Azerbaijan–Turkey relations
Bilateral relations From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Relations have always been strong between Azerbaijan and Turkey, the only two predominantly Turkic countries located west of the Caspian Sea and east of the Mediterranean Sea. Former Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev often described the two as being "one nation, two states."[a][1]
| |
 Turkey |
 Azerbaijan |
|---|---|
| Diplomatic mission | |
| Embassy of Turkey, Baku | Embassy of Azerbaijan, Ankara |
Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence on June 4, 1918 (Treaty of Batum) and the first to recognize Azerbaijan's restoration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, Turkey has been a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan in its efforts to consolidate its independence, preserve its territorial integrity and realize its economic potential arising from the rich natural resources of the Caspian Sea. The two countries share a 17 kilometres (11 mi) long international borderline, with the Aras River separating Turkey from the Nakhchivan exclave of Azerbaijan.
Political relations
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State visits
İlham Aliyev visited Turkey in 2003 shortly after first entering the Azerbaijani political scene at the behest of his ailing father Heydar Aliyev in a move that was interpreted at the time as an indication of political support from Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[2]
On 13 May 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Baku with a delegation to strengthen ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In a joint press conference with President Aliyev, Erdoğan emphasized that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the cause of the closed border and that Turkey would not normalize relations with Armenia until the occupation ended. He also reaffirmed Turkey's support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The visit was positively received by Turkish opposition parties, and Erdoğan later met with Russian Prime Minister Putin to discuss regional issues, including Nagorno-Karabakh.[3][4][5][6][7][8]
OSCE Minsk Group
Turkey supports the OSCE Minsk Group, as a mechanism for resolving the territorial dispute and views it from the principle of Azerbaijani integrity. Turkey did not recognize the previously de facto independent republic of Nagorno-Karabakh that emerged, otherwise known as Artsakh.[9] Turkey has supported various indirect bilateral talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia and initiated trilateral dialogue in Reykjavík in 2002 and the Istanbul Summit, 2004 among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict, but its diplomatic efforts are hampered by its own tensions with Armenia over the claim of Armenian genocide and its ongoing border blockade against Armenia, which has resulted in subsequent infrastructure projects bypassing Armenian territory.
Shusha Declaration
After Azerbaijan won the Second Karabakh War, the Victory Ceremony was held in Baku with the participation of Türkiye and Erdoğan. During this ceremony, Erdoğan read a poem by a nationalist Azerbaijani poet, which led to a crisis between Turkey and Iran regarding Iranian Azerbaijan. Months after this ceremony, the Shusha Declaration was signed in Shusha, Karabakh, between Turkish President Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev, which deepened the relations between the two countries. After this declaration, political, economic and military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey reached a higher level. The Azerbaijani Armed Forces abandoned the Soviet model by taking the Turkish military as an example. The Azerbaijani defense industry decided to cooperate with Turkish defense companies. Turkey stated that it would support Azerbaijan's Zangezur corridor project. The two countries also formed a defense pact.[10][11][12][13]
Armenian–Turkish diplomatic progress in the 2000s
On the eve of the April 2009 official visit to Turkey by US President Barack Obama, sources in Ankara and Yerevan announced that a deal may soon be struck to reopen the border between the two states and exchange diplomatic personnel.[14]
That prompted concerns from both Baku and Turkish nationalists that the ongoing negotiations over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute would be adversely affected by the lifting of the longstanding blockade. Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry spokesman Elkhan Polukhov initially stated that it was "too early" to discuss what steps his country might take in retaliation."[15] Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev failed to take part in the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) meeting in Istanbul on April 6–7, which was claimed to be a protest. There was a speculation in the Turkish press that Azerbaijan had received distorted information on the content of the Armenian-Turkish talks through Russian channels.[16] Further developments proved those claims to be groundless.
There was also heated debate in the Turkish Parliament with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader, Devlet Bahçeli, who shared the Azerbaijanis' "rightful concerns" in warning the government: "Your approach to Armenia harms our dignity". The Republican People's Party (CHP) leader, Deniz Baykal, asked, "How can we ignore the ongoing occupation of Azerbaijan?"[17] Both parties were dispatching delegations to Baku and hosting Azerbaijani politicians in Ankara.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attempted to ease those concerns by announcing, "Unless Azerbaijan and Armenia sign a protocol on Nagorno-Karabakh, we will not sign any final agreement with Armenia on ties. We are doing preliminary work but this definitely depends on resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem".[18] Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan clarified that "we want a solution in which everybody is a winner" in a statement prior to the April 15 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Foreign Ministers Council in Yerevan: "We don't say, 'Let's first solve one problem and solve the other later.' We want a similar process to start between Azerbaijan and Armenia. We are closely watching the talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia".[19] Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mahmud Mammad Guliev responded that the solution to both countries' problems should be tied to the solution of the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia and that Azerbaijanis believe that Turkey will protect their interests.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report on the normalisation: "The politicized debate whether to recognize as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. ... The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia. ... Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate".[19]
Failure and cancellation of proposed Azerbaijan–Turkey visa-free regime
Azerbaijan agreed to a visa-free regime with Turkey while Iran also demanded the same visa-free regime with Azerbaijan. Iran had threatened to cut off the critical supply line between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic if Azerbaijan lifted visa requirements for Turkish citizens but not extend the same privilege to Iranian citizens.[20] According to Azerbaijani diplomats, a visa-free travel regime proposed by Turkey in 2009 had fallen victim to Iranian pressure on Azerbaijan, prompting the last-minute cancellation of the deal between Baku and Ankara. Azerbaijani diplomats also said the national interests of Azerbaijan did not allow for an open-border policy with Iran since political instability in Iran may trigger a huge influx of Iranian ethnic Azeris refugees to Azerbaijan and did not want the proposed Turkey-Azerbaijan Visa-Free Regime to be reciprocal with Iran as well.[21] Azerbaijan lifted visa requirements for Turkish citizens from 1 September 2019.
Strategic partnership
In June 2010, Azerbaijan and Turkey have signed key agreement on a package of Shah Deniz gas issues in Istanbul.[22][23] The agreement also will open the way for securing supplies to the EU's flagship Nabucco gas pipeline project.[24] On 16 September 2010, countries signed a treaty to establish Strategic Cooperation Council in Istanbul.[25][26] In December 2010, National Assembly of Azerbaijan ratified on strategic partnership and mutual assistance between Azerbaijan and Turkey.[27][28] The agreement consists of 23 articles and five chapters: Military-political and security issues, military and military-technical cooperation, humanitarian issues, economic cooperation, and common and final provisions.[29][30]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a written statement that the 2019 Turkish offensive into north-eastern Syria will serve to eliminate the terror risks, return of the refugees to their homes, solution of the humanitarian problems, and providing peace and stability within the territorial integrity of Syria.[31]
The two countries have cooperated closely, particularly since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, where Turkey provided military support to Azerbaijan, including the use of Bayraktar TB2 drones. This collaboration has shifted the regional balance in the South Caucasus, diminishing Russia's influence. The strategic partnership extends beyond military matters, with Azerbaijan benefiting from enhanced access to European political and economic systems through its ties with Turkey. As Turkey strengthens its position in Europe and grows its influence in Central Asia, Azerbaijan's relationship with Turkey serves as a model for regional cooperation and diversification of foreign relations.[32]
Economic relations
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Azerbaijan and Turkey have subsequently built upon their linguistic and cultural ties to form a very close economic partnership that sees Turkey negotiating to buy natural gas from Azerbaijan and the two co-operating, along with neighbouring Georgia, in such infrastructure projects as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline, Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway and the proposed Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline[33] all of which bypass Armenia despite a recent thaw in diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan, which make them key players in European energy security. As BBC correspondent Chris Morris states, in The New Turkey (Granta Books, 2005), "Turkey lacks the great natural resources of the industrial age – oil and gas – and it has to import nearly all its energy supplies. But its proximity to Azerbaijan, the Caspian, and Central Asia, as well as to the Middle East, has allowed it to cultivate a new strategic role: the ‘missing link’ in a chain connecting these new producers of vast mineral resources with the consumer societies in Europe, America and beyond."[34]
İlham Aliyev visited Turkey in 2003 shortly after first entering the Azerbaijani political scene at the behest of his ailing father Heydar Aliyev in a move that was interpreted at the time as an indication of political support from Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[2]
STAR
The opening of the STAR oil refinery, owned by the Azerbaijani State Oil Company SOCAR, was held in the Turkish city of Izmir on October 19, 2018. The foundation of STAR was laid on October 25, 2011, with the participation of Azerbaijani and Turkish Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The consortium consisting of Técnicas Reunidas (Spain), Saipem (Italy), GS Engineering & Construction Corp (South Korea) and Itochu (Japan) built the plant.[35][36][37][38]
TANAP
The TANAP project was envisaged on November 17, 2011, at the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum in Istanbul. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline Project on December 24, 2011, in order to establish a consortium of the project with 20% (twenty percent) in accordance with the share of Turkey and 80% (eighty percent) in accordance with the share of the Republic of Azerbaijan.[39][40][41]
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ilham Aliyev, and Georgy Margvelashvili officially met in the city of Kars in Eastern Turkey to lay the foundation of the pipeline on March 17, 2015. The construction of the gas pipeline began in 2015 and completed in June 2018.[42]
On November 21, 2018, the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) joined the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) at the Turkish-Greek border near Meric River. Through the TAP, the Azerbaijani gas will be transported to Europe from the Shah Deniz field.[43][44]
Military relations
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Military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey first emerged in 1992, with an agreement signed between the two governments on military education and weapon equipment and deals to help strengthen the bond between the two nations.[45] Since then, the Azerbaijani and the Turkish governments have closely cooperated on defense and security. The Training and Education Center of the Armed Forces was established in accordance with the protocol which was signed between Azerbaijan and the Turkish Armed Forces on 5 April 2000.[46]
In June 2010, Azerbaijani military company Azersimtel announced that it had reached an agreement with the Turkish Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE) on launching a joint military facility.[47][48] According to Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, Turkish military assistance to Azerbaijan exceeded $200 million in 2010.[49] In the first stage of production, the company is expected to produce military arms venture for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
In December 2010, both countries signed a range of treaties that makes each other a guarantor in case of an attack by foreign forces.[50] The Treaty would enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification and valid for 10 years. In addition, the term extended for another 10 years if in the last 6 months, there is no notification to terminate the treaty.[51]
More than 20 Turkish defense industry companies have co-operative and commercial relations with Azerbaijan.[52]
On January 29, 2013, TAKM (Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status) was formed as an intergovernmental military law enforcement (gendarmerie) organization of three Turkic countries (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey) and Mongolia.
Aliyev stated in 13 August 2020 that they wanted to benefit from the Turkish defense industry and that Türkiye was Azerbaijan's most important defense industry partner. He also stated that Türkiye was the first country to provide full support to Azerbaijan against Armenia's attacks.[53]
Azerbaijani Defense Minister Colonel General Zakir Hasanov announced that in 2021 the Azerbaijani Armed Forces will take the Turkish military as a model and will be organized accordingly.[54] Military cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan evolved into a very high-level cooperation after the 2020 Karabakh war. The two armed forces adopted a common approach in terms of weapons, tactics, and intelligence. During this period, the Azerbaijani army entered a transition phase from a Soviet-style structure to NATO standards.[55] The two armies later held a joint exercise on the Iranian border.[56]
While serving in the Turkish Armed Forces with the rank of Lieutenant General, Bahtiyar Ersay was transferred to the Azerbaijani Army on December 15, 2022 and was appointed as an advisor to the Azerbaijani Minister of Defense. Until this date, Ersay served as the commander of the 7th Corps based in Diyarbakır in the Turkish Armed Forces. It was the first time in the history of the Turkish Armed Forces that an active-duty Turkish general was transferred to another army.[57][58]
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
A war between Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia broke out shortly after the parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous oblast in Azerbaijan, voted to unify the region with Armenia on February 20, 1988. The Armenian demand to unify Karabakh with Armenia, which proliferated in the late 1980s, began in a relatively peaceful manner; however, as the Soviet Union's disintegration neared, the dispute gradually grew into a violent conflict between the ethnic groups in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in ethnic cleansing by all sides.[59] The declaration of secession from Azerbaijan was the final result of the territorial conflict regarding the land.
Following a UN Security Council resolution on April 6, 1993, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azerbaijani district of Kelbajar, Turkey joined Azerbaijan in imposing a full economic embargo on Armenia, and the border between the two states was closed.[60][61] The border subsequently remained closed, as Turkey demanded the withdrawal of Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts of Azerbaijan. Turkey made the demand a condition for establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia.[62]
Turkey supported Azerbaijan politically, supplied arms, and held joint military drills to improve combat interoperability since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. In September 2022, at a United Nations news conference, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar reiterated Turkey's support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia.[63]
On 10 August 2020, six Turkish F-16s from the Turkish Air Force traveled from Türkiye to Azerbaijan to participate in the TurAz Qartali-2020 exercise. Some news sources determined through satellite images that these planes did not leave Azerbaijan when the Second Karabakh War began and remained at Ganja airport.[64][65] Azerbaijani President Aliyev confirmed that the planes were in the country but stated that they did not participate in the conflict. In contrast, Aliyev said, "In the event of an external attack on Azerbaijan, you will see Turkish planes in the sky."[66][67][68] Armenia claimed that a SU-25 fighter jet from its air force was shot down by Turkish F-16s, but Türkiye and Azerbaijan denied this.[69]
Military Base
The Azerbaijani military doctrine adopted in 2010 allows for foreign military bases in Azerbaijan, and that action opened the way to speculation that Turkey could quarter its troops in the Nakhchivan region, an Azerbaijani exclave surrounded by Armenia and Turkey.[70] Azerbaijan maintains a base in Nakhchivan that has received heavy Turkish support in the past, but no official information is available about the current scope of military cooperation between the two countries in the exclave.[8]
High-level visits
On August 11, 2020, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Jeyhun Bayramov paid his first visit to Turkey after being appointed for the position of Azerbaijan's new foreign minister.[71]
Resident diplomatic missions
See also
- Foreign relations of Azerbaijan
- Foreign relations of Turkey
- Armenia–Turkey relations
- Azerbaijan–Turkey border
- Azerbaijanis in Turkey
- List of ambassadors of Turkey to Azerbaijan
- Eurasianism
- Caucasus Army Group (Ottoman Empire)
- Battle of Baku
- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Monument, Baku
- Organization of Turkic States
- Shusha Declaration
- Turanism
- Turks in Azerbaijan
- Azerbaijan–European Union relations
- Turkey–European Union relations
Notes
- Azerbaijani: Bir millət, iki dövlət, Turkish: Bir millet, iki devlet
References
External links
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