氣候變化政治(英語:Politics of climate change)指的是不同群體為應對氣候變化所具的不同觀點(如因應策略的歧異、利益衝突、科學認知的差距及政治考量)。氣候變化主要是由人類經濟活動所排放的溫室氣體造成,特別是由燃燒化石燃料、製造水泥和生產鋼鐵等,加上農業和林業的土地利用及土地利用改變所產生。自第一次工業革命以來,化石燃料為經濟和開發活動提供重要的能源。科學界普遍認為氣候政策有其必要(參見關於氣候變化的科學共識),但居中心地位的化石燃料和碳密集型產業卻對此種氣候友善政策予以強烈抵制。
各國制定自己的減排計畫,很大程度上是1991年引入的自願性承諾和審查(英语:pledge and review)制度,但在京都議定書簽署之前(1997年)已被放棄,京都議定書的重點是達成一致的"由上而下"的排放目標。這種自願性做法在哥本哈根會議重新出現,並在2015年《巴黎協定》中得到進一步重視,但承諾被改稱為國家自訂貢獻(英语:Nationally Determined Contributions),承諾應每隔5年重新提交一次。這種方法的效果還有待觀察。[11]一些國家在2021年於蘇格蘭格拉斯哥召開的第26屆聯合國氣候變化大會前後提交數量更高的國家自訂貢獻。簽署國於同一會議中也通過碳交易的會計規則。[12]
為氣候而罷課(瑞典語:Skolstrejk för klimatet)亦稱週五為未來而戰(英語:Fridays for Future (FFF))、青年需要良好氣候(Youth for Climate)、氣候罷課(Climate Strike/Climatestrike)或青年為氣候罷課(Youth Strike for Climate),是項由學生在週五罷課,參加示威活動的國際運動,訴求是政治領導人該採取行動以緩解氣候變化,以及化石燃料行業該轉而生產再生能源。
瑞典學生格蕾塔·童貝里於2018年8月在瑞典議會外舉著書寫“Skolstrejk för klimatet”(“為氣候而罷課”)的牌子進行舉抗議活動,隨後世界各地展開宣傳和廣泛的組織活動。[36][37]
在2019年9月進行的氣候罷課(Global Week for Future),總計在150多個國家/地區共舉行過4,500起罷課,集中在9月20日(2019年聯合國氣候行動峰會前三日)星期五和9月27日星期五,也包含有在兩日之間的活動。 於9月20日的罷課是世界史上最大規模的為氣候而罷課,聚集大約400萬名抗議者,其中許多是學童,德國的參與者有140萬名。[45]
一些氣候友善政策在立法過程中受到環境和/或左派壓力團體和政黨的阻撓。例如於2009年,澳大利亞綠黨投票反對碳污染減排計劃(英语:Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme),因為他們認為該計劃沒有施加足夠高的碳價。在美國,草根環境組織塞拉俱樂部助陣,阻止2016年氣候稅法案通過,因為他們認為該法案缺乏社會正義。在美國各州實施的一些碳定價嘗試已被左派政客阻止,因為這些是透過碳定價(又稱限額與交易機制 cap and trade)而非稅收來執行的。[123]
太陽輻射調節是另一項減少全球暖化的技術,透過於平流層中注入氣膠,人們普遍認為這將有效降低全球平均氣溫。然而許多氣候科學家認為這種技術的前景不受歡迎,並警告說,副作用包括由於陽光和降水量減少可能會導致農業產量下降,以及可能出現局部氣溫上升和其他天氣干擾。根據美國氣候學家邁克爾·曼(英语:Michael E. Mann)的說法,利用太陽輻射調節來降低地球升溫,是種降低制定減排政策意願的另一手法。[126][51][127]
氣候融資的成長:近年來於氣候變化領域中的資金流動開始增加,融資機制有所開展。在墨西哥坎昆舉行的2010年聯合國氣候變化大會,呼籲創立綠色氣候基金,由已開發國家向開發中國家提供大量資金,以支持調適和緩解技術。資金將透過雙邊和多邊官方發展援助、全球環境基金、聯合國氣候變化綱要公約等多種管道轉移。[178]此外也有越來越多的公共資金為發展中國家應對氣候變化提供更大的助力。例如氣候韌性試點計畫(Pilot Program for Climate Resilience),目的在為一些低收入國家制定綜合和擴大規模的氣候變化調適方法,及為未來資金流動預作準備。除開發中國家和已開發國家對"共同但有區別的責任(英语:common but differentiated responsibilities)(CBDR)概念"有不同的解釋之外,氣候變化資金的挹注也可能會改變對開發中國家的傳統援助機制。[179][180]開發中國家因而必須改變治理結構,將傳統的捐贈與受援關係揚棄。在這類情景中,了解氣候變化領域資金流動的政治經濟過程對於有效的管理資源轉移和應對氣候變化會非常重要。[174]
Dessler (2020), broadly agrees that this more collaborative approach was key to success at Paris, though warned that one of the main parties which drove the change (China) had by 2018 returned to a less friendly approach, seeking to magnify differences between developed and less developed nations.
In addition to the normal collective action problems, other difficulties have included: 1.) The fact that fossil fuel use has been common across the economy, unlike the relatively few firms that controlled manufacture of products containing the CFCs, which had been damaging the Ozone layer. 2.) Incompatible views from different nations on the level of responsibility that highly developed countries had in assisting less developed controls to control their emissions without inhibiting their economic growth. 3.) Difficulty in getting humans to take significant action to limit a threat that is far away in the future. 4.) The dilemma between the conflicting needs to reach agreements that could be accepted by all, versus the desirability for the agreement to have significant practical effect on human activity. See e.g. Dryzek (2011) Chpt. 3, and Dessler (2020) Chpt. 1, 4 & 5.
Whether it actually is cheaper depends on various factors like the fluctuating price of fossil fuels on the global market, the endowments that the Jurisdiction enjoys (sunlight, amount of flowing water etc. ) and if the new renewable energy infrastructure is replacing an existing fossil fuel plant, on the timescale under consideration, which determines whether construction costs can be offset.
Much media coverage on these lines was paid for by the fossil fuel industry, with Koch Industries one of the more prominent companies involved. Yet in the early 2010s the Koch brothers pushed for taxes on households with solar panels selling excess energy back to the Grid, leading Michael Mann to suggest that preference for small government may not have been their primary motivation. See Mann (2021) Chpt 6, p. 124-127
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