功能主義，也稱機能主義是心靈哲學中的觀點之一，認為心靈狀態（信念、欲望、痛苦等）都僅僅基於它們的功能角色。功能角色是，一個心靈狀態與其他心靈狀態（其他人的心靈）之間的關係，感官輸入和行為輸出。[1] 功能主義是同一理論和行為主義的發展演變。
多重實現是功能主義的重要部分。根據標準的功能主義理論，心靈狀態回應功能角色。它們像閥門一樣，一個閥門可以由塑料或鐵等等構成，只要它們能當作閥門來用。類似地，功能主義者認為，心靈狀態也可以被解釋，而不需要什麼實現它們的物理的中介（例如大腦），人們只需要考慮更高層面的功能即可。
但是，也有功能主義理論與同一理論相組合，否定了多重現實。例如Functional Specification Theories (FSTs) (Levin, § 3.4)。最著名的支持這個觀點的人是大衛·劉易斯[2]和戴維·阿姆斯特朗.[3] 根據FSTs，心靈狀態是功能角色的特殊「實現者」，而不是功能角色本身。
批判這一理論的反例，可見於中文屋、中文腦和倒錯光譜、孿生地球。
Block, Ned. (1996). "What is functionalism?" a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan.
(PDF online （頁面存檔備份，存於互聯網檔案館）) Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.
- Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.
- Baron-Cohen S.; Leslie A.; Frith U. Does the Autistic Child Have a "Theory of Mind"?. Cognition. 1985, 21: 37–46. PMID 2934210. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8.
- Block, Ned. (1980a). "Introduction: What Is Functionalism?" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Block, Ned. (1980b). "Troubles With Functionalism", in Block (1980a).
- Block, Ned. (1994). Qualia. In S. Guttenplan (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell
- Block, Ned. What is functionalism? (PDF). a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan. 1996 [2020-02-24]. （原始內容存檔 (PDF)於2017-12-30）.
- Block, Ned and Fodor, J. (1972). "What Psychological States Are Not". Philosophical Review 81.
- Chalmers, David. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crabb, B.G. (2005). "Fading and Dancing Qualia - Moving and Shaking Arguments", Deunant Books.
- DeLancey, C. (2002). "Passionate Engines - What Emotions Reveal about the Mind and Artificial Intelligence." Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dennett, D. (1990) Quining Qualia. In W. Lycan, (ed), Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwells
- Levin, Janet. (2004). "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.). (online（頁面存檔備份，存於互聯網檔案館）)
- Lewis, David. (1966). "An Argument for the Identity Theory". Journal of Philosophy 63.
- Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
- Lycan, W. (1987) Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Mandik, Pete. (1998). Fine-grained Supervience, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Future of Functionalism.
- Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Approach. San Francisco: Freeman & Co.
- Polgar, T. D. Functionalism. 2008 [2020-02-24]. （原始內容存檔於2019-05-19）.
- Putnam, Hilary. (1960). "Minds and Machines". Reprinted in Putnam (1975a).
- Putnam, Hilary. (1967). "Psychological Predicates". In Art, Mind, and Religion, W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), pp. 37–48. (Later published as "The Nature of Mental States" in Putnam (1975a).
- Putnam, Hilary. (1975a). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: CUP.
- Searle, John. Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980, 3 (3): 417–424. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756.
- Smart, J.J.C. (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes". Philosophical Review LXVIII.
