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Syrian Islamist military and political organization From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; Arabic: هيئة تحرير الشام, romanized: Hayʼat Taḥrīr aš-Šām[46], lit. ''Organization for the Liberation of the Levant' or 'Levant Liberation Committee''),[43] commonly referred to as Tahrir al-Sham, is a Sunni Islamist[47][48] political and armed organisation involved in the Syrian Civil War. It was formed on 28 January 2017 as a merger between Jaysh al-Ahrar (an Ahrar al-Sham faction), Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haqq, and Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement.[3][49] The unification process was held under the initiative of Abu Jaber Shaykh, an Islamist commander who had been the second Emir of Ahrar al-Sham.[3]
Proclaiming the nascent organisation as "a new stage in the life of the blessed revolution", Abu Jaber urged all factions of the Syrian opposition to unite under its Islamic leadership and wage a "popular Jihad" to achieve the objectives of the Syrian revolution, which he characterised as the ouster of the Ba'athist regime and Hezbollah militants from Syrian territories, and the formation of an Islamic government.[50] After the announcement, additional groups and individuals joined. The merged group has been primarily led by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and former Ahrar al-Sham leaders, although the High Command also has representation from other groups.[51] The Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement[5] split from Tahrir al-Sham in July 2017, and the Ansar al-Din Front in 2018.[52]
The formation of HTS was followed by a string of assassinations of its supporters. In response, HTS launched a successful crackdown on Al-Qaeda loyalists, which cemented its power in Idlib. HTS has since been pursuing a "Syrianization" programme; focused on establishing a stable civilian administration that provides services and connects to humanitarian organizations in addition to maintaining law and order.[49] Tahrir al-Sham's strategy is based on expanding its territorial control in Syria, establishing governance and mobilising popular support. In 2017, HTS permitted Turkish troops to patrol North-West Syria as part of a ceasefire brokered through the Astana negotiations. Its policies have brought it into conflict with Hurras al-Deen, Al-Qaeda's Syrian wing.[53] HTS had an estimated 6,000-15,000 members in 2022.[16]
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham gives allegiance to the Syrian Salvation Government, which is an alternative government of the Syrian opposition in the Idlib Governorate.[54][55] While the organisation officially adheres to the Salafi school; the High Council of Fatwa of the Syrian Salvation Government - to which it is religiously beholden - consists of ulema from Ash'arite and Sufi traditions as well. In its legal system and educational curriculum, HTS implements Shafi'ite thought and teaches the importance of the four classical Sunni madhahib (schools of law) in Islamic jurisprudence.[56] As of 2021, HTS is considered the most powerful military faction within the Syrian opposition.[57]
Al-Nusra/JFS co-operated with Ahrar al-Sham for much of 2015–16. Leading Ahrar al-Sham cleric Abu Jaber had long criticized al-Nusra's affiliation to al-Qaeda as setting back the cause of the rebels, and had also been the focus of attempts to unify Islamist rebel elements.[58][3][59] He led a more Islamist and less nationalist faction within Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Ahrar, which supported merger of Ahrar al-Sham with JFS. There were merger talks in late 2016, but these broke down. In early 2017 it clashed with rival Islamist groups in Idlib, in particular Ahrar al-Sham, but Jaish al-Ahrar detached itself from Ahrar al-Sham to merge with JFS in a new body.[60]
During its foundation declaration, Emir Abu Jaber Shaykh described the Levant Liberation Committee as "an independent entity" free from all the previous relations and allegiances by virtue of the unification.[61]
According to Syria analyst Charles Lister, Ahrar al-Sham lost some 800–1,000 defectors to HTS, but gained at least 6,000-8,000 more from the merger into its ranks of Suqor al-Sham, Jaish al-Mujahideen, Fastaqim Union and the western Aleppo units of the Levant Front, and the Idlib-based units of Jaysh al-Islam. JFS meanwhile lost several hundred fighters to Ahrar al-Sham, but gained 3,000-5,000 fighters from its merger with Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Haq, Jaish al-Sunna, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din into HTS.[60] Nour al-Din al-Zenki had at one time been supported by the US.[62]
Throughout January fierce fighting had broken out between the JFS and Al-Qaeda loyalists of Al-Nusra Front, before the JFS-Ahrar al-Sham merger to form Tahrir al-Sham (Syrian Liberation Committee) in January 28. Soon after the merger, Emir Abu Jaber Shaykh announced a ceasefire deal to unite all opposition militia factions into a central command. Some Turkish-backed FSA supporters pejoritavely named the newly formed organization "Hetish". The formation of HTS was described as a "reshaping of revolutionary dynamics" that could change the balance of power in the Syrian civil war and also adversely affect the future prospects of Al-Qaeda in northern Syria.[63] During 2017-2019, HTS launched a series of crackdowns against Al-Qaeda loyalists; while concurrently carrying out military operations to dismantle cells linked to the Islamic State (IS) group.[64]
On 30 January, it was reported by Asharq al-Awsat that there were around 31,000 fighters in Tahrir al-Sham. Fighters of Jaysh al-Ahrar, a breakway faction of Ahrar al-Sham militia, joined Tahrir al-Sham and increased its numbers.[12]
On 3 February, a US airstrike struck a Tahrir al-Sham headquarters in Sarmin, killing 12 members of HTS and Jund al-Aqsa. 10 of the killed militants were HTS members.[65][66]
Civilians in the rebel regions that HTS controls have resisted it. On 3 February, hundreds of Syrians demonstrated under the slogan "There is no place for al-Qaeda in Syria" in the towns of Atarib, Azaz, Maarat al-Nu'man to protest against HTS. In response, supporters of HTS organized counter-protests in al-Dana, Idlib, Atarib, and Khan Shaykhun.[67] In Idlib pro- Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham protests were held waving pictures of its emir Abu Jaber on 3 February 2017.[68]
On 4 February 2017, a US airstrike killed former al-Qaeda commander Abu Hani al-Masri, who was a part of Ahrar al-Sham at the time of his death. It was reported that he was about to defect to Tahrir al-Sham before his death.[66] Around 8 February, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi confirmed that 2 senior Jabhat Fateh al-Sham leaders loyal to al-Qaeda, including former al-Nusra deputy leader Sami al-Oraydi, left Tahrir al-Sham after its formation.[69]
A speech was released by Abu Jaber on 9 February.[70] He emphasized his group being an "independent entity" and praised his "brothers" in the "Syrian Jihad" for their "heroic" resistance against Ba'athist forces, Hezbollah and Russians. The statement urged all opposition factions to join forces with HTS and warned Syrian Sunnis; asserting that Iran will "enslave the region" if the rebels lose the war.[1]
On 12 February, the Bunyan al-Marsous Operations Room, of which Tahrir al-Sham was a member, launched an offensive against the Syrian Army in Daraa's Manshiyah district. Tahrir al-Sham forces reportedly began the attack with 2 suicide bombers and car bombs.[71]
On 13 February, clashes erupted between the previously allied Tahrir al-Sham and Jund al-Aqsa, also called Liwa al-Aqsa, in northern Hama and southern Idlib.[72][73]
On 15 February, Ahrar al-Sham published an infographic on its recent defections, claiming that only 955 fighters had defected to Tahrir al-Sham.[69] On 22 February, the Combating Terrorism Center reported that Jabhat Fateh al-Sham had formed the Tahrir al-Sham group due to its fear of being isolated, and to counter Ahrar al-Sham's recent expansion during the clashes in the Idlib Province.[69]
On 22 February, the last of Liwa al-Asqa's 2,100 militants left their final positions in Khan Shaykhun, with unconfirmed reports in pro-government media that they were to join ISIL in the Ar-Raqqah Province after a negotiated withdrawal deal with Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party.[74] Afterward, Tahrir al-Sham declared terminating Liwa al-Aqsa, and promised to watch for any remaining cells.[75]
On 26 February, a US airstrike in Al-Mastoumeh, Idlib Province, killed Abu Khayr al-Masri, who was the deputy leader of al-Qaeda.[76][77] The airstrike also killed another Tahrir al-Sham militant.[78][79] Abu Khayr's death left HTS freer to move away from al-Qaeda's any remaining influence.[60]
In early March 2017, local residents in the Idlib Province who supported FSA factions accused Tahrir al-Sham of doing more harm than good, saying that all they've done is "kidnap people, set up checkpoints, and terrorize residents."[80]
On 16 March, a US airstrike struck the village of al-Jinah, just southwest of Atarib, killing at least 29 and possibly over 50 civilians; the US claimed the people targeted in the strike were "al-Qaeda militants" but the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), local residents and local officials have said that the building struck was a mosque filled with worshipers, which was subsequently confirmed by Bellingcat.[81][82][83]
On the morning of 21 March, according to pro-government media, a US drone strike in Darkush, Idlib Province, killed Abu Islam al-Masri, described as an Egyptian high-ranking HTS commander, and Abu al-'Abbas al-Darir, described as an Egyptian HTS commander;[84] however, the Institute for the Study of War reported that the commander killed was Sheikh Abu al-Abbas al-Suri.[85]
On 24 March, two flatbed trucks carrying flour and belonging to an IHH-affiliated Turkish relief organization were stopped at a HTS checkpoint at the entrance to Sarmada. HTS then seized the trucks and the flour, which was intended for a bakery in Saraqib. The seizure caused 2,000 families in the area to be cut off from a free supply of bread.[86]
In April 2017, Jaysh al-Islam attacked HTS and expelled it from the territories under its control in Eastern Ghouta.[87]
On 3 May, HTS arrested Suhail Muhammad Hamoud, "Abu TOW", a former FSA fighter, in a house raid in Idlib. Earlier, al-Hamoud had published a photograph of him smoking in front of a HTS billboard that prohibited smoking.[88]
According to reports from pro-government Al-Masdar news, on 20 May, the main faction of the Abu Amara Battalions joined Tahrir al-Sham, which "now boasts a fighting force of some 50,000 militants" according to one pro-government media source.[89] However, the covert operations unit of the Abu Amara Battalions based in Aleppo remained independent.[90]
On 29 May, Tahrir al-Sham arrested opposition activist and FSA commander Abdul Baset al-Sarout after accusing him of participating in an anti-HTS protest in Maarat al-Nu'man.[91]
On 2 June 2017, defectors from the Northern Brigade's Commandos of Islam Brigade reportedly joined Tahrir al-Sham, although Captain Kuja, leader of the unit, stated that he is still part of the Northern Brigade.[92][93]
During 18–23 July, HTS launched a series of attacks on Ahrar al-Sham positions, which were quickly abandoned.[60] On 20 July 2017, the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement led by Sheikh Tawfiq Shahabuddin announced its withdrawal from Tahrir al-Sham amid widespread conflict between HTS and Ahrar al-Sham, and became an independent Islamist group.[5] On 23 July 2017, Tahrir al-Sham expelled the remnants of Ahrar al-Sham from Idlib, capturing the entire city[94] as well as 60% of the Idlib Governorate.[95] HTS was now the dominant armed group in opposition-held NW Syria.[60]
On 18 August 2017, Tahrir al-Sham captured 8 rebel fighters from the town of Madaya after it accused them of wanting to return to Madaya during a ceasefire agreement.[96]
Syrian intelligence commander Hassan Daaboul was among the 40 assassinated by Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham, in twin bomb attacks at complexes of the Ba'athist secret police in Homs.[97] The explosion killed Ibrahim Darwish, a Brigadier General and the state security branch's chief.[98] Abu Yusuf al-Muhajir, a Tahrir al-Sham military spokesman was interviewed by Human Voice on the bombings.[99] Twenty-six names were released.[100] HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani mentioned the Homs attack, stating that it was a message for the "defeatist politicians" to "step aside."[101] It has been disputed that the raid resulted in the death of Ibrahim Darwish.[102]
On 11 March 2017, Tahrir al-Sham carried out a twin bombing attack in the Bab al-Saghir area of Damascus's Old City, killing 76 and wounding 120. The death toll included 43 Iraqi pilgrims, whom HTS claimed were "Iranian militias" supporting Assad regime's dictatorship.[103] The attacks were at a shrine frequented by Shi'ite pilgrims and militiamen.[104] In a statement released the following day, Tahrir al-Sham stated that the attacks targeted Iran-backed militants fight on behalf of Bashar al-Assad and condemned Khomeinist militants for ""killing and displacing" Syrians.[105]
From September to November 2017, there were a series of assassinations of HTS leaders, in particular foreign clerics associated with the most hardline elements, such as Abu Talha al-Ordini, Abu Abdulrahman al-Mohajer, Abu Sulaiman al-Maghribi, Abu Yahya al-Tunisi, Suraqa al-Maki and Abu Mohammad al-Sharii, as well as some local military leaders, including Abu Elias al-Baniasi, Mustafa al-Zahri, Saied Nasrallah and Hassan Bakour. There was speculation that the assassinations were carried out either by pro-Turkish perpetrators, given the hostility between Turkey and HTS in Idlib, or by supporters[who?] of Jolani's attempt to turn the organization away from hardline Salafi-jihadi positions. There were also high-profile defections from HTS in the same period, including Abdullah al-Muhaysini and Muslah al-Alyani.[106] In December, HTS arrested several prominent jihadi activists, former members of al-Nusra who remained loyal to al-Qaeda and rejected HTS's turn away from Salafi-jihadist positions. The move was interpreted as an attempt to re-establish as a more pragmatic, pan-Sunni group, with a civilian structure. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri denounced this turn.[107][108]
HTS announced Abu Jaber's resignation as the group's leader on 1 October 2017. He was succeeded by Nusra Front founder Abu-Muhammad al-Julani, who had already been the de facto military commander.[109][110] On 1 October 2017, the ibn Taymiyyah Battalions based in the town of Darat Izza defected from Tahrir al-Sham.[111] In October 2017, Russia claimed to have injured Abu Mohammed al-Joulani in an air raid; HTS denied the claim.[112][110] HTS established the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib, as a rival to the Syrian Interim Government recognized by other rebels.[87]
In early 2018, there were reports that HTS had been significantly weakened, and now had "a small presence in Eastern Ghouta and declining influence in Idlib, northern Hama, and western Aleppo provinces", with just 250 men in Eastern Ghouta[87] and a total of 12,000 fighters.[60]
In February 2018, Tahrir al-Sham was accused of killing Fayez al-Madani, an opposition delegate tasked with negotiations with the government over electricity delivery in the northern Homs Governorate, in the city of al-Rastan. Hundreds of people, including fighters of the Men of God Brigade, part of the Free Syrian Army's National Liberation Movement group,[38][39][113] proceeded to demonstrate against HTS in the city on 13 February. In response, HTS withdrew from Rastan and handed over its headquarters in the city to the Men of God Brigade.[114] Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda loyalists formed the anti-HTS Guardians of Religion Organization (Hurras al-Din) in February 2018, establishing it as the successor group of Al-Nusra Front.[115]
HTS was left excluded of the 24 February ceasefire agreement on Eastern Ghouta. In late February, a group of armed factions, including Failaq al-Rahman and Jaysh al-Islam, wrote to the UN declaring they were ready to "evacuate" remaining HTS fighters from Eastern Ghouta within 15 days.[87] At the same time in Idlib Governorate, Ahrar al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki and Soqour al-Sham entered into conflict with HTS, taking significant territory.[87]
During late 2017 and early 2018, it co-operated with Turkey in Idlib, leading to deepening tensions between the more pragmatic leadership and more hardline (especially foreign fighters) elements hostile to working with Turkey. Some of the latter split in February 2018 to form Huras al-Din. The HTS leadership also cracked down on remaining ISIS splinter cells active in Idlib. By August, when HTS entered into (unsuccessful) negotiations with Russia and Turkey, HTS was estimated to have around 3,000–4,000 foreign fighters, including non-Syrian Arabs, out of a total of 16,000 HTS fighters. On 31 August, Turkey declared HTS a terrorist organization.[58]
In the summer of 2018, HTS strengthened its crackdown campaign against cells affiliated with IS organization in Idlib and Hama regions.[64]
In January 2019, HTS was able to seize dozens of villages from rivals, and afterwards, a deal was reached in which the civil administration was to be led by HTS in the whole rebel-held Idlib Governorate.[116]
In the wake of the 5th Idlib inter-rebel conflict, HTS gained control of nearly the entire Idlib pocket, after defeating the Turkish-backed National Front for Liberation. Following their victory, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham would immediately violate the ceasefire treaty brokered by Turkey and Russia by placing combat units in the demilitarized zone along the Idlib-Syrian Government border, and attack SAA encampments near the area. In response to these attacks, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad increased the number of troops garrisoned near Idlib, which some have argued is an impending renewed offensive in the region, following the Northwestern Syria Campaign, where pro-government forces retook the formerly rebel-controlled Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase that was captured by the FSA and Army of Conquest in 2015. In 2019, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense Michael Mulroy stated that "Idlib is essentially the largest collection of al Qaeda affiliates in the world."[117][118][119][120] On July 10–11, 57 pro-government fighters were killed when Tahrir al-Sham militants attacked Syrian positions near the fortified village of Hamamiyat. 44 militants were also killed.[121][122]
HTS successfully defended Idlib from 2019 to 2020 government offensives. During this period, HTS cemented its security partnership with the Turkish military against the Assad regime.[57]
On 1 March 2021 it was reported that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham intensified its campaign against al-Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Din in Idlib.[123] Since 2021, HTS has started implementing various reconstruction projects in areas under its control, with a focus on establishing civil institutions in opposition-held territories. These included the Bab al-Hawa Industrial City project and re-opening of al-Ghazawiya crossing point to connect with the Syrian Interim Government held territories.[124]
After achieving stability in Idlib in 2021, HTS launched the policy of repatriating confiscated properties of minorities in North-West Syria. These also included the re-building of destroyed churches in Idlib. HTS commanders and SSG officials have since initiated regular meetings to engage with priests and representatives the Christian community in Idlib.[125][126]
The Washington Post reported in January 2022 that the group was "trying to convince Syrians and the world that it is no longer as radical and repressive as it once was", voicing rhetoric about combating extremism, and shifting its focus to providing services to the refugees and residents of Idlib province through the Salvation Government.[127] In 7 January, Abu Muhammad al-Joulani announced the inauguration of the Aleppo-Bab al-Hawa International Road, presenting the event as part of "a comprehensive plan.. to achieve development and progress for the region".[124]
In August 2022, HTS ideologue Abu Maria al-Qahtani issued a statement demanding the dissolution of Al-Qaeda and urged all AQ branches to cut ties from the organization.[128] In 2022, HTS took a significant amount of territory and several key settlements during the October 2022 Aleppo clashes.
In 2023, it was reported that Western hostilities towards HTS have decreased, yet still marked by mutual rivalry due to conflict with American interests in the region.[129]
In a speech before the revolutionary conference of Syrian Salvation Government in May 2023, Joulani announced intentions to transform the strategic map of the conflict. Stating that Tahrir al-Sham has achieved remarkable military preparation, Joulani asserted that "Aleppo is the gate to Damascus and it will be under focus for one or two years."[130] In May 2023, HTS and SDF announced separate proposals to host millions of Syrian refugees stranded across the neighboring countries, following Arab League's reinstatement of the Assad government.[131]
In June 2023, Tahrir al-Sham and Syrian Democratic Forces initiated formal diplomatic talks; concluding an agreement to initiate trade of fuel supplies between Rojava and Idlib. The meetings had been ongoing in the backdrop of growing tensions between Turkey and SDF, and SDF's intention to deploy HTS as a check on the growing Turkish influence in northern Syria. For their part, HTS proposed joint counter-terrorism efforts alongside SDF. Apart from economic co-operation, the talks also involved negotiations on political arrangements, such as prospects for a joint HTS-SDF civil administration in the event of potential expulsion of SNA forces from North-West Syria.[132]
Abu Jaber Shaykh, a major scholarly leader and chief of Shura Council of Tahrir al-Sham, was arrested several times by the Ba'athist regime, which accused him of holding Salafi-jihadist beliefs. He was imprisoned at the Sednaya Prison in 2005 and released among several jihadist prisoners in 2011 who would form several Salafist rebel groups during the Syrian Civil War.[1] Abu Jaber has also professed a belief in "Popular Jihad", a bottom-to-top approach in which jihadists would win the hearts and minds of the people, before setting out to establish Islamic governance, after receiving enough popular support, which is notably the opposite of ISIL's "elite Jihad" top-to-bottom approach by a vanguard.[133] Ayman al-Tamimi of the CTC claimed in February 2017 that despite public statements by Tahrir al-Sham's leaders and partisans, the group at the time was mostly an al-Qaeda-aligned group.[69]
On 18 June 2019, HTS released a statement offering condolences to Egypt's former President Muhammad Morsi upon his death in Egyptian custody.[134] In an interview given to the PBS Frontline documentarian Martin Smith, Abu Muhammad al-Joulani stated regarding the religious doctrines and political goals of Tahrir al-Sham:
"to limit the description of the HTS to only being a Salafist or jihadist, I believe, needs a long discussion. And I don’t want to comment on that now, because it would take a lot of research and study. We are trying today to talk about Islam in its real concept, the Islam that seeks to spread justice and aspires for building and for progress, and to protect women and preserve their rights, and for education as well. So if we agree that there’s an Islamic rule in the liberated areas, we say that there are universities, by Allah’s grace, full of students, two-thirds being female students. There are more than 450,000 to 500,000 students enrolled in schools. There are fully functioning hospitals in the liberated areas, and there are people working to build towns and pave roads. Others are trying to establish an economic system for people to live securely and peacefully. And there’s a judicial system that seeks to give people back their rights and not only to punish the wrongdoers.."[135]
Educational curricula of Tahrir al-Sham teaches the Shafi'ite school, the predominant mad'hab in Syria, and emphasizes the importance of the four traditional schools of law for ensuring Muslim unity. In theology, Tahrir al-Sham officially follows the Athari school, while also allowing Ash'arite scholarship in educational institutes and co-operating with mosques run by Ash'ari Imams. As it consolidated power over the course of time, it also reduced its policy of moral policing, arguing that such duties were the role of "relevant ministries of the SSG".[136] Commenting on the changes since 2020, a female Islamist activist campaigning for women's issues stated:
"Pressure on individual behaviour fell with the creation of HTS.. Before, it would have been inconceivable to imagine that women could talk about politics like this. The pressure to wear the full veil (niqab) has also diminished... this situation is new. All the women wore the full veil after the liberation of Idlib. The current transformation exasperates religious hardliners, but more pressure cannot be exerted on society or it might get out of control."[137]
In June 2022, HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Joulani met with a delegation of Druze leaders and inaugurated a well-project that facilitated water supply to the Druze-majority villages of Harim mountains. At the event, Joulani assured the Druze leaders that he was committed to improving economic conditions in the region and expanding public services provided by the Syrian Salvation Government. The event was viewed by various Syrian observers as part of a public outreach programme of HTS with local Druze residents.[138][139][140]
In 2022, Tahrir al-Sham permitted the re-opening of churches in Idlib city, enabling the Christian residents to celebrate Mass. After a meeting with members of Christian clergy and civil activists, Joulani announced his policy to "protect" Christian participation in their religious rites and celebrations. He also promised restoration of properties unjustly seized from Christian citizens. Al-Qaeda aligned Hurras al-Din condemned the move, accusing the Salvation Government of changing Idlib to be "less Muslim". In response, Tahrir al-Sham leaders maintained that Sharia (Islamic law) safeguarded the rights of non-Muslim citizens to observe and teach their religious rites within their communities; arguing for the need for tolerance and peaceful relations between religious communities living in an Islamic government.[141]
Hanna Celluf, Archpriest of 1000-year-old church in Quniyah and member of the Franciscan order, stated that Idlib residents have been free to practice their religious rites and expressed his pride in serving the Christians of Idlib.[142]
 | Parts of this article (those related to Public opinion) need to be updated. (January 2023) |
The ECHO Research Centre at Laurentian University conducted an opinion poll on 4,858 residents in several areas of Syria between 10 July 2017 and 28 July 2017. According to the poll's results, 77% of those surveyed disagreed with the Salafist ideology Tahrir al-Sham and other Salafist groups promote in Idlib, 73% rejected HTS-affiliated local councils in Idlib, 66% thought that HTS is part of al-Qaeda in Syria, and 63% claimed that the dominance of HTS in Idlib could lead to a "second Tora Bora". Of those who participated in the poll, nearly all of them (close to 100%) considered HTS to be contrary to the goals of the Syrian opposition, although they were split in its extent. 51% of them considered HTS to be contrary to the opposition since its inception, 42% considered HTS to be previously consistent with the opposition, but is no longer so, and 7% considered HTS to be a counter-revolutionary organization.[143]
The groups in italic are defectors from Ahrar al-Sham which either left to join Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in the last few days of its existence, or joined its successor group Tahrir al-Sham.
Since October 2017, the "general commander" or emir of Tahrir al-Sham is Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who is also Tahrir al-Sham's "military commander" and the emir of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, who also led its predecessor organisation al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda until 2016.[177]
Previously, the general commander of Tahrir al-Sham was Hashim al-Shaykh, also known as Abu Jaber, who was the leader of Ahrar al-Sham between September 2014 and September 2015.[178] On 1 October 2017, Abu Jaber resigned from his position as the general leader of Tahrir al-Sham and was replaced by Abu Mohammad al-Julan. Abu Jaber took another position as the head of HTS's Shura council.[2]
Individuals in italic are defectors from Ahrar al-Sham, which either left to join Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in the last few days of its existence, or directly joined Tahrir al-Sham.
During its foundation declaration, the first Emir Abu Jaber Shaykh had described the Levant Liberation Committee as "an independent entity" free from all the previous relations and allegiances as a result of the newly formed union with various Syrian Islamic militias, thereby disassociating itself from previously dissolved factions such as the Al-Nusra Front.[185] Since officially disassociating from Al-Qaeda in 2017, Tahrir al-Sham has formally established governance over many parts of North-West Syria.[186]
In November 2017, HTS launched a wide-scale crackdown on Al-Qaeda elements in Idlib and arrested prominent leaders from Af-Pak region and Al-Nusra Front such as Sami al-Oraydi. Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri opposed the split of HTS from Al-Qaeda, stating that it was a treasonous act done without his consent and further denounced the clampdown on foreign Jihadist fighters through an audio-statement.[187] Several Al-Qaeda circles and supporters have also condemned Joulani and compared him to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi because of the group's conflicts with other rebel groups, and have described him as an 'opportunist' as well as making claims that he is an agent of foreign powers.[188]
After reaching a ceasefire deal brokered by Turkey, HTS turned its attention to destroying Al-Qaeda cells and Islamic State remnants in Idlib.[129] Rivalry between Al-Qaeda aligned Hurras al-Din and Tahrir al-Sham had begun to escalate violently as early as December 2019. In February 2021, HTS intensified its fight against al-Qaeda cells by launching a large-scale crackdown that saw many military commanders and leaders of Hurras al-Din incarcerated.[123] According to Istanbul-based academic Abbas Sharifeh, the measures were part of a strategy by HTS for governance consolidation: "Golani simply does not want any competitors in Idlib, especially from a jihadi current affiliated with al-Qaeda."[123] By 2023 Tahrir al-Sham had eliminated most of the clandestine networks of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, disarmed the militias and established total control over Idlib.[129]
U.S. government accuses Tahrir al-Sham of working with al-Qaeda's Syrian branch on a covert level, despite its self-identification as a distinct organisation.[189] Some analysts assert that many of the group's senior figures, particularly Abu Jaber, held similarly extreme views.[133][190] However, Tahrir al-Sham has officially denied being part of al-Qaeda and said in a statement that the group is "an independent entity and not an extension of previous organizations or factions".[1] In his 2021 interview to PBS News, Abu Muhammad al-Julani argued that financial co-operation with Al-Qaeda was necessary to defend Syrians from the tyranny of the Assad regime, and stated that "even at that time when we were with Al Qaeda, we were against external attacks".[135] Clarifying the reasons behind the termination of relations with Al-Qaeda, Julani said:
"[W]hen we saw that the interest of the revolution and the interest of the people of Syria was also to break up from [the] Al Qaeda organization, we initiated this ourselves without pressure from anybody, without anybody talking to us about it or requesting anything. It was an individual, personal initiative based on what we thought was in the public interest that benefits the Syrian revolution."[135]
According to Abdul Razzaq al-Mahdi, who was a leading scholar in Tahrir al-Sham, the groups do not particularly hate one another in the political or social battlefield. Certain members, however, do believe that a war between the two would be possible, since Ahrar al-Sham's attendance at the Astana talks labels it as a "moderate" faction, often seen as blasphemy within groups such as Tahrir al-Sham.[191]
In February 2018 Ahrar al-Sham and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement merged and formed the Syrian Liberation Front then launched an offensive against Tahrir al-Sham seizing several villages and the city of Maarrat al-Nu'man.
| Country | Date | References |
 United States |
31 May 2018 | [192] |
 Canada |
23 May 2018 | [193] |
 Turkey |
31 August 2018 | [194] |
 Morocco |
7 April 2022 | [195] |
 United Kingdom |
[196] | |
 European Union |
September 2020 | [197] |
The US embassy in Syria, which had suspended operations in February 2012, confirmed in May 2017 that HTS had been designated a terrorist organization in March 2017. A US State Department spokesperson further stated that a review of HTS's internal mechanisms was being conducted to analyse "the issue carefully".[198] In May 2018, the United States Department of State formally added HTS to its list of "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (FTO).[192][186] The United States officially confirmed in June 2023 that HTS leader Joulani had severed links to Al-Qaeda in 2016, while sanctioning individuals known to finance HTS. These included Abu Ahmed Zakour, a member of HTS's Majlis ash-Shura.[199]
Canada designated Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization on 23 May 2018.[193]
In August 2018, Turkey designated Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization.[200] Despite this, the Turkish army has pursued strategic co-operation with HTS, viewing them as allies in the fight against Al-Qaeda and Islamic State remnants. Since the objective of Tahrir al-Sham was defending Idlib from the Baathist regime and consolidating governance, it became a party to several ceasefire agreements brokered by Turkey. Following the ceasefire deal in March 2020, HTS turned its focus to eradicating independent militias and hardline Jihadist factions in Idlib. Within a few weeks it was able to dismantle all the Al-Qaeda networks and eventually succeeded in achieving undisputed control of Idlib by subduing or co-opting other rebel factions.[129]
In response to the American designation of HTS as a terrorist organisation; Abu Muhammad al-Julani, distancing himself from past involvement with Al-Qaeda, stated in a 2021 interview to PBS Frontline:
"Our message to them is brief. We here do not pose any threat to you, so there is no need for you to classify people as terrorists and announce rewards for killing them. And also, all that does not affect the Syrian revolution negatively. This is the most important message. The second message is that the American policies in the region, and in Syria in particular, are incorrect policies that require huge amendments... What we might have in common would be putting an end to the humanitarian crisis and suffering that is going on in the region, and putting an end to the masses of refugees that flee to Turkey or to Europe and create huge issues, either for the Syrian people, who are being displaced all over Europe, or for the Europeans themselves.. This is the issue that we can cooperate the most on, by helping people stay here, by providing them with a dignified life here, in the region, or by liberating the lands of these people so that they can return to their homes, instead of having Russia or the Iranian militias push them to flee abroad."[135][201]
In 2018, Turkey designated Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization and the Al-Nusra Front in 2014. The Turkish government once said it was opposed to Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and had fought with it and declared it a terrorist organisation, and HTS's Syrian Salvation Government was a direct challenge to the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government.[202]
However, since 2017 there have been times HTS, and in particular its pragmatic faction around Abu Muhammed al-Jolani, has fought alongside the SNA which is backed and funded by Turkey, has not stopped Turkey from setting up several observation posts in its controlled territory in Idlib Governorate, and has joined joint operations rooms with Turkish-backed groups while preserving its autonomy. The Clingendael Institute in November 2019 has described the Turkish policy since 2018 as attempting to divide the pragmatic elements from the hardline elements within HTS.[202]
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