. In the next sentence, I have to confess I'm not a fan of the phrase "Continental Rationalists", since it is an out-of-date way of referring to philosophers in the period and doesn't really capture anything that would substantively unite them. But that's just my preference (although the phrase has really fallen out of favor). 3. In the Descartes section, I would say not "Despite his dualism, Descartes rejects the teleological, or purposive, view of the material world", but rather BECAUSE of his dualism -- by ridding the material world of anything mental, he can effectively void all talk of ends or intentions from explanations in physical science. Also, technically, it is not right to talk of atoms with respect to Descartes -- he explicitly denies atomism; rather, he is a non-atomistic corpuscularian -- everything is explained in terms of parts of extension, or particles of matter, but not, strictly speaking, atoms. 4. Under Spinoza, I would say that "Spinoza uses conatus to describe an inclination of things to increase in power", rather than "increase in character". A question about the last sentence of this section: If a thing is destroyed by "the action of external forces", how could it be a case of "self-destruction"? I hope this helps. Steve NadlerFor more information about external reviews of Wikipedia articles and about this review in particular, see this page. |
This article was reviewed by John M. Connolly, Smith College on 2009-02-19. Comments: ;John M. Connolly, Five College 40th Anniversary Professor of Philosophy and Chairman of the Philosophy Department at Smith College In any event, I like your article. Just two comments: 1) You don't, I think, give enough attention to Augustine. He played a bigger role, I think, in the transmission of the Stoic horme to the Christian Middle Ages than you give him credit for. Or so argues Sarah Byers in the attached; and 2) the term "conative" has also been used in contemporary philosophy of human action, e.g. by Davidson (it was in reading his work on action that I first came across the term -- he may well have borrowed it from Spinoza, whom he regarded as an inspiration for his own "anomalous monism"; but I am afraid I have not been able to find a reference offhand. It was in any event not a central notion for him, as was hormē for the Stoics). ... Regards, JohnFor more information about external reviews of Wikipedia articles and about this review in particular, see this page. |