Public policy does not admit of definition and is not easily explained. It is a variable quantity; it must vary and does vary with the habits, capacities, and opportunities of the public.
Davies v. Davies (1887), L. R. 36 C. D. 364; see alsoEgerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. 1.
It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret which I believe every Judge on the bench shares, that text-books are more and more quoted in Court—I mean, of course, text-books by living authors—and some Judges have gone so far as to say that they shall not be quoted.
Union Bank v. Munster (1887), L. R. 37 CD. 54.
This seems to me to be one of those cases in which the Court is bound to arrive at a conclusion without having any satisfactory means of arriving at it. The only guide I have is this. I am entitled to sit in the testator's chair as he wrote his own will.
Horlock v. Wiggins (1888), L. R. 39 C. D. 143.
I think that the proper and safe course is to follow a decision of a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, unless some cogent reason is given to the contrary.
Evans v. Manchester, &c. Rail. Co. (1887), L. J. (N. S.) 57 C. D. 157.
It is the right of her Majesty's subjects to make claims and to have them tried in the constitutional way.
Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (1888), 57 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. D. 123.
Motives do not concern me; they are a dangerous subject with which to deal.
Whelan v. Palmer (1888), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 57 C. D. 788.
The difficulty which I feel as a Judge, and always felt at the Bar, is this: a defendant is entitled to put his back against the wall and to fight from every available point of advantage.
Blank v. Footman & Co. (1888), 57 L. J. (N. S.) C. D. 914.
I am always afraid of quoting my own decisions; I do not think it is the right thing for a judge to do, but I often do refer to them when I can thereby avoid repeating in different words what I have said before.
Bolton Partners v. Lambert (1889), L. R. 41 C. D. 300.
A decision of the House of Lords requires no sanction.
In re Weall Andrews v. Weall (1889), L. R. 42 Ch. D. 679.
Masterly inactivity may be prudence to one man, desperate rashness to another.
In re Liverpool Household Stores Assoc. (1890), 59 L. J. Rep. C. D. 618.
Born and bred, so to say, in Chancery, I have a strong leaning towards the rule of the Court of Chancery, of requiring full discovery.
Ashworth v. Roberts (1890), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 60 C. D. 28.
I have said frequently, and I repeat it, that there is no Judge on the bench who is more willing to allow amendments, even at the last moment, than I, provided there is no surprise.
James v. Smith (1890), L. R. 1 C. D. [1891], p. 389.
It is impossible for us English lawyers, dealing with the English language, to express our views except in the technical language of our law.
Lauri v. Renad (1892), L. R. 3 C. D. [1892], p.413.
I wish to uphold counsel in the exercise of their discretion.
In re Somerset; Somerset v. Earl Poulett (1893), L. R. [1894], 1 Ch. 249.
I must look at the decision with reference to all the circumstances which led to it.
In re England (1895), L. R. 2 C. D. [1895], p. 109.
Any man who spends his income, whether large or small, benefits the community by putting money in circulation.
In re Nottage (1895), L. R. 2 C. D. [1895], p. 653.
Experience tells us that sometimes, when minorities insist on their rights, they ultimately prevail.
Young v. South African, &c. Syndicate (1896), L. R. 2 C. D. [1896], p. 278.
I do not think I can pass over the distinct words of Sir George Jessel, who knew practice as thoroughly as any Judge who ever sat on the bench.
Woolf v. Woolf (1898), L. R. 1 C. D. 347.
Decisions in the American Courts are entitled to great respect, but are not binding here; and there are many circumstances affecting questions arising between the laws of different States which may or may not be applicable to questions arising here.
In re De Nicols. De Nicols v. Curlieb (1898), L. R. 1 C. D. [1898], p. 410.