User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-AirCampaign
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The existing article aerial warfare is more historical than doctrinal. The Air Campaign is the title of COL John Warden's book, which may or may not be an appropriate title for the article, but gives the flavor. This article takes a different approach, absolutely full of Original Synthesis and probably some Original Research (or at least conversations with primary sources and their progeny). Bless me Jimbo, for I have sinned -- and I do not repent.
I'm trying to make this globalised and welcome inputs. At present, while there is much from US sources, NATO coordination is recognized, and there are references (some fragmentary at the moment) to work by British, French, German, Danish, Singaporean and Filipino military personnel.
I offer a set of propositions from COL Phillip Meininger, a United States Air Force theorist, commander of the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, while recognizing joint operations, still leans in the direction of "Trust Us, We're the Air Force." Nevertheless, it is a point of departure regarding both the process of air planning, and why other services' reluctance to rely on airpower alone.
Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power[1]
- Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface.
- Air Power is an inherently strategic force.
- Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon.
- In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.
- Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension-time.
- Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously .
- Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass.
- Air Power’s unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.
- Technology and air power are integrally and synergistically related.
- Air Power includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.
Meininger does reflect the position that air warfare is a single entity, rather than the [2] Cold War position "Prior to 1991 Air Power thinking was generally divided in two. On the one hand Air Power was strategic employment of nuclear weapons and on the other hand Air Power was support to army land operations. After 1989 the nuclear exchange strategy was no longer valid, which only left us the Air-Land Battle doctrine to build upon. The Air-Land Battle doctrine was developed for the European Theater as the US doctrine for opposing the Warsaw offensive army doctrine. The doctrine developed for these operations was a tactical level doctrine designed to facilitate a common language for tactical level joint operations between airmen and the army, and it is this language upon which we develop today’s doctrine."