۱۹۸۲ء دی جنگ لبنان

حوالے

[1]
The Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 4 February 2014.
[2]
Globalsecurity.org, THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN LEBANON, 1982–1985, Major George C. Solley, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 10 May 1987. Retrieved 7 February 2014.
"The third goal was to remove Syrian presence from Lebanon. The recognition that this goal was obviously unsuccessful must betempered by an awareness of the Lebanese situation since 1982. Even when the first two aims seemed to have been met, Syrian recalcitrance acted as a stumbling blocks the Syrians would by nomeans agree to a withdrawal from Lebanon in conjunction with the Israelis and therefore were able to effectively scuttle the 17 May, Agreement between Israel and Lebanon before it had any chance of fulfillment; Syria offered a haven for PLO fighters in the Bekaa Valley from which they could stage raids on the IDF in Lebanon and from which many have now moved back into Beirut and Sidon; and despite having taken severe losses during the June fighting, Syria was able to quickly replace those losses with better Soviet equipment accompanied by a number of Soviet advisors."
[3]
Hirst, David (2010). Beware of Small States. NationBooks, 144–145. ISBN 978-1-56858-657-1. “In time, however, Arafat and his guerrilla leadership decided that they would have to withdraw, leaving no military and very little political or symbolic presence behind. Their enemy's firepower and overall strategic advantage were too great and it was apparently ready to use them to destroy the whole city over the heads of its inhabitants. The rank and file did not like this decision, and there were murmurings of 'treason' from some of Arafat's harsher critics. Had they not already held out, far longer than any Arab country in any former war, against all that the most powerful army in the Middle East – and the fourth most powerful in the world, according to Sharon – could throw against them? (…) But [Palestinians] knew that, if they expected too much, they could easily lose [Lebanense Muslim support] again. 'If this had been Jerusalem', they said, 'we would have stayed to the end. But Beirut is not outs to destroy.”
[4]
Morris, p. 559
[5]
«In the Spotlight: PKK (A.k.a KADEK) Kurdish Worker's Party». Cdi.org. بایگانی‌شده از روی نسخه اصلی در ۲۳ دسمبر ۲۰۱۸. دریافت‌شده در ۲۹ فروری ۲۰۱۲.
[6]
«Abdullah Öcalan en de ontwikkeling van de PKK». Xs4all.nl. بایگانی‌شده از روی نسخه اصلی در ۲۳ دسمبر ۲۰۱۸. دریافت‌شده در ۲۹ فروری ۲۰۱۲.
[7]
«a secret relationship». Niqash.org. بایگانی‌شده از روی نسخه اصلی در ۲۳ دسمبر ۲۰۱۸. دریافت‌شده در ۲۹ فروری ۲۰۱۲.
[8]
Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East, Gad Barzilai, pp. 148

[1] [1]
The Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 4 February 2014.

[2] [2]
Globalsecurity.org, THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN LEBANON, 1982–1985, Major George C. Solley, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 10 May 1987. Retrieved 7 February 2014.
"The third goal was to remove Syrian presence from Lebanon. The recognition that this goal was obviously unsuccessful must betempered by an awareness of the Lebanese situation since 1982. Even when the first two aims seemed to have been met, Syrian recalcitrance acted as a stumbling blocks the Syrians would by nomeans agree to a withdrawal from Lebanon in conjunction with the Israelis and therefore were able to effectively scuttle the 17 May, Agreement between Israel and Lebanon before it had any chance of fulfillment; Syria offered a haven for PLO fighters in the Bekaa Valley from which they could stage raids on the IDF in Lebanon and from which many have now moved back into Beirut and Sidon; and despite having taken severe losses during the June fighting, Syria was able to quickly replace those losses with better Soviet equipment accompanied by a number of Soviet advisors."

[3] [3]
Hirst, David (2010). Beware of Small States. NationBooks, 144–145. ISBN 978-1-56858-657-1. “In time, however, Arafat and his guerrilla leadership decided that they would have to withdraw, leaving no military and very little political or symbolic presence behind. Their enemy's firepower and overall strategic advantage were too great and it was apparently ready to use them to destroy the whole city over the heads of its inhabitants. The rank and file did not like this decision, and there were murmurings of 'treason' from some of Arafat's harsher critics. Had they not already held out, far longer than any Arab country in any former war, against all that the most powerful army in the Middle East – and the fourth most powerful in the world, according to Sharon – could throw against them? (…) But [Palestinians] knew that, if they expected too much, they could easily lose [Lebanense Muslim support] again. 'If this had been Jerusalem', they said, 'we would have stayed to the end. But Beirut is not outs to destroy.”

[Morris-4] [4]
Morris, p. 559

[PKK1-5] [5]
«In the Spotlight: PKK (A.k.a KADEK) Kurdish Worker's Party». Cdi.org. بایگانی‌شده از روی نسخه اصلی در ۲۳ دسمبر ۲۰۱۸. دریافت‌شده در ۲۹ فروری ۲۰۱۲.

[PKK2-6] [6]
«Abdullah Öcalan en de ontwikkeling van de PKK». Xs4all.nl. بایگانی‌شده از روی نسخه اصلی در ۲۳ دسمبر ۲۰۱۸. دریافت‌شده در ۲۹ فروری ۲۰۱۲.

[PKK3-7] [7]
«a secret relationship». Niqash.org. بایگانی‌شده از روی نسخه اصلی در ۲۳ دسمبر ۲۰۱۸. دریافت‌شده در ۲۹ فروری ۲۰۱۲.

[books.google.no-8] [8]
Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East, Gad Barzilai, pp. 148