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Ethnic group in Xinjiang, China From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Kazakhs in China form the largest community of Kazakhs outside Kazakhstan. They are one of the 56 ethnic groups officially recognized by the People's Republic of China. There is one Kazakh autonomous prefecture – Ili in Xinjiang – and three Kazakh autonomous counties – Aksay in Gansu, and Barkol and Mori in Xinjiang.
| Total population | |
|---|---|
| 1,462,588 | |
| Regions with significant populations | |
| Xinjiang (Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Aksai Kazakh Autonomous County, Barkol Kazakh Autonomous County, Mori Kazakh Autonomous County) | |
| Languages | |
| Kazakh, Mandarin | |
| Religion | |
| Majority Sunni Islam, minority Tibetan Buddhism or unaffiliated | |
| Related ethnic groups | |
| Uyghurs, Salar people, Kyrgyz in China, Uzbeks in China |
| Kazakhs in China | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese name | |||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 中国哈萨克族 | ||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 中國哈薩克族 | ||||||
| |||||||
| Dunganese name | |||||||
| Dungan | Җунгуй хазахзў | ||||||
| Kazakh name | |||||||
| Kazakh | جۇڭگو قازاقتارى Қытайда қазақтар Qytaida qazaqtar [qɤ̆tʰaɪtá qasaχtʰáɚ] | ||||||
During the fall of the Dzungar Khanate in the mid-18th century, the Manchus of the Qing Dynasty massacred the native Dzungars of Dzungaria in the Dzungar genocide, and afterwards colonized the depopulated area with immigrants from many parts of their empire. Among the peoples that moved into the depopulated Dzungaria were the Kazakhs from the Kazakh Khanates.[1]
In the 19th century, the advance of the Russian Empire troops pushed the Kazakhs to neighboring countries. Russian settlers on traditional Kazakh land drove many over the border to China, causing their population to increase in China.[2]
During the Russian Revolution, when Muslims faced conscription, Xinjiang again became a sanctuary for Kazakhs fleeing Russia.[3] During the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of Kazakh nomads moved from Soviet Kazakhstan to Xinjiang to escape Soviet persecution, famine,[note 1] violence, and forced sedentarization.[4] Kazakhs that moved to China fought for the Soviet Communist-backed Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion (1944–1949).
Toops[who?] estimated that 326,000 Kazakhs, 65,000 Kirghiz, 92,000 Hui, 187,000 Han, and 2,984,000 Uyghur (totaling 3,730,000) lived in Xinjiang in 1941. Hoppe[who?] estimated that 4,334,000 people lived in Xinjiang in 1949.[5]
In 1936, after Sheng Shicai expelled 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, Hui Chinese led by General Ma Bufang massacred Kazakhs, until there were only 135 of them left.[6]
The arrival of the People's Republic of China at the end of The Civil War led to significant changes in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the region were granted autonomy around governance, language, and religion at first, but the end goal was for the Kazakhs to integrate into the new Chinese State.[7]
In the early stages, this meant high spending on infrastructure and education, aiming to boost agricultural output and literacy respectively.[7] The arrival of the Cultural Revolution saw the end of permissiveness and the beginning of a more hardline policy, as Kazakh party cadres were purged, Islamic practice restricted, and pastoralist herds collectivized.[7] The end of pastoralism was especially harmful, as the connection to the land and nomadic lifestyle remains an important part of the Kazakh identity.[8]
In more outward ways, Xinjiang began to change as well. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began a series of projects aimed at urbanising the region.[8] This, combined with the arrival of Han settlers led to a demographic shift as Kazakh areas were no longer majority Kazakh.[7] This period also saw concerns over separatism, as worsening Sino-Soviet relations saw the USSR stirring up nationalist sentiments.[7]
The end of the Cultural Revolution and rise of Deng Xiaoping led to a loosening of restrictions. The representation of Kazakhs rebounded, especially with the return of purged political leaders and Kazakhs who fled the country.[7] The collectivisation policies were also rolled back, but ethnic tensions between Kazakh and Han persist.[9]
But, there were limitations to the loosening of restrictions. The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.[10] This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.[10]
(Only includes counties or county-equivalents containing >1% of county population.)
| Сounty/City | % Kazakh | Kazakh pop | Total pop |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region | 6.74 | 1,245,023 | 18,459,511 |
| Aksay Kazakh autonomous county | 30.5 | 2,712 | 8,891 |
| Ürümqi city | 2.34 | 48,772 | 2,081,834 |
| Tianshan district | 1.77 | 8,354 | 471,432 |
| Saybag district | 1.27 | 6,135 | 482,235 |
| Xinshi district | 1.06 | 4,005 | 379,220 |
| Dongshan district | 1.96 | 1,979 | 100,796 |
| Ürümqi county | 8.00 | 26,278 | 328,536 |
| Karamay city | 3.67 | 9,919 | 270,232 |
| Dushanzi district | 4.24 | 2,150 | 50,732 |
| Karamay district | 3.49 | 5,079 | 145,452 |
| Baijiantan district | 3.35 | 2,151 | 64,297 |
| Urko district | 5.53 | 539 | 9,751 |
| Hami city | 8.76 | 43,104 | 492,096 |
| Yizhou district | 2.71 | 10,546 | 388,714 |
| Barkol Kazakh autonomous county | 34.01 | 29,236 | 85,964 |
| Yiwu county | 19.07 | 3,322 | 17,418 |
| Changji Hui autonomous prefecture | 7.98 | 119,942 | 1,503,097 |
| Changji city | 4.37 | 16,919 | 387,169 |
| Fukang city | 7.83 | 11,984 | 152,965 |
| Midong district | 1.94 | 3,515 | 180,952 |
| Hutubi county | 10.03 | 21,118 | 210,643 |
| Manas county | 9.62 | 16,410 | 170,533 |
| Qitai county | 10.07 | 20,629 | 204,796 |
| Jimsar county | 8.06 | 9,501 | 117,867 |
| Mori Kazakh autonomous county | 25.41 | 19,866 | 78,172 |
| Bortala Mongol autonomous prefecture | 9.14 | 38,744 | 424,040 |
| Bole city | 7.10 | 15,955 | 224,869 |
| Jinghe county | 8.27 | 11,048 | 133,530 |
| Wenquan county | 17.89 | 11,741 | 65,641 |
| Ili Kazakh autonomous prefecture | 1.78 | 5,077 | 285,299 |
| Kuytun city | 1.78 | 5,077 | 285,299 |
| Ili prefecture direct-controlled territories | 22.55 | 469,634 | 2,082,577 |
| Ghulja city | 4.81 | 17,205 | 357,519 |
| Ghulja county | 10.30 | 39,745 | 385,829 |
| Qapqal Xibe autonomous county | 20.00 | 32,363 | 161,834 |
| Huocheng county | 7.96 | 26,519 | 333,013 |
| Gongliu county | 29.69 | 45,450 | 153,100 |
| Xinyuan county | 43.43 | 117,195 | 269,842 |
| Zhaosu county | 48.43 | 70,242 | 145,027 |
| Tekes county | 42.25 | 56,571 | 133,900 |
| Nilka county | 45.15 | 64,344 | 142,513 |
| Tacheng prefecture | 24.21 | 216,020 | 892,397 |
| Tacheng city | 15.51 | 23,144 | 149,210 |
| Usu city | 9.93 | 18,907 | 190,359 |
| Emin county | 33.42 | 59,586 | 178,309 |
| Shawan county | 16.23 | 30,621 | 188,715 |
| Toli county | 68.98 | 55,102 | 79,882 |
| Yumin county | 32.42 | 15,609 | 48,147 |
| Hoboksar Mongol autonomous county | 22.59 | 13,051 | 57,775 |
| Altay prefecture | 51.38 | 288,612 | 561,667 |
| Altay city | 36.80 | 65,693 | 178,510 |
| Burqin county | 57.31 | 35,324 | 61,633 |
| Koktokay county | 69.68 | 56,433 | 80,986 |
| Burultokay county | 31.86 | 24,793 | 77,830 |
| Kaba county | 59.79 | 43,889 | 73,403 |
| Qinggil county | 75.61 | 40,709 | 53,843 |
| Jiminay county | 61.39 | 21,771 | 35,462 |
The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.[11] Some Kazakhs are nomadic herders and raise sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. These nomadic Kazakhs migrate seasonally in search of pasture for their animals. During the summer the Kazakhs live in yurts, while in winter they settle and live in modest houses made of adobe or cement blocks. Others live in urban areas and tend to be highly educated and hold much influence in integrated communities. The Islam practiced by the Kazakhs in China contains many elements of shamanism, ancestor worship, and other traditional beliefs and practices.[12]
Kazakh is still spoken in the community, although unlike Kazakh varieties in Kazakhstan, it takes influences from Mandarin and is written in the Arabic script. Chinese Kazakhs almost always speak Uyghur or Mandarin in addition, both of which are used for interethnic communication.[13] Thus, Kazakh remains important but is seldom spoken outside the home, with the exception of Kazakh-majority areas.[13] Many Kazakhs feel ethnically distinct from other groups in Xinjiang and connected to Kazakhs across the border in Kazakhstan.[14] However, the rollback of Kazakh-medium education and the Russification of post-Soviet Kazakhs across the border means this feeling is not quite universal.[14]
The Chinese surveillance apparatus employs extensive data collection and advanced artificial intelligence to create a more agile version of authoritarian governance, enabling it to exert unparalleled social control.[15] Chinese leaders are confident that by collecting large amounts of data, they can foresee potential threats and issues before they manifest.[16] The Chinese Communist Party has been integrating traditional surveillance techniques with cutting-edge technological innovations and biometric information to create a substantial surveillance system in Xinjiang.[17] This surveillance system includes measures such as biometric data collection (facial and iris recognition), vehicle and drone surveillance, and smartphone applications.[18] These surveillance measures extend to all aspects of life in Xinjiang, pressuring ethnic minorities to conform to government standards.[18]
Historically, the cultural landscape allowed traditional Kazakh shrines, festivals, and religious observances, such as the annual pilgrimage to the Imam Asim shrine.[19] However, anti-terrorism and social stability policies have limited Kazakhs' freedom to express religious beliefs and participate in cultural practices.[20] This surveillance infrastructure also monitors community gatherings and religious practices, impacting the ability to openly practise Islam.[18] Since 2017, the CCP adopted a preventative approach, allegedly detaining over one million people in re-education facilities.[18] Testimonies from minority Kazakhs describe the experiences of detention, detailing physical and emotional abuses.[21] Gulbahar Haitiwaji, a detainee, recounted military-style exercises and enforced silence in the camps.[22]
With no strict guidelines for assessing 'transgressions,' local authorities are given discretion in interpreting and enforcing rules, solidifying Beijing's 'preventative approach' towards separatist activism.[23] The 'Grid Management System' divides communities into administrative zones with party members tasked with surveillance to maintain 'social stability.'[24] This has led to mistrust within the Kazakh community as residents are encouraged to report 'suspicious' activity among neighbours, weakening communal bonds.[24]
In 2017, a new policy targeted 'three threats'—terrorism, separatism, and religious radicalism.[25] Kazakhs were sent to re-education centres, temporarily removing them from the workforce.[26] This strategy enforced ideological 'development' within the centres, limiting individual liberties and reinforcing self-censorship.[26] Families faced financial strain as primary earners were detained.[26]
Surveillance heavily impacts Kazakhs, especially those involved in cross-border commerce or the local labour market. Being flagged by the state increases unemployment risk.[27] Business transactions are closely monitored, limiting economic opportunities.[28]
Increased monitoring since 2016 has restricted ethnic Kazakhs' travel, particularly for passport acquisition, hindering their ability to leave China.[26] Surveillance checkpoints requiring ID and biometric scans further limit freedom of movement, affecting access to work, education, and family connections.[26]
Grassroots movements advocating anti-Chinese sentiment are not an unfamiliar phenomenon in Kazakhstan [29] Despite heavy Chinese investment into the relationship between Kazakhstan and China through the establishment of several Confucius institutes - non-profit organisations promoting Chinese language and culture - and a range of student exchange programs, the catalogue of anti-Chinese grievances appears to have expanded significantly since the 1990s [29] These grievances have only expanded further following the detention of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang.[29]
These grassroots movements resulted in the formation of Atajurt in 2006, founded by Kazakh activist Serikzhan Bilash, which operates primarily out of Almaty in southern Kazakhstan [29] Atajurt successfully galvanised international support through collecting testimonies from those imprisoned, translating documents, and advocating on behalf of family members of detainees [30] This support was bolstered by regular press conferences held by Atajurt [31] Although the Kazakh population detained in these ‘re-education facilities’ is significantly smaller than the Uighur population,it is estimated that in the initial stages of its activism, seventy percent of the information on the facilities and its detainees came directly from Atajurt [30]
However, attempts by Atajurt to be officially recognised by Kazakh authorities were continually denied, and Serikzhan Bilash was detained in Kazakhstan in March 2019 and charged with ‘inciting ethnic hatred,’ a common means by which critics of the Kazakh government are censored.[31] Therefore, the extent to which these grassroots movements have effected change in the region is questionable.
Xinjiang is in many respects the “main arena of the Sino-Central Asian relationship”.[29] Kazakhstan, the initial stage of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has cemented its relations with China over the past decade through various energy and infrastructure projects, enlarging its Gross Domestic Product by 6.5 percent [32] The reduction of trade tariffs along BRI corridors is projected to add another fifteen percent to this figure.[32]
However, these congenial relations, built on ideas of political non-interference and China's support of the Kazakh economy seems to be under increasing threat.[33] Investment into the nation has halved to $4 billion USD from the figure in 2011-2014, which was estimated at $8.1 billion USD.[34] Furthermore, China's deflating economy, paired with its ageing population, stagnating real estate market, and weakened relations with both Europe and the United States could present a challenge to relations with Central Asia, further bolstering grassroots anti-China movements within Kazakhstan.[33] Despite this, the Kazakh government has not publicly condemned nor acted against Beijing's policy in Xinjiang, and sixty-nine of China's political and economic partners have co-sponsored a statement urging for the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner to consider events in Xinjiang “China's internal affairs,” and further “opposing the politicization of human rights” [35]
However, the wider global response has been remarkably different.[35] Several nations including the United States, United Kingdom and Canada have publicly asserted that Beijing's policy in Xinjiang constitutes a ‘genocide,’ and most recently, the United States has sanctioned five Chinese companies, four of which are affiliated with the surveillance device manufacturer Hikvision.[36] However, in a recent victory for China, the United Nations Human Rights Council has voted down a motion to debate and investigate Beijing's actions in Xinjiang.[37] Thus, the record is highly mixed on how China's policy in Xinjiang has impacted its relationship with Kazakhstan, Central Asia and its position on the global stage more broadly.
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