舉證責任（英語：burden of proof）為一哲學方法，源自古典羅馬法典（拉丁語：onus probandi）在中立裁判庭前由雙方立論並反駁彼此的爭訟程序的一項規定，此規定關乎論述之勞務分工[1]：
假設A和B分別代表兩種對立觀點。如果A取得有利的位置，B將被要求出有力的論點來捍衛自己不太有利的位置，那麼是A將舉證責任設在B的身上。如果B不能移轉舉證責任，那麼其觀點就被擊敗，即使其觀點有可能是正確的。反過來說，如果B提出比A更強的論點，那麼B就轉移舉證責任給A。
舉證責任是處理證據的基本原則。一般情況下，主張或反對某事的一方有舉證責任。[1]
在過去，舉證責任並不是主流哲學的重要概念，因為一般認為一個論點要成功必需要有確鑿結論，必需證成而無疑。然而根據概率的理性思考，包括廣義的統計思考，提供了可能性結論，雖或有被認為過於主觀的問題。[2]
倫理哲學近年來反省考查舉證責任在不同機構的移轉，是在科學及倫理不確定情境下無法避免的[3]。
知識論爭議中一般共識：試圖要他人接受一件事的人有義務為那件事提供適當理據。[來源請求]
一般而言，讓他人接受自己的主張可得到一定利益，例如名譽、資源等等，因此在公開的思想競爭中，人們認為提出主張的人應提供證據支持其主張，用適當的代價換取可能的利益，避免享利益而不付代價之不對等，如此可確保各思想流派發揮生產力。[4][5][6][7]
主張非決定論的卡爾·波普爾認為哲學知識的舉證責任在決定論者身上，並提出四項理由將舉證責任轉給決定論者：程度問題、偶然問題、複雜系統預測問題、所有事件皆能料問題[8]。
在神學與無神論者關於神是否存在的爭論中，無神論的立論之一是採舉證責任論點，主張神若存在應由信仰者提供神存在之證據[9]。以舉證責任為立論基礎的無神論者如安東尼·弗盧(1984)，面臨數派神學的批評及挑戰[10][11]。
有數學哲學家認為舉證責任做為哲學論證方法沒有必要，因為在解決理論問題，而不是法庭上雙方爭論的裁判問題，舉證責任是法律程序，而法庭有時需要在沒有資料情況下做出判決。舉例來說，一個反對歐幾里得的幾何學家或許會說舉證責任應該在那些說三角形三角總和等於兩個直角的人身上，而另一方只需回說那總和肯是極端靠近兩個直角，那麼舉證責任就移到了那些認為不是正好兩個直角的人身上[12]。
自然主義哲學立場常使用舉證責任來立論，但此立論很少不具爭議性，且也建立困難，在哲學上要立基於舉證責任是不安穩的[13]。
理性上，相信任何事都需要證據，不證自明的事要訴諸最基本的理性直覺，非不證自明的事則要以經驗證據作為基礎、或由其他已知的事證明或論證作為基礎。[來源請求]
理性上來說，如有充分證據顯示某事為真，應相信某事為真；如有充分證據顯示某事為假，應相信某事為假；如無充分證據顯示某事為真、亦無充分證據顯示某事為假，應對某事之真假存疑。「不相信某事（為真）」經常用於描述對某事真假存疑的想法，然而有時也指「相信某事為假」，須視具體情況判斷。[來源請求]
猜想或臆測（supposition）是依賴彼此的共同信念，只要雙方同意即可，雙方均不擔負舉證責任。斷定或斷言、主張、宣稱、聲明（assertion）則認定了一件事是真的，一般也相當於要求他人認同，因此須擔負舉證責任。預設（presumption）則界於兩者之間，沒有直接的舉證責任，但有責任反駁與之衝突的證據。[14]
現代法治國家多半遵守無罪推定原則：「如沒有充分證據證明被告有罪，則推定被告無罪」，這麼做主要是基於避免冤獄及栽贜等倫理考量，以及「有充分證據證明被告無罪」的現實困難。
一個人事實上有罪但法律上推定無罪是有可能發生的。「法律上推定無罪」只是一種實務上的認定，並不等同於「事實上無罪」，如將無罪推定原則擴大解讀為「如沒有充分證據證明被告有罪，則事實上被告無罪」，便是不恰當的推理。[15]
Nicholas Bunnin; Jiyuan Yu. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. 15 April 2008: 92–93. ISBN 978-0-470-99721-5 （英語）. Philosophical method [Latin onus probandi] Originating in classical Roman law, an adversary proceeding where one party tries to establish and another to rebut some charge before a neutral adjudicative tribunal. The term has come to refer to a rule concering the division of labor of argumentation. Suppose A and B represent two competing views. If A has a favorable position, B will be required to produce strong arguments to defend its less favorable position. This is to say, A sets burden of proof on B. If B cannot shift this burden, its positioin is defeated, even though it might be right. On the other hand, if B puts forward arugments that show that its position is stronger than A's, then it transfers the burden of proof to A. It is a basic rule of dealing with evidence. Normally any position that argues for or against something has the burden. For instance, because common sense usually has an intuitive appeal prior to argument, any philosophical position standing against common sense bears the burden of proof.
Douglas Walton. Burden of Proof, Presumption and Argumentation. Cambridge University Press. 30 June 2014: 122. ISBN 978-1-107-04662-7. Burden of proof did not seem to be an important concept in mainstream philosophy in the past because it was generally assumed that in order for an argument to be successful it has to be a conclusive argument, in some sense meaning that it proves its conclusion beyond doubt. ... Reasoning based on probability, broadly of the statisical kind was reluctantly allowed, but defeasible reasoning of the kind that only offer plausibility of a conclusion was seen as too subjective to be admitted as justification for rational acceptance. The impracticality of this view of the matter has long been implicitly recognized by law, where burden of proof is one of the most important factors in aiding courts to use reasoned argumentation at a conclusion. In typical cases of reasoning based on legal evidence, there is inconsistenncy and uncertainty in the evidence on both sides of a disputed issue, making a conclusive proof for one side an unrealistic requirements.
Goldman, Alvin. Argumentation and Social Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy. 1994, 91 (1): 27–49. JSTOR 2940949. Eemeren, Frans van; Grootendorst, Rob. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004: 60. ISBN 0521830753. [t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point.
Brandom, Robert. Making it Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1994: 222. ISBN 067454319X. [t]here are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to challenge, such as 'Red is a color,' 'There have been black dogs,' 'Lighting frequently precedes thunder,' and similar commonplaces. These are treated as 'free moves' by members of our speech community—they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert unchallenged.
atheism. Encyclopaedia Britannica（大英百科全書）. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition （大英線上英文學術版）. 2014. An atheist who argues in this manner may also make a distinctive burden-of-proof argument. Given that God (if there is one) is by definition a very recherché reality—a reality that must be (for there to be such a reality) transcendent to the world—the burden of proof is not on the atheist to give grounds for believing that there is no reality of that order. Rather, the burden of proof is on the believer to give some evidence for God’s existence—i.e., that there is such a reality. Given what God must be, if there is a God, the theist needs to present the evidence, for such a very strange reality. He needs to show that there is more in the world than is disclosed by common experience. The empirical method, and the empirical method alone, such an atheist asserts, affords a reliable method for establishing what is in fact the case. To the claim of the theist that there are in addition to varieties of empirical facts 「spiritual facts」 or 「transcendent facts,」 such as it being the case that there is a supernatural, self-existent, eternal power, the atheist can assert that such 「facts」 have not been shown.
Charles Sanders Peirce; Mouton De Gruyter; Walter De Gruyter Incorporated. Mathematical Philosophy. Walter de Gruyter. 1 January 1976: 73. ISBN 978-3-11-080588-8 （英語）. The burden of proof is strictly an affair of legal procedure, where, owing to the necessity of deciding each case one way or the other, certain rules of presumptions are adopted by courts. there is something analogous in other cases in which questions must be decided, and in which there are some recognized rules for deciding them in the absence of data. But a purely theoretical question need to be decided at all, and therefore, in such a case, there is no "burden of proof." The person who talks of it may mean to say that there is some vague improbability in the proposition he opposes, which may be true. But then he should state his argument just as it really is, so that its true force or weakness may appear. For example, a noneuclidean geometer might say that the burden of proof is upon whoever says that the sum of angels of a triangle is that of two right angles; to which his opponent will answer that it is certainly extremely near that, and that the burden of proof is upon whoever says it is not exactly so.
J.J. Chambliss. Philosophy of Education An Encyclopedia. Routledge. 4 July 2013: 429. ISBN 978-1-136-51168-4 （英語）. Naturalism... Criticism ...Finally, burden-of-proof claims are rarely uncontroversial, and always difficult to eastablish. It is philosophically precarious to rest one's case on a burden of proof.
Douglas Walton. Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Routledge. 2013: 17–28. ISBN 113668705X （英語）. Dov M. Gabbay; Franz Guenthner. Handbook of Philosophical Logic: Volume 13. Springer. 2006. ISBN 1402035217 （英語）.
- Douglas Walton. Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Routledge. 2013. ISBN 113668705X （英語）.
- Mojtaba Kazazi. Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1996. ISBN 904110142X （英語）.
