Battle of Malplaquet

The Battle of Malplaquet took place on 11 September 1709 during the War of the Spanish Succession, near Taisnières-sur-Hon in modern France, then part of the Spanish Netherlands. A French army of around 75,000 men, commanded by the Duke of Villars, engaged a Grand Alliance force of 86,000 under the Duke of Marlborough. In one of the bloodiest battles of the 18th century, the Allies won a narrow victory, but suffered heavy casualties.

Battle of Malplaquet
Part of the War of the Spanish Succession
The Battle of Malplaquet, Jan van Huchtenburgh
Date 11 September 1709 (1709-09-11) Location Taisnières-sur-Hon, French Hainaut 50°20′10″N 3°52′35″E Result See Aftermath
Belligerents
Dutch Republic  Great Britain  Holy Roman Empire  Prussia	France
Commanders and leaders
Marlborough Eugene of Savoy Tilly Prince of Orange Fagel Lottum Schulenburg Earl of Orkney	Villars (WIA) Boufflers Puységur De la Colonie
Strength
86,000 men, 100 guns[1]	75,000 men, 80 guns[2]
Casualties and losses
c. 22,000	c. 11,000

Allied advances in 1708 led to the renewal of peace talks, which collapsed in April 1709. After taking Tournai in early September, the Allies besieged Mons, whose capture would allow them to enter France itself, and Louis XIV ordered Villars to prevent its loss. Although the two armies made contact on 10 September, the attack was delayed until the next day, giving Villars time to construct strong defensive positions.

After an opening artillery barrage, the Allied infantry made simultaneous assaults on the French flanks. These were intended to divert troops from their centre, weakening it sufficiently so it could then be broken by a mass Allied cavalry charge. Although successful in previous battles, at Malplaquet the flank attacks incurred heavy casualties, while the French cavalry ensured their centre did not collapse. This allowed their infantry to retreat in good order, with the Allies too exhausted to conduct a pursuit.

Most historians estimate Allied losses as about 22,000 killed or wounded, those of the French being around 11,000. These levels shocked contemporaries, and heightened internal divisions within the Grand Alliance over the wisdom of continuing the war. By saving his army, Villars ultimately enabled Louis to negotiate far better peace terms in 1713 than those available in 1709. However, it did little to change the immediate strategic situation; Mons surrendered shortly afterward and the Allies resumed their advance in 1710.

Background

By early 1709, the French state was bankrupt, while the severe winter of 1708–1709 caused widespread famine; garrisons at Tournai, Arras, St Omer, Valenciennes and Cambrai all mutinied over lack of food and pay.^[3] Desperate to end the war, Louis XIV initiated peace talks with the Grand Alliance in The Hague. He accepted most of their terms, including replacing his grandson Philip V of Spain with the Habsburg candidate Archduke Charles, the principle for which they were ostensibly fighting. However, he and his ministers could not agree to the demand French troops be used to remove Philip, and talks broke down at the end of April.^[4]

Douai

Tournai

Mons

Ypres

Malplaquet

Saint-Venant

Boussu

Le Quesnoy

Key locations; modern French region of Hauts-de-France (dark green), Belgium (light green)

When the 1709 campaign began, Louis ordered Villars to avoid battle and to prevent any further deterioration in the French position. Ordinarily an extremely aggressive general, Villars instead built defensive lines along the River Scarpe, running from Saint-Venant to Douai.^[5]

For their part, the Allies were convinced France was on the verge of collapse, and looked to keep up the pressure by advancing through the line of border fortresses known as the Frontière de fer. While French strategy was always ultimately determined by Louis XIV, that of the Allies had to be approved separately by the British, Dutch and Austrian governments, which often required compromise. Marlborough, the Allied commander, considered the positions held by Villars too strong for a frontal assault, and since the Dutch opposed his preferred option of Ypres, he agreed to make Tournai the main objective for 1709.^[6]

Although persistent heavy rain caused further delays, the siege of Tournai commenced on 15 June; one of the strongest fortresses in France and held by a garrison of 7,700, it surrendered on 3 September and Marlborough immediately marched on Mons.^[7] Having assumed Tournai would hold out until October and thus consume the entire 1709 campaign season, Louis now ordered Villars to prevent the loss of Mons "at all costs...the salvation of France is at stake".^[2] The main Allied army arrived east of the town on 7 September, awaiting the arrival of their siege artillery from Tournai; Villars took up positions to the southwest on the 9th, leaving the two forces facing each other across the gap of Malplaquet.^[8]

Prelude

Disposition of forces; Allied (upper right), French (lower left)

Knowing Villars had been instructed to fight for Mons, Marlborough and his deputy Prince Eugene of Savoy were confident of winning a victory that would effectively end the war. At the same time, while conscious of the implications of defeat, Villars informed Louis XIV he must fight, or his army would dissolve.^[2] The Allies delayed their attack pending the arrival of 1,900 men from Tournai under Henry Withers, a decision criticised then and later, one analyst arguing "the battle should have taken place on 10 September, or not at all".^[9] This gave Villars an extra day to construct defensive positions, including earthworks covering the open ground in the centre, and additional entrenchments extending into the woods on either side.^[2]

Marlborough's plan was the same as he had successfully employed at Blenheim, Ramillies and Oudenarde. On each occasion, frontal assaults on the French flanks forced them to move troops from the centre, which was then broken by mass cavalry attacks. Although the leading units took heavy casualties, overall Allied losses were substantially less than those suffered by the defeated. In contrast, at Malplaquet the French held strong defensive positions, were better led, and highly motivated.^{[10][lower-alpha 1]}

Villars had also learned from Ramillies, where Villeroy arguably contributed to his own defeat by over-extending his line.^[12] He was helped by the fact that the battlefield at Malplaquet was much more restricted, allowing him to concentrate his infantry in defensive positions. It also prevented Marlborough from quickly shifting troops between wings, a tactic he often adopted to keep opponents off balance.^[13]

The French army consisted of 80 guns and between 75,000 and 80,000 men, including significant numbers of Bavarian and Swiss mercenaries, as well as the Irish Brigade. Villars himself commanded the left, de la Colonie led the centre, with the right, where Villars had placed the bulk of the infantry, led by 67-year-old Marshal Louis-François de Boufflers, who was senior to Villars in rank but volunteered to serve under him. The infantry held a continuous line of entrenchments supported by artillery, with the cavalry massed in the rear.^[1]

Facing them was an Allied force of roughly 86,000 men and 100 guns, with the right wing formed of 30,000 German and Danish infantry led by Prince Eugene. The Earl of Orkney commanded the Allied centre, with 8,000 mostly British infantry, and the bulk of the 30,000 cavalry to their rear.^[14] Finally, the Allied left was held by the Dutch, with 18,000 infantry under the Prince of Orange, plus 10,000 cavalry under the Prince of Hesse-Kassel. Overall control was exercised by Count Tilly, who had succeeded Lord Overkirk as senior Dutch commander.^{[lower-alpha 2][17][15]}

Battle

Dutch troops at Malplaquet led by the Prince of Orange, by Charles Rochussen.

At 07:00 on 11 September, the Allies opened the battle with an artillery bombardment. This ended at 08:30, when their right wing assaulted French troops based in Sars Wood, led by Count Finckenstein, Lottum and Schulenburg. Three hours of close combat ensued, both sides taking heavy losses; Prince Eugene was slightly wounded, but refused to leave the field. At around 09:00, the Dutch, commanded by François Nicolas Fagel, moved against the French right with 13 battalions, including Swiss mercenaries and the Scots Brigade. After initial success, they were repulsed, and the Prince of Orange and Sicco van Goslinga then ordered another 17 battalions to support Fagel by attacking French positions around Blairon Farm.^[18][19]

A frontal assault on strongly entrenched troops meant the Dutch incurred over 5,000 casualties capturing Blairon Farm, including many senior officers.^[20] Despite these losses, the Prince of Orange continued his attacks until Marlborough ordered him to stop. Covered by their cavalry, the Dutch withdrew to their original positions, while Orkney later wrote their dead lay "as thick as ever you saw a flock of sheep."^[21] Boufflers, in command of the French right, had over 60 battalions at his disposal, but made no attempt to launch a counterattack, a decision later criticised.^[22] Suggestions the Dutch action was only intended as a demonstration appear unlikely. Marlborough blamed himself for not monitoring it more closely, and took full responsibility for the failure.^[23]

Meanwhile, pressure from Prince Eugene forced Villars to keep moving troops from the centre to prevent the collapse of his left wing. Withers and the detachment from Tournai arrived too late to support the Dutch, and were instructed instead to make a flanking move north of the French lines in Sars Wood. This manoeuvre took over two hours to complete, by which time the fighting had largely ended, but their approach forced Villars to reinforce his left with another twelve battalions.^[24] By midday, this left nine French battalions and sixty cavalry squadrons in the centre, facing twenty-three and eighty respectively.^[25] In the early afternoon, Villars was badly wounded, and transferred overall command to Boufflers, with Puységur taking over the left.^[26]

Battle of Maplaquet by Louis Laguerre; Allied troops enter the French positions

Despite their losses, the Dutch assaults prevented the French right reinforcing their centre.^[27] This was now over-run by Orkney's infantry, while the Dutch cavalry under Grovestins broke into their rear, before being attacked by the elite Maison du Roi cavalry under Boufflers.^{[lower-alpha 3]} Superior numbers forced the Allied cavalry back, before the French in turn were repulsed by Orkney's infantry. The Allies advanced once again, and engaged the French in what was the largest cavalry action of the 18th century.^[29] As this unfolded, the French left finally started to crumble under pressure from Withers and Schulenburg.^[30]

Puységur now ordered his troops to withdraw, while the Prince of Orange led another mass assault against the French right. The Dutch infantry made some progress but were repulsed once again, before Grovestins' cavalry approached the French rear, forcing them to finally abandon their entrenchments.^{[31][lower-alpha 4]} At 15:00 Boufflers ordered a general retreat towards Le Quesnoy, some 25 kilometres (16 mi) away,^[33] with the Allies too exhausted to pursue.^[30]

Casualties

Most commentators put Allied casualties between 21,000 and 25,000 killed or wounded,^[34] 8,462 of which were incurred by the Dutch infantry.^{[30][lower-alpha 5]} Other estimates range from a low of 15,000 ^[36] to a high of 30,000.^[37] There is less consensus on French losses, which are generally put at between 11,000 and 14,000,^[38][39] Other estimates suggest a low of 7,000,^[40] to a high of 17,000 killed or wounded, plus 500 prisoners.^{[lower-alpha 6][21][42][43][lower-alpha 7]} The Allies also captured 16 French artillery pieces.^[45]

Aftermath

The Pré carré line on the French northern border, defended by a line of fortresses known as the Ceinture de fer (marked in red and green); by the end of 1710, this line was badly compromised

Although horrified by the casualties, contemporaries viewed Malplaquet as an Allied victory,^[46][47] and most modern historians concur.^[48] The French commanders focused on the losses they had inflicted, Boufflers reporting to Louis XIV "...misfortune compels me to announce the loss of another battle, but I can assure your Majesty misfortune has never been accompanied by greater glory".^[49] In a similar vein, Villars later wrote: "If God grants us the grace to lose such a battle again, Your Majesty can count on all of his enemies being destroyed".^[50]

The Prince of Orange was left to oversee the siege of Mons, which surrendered on 21 October.^[51] Despite this loss, in the long term Malplaquet arguably allowed Louis to negotiate far better terms at Utrecht in 1713 than those available in 1709.^[52][53] When negotiations resumed in March 1710, the French strategic position was largely unchanged,^[54] but Maplaquet accentuated Allied divisions over war aims and their associated cost.^{[lower-alpha 8]} Even before the 1709 campaign, Marlborough himself felt Whig demands of "No Peace Without Spain" were excessive.^[56] In that respect, Malplaquet had less impact on British policy than Spanish successes the same year at Alicante and La Gudina, which made prospects of victory there increasingly remote.^[57]

Victory at Villaviciosa in December 1710 signalled the collapse of Allied ambitions in Spain and accelerated peace talks

Before peace talks resumed in 1710, Marlborough wrote to the Allied negotiators that "thanks to our victory..., you may have what peace you want".^[58] This view was used on the loss of Mons, which exposed the French interior, while the losses incurred at Malplaquet meant they could only act on the defensive.^[59] In spring 1710, the Allies resumed their advance almost unopposed; by September they had broken through the secondary line of the "Pré carré", capturing Douai, Béthune, Aire and Saint-Venant. Short of supplies, and with many regiments reduced to less than half their official size, Villars could not risk the last significant French field army in another battle.^[60]

As a result, the immediate impact of Malplaquet was political rather than military. When peace negotiations resumed in March 1710 at Geertruidenberg, it was clear the mood in Britain had changed.^[61] Although British losses were comparatively low,^{[lower-alpha 9]} Marlborough's domestic opponents used the heavy casualties to attack him.^[63] Reluctance to continue fighting for what seemed marginal gains resulted in a landslide victory for the Tories in the October 1710 British general election, although they confirmed their commitment to the war to prevent a credit crisis.^{[64][lower-alpha 10]} Despite success in France, British opposition to continuing the war was strengthened by further defeats at Brihuega and Villaviciosa in December 1710 which confirmed Philip V as king of Spain, ostensibly the original cause of the war.^[66]

Portraits of Eugene of Savoy, Marlborough and the Prince of Orange, by Pieter Tanjé

The Dutch blamed their losses on Marlborough's tactics, Withers for allegedly failing to support their attack, and the Prince of Orange for continuing when it became clear the French positions were too strong.^[67] Although Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius and several Dutch regenten felt the casualties justified more stringent peace terms, others considered this unrealistic. Sicco van Goslinga, a Dutch field deputy attached to Marlborough's staff, argued such casualties were to be expected, given they had taken Tournai and Mons, "two of the strongest fortresses in Europe", and won "one of the hardest battles ever fought".^[67]

In April 1711, the Habsburg candidate for the Spanish throne, Archduke Charles, succeeded his brother Joseph as Holy Roman Emperor. Since the British and Dutch viewed a union of Spain with Austria as unwelcome as one with France, this effectively undermined a key reason for continuing the war.^[68] While the capture of Bouchain in September 1711 removed one of the last significant obstacles to the Allied advance, the new British government had already secretly negotiated peace terms with Louis XIV, signing the Preliminary Articles of London on 8 October 1711.^[69] At the end of 1711, Marlborough was replaced by the Tory Duke of Ormonde, who was ordered to prevent any further offensive action by British troops.^[70]

Legacy

While the battle is now chiefly remembered by British and Dutch commentators for the casualties incurred, the French view it differently. At the beginning of the war, their army was considered the best in Europe, a reputation shattered by a series of defeats between 1704 and 1708.^[71] Despite being a narrow defeat which did little to change the immediate strategic situation, Malplaquet is seen as more important than victory at Denain in 1712. Historian André Corvisier suggests its significance in French military history is primarily psychological. He argues 18th century authors viewed it as the point when the French army regained its confidence, while for those writing after the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, it provided proof of French resilience and ability to recover from catastrophic defeat.^[72]

A total of fourteen battalions of Swiss mercenaries fought in the battle, six with the French, including two of Swiss Guards, and another eight with the Dutch. More than 8,000 of these became casualties, while Malplaquet was the last action where Swiss mercenaries directly engaged one another until Bailén in 1808.^[73]

Written many years later, a firsthand account of the battle is given in the book Amiable Renegade: The Memoirs of Peter Drake (1671–1753).^[74] An Irishman who served in various European armies, Drake fought with the Maison du Roi at Malplaquet and was captured after being wounded several times.^[75] Another émigré of Irish descent, Féilim Ó Néill, was among those killed serving with the Irish Brigade.^[76]

Notes

1. One suggestion is that this was partly due to the mixing of regular troops with militia units who had not been demoralised by past defeats.^[11]
2. In reality, Tilly's anti-Orangist sympathies meant his largely pro-Orangist senior officers allegedly took their orders from the Prince of Orange, ^[15] and as a result seems to have had little influence on the battle.^[16]
3. According to Quincy, James Francis Edward Stuart, under the pseudonym Chevalier de St. George, rode with the Maison du Roi as a volunteer during this charge.^[28]
4. Sicco van Goslinga about the Dutch casualties: "Yesterday, the princes and generals saw [...] with horror how our men lay against the field fortifications and entrenchments, still in the rank orders as they had fallen. Our infantry is dilapidated and ruined [...] Tilly will draw up a list [of the dead and wounded] in accordance with the advice of the generals and colonels. [...] It does not suit us to jeopardise our Republic so many times [...], but the good Lord has preserved it, at the cost of a river of blood shed by the bravest people in the world."^[32]
5. The British lost 1,800 killed or wounded, although this excludes those serving in the Dutch Scots Brigade.^[35]
6. Dumont and Rousset de Missy relate that after the battle, it was agreed that 1,500 French wounded, who had been left behind during the retreat, would be considered Prisoners of War until exchanged for an equal number of Allied prisoners.^[41]
7. The estimate of 17,000 is supported by an intercepted letter from a French officer, who wrote: "...we had at least seven thousand killed on the battlefield, and more than ten thousand wounded."^[44]
8. In 1709, Parliament approved expenditures of £6.4 million, up from £5.0 million in 1706; by the end of 1710, these had doubled to £12.9 million.^[55]
9. Estimates suggest 600 dead, plus another 1,500 wounded.^[62]
10. Tory opposition to the war originated in foreign policy differences going back to the 1690s. Whigs viewed a Continental strategy as essential, while Tories favoured using the Royal Navy to attack the trading interests of their opponents. The latter also considered European commitments overly expensive, and primarily of benefit to others, notably their Dutch commercial rivals.^[65]

References

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2. Lynn 1999, p. 331.
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5. Lynn 1999, p. 330.
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7. Holmes 2008, p. 422.
8. Holmes 2008, p. 423.
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10. Bergin 2001, pp. 138–139.
11. Drévillon & Fonck 2017, p. 36.
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16. De Graaf 2021, p. 153.
17. Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 313.
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21. Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 318.
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25. Chandler & Beckett 1996, p. 84.
26. Holmes 2008, p. 431.
27. Wijn 1959, p. 544.
28. Sevin de Quincy 1726, pp. 197, 202.
29. De Graaf 2021, pp. 173–174.
30. Holmes 2008, p. 433.
31. Wijn 1959, p. 537.
32. De Graaf 2021, p. 184.
33. Penant 2019, p. 222.
34. Lynn 1999, p. 334; Holmes 2008, p. 433; Clodfelter 2017, p. 74; Chandler 1996, p. 265; Somerset 2012, p. 387.
35. MacDowall 2020, p. 84.
36. Thackeray & Findling 1998, p. 34.
37. Delbrück 1919, p. 229.
38. Lynn 1999, p. 334.
39. Corvisier 1997, p. 1; Delbrück 1919, p. 229; Somerset 2012, p. 387.
40. Périni 1906, p. 227.
41. Dumont et al. 1729, p. 97.
42. Wijn 1959, p. 543.
43. Van Alphen et al. 2019, p. 95.
44. De Vryer 1738, pp. 444–445.
45. Wijn 1959, p. 541.
46. Lynn 1999, pp. 334–335.
47. Delbrück 1919, p. 325.
48. Jenkins 2021, p. 220.
49. Holmes 2008, p. 434.
50. Anquetil 1819, p. 241.
51. De Graaf 2021, pp. 186–187.
52. MacDowall 2020, p. 89.
53. Parrott 2001, p. 125.
54. Onnekink & Bruin 2013, p. 65.
55. Hattendorf 1987, p. 304.
56. Bergin 2001, pp. 125–126, 140.
57. Gregg 1980, p. 289.
58. Lynn 1999, p. 336.
59. Lynn 1999, p. 337.
60. Lynn 1999, p. 338.
61. Holmes 2008, p. 435.
62. Somerset 2012, p. 387.
63. Somerset 2012, pp. 386–387.
64. Simms 2008, pp. 60–64.
65. Shinsuke 2013, pp. 37–40.
66. Kamen 2001, p. 101.
67. Van Nimwegen 2020, pp. 319–320.
68. Somerset 2012, p. 445.
69. Bromley 1979, pp. 459–460.
70. Somerset 2012, p. 471.
71. MacDowall 2020, p. 23.
72. Corvisier 1997, pp. 2–4.
73. Z'Graggen 2018, p. 51.
74. Drake 1960, pp. 163–170.
75. Holmes 2008, p. 432.
76. Instituto Português de Heráldica 2006, p. 391.

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Further reading

• Bodart, Gaston (1908). Militär-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon (1618–1905). Wien und Leipzig, C. W. Stern.
• Braun, Hans: Hans Rudolf von May in German, French and Italian in the online Historical Dictionary of Switzerland, 2009.
• Garrison, F.H. (1970). Notes on the history of military medicine. Legare Street Press. ISBN 978-1397937636.
• Green, Howard (1971). Famous engagements. Vol. 2, Marathon to Passchendaele. Cooper. ISBN 978-0850520408.
• Jones, J.R. (1993). Marlborough. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521375719.
• Nicholson, G.W.L. (1955). Marlborough and The War of the Spanish Succession. Army Headquarters.
• Nicholson, Soterios (2018) [1916]. War or an United World: With a Review of Its Precursors in Europe, a Retrospect and Estimate. Forgotten Books. ISBN 978-1528477857.
• Thomas, Edward (1915). The Life of the Duke of Marlborough. Hardpress Publishing.
• Tucker, Spencer C (2009). A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East [6 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 872. ISBN 978-1-85109-672-5.
• Van Alphen, Marc; Hoffenaar, Jan; Lemmers, Alan; Van der Spek, Christiaan (2021). Military Power And The Dutch Republic: War, Trade and the Balance of Power in Europe, 1648–1813. Boom. ISBN 978-9087283650.
• Weir, William (2004). 50 battles that changed the world : the conflicts that most influenced the course of history. New York: Franklin Lakes, NJ : New Page Books. ISBN 1564144917.

External links

Media related to Battle of Malplaquet at Wikimedia Commons