Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive

The Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive^[5] operation (Russian: Житомирско-Бердичевская операция; Ukrainian: Житомирсько-Бердичівська наступальна операція) was a part of the strategic offensive of the Red Army in the right-bank Ukraine, the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive. The successful offensive operation was conducted by the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front commanded by General of Army Nikolai Vatutin during World War II, from 24 December 1943 through to 14 January 1944.

Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive
Part of the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive on the Eastern Front of World War II
Soviet T-34 tanks await orders to move forward.
Date 24 December 1943 - 31 January 1944 Location Zhitomir and Berdichev, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union Result Soviet victory
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein Erhard Raus Hans-Valentin Hube	Georgy Zhukov Nikolai Vatutin Nikolai Pukhov
Strength
358,618 in total[1]	831.000 in total,[2] 1.100 tanks[3]
Casualties and losses
unknown, heavy	23.000 killed, 76.000 wounded,[2] 700 tanks.[4]

The task was to defeat the opposing German 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South and advance to the Southern Bug river while preventing new attempts by the enemy to recapture Kiev. After an opening attack across a 300 kilometer front, Soviet troops advanced from 80 to 200 km and nearly liberated all of the Kiev and Zhitomir regions, along with the regions of Vinnitsa and Rovno. The 1st Ukrainian Front gained a position north of the main German forces of Army Group South. The German forces retained the western shore of the Dnieper in the Kanev region.

A panzer group checks its position

Prelude

As a result of the Kiev strategic offensive operation late in 1943, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under Vatutin had taken a large bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper in the Kiev region that “overhung” the enemy group of the troops in the south-western Ukraine. In an attempt to reduce the bridgehead and to retake Kiev, German forces counter-attacked in the region south of Zhitomir.

Manstein brought the 1st Panzer Army up to join the 4th Panzer Army in launching a series of counterattacks against the flanks of the extended Soviet forces. These counterattacks, conducted over the following three weeks, succeeded in creating a series of loosely held pockets, and the Germans began to stabilize their front. The German counterattacks inflicted considerable losses in men and materiel upon the Red Army, and a cohesive defensive position eventually was restored. However the Soviets held a great number of forces in reserve, and the success von Manstein achieved could not last. The attempt to retake Kiev, in what was called the Kiev Strategic Defensive, had failed.

Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive

On 24 December 1943, General Vatutin began his general offensive by launching the attack along the Zhitomir-Kiev highway and the Fastov-Kazatin railway line with three armies: the 1st Guards Army (Andrei Grechko), the 18th Army (Konstantin Leselidze) and the 38th Army (Kirill Moskalenko). In addition to the Soviet formations and units, the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade also participated in the operation.

The attack, preceded by a powerful initial barrage of artillery, started in the thick fog and took the German troops of the XIII Army Corps and XLII Army Corps by surprise for its suddenness and intensity, and immediately put the deployment of the 4th Panzer Army in peril. Returning hastily to his headquarters in Vinnytsia, Field Marshal von Manstein understood the gravity of the situation and began disengaging the three Panzer-Divisions of General Hermann Balck's XLVIII Panzerkorps, deployed north of the XIII Army Corps, in order to transfer them towards the south and counterattack the Soviet attack wedge on the flank. However, the situation of the German front was already compromised; the Soviet forces were in the process of exploiting the success after breaking through.

During January 1944 the forces of the First Ukrainian Front advanced further to the southwest to Berdichev (taken on 5 January), towards Vinnytsia and Zhmerynka, but the advance to the Upper Bug was repulsed by German forces and during February the frontline stabilised southwest of Berdichev and Kazatin.

Results

All told, in the course of the operation, the Soviets achieved notable success. Having advanced to a depth of 80 to 200 km, they almost completely cleared the German forces from the Kiev and Zhitomir regions, a number of districts of the Vinnitsa and Rovno regions.^[6] The Soviets now dangerously hanged from the north over Army Group South, while the 27th and 40th Armies had deeply enveloped the German troops that continued to hold the right bank of the Dnieper in the area of Kanev. This created the conditions for the subsequent Korsun-Schevchenkovsky Operation.

The blow of the 1st Ukrainian Front was struck at the most sensitive place of Army Group South - its northern flank, which threatened to cut off its main forces from the paths leading to Germany. The 1st and 4th Panzer Armies operating in the front line had suffered serious losses- the 143rd and 147th Reserve Infantry Divisions were disbanded, the 68th Infantry Division due to heavy losses was withdrawn from the front-line and sent to Poland for extensive refits, while 8th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer-Grenadier Division, 112th, 291st and 340th Infantry Divisions were halved in strength.^[6] All told, 8 Wehrmacht divisions were either destroyed or halved in strength.

To close the gaps in their defense and to stop the Soviet offensive on this sector, the Germans had to urgently transfer 12 divisions of the 1st Panzer Army from southern Ukraine to this area. The reserves turned out to be almost completely spent, which affected the further course of operations. To parry the subsequent attacks of the Soviet troops, the German command was forced to deploy troops from Western Europe, as well as from Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia.^[6]

Notes and references

1. Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4 an Heeresgruppen Intendant Süd, 1227/43 geh. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stande vom 20.12.43. NARA T313, R390, F8680079.
2. D. Glantz/J. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler., p. 436.
3. J. Erickson, The road to Berlin, p. 143.
4. E. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, p. 226.
5. Glantz, David (2007). Red storm over the Balkans: the failed Soviet invasion of Romania, spring 1944. University Press of Kansas. pp. 3, 8, 58. ISBN 978-0-7006-1465-3.
6. Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 46

See also

• Eastern Front (World War II)
• Timeline of the Eastern Front of World War II

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