伊朗原則主義派

原則主義派席次
行政部門
總統	否
部長	3 / 18 （17%）
副總統	2 / 12 （17%）
議會
發言人	是
席次	83 / 290 （29%）
司法機構
司法總監	是
狀態	優勢
監督機構
專家會議	66 / 88 （75%）
憲法監督委員會	優勢
國家利益委員會	優勢
城市議會
德黑蘭	0 / 21 （0%）
馬什哈德	0 / 15 （0%）
伊斯法罕	0 / 13 （0%）
卡拉季	0 / 13 （0%）
庫姆	12 / 13 （92%）
設拉子	1 / 13 （8%）
大不里士	3 / 13 （23%）
亞茲德	2 / 11 （18%）
扎黑丹	0 / 11 （0%）
拉什特	1 / 9 （11%）

原則主義派
原則主義派
議會領袖	阿里·拉里賈尼; 卡澤姆·賈拉利
意識形態	保守主義; 伊斯蘭主義; 政治伊斯蘭; 神權主義; 教法學家監護派系：; 民粹主義; 古典保守主義; 實用主義; 伊斯蘭原教旨主義
政治立場	右翼
宗教信仰	什葉派
	伊朗政治; 政黨 · 選舉

原則主義派（波斯語：اصول‌گرایان‎，羅馬化：Osul-Garâyân），也被稱作伊朗保守派^[11]^[12]、保守-強硬派^[13]或伊朗右翼^[12]^[14]^[15]，伊斯蘭革命之後與改革派構成兩大主要政治陣營。某些歐美媒體稱其為「強硬派」，通常指的是陣營中的某些極右派系^[16]，但陣營也包含部分中間傾向的派系 ^[17]。

快速預覽 原則主義派, 議會領袖 ...

關閉

快速預覽 行政部門, 總統 ...

關閉

在伊朗政治中，「原則」指的是支持伊朗最高領袖，並倡導保護伊斯蘭革命早期的守舊派意識形態。^[18]海珊·穆薩維指出，伊朗原則主義派構築了伊朗絕大多數的右翼/保守主義，傾向於宗教主義，且比起改革派，他們與庫姆的教權組織有更多聯繫。^[19]原則主義派聲明，會始終保持對伊斯蘭教和守舊派伊斯蘭革命的忠誠，服從最高領袖的命令和法基赫的監護。^[20]該陣營反對國際社會方面否認、改變當今伊朗守舊派政治體制的現狀^[7]，且還大力支持目前伊朗國內的守舊派政權之形式。^[21]

目前原則主義派在專家會議、憲法監督委員會和司法機構中占據主導權。^[20]

20 sources

派系

極端保守派，也被稱作強硬派、新保守主義派—由伊斯蘭革命衛隊等黨派組成^[22]該派支持伊斯蘭政府，對歐美國家具有更強的對抗性。^[22]代表人物為前伊朗總統馬哈茂德·艾哈邁迪內賈德。^[23]

傳統保守派，伊斯蘭革命中協助組建了新政府，與魯霍拉·穆薩維·何梅尼有傳統的連接。^[22]該派支持伊斯蘭政府並倡導文職統治。^[24]

3 sources

選舉結果

總統選舉

更多資訊 年份, 候選人 ...

年份	候選人	得票	%	排名
1997	阿里·阿克巴·納塔格-努里	7,248,317	24.87	2nd
2001	阿赫馬德·塔瓦克里	4,387,112	15.58	2nd
2005/1	馬哈茂德·艾哈邁迪內賈德	5,711,696	19.43	2nd
	穆罕默德·巴吉爾·卡利巴夫	4,095,827	13.93	4th
	阿里·拉里賈尼	1,713,810	5.83	5th
Total		11,521,333	39.19	決勝投票
2005/2	馬哈茂德·艾哈邁迪內賈德	17,284,782	61.69	1st
2009	馬哈茂德·艾哈邁迪內賈德	24,527,516	62.63	1st
2009	穆赫辛·禮薩伊	678,240	1.73	3rd
Total		25,205,756	64.36	當選
2013	穆罕默德·巴吉爾·卡利巴夫	6,077,292	16.56	2nd
	賽義德·賈利利	4,168,946	11.36	3rd
	穆赫辛·禮薩伊	3,884,412	10.58	4th
	阿里·阿克巴·韋拉亞提	2,268,753	6.18	6th
Total		16,399,403	44.68	失敗
2017	埃卜拉希姆·賴西	15,835,794	38.28	2nd
2017	莫斯塔法·米爾-薩利姆	478,267	1.16	3rd
Total		16,314,061	39.44	失敗

關閉

政黨和組織

下面列出了伊朗目前還在活躍的原則主義黨派：

兩個社會（非正式）
- 戰鬥教士聯盟
- 庫姆神學院教師學會
伊瑪目和領袖路線追隨者陣線
- 伊斯蘭聯盟黨
- 伊斯蘭工程師協會
伊斯蘭革命穩定陣線
發展與正義黨

參考文獻

[1]
Bodaghi, Ehsan. 'National dialogue' initiative indicates shifting political sands in Iran. Al-Monitor. 2017-05-04 [2017-06-17]. （原始內容存檔於2020-02-07）.
[2]
Rohollah Faghihi, Iran's parliament shows its true colors, Al-Monitor, 2016-11-04 [2017-05-25], （原始內容存檔於2020-02-07）
[3]
Mehdi Mozaffari, What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2007, 8 (1): 17–33, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622, In fact, Iranian 『Islamists』 of our day call themselves 『Usul gara』, which literally means 『fundamentalist』, but in a positive sense. It designates a 『person of principles』 who is the 『true Muslim』.
[4]
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Women's Rights, Shari'a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran, International Journal of Politics Culture and Society (New York), 2013, 26 (3): 237–253, doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x, 「Principlism」 or osul-gera』i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari『a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari『a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.
[5]
Mohseni, Payam. Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation. Brumberg, Daniel; Farhi, Farideh (編). Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Indiana University Press. 2016: 47. ISBN 978-0253020680.
[6]
Melody Mohebi, The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan: 129–131, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6
[7]
Robert J. Reardon, Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation: 81–82, 2012, ISBN 978-0833076373
[8]
Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press: 135, 2002, ISBN 9780815629788
[9]
Freedom in the World: Iran, Freedom House, 2017 [2017-05-25], （原始內容存檔於2017-05-17）
[10]
Iran conservatives tighten grip on top oversight body, Agence France-Presse (Yahoo), 2017-08-14 [2017-08-14], （原始內容存檔於2019-02-21）
[11]
Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown. The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. 2013: 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. 「Conservative」 is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as 「principlist」 is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eslahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congrous groups and individuals.
[12]
Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush. Glossary of the most commonly-used Persian terms and abbreviations. Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989-2009 (學位論文). Martin, Vanessa (Supervisor). Royal Holloway, University of London: 11. 2012 [2019-03-17]. （原始內容存檔於2020-11-28）. Open access material licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
[13]
李國富. 展望伊朗总统鲁哈尼第二任的内外政策. 當代世界. doi:10.19422/j.cnki.ddsj.2017.07.014.
[14]
Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan. Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. 2012-08-31: 108. ISBN 9781908433022. |entry=被忽略 (幫助)
[15]
Robin B. Wright (編), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press: 37, 2010, ISBN 978-1601270849
[16]
Masoud Kazemzadeh, Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran, Middle Eastern Studies, 2008, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, In Western sources, the term 『hard-liners』 is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves 『Osul-gara』. The word 『osul』 means 『fundamentals』, or 『principles』 or 『tenets』. And the suffix 『gara』 means 『those who uphold or promote’. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves 『Ommat Hezbollah』. 『Ommat』 is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. 『Hezbollah』 literally means 『Party of Allah』. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as 『mohafezeh-kar』 (『conservative’). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms 『eqtedar-gara』 (authoritarian) and 『tamamiyat-khah』 (totalitarian) for what many Western observers have termed 『hard-liners』. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners 『eqtedar-gara』.
[17]
Banafsheh Keynoush, Iran after Ahmadinejad, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (New York), 2012, 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hardliners but also more centre-right factions.
[18]
Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi. Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope. Bloomberg. 2013-06-16 [2015-03-10]. （原始內容存檔於2020-11-11）.
[19]
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press: 486, 2012, ISBN 9780870033025
[20]
SHAUL, BAKHASH. Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. 2011-09-12 [2015-03-10]. （原始內容存檔於2017-08-22）.
[21]
Etel Solingen (編), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press: 222, 2012, ISBN 9781107010444
[22]
Sherrill, Clifton. After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?. Orbis. 2011, 55 (4): 631–47. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.07.002.
[23]
伊朗：“新保守派”在崛起_网易新闻. news.163.com. [2019-03-17].^{[永久失效連結]}
[24]
Thaler et. al. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. 2010. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.

[1] [1]
Bodaghi, Ehsan. 'National dialogue' initiative indicates shifting political sands in Iran. Al-Monitor. 2017-05-04 [2017-06-17]. （原始內容存檔於2020-02-07）.

[2] [2]
Rohollah Faghihi, Iran's parliament shows its true colors, Al-Monitor, 2016-11-04 [2017-05-25], （原始內容存檔於2020-02-07）

[Islamism-3] [3]
Mehdi Mozaffari, What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2007, 8 (1): 17–33, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622, In fact, Iranian 『Islamists』 of our day call themselves 『Usul gara』, which literally means 『fundamentalist』, but in a positive sense. It designates a 『person of principles』 who is the 『true Muslim』.

[4] [4]
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Women's Rights, Shari'a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran, International Journal of Politics Culture and Society (New York), 2013, 26 (3): 237–253, doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x, 「Principlism」 or osul-gera』i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari『a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari『a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.

[5] [5]
Mohseni, Payam. Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation. Brumberg, Daniel; Farhi, Farideh (編). Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Indiana University Press. 2016: 47. ISBN 978-0253020680.

[mm-6] [6]
Melody Mohebi, The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan: 129–131, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6

[CI-7] [7]
Robert J. Reardon, Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation: 81–82, 2012, ISBN 978-0833076373

[8] [8]
Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press: 135, 2002, ISBN 9780815629788

[FH-9] [9]
Freedom in the World: Iran, Freedom House, 2017 [2017-05-25], （原始內容存檔於2017-05-17）

[10] [10]
Iran conservatives tighten grip on top oversight body, Agence France-Presse (Yahoo), 2017-08-14 [2017-08-14], （原始內容存檔於2019-02-21）

[11] [11]
Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown. The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. 2013: 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. 「Conservative」 is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as 「principlist」 is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eslahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congrous groups and individuals.

[SRD-12] [12]
Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush. Glossary of the most commonly-used Persian terms and abbreviations. Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989-2009 (學位論文). Martin, Vanessa (Supervisor). Royal Holloway, University of London: 11. 2012 [2019-03-17]. （原始內容存檔於2020-11-28）. Open access material licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

[13] [13]
李國富. 展望伊朗总统鲁哈尼第二任的内外政策. 當代世界. doi:10.19422/j.cnki.ddsj.2017.07.014.

[14] [14]
Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan. Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. 2012-08-31: 108. ISBN 9781908433022. |entry=被忽略 (幫助)

[15] [15]
Robin B. Wright (編), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press: 37, 2010, ISBN 978-1601270849

[16] [16]
Masoud Kazemzadeh, Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran, Middle Eastern Studies, 2008, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, In Western sources, the term 『hard-liners』 is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves 『Osul-gara』. The word 『osul』 means 『fundamentals』, or 『principles』 or 『tenets』. And the suffix 『gara』 means 『those who uphold or promote’. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves 『Ommat Hezbollah』. 『Ommat』 is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. 『Hezbollah』 literally means 『Party of Allah』. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as 『mohafezeh-kar』 (『conservative’). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms 『eqtedar-gara』 (authoritarian) and 『tamamiyat-khah』 (totalitarian) for what many Western observers have termed 『hard-liners』. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners 『eqtedar-gara』.

[17] [17]
Banafsheh Keynoush, Iran after Ahmadinejad, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (New York), 2012, 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hardliners but also more centre-right factions.

[Bloomberg-18] [18]
Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi. Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope. Bloomberg. 2013-06-16 [2015-03-10]. （原始內容存檔於2020-11-11）.

[19] [19]
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press: 486, 2012, ISBN 9780870033025

[Tehran_Bureau-20] [20]
SHAUL, BAKHASH. Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. 2011-09-12 [2015-03-10]. （原始內容存檔於2017-08-22）.

[21] [21]
Etel Solingen (編), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press: 222, 2012, ISBN 9781107010444

[sherill-orbis-22] [22]
Sherrill, Clifton. After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?. Orbis. 2011, 55 (4): 631–47. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.07.002.

[23] [23]
伊朗：“新保守派”在崛起_网易新闻. news.163.com. [2019-03-17].^{[永久失效連結]}

[24] [24]
Thaler et. al. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. 2010. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.

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