User:Mackensen/Schlieffen Plan
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The Schlieffen Plan is commonly held to have been the German General Staff's overall strategic plan for victory against France in the event of a two-front war in the years before the First World War. The reputed brainchild of then Chief of the General Staff Count Alfred von Schlieffen, it envisaged a rapid German mobilisation followed by a sweeping attack against France through the neutral territories of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. The bulk of the German Army would sweep through northern France and encircle and occupy Paris, the French capital, which presumably would force the French to surrender. The war in the west was to be over within six weeks, according to a rigid timetable.
Chief of Staff, 1891ā1906
Since the First World War the "Schlieffen Plan" has been a consistent source of controversy among generals, statesmen, and academics. Schlieffen's actual intentions remain a subject of debate, as do those of the German Army itself in 1914. By that point, Schlieffen had been dead for over a year, and in retirement for eight. Therefore, compounding the questions about Schlieffen's intentions are those of his successor, Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke, often referred to simply as Moltke the Younger. Such debates began right after the First Battle of the Marne, and continued into the 1920ss, when former disciples of Schlieffen, referred to in academia as the "Schlieffen School," attacked the younger Moltke (who had died in 1916) for "betraying" the legacy of the great master and failing to execute his "perfect blueprint" for victory.
The Plan itself, in its canonical form, has attracted criticism from academics and statesmen for its supposed inflexibility and disregard for political realities. In particular, the violation of the neutrality of both Belgium and Holland has been singled out as an example of the excesses of Prusso-German militarism. It has also been criticised by some for being militarily impracticalāmost notably, for requiring more troops than the German army possessed at the time or later. This discusses both the plan itself and the historiography of the Plan, as the Plan and the history of it have become one in the same.