Stalin's ten blows

In Soviet historiography, Stalin's ten blows^[a] (Russian: Десять сталинских ударов, romanized: Desyat' stalinskikh udarov) were the ten successful strategic offensives in Europe conducted by the Red Army in 1944 during World War II. The Soviet offensives drove the Axis forces from Soviet territory and precipitated Nazi Germany's collapse.

Soviet gains, mid-1943 to end of 1944.

History of the expression

The term was heard for the first time in November 1944 from Joseph Stalin in his speech "27th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution" (Russian: «27-я годовщина Великой Октябрьской социалистической революции», romanized: "27-ya godovshchina Velikoy Oktyab'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii") during the 1944 meeting of the Moscow's Soviet deputies.^[1] The term was coined as a reflection of the Stalin's cult of personality that prevailed in Soviet Union at the time. It did not reflect specific strategic planning of the Stavka, and at times had been called the "Year of twelve victories," based on the order issued by Stalin on the following day, authorizing the firing of artillery salutes with 24 guns in 12 cities of the Soviet Union:^[2] Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Petrozavodsk, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Kishinev, Tbilisi, Sevastopol, and Lvov.^[3] Having in his youth enrolled in the Russian Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis, Stalin would have been familiar with the Bible and specifically with the famous Ten Plagues of Egypt, ten massive "blows" which God was said to have inflicted on the evil Pharaoh and leading to Pharaoh's surrender. The term was discontinued in use after Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 Secret Speech denouncing Stalin and ending his cult of personality following his death.^{[citation needed]}

Background

After the collapse of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the Soviet counter-offensives, and the Battle of Kursk later in 1943, it became apparent that the tide of war was turning against Germany. Soviet forces were, all along the front, approaching the pre-war border. Partly because of Führer Directive No. 51, which funneled all new men and materials to the Western Front, to meet the expected Allied Invasion, issued on 3 November 1943, Axis forces along the Eastern Front were severely inadequately equipped in comparison to their Soviet opponents, reinforcements were rare, and reserves were stretched thin.^[4] Although in this directive Hitler implied that he might be willing to allow withdrawals, trading space for time, this proved to be false.^[5] This, combined with Hitler's insistence on holding onto captured territory at all costs, made Soviet victories in 1944 nearly inevitable.^[6]

Comparison of German and Soviet forces, January 1944.

	Soviet	Axis
Personnel	6,500,000[6]	4,300,000[6]
Tanks	5,600[6]	2,300[6]
Field Guns	90,000[6]	54,000[6]
Aircraft	8,800[6]	3,000[6]

The offensives

1. Leningrad–Novgorod Offensive (14 January – 1 March 1944). This, the second chronologically of the offensives, fully relieved the siege of Leningrad, which had started on September 8, 1941. Although the Germans resisted fiercely at first, having had years to prepare defensive rings including pillboxes and minefields around Leningrad, once the initial defenses were broken Soviet forces easily reached the border of Estonia. In Stalin's speech he called it the Lifting of the Leningrad Blockade. It was conducted by the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov Front.^[7][8]
2. Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive (24 December 1943 – 17 April 1944). This offensive was launched on Christmas Eve, 1943, the first chronologically of the 1944 offensives, but the second mentioned in Stalin's speech. It involved the clearing of Axis forces from Ukraine. It also resulted in the isolation of the German-controlled Crimea. It was called the Liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine in Stalin's speech, and involved the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, and the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts.^[9][10]
3. Odessa Offensive (26 March 1944 - 14 April 1944) which began the third blow, and the Crimean Offensive (8 April - 12 May 1944) which completed it. Even though militarily the Odessa Offensive was included in the Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive, Stalin grouped it with the Crimean Offensive in his speech. This offensive cleared the Crimea of German and Romanian forces, and recaptured Sevastopol. Adolf Hitler had refused to allow Axis forces to evacuate, believing that retention of the Crimea was vital to maintaining Turkish neutrality. The Red Army attacked over the Perekop Isthmus, and quickly drove the German and Romanian forces back to Sevastopol, which surrendered on 9 May. Although Hitler had finally given permission for evacuation, the majority of soldiers were unable to escape in time and surrendered and went into captivity. Due to heavy casualties suffered by the Romanian forces, this battle was a major factor in the Romanian surrender later in 1944. Stalin called it the Liberation of Odessa and Liberation of the Crimea in his speech. It was conducted by the 4th Ukrainian Front.^[11]
4. Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive (9 June – 9 August 1944). Directed against Finnish forces north of Leningrad, its strategic objective was to drive Finland out of the war by destroying Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus and advancing to the Kymi River,^[12][13][14] whereby Soviet forces would prepare for an advance deep into Finland.^[15] It was carried out by the Leningrad Front and the Karelian Front.^[10][16] Soviet forces succeeded in expelling Finnish forces from territory they had gained in 1941, but the Soviet advance was halted at the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Further north, Finnish victories in the Battles of Vuosalmi and Ilomantsi halted additional Soviet attempts to break through Finnish lines. The Soviet destruction of Finnish forces and advancement to the Kymi River had failed.^[17][18] An unsigned draft document called "The Terms for Finnish Unconditional Surrender" was found in October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive, implying that unconditional surrender was indeed the Soviet goal.^[19][20] While the Red Army had failed to achieve all of its objectives, the offensive nonetheless led to Finland agreeing to Soviet peace terms. On 19 September 1944, the Moscow Armistice was signed, ending the Continuation War. Stalin dubbed the operation the Liberation of Karelia-Finland Soviet Republic.
5. Operation Bagration (22 June - 19 August 1944) Started exactly three years after the invasion of the Soviet Union, and named after Pyotr Bagration, a Georgian prince fighting for the Russian Empire during the Napoleonic Wars, this drove the last remaining German forces from Soviet territory, recapturing Belarus. It inflicted extremely heavy casualties upon the German Army Group Center, to the point of being called "The Destruction of Army Group Center," and was undoubtedly one of Germany's worst defeats of the war. Soviet forces advanced past the Bobruisk-Mogilev-Vitebsk line, and nearly reached Warsaw before stopping. Almost 30 German divisions were encircled near Minsk, and the prewar border of East Prussia was reached. Stalin called the operation the Belorussian Operation, and liberation of Lithuania and significant parts of allied Poland, and advance to the borders of Germany." It was conducted by the 1st Baltic Front, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian Fronts.^[10][21]
6. Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive (13 July – 29 August 1944). This offensive to the south of and concurrent to Operation Bagration advanced through Poland and past the Bug River. Although it made little progress at first, eventually it became successful, capturing Brody, Lvov, and Sandomierz. Called the Liberation of western Ukraine and crossing of the Vistula, it was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front,^[22] and, in conjunction with Operation Bagration, destroyed the German Army Group Centre.^[23]
7. Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive (19 August – 14 October 1944). This offensive includes the Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive, from 20 to 29 August, and its follow-ups, which continued well into October. This offensive and its follow-ups were mainly conducted in the Balkans, and were targeted at German and Romanian formations in Army Group South Ukraine. About 15 or 16 German divisions were encircled with several Romanian divisions during the course of the Soviet advance. These operations directly caused the capitulation of Romania and Bulgaria^{[citation needed]}. It decimated the formations of Army Group South Ukraine, and Soviet forces advanced deep into Romania. In Stalin's speech, he referred to it as the Forcing out of the war of Romania and Bulgaria, advancing to the borders of Hungary, and the possibility of offering assistance to allied Yugoslavia. It was carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts.^[10][24]
8. Baltic Offensive (14 September – 20 November 1944). Recapturing the Baltic states, including most of Latvia and Estonia, this offensive isolated the Courland Pocket, where 30 divisions of Army Group North were cut off from Army Group Center until the end of the war in Europe. Stalin's speech called the offensive the Liberation of Estonia and Latvia, surrounding of Germans in Courland, and forced exit of Finland from the war. The Leningrad Front and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Baltic Fronts carried out this attack.^[22]
9. East Carpathian Offensive (8 September 1944 – 28 September 1944), Budapest Offensive (29 October 1944 - 13 February 1945), and the Belgrade Offensive (14 September 1944 - 24 November 1944). These, the final of the 1944 offensives, resulted in the capture of Budapest on 13 February 1945. Budapest was surrounded by Soviet forces on 26 December 1944, and was captured after weeks of brutal street fighting. The three offensives were regarded and planned as a single continuous strategic advance that was also imbued with great political significance due to the participation of the Yugoslav communist forces in its final phase. Stalin called it the crossing of the Carpathian mountains, liberation of Belgrade and offering of direct help to Czechoslovakia, destruction of the Budapest group of Axis forces, and Liberation of Belgrade. It was conducted by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts.^[25]
10. Petsamo–Kirkenes Offensive (7–29 October 1944). This, the first and only large-scale Arctic military operation^[26] started after German forces did not evacuate from Finnish territory by 15 September, as dictated in the terms of the Moscow Armistice. It involved Soviet forces chasing retreating Germans into Norway, and enabled the occupation of the nickel mines in Pechenga, which had been producing metal vital for the German war effort. Stalin called it the Removal of the threat from German forces to the Soviet northern shipping port of Murmansk and entry into Norway. It was conducted primarily by the Karelian Front, with assistance from Soviet naval forces.^[26]

Notes

1. Also "Stalin's ten victories" or the "ten victories of the Red Army".

1. 27-я ГОДОВЩИНА ВЕЛИКОЙ ОКТЯБРЬСКОЙ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ Доклад Председателя Государственного Комитета Обороны на торжественном заседании Московского Совета депутатов трудящихся с партийными и общественными организациями г. Москвы 6 ноября 1944 года
2. Приказ Верховного Главнокомандующего 7 ноября 1944 года Archived 2008-05-03 at the Wayback Machine И. Сталин о Великой Отечественной войне Советского Союза. — М.: Госполитиздат, 1946
3. Willmott, p. 368
4. Ziemke, p. 216
5. Ziemke, p. 217
6. Pimlott, p. 330
7. Willmott, p. 369-371
8. Werth, p. 764
9. Willmott, p. 372-374
10. Werth, p. 765
11. Pimlott, p. 334
12. Gebhardt, p. 2
13. Zolotarev (1999), pp. 97–98
14. (in Russian) Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Наступление советских войск на Карельском перешейке и в Южной Карелии Archived 2011-09-30 at the Wayback Machine По замыслу Ставки войска Ленинградского и Карельского фронтов при содействии Краснознаменного Балтийского флота, Ладожской и Онежской военных флотилий мощными ударами должны были разгромить противостоящего противника, овладеть Выборгом, Петрозаводском и выйти на рубеж Тикшеозеро, Сортавала, Котка. Операцию начинали войска Ленинградского фронта, затем в наступление переходил Карельский фронт.
15. Platonov (1964)
16. Pimlott, p. 343
17. Mannerheim (1953), p. 500
18. Ziemke (2002), p. 388
19. Tapio Tiihonen (2000). Ratkaisu Kannaksella 1944 [Decision at the Isthmus 1944]. Espoo: Fenix. pp. 77–79. The Voroshilov committee prepared the conditions for Finnish capitulation for nine and a half months. The secretary of the committee, S. Bazarov handed these to the "secret police man" of the Foreign Ministry, V. Dekanozov on 26 June [...] The "sekretno projekt" for the surrender of Finland, handed by Barazov to Dekanozov, is dated to 28 June. The signature of the agreement would have meant a complete economic, political, and social subduction of Finland to the Soviet Union [...] The agreement was to be signed by attorneys from both the Soviet and Finnish governments and armed forces. Already the preamble of the agreement made it clear to Finland, what it was about: "The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Defence Forces acknowledge the complete defeat of the Finnish Armed Forces in the war against the U.S.S.R. and announce the unconditional surrender of Finland, requesting the cessation of acts of war."
20. Turtola (2001), p. 168, Dr. Turtola discovered a Soviet draft for "The Unconditional Surrender of Finland" from the Russian Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow, dated June 1944. Here are the relevant passages from the document: "The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Defence Forces acknowledge the complete defeat of the Finnish Armed Forces in the war against the U.S.S.R. and announce the unconditional surrender of Finland, requesting the cessation of acts of war."; "5. As this document takes effect, the Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces commit themselves without delay in calling to Finland all Finnish troops on other fronts and in disarming them."; "7. The Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces will carry out the disarming of all Finnish land, air, and naval forces according to the orders, schedule, and sequence given by the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces, under its supervision. 8. Since the moment of signing this document until when the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces has taken under its control all communications connections in Finland, all radio broadcasts in Finnish territory are forbidden, and Finnish telegraph, telephone, and radio connections to other countries will be cut off. 9. The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces will secure the transportation of military troops of the U.S.S.R. in Finnish territory by rail and by other means of transportation and the needed supplies to the troops. 10. To fulfill the terms of surrender and to secure the interests of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces – by its own military forces and at its own discretion – will occupy partially or fully the territory of Finland, her harbours, the archipelago of Åland, and the islands of the Gulf of Finland. The Government of the U.S.S.R. will make use of all the rights of an occupying power in the occupied territories of Finland. The Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces will publish its own orders and directives. The Finnish Government and the Finnish people will by all means try to contribute to the execution of these orders and directives. To serve this aim, the Finnish Government will without delay give an order to all the authorities of the central and local government, to the judicial system, public organisations, and all civil servants to remain in their previous positions, to obey orders unconditionally, and to carry out their duties conscientiously, until the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces gives its directives."
21. Pimlott, p. 336
22. Pimlott, p. 338
23. McCarthy, p. 232
24. Pimlott, p. 341
25. Willmott, p. 391
26. Willmott, p. 387

References

• Gebhardt, James (1990). "The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944" (PDF). Leavenworth Papers (17). Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute. ISSN 0195-3451. Retrieved 10 May 2010.
• Lucas, James (1991). War on the Eastern Front: The German Soldier in Russia, 1941-1945. Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-311-5.
• Mannerheim, G. (1953). The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. London: Cassell.
• McCarthy, Peter; Mike Syron (2003). Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions. Carroll & Graf Publishers. ISBN 978-0-7867-1264-9.
• Pimlott, John; et al. (1989). "Year of ten victories". The World at Arms: The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited. ISBN 0-89577-333-3.
• Platonov, S. P. (1964). Bitva za Leningrad (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva Оborony.
• Turtola, Martti (2001). Mannerheim-kirja [Mannerheim Book] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Ajatus. ISBN 951-0-18860-3.
• Werth, Alexander (1964). "1944: Russia enters Eastern Europe". Russia at War, 1941 - 1945. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. ISBN 9788013045928.
• Willmott, H.P. (1989). The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. New York: The Free Press. ISBN 0-02-934715-7.
• Ziemke, Earl F. (1968). Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington, DC: The U.S. Army Center of Military History. ISBN 1-4102-0414-6.
• Ziemke, Earl (2002). Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. ISBN 978-0-16-001962-3.

Further reading

• Beshanov, V., Stalin's ten blows, Minsk, Harvest, 2004 (Бешанов В. Десять сталинских ударов. — Мн.: Харвест, 2004.)
• Yemelyanov, Yu., Stalin's ten blows: triumph of the generalissimo, Moscow, Eksmo, 2006 (Емельянов Ю. Десять сталинских ударов. Триумф генералиссимуса — М.: Эксмо, 2006. ISBN 5-699-18353-1)