United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly: Volume 1: 51. 3 September 1947 [20 April 2017]. A/364(SUPP). （原始內容存檔於2021-10-01）. The primary objectives sought in the foregoing scheme were, in short, political division and economic unity: to confer upon each group, Arab and Jew, in its own territory, the power to make its own laws, while preserving both, throughout Palestine, a single integrated economy, admittedly essential to the well-being of each, and the same territorial freedom of movement to individuals as is enjoyed today.
David McDowall (1990). Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond. I.B. Tauris. p. 193.. ISBN 9780755612581. Although the Jewish Agency accepted the partition plan, it did not accept the proposed borders as final and Israel's declaration of independence avoided the mention of any boundaries. A state in part of Palestine was seen as a stage towards a larger state when opportunity allowed. Although the borders were 'bad from a military and political point of view,' Ben Gurion urged fellow Jews to accept the UN Partition Plan, pointing out that arrangements are never final, 'not with regard to the regime, not with regard to borders, and not with regard to international agreements'. The idea of partition being a temporary expedient dated back to the Peel Partition proposal of 1937. When the Zionist Congress had rejected partition on the grounds that the Jews had an inalienable right to settle anywhere in Palestine, Ben Gurion had argued in favour of acceptance, 'I see in the realisation of this plan practically the decisive stage in the beginning of full redemption and the most wonderful lever for the gradual conquest of all of Palestine.
Sean F. McMahon. The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations. Routledge. 2010: p40. "The Zionist movement also accepted the UN partition plan of 1947 tactically. Palumbo notes that 「[t]he Zionists accepted this scheme [the UN partition plan] since they hoped to use their state as a base to conquer the whole country.」 Similarly, Flapan states that 「[Zionist] acceptance of the resolution in no way diminished the belief of all the Zionist parties in their right to the whole of the country [Palestine]」; and that 「acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution was an example of Zionist pragmatism par excellence. It was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction – a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious.」 引文格式1維護：冗餘文本 (link)
See The Palestine Declaration To The International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue Archived copy(PDF). [19 July 2009]. （原始內容(PDF)存檔於16 July 2011）. and Silverburg, Sanford R. (2002), "Palestine and International Law: Essays on Politics and Economics", Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co, ISBN0-7864-1191-0, pages 37–54
See Chapter 5 "Israel (1948–1949) and Palestine (1998–1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States", in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, and Stefan Talmon, eds., The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999)
Sourcebook on public international law, by Tim Hillier, Routledge, 1998, ISBN1-85941-050-2, page 217; and Prof. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, "Collective Responses to the Unilateral Declarations of Independence of Southern Rhodesia and Palestine, An Application of the Legitimizing Function of the United Nations", The British Yearbook of International Law, 1990, pp.l35-l53
蘇聯
捷克斯洛伐克
白俄羅斯蘇維埃社會主義共和國
波蘭人民共和國
烏克蘭蘇維埃社會主義共和國
土耳其
希臘王國
南斯拉夫
泰國
