原則主義派（波斯語：اصولگرایان，羅馬化：Osul-Garâyân），也被稱作伊朗保守派[11][12]、保守-強硬派[13]或伊朗右翼[12][14][15]，伊斯蘭革命之後與改革派構成兩大主要政治陣營。某些歐美媒體稱其為「強硬派」，通常指的是陣營中的某些極右派系[16]，但陣營也包含部分中間傾向的派系 [17]。
Quick Facts 原則主義派, 議會領袖 ...
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Quick Facts 行政部門, 總統 ...
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在伊朗政治中，「原則」指的是支持伊朗最高領袖，並倡導保護伊斯蘭革命早期的守舊派意識形態。[18]海珊·穆薩維指出，伊朗原則主義派構築了伊朗絕大多數的右翼/保守主義，傾向於宗教主義，且比起改革派，他們與庫姆的教權組織有更多聯繫。[19]原則主義派聲明，會始終保持對伊斯蘭教和守舊派伊斯蘭革命的忠誠，服從最高領袖的命令和法基赫的監護。[20]該陣營反對國際社會方面否認、改變當今伊朗守舊派政治體制的現狀[7]，且還大力支持目前伊朗國內的守舊派政權之形式。[21]
目前原則主義派在專家會議、憲法監督委員會和司法機構中占據主導權。[20]
More information 年份, 候選人 ...
| 年份
|
候選人
|
得票
|
%
|
排名
|
| 1997
|
阿里·阿克巴·納塔格-努里
|
7,248,317
|
24.87
|
2nd
|
| 2001
|
阿赫馬德·塔瓦克里
|
4,387,112
|
15.58
|
2nd
|
| 2005/1
|
馬哈茂德·艾哈邁迪內賈德
|
5,711,696
|
19.43
|
2nd
|
| 穆罕默德·巴吉爾·卡利巴夫
|
4,095,827
|
13.93
|
4th
|
| 阿里·拉里賈尼
|
1,713,810
|
5.83
|
5th
|
| Total |
11,521,333 |
39.19 |
決勝投票
|
| 2005/2
|
馬哈茂德·艾哈邁迪內賈德
|
17,284,782
|
61.69
|
1st
|
| 2009
|
馬哈茂德·艾哈邁迪內賈德
|
24,527,516
|
62.63
|
1st
|
| 穆赫辛·禮薩伊
|
678,240
|
1.73
|
3rd
|
| Total |
25,205,756 |
64.36
|
當選
|
| 2013
|
穆罕默德·巴吉爾·卡利巴夫
|
6,077,292
|
16.56
|
2nd
|
| 賽義德·賈利利
|
4,168,946
|
11.36
|
3rd
|
| 穆赫辛·禮薩伊
|
3,884,412
|
10.58
|
4th
|
| 阿里·阿克巴·韋拉亞提
|
2,268,753
|
6.18
|
6th
|
| Total |
16,399,403 |
44.68 |
失敗
|
| 2017
|
埃卜拉希姆·賴西
|
15,835,794
|
38.28
|
2nd
|
| 莫斯塔法·米爾-薩利姆
|
478,267
|
1.16
|
3rd
|
| Total |
16,314,061 |
39.44 |
失敗
|
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下面列出了伊朗目前還在活躍的原則主義黨派：
- 兩個社會（非正式）
- 伊瑪目和領袖路線追隨者陣線
- 伊斯蘭革命穩定陣線
- 發展與正義黨
Mehdi Mozaffari, What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2007, 8 (1): 17–33, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622, In fact, Iranian 『Islamists』 of our day call themselves 『Usul gara』, which literally means 『fundamentalist』, but in a positive sense. It designates a 『person of principles』 who is the 『true Muslim』.
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Women's Rights, Shari'a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran, International Journal of Politics Culture and Society (New York), 2013, 26 (3): 237–253, doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x, 「Principlism」 or osul-gera』i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari『a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari『a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.
Mohseni, Payam. Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation. Brumberg, Daniel; Farhi, Farideh (編). Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Indiana University Press. 2016: 47. ISBN 978-0253020680. Melody Mohebi, The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan: 129–131, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6 Robert J. Reardon, Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation: 81–82, 2012, ISBN 978-0833076373 Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press: 135, 2002, ISBN 9780815629788 Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown. The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. 2013: 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. 「Conservative」 is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as 「principlist」 is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eslahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congrous groups and individuals.
Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan. Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. 2012-08-31: 108. ISBN 9781908433022. Robin B. Wright (編), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press: 37, 2010, ISBN 978-1601270849 Masoud Kazemzadeh, Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran, Middle Eastern Studies, 2008, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, In Western sources, the term 『hard-liners』 is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves 『Osul-gara』. The word 『osul』 means 『fundamentals』, or 『principles』 or 『tenets』. And the suffix 『gara』 means 『those who uphold or promote’. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves 『Ommat Hezbollah』. 『Ommat』 is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. 『Hezbollah』 literally means 『Party of Allah』. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as 『mohafezeh-kar』 (『conservative’). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms 『eqtedar-gara』 (authoritarian) and 『tamamiyat-khah』 (totalitarian) for what many Western observers have termed 『hard-liners』. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners 『eqtedar-gara』.
Banafsheh Keynoush, Iran after Ahmadinejad, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (New York), 2012, 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hardliners but also more centre-right factions.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press: 486, 2012, ISBN 9780870033025 Etel Solingen (編), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press: 222, 2012, ISBN 9781107010444 Thaler et. al. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. 2010. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.
