User:Gunbirddriver/East Front

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Guderian quote: Man schlägt jemanden mit der Faust und nicht mit gespreizten Fingern. (You hit somebody with your fist and not with your fingers spread.) Meaning that you should concentrate your Panzers for one mighty push in one direction and not distribute them over a large area. Quoted in "Die Deutschen gepanzerten Truppen bis 1945" - Page 209 - by Oskar Munzel - Tanks (Military science) - 1965 Also found in von Mellenthin p.

Operation Mars

• Source

Operation Bagration

The objectives of the operation were to eliminate the Minsk salient and the forces therein, to clear Belorussia and to advance to the Vistula and the German border.^[1] The operation would put Soviet forces within striking distance of Berlin.

In this operation the Red Army demonstrated its mastery of the concepts of Soviet deep battle and maskirovka.

220,000 trucks by the United States^[2]

conforming to the concept of Soviet deep operations — striking deep into the enemy's strategic depths.^[3]

Battle of Kursk

Battle of Prokhorovka

Though most accounts of the battle focus on the massed armoured assault of the 5th Guards Tank Army against Leibstandarte, Leibstandarte's neighboring divisions were placed under pressure as well. To the south attacks delivered by the 2nd Tank Army upon the Das Reich division placed the division under such pressure it was unable to move forward. The battle fought here was as intense as the swirling armoured battle fought to the north of the raised rail line. ^[4] Liebstandarte's 1st Panzergrenadier regiment and Panzerjaegar battalion were just south of the rail line and were fully pressured with attacks as well.

in the region between the Psel river and the rail line

Das Reich T-34s surprise Russian armoured thrust ^[5]

The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34. Soviet tank production was putting out 1,500 of these a month. This allowed large numbers of the machines available for the battle. The Soviets also received a great deal of lend lease armoured vehicles, though these they had a general poor opinion of. The Soviets placed the majority of their lend lease machines in the salient, preserving their own T-34 for operation in the counter-offensive operation.^[6] The Soviet tank arm also contained large numbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s. In the salient itself, the Soviets had assembled a large number of lend lease tanks. These included U.S. manufactured M3 Lees, and British built Churchills, Matildas and Valentines. However, the T-34 made up the bulk of the Soviet armour.^[6] Without including the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front, the Soviets had massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, and 2,792 aircraft to defend the salient.^[7][8] This amounted to 26 per cent of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26 per cent of its mortars and artillery, 35 per cent of its aircraft, and 46 per cent of its tanks.^[7]

The advance toward Prokhorovka was blocked and the opportunity to break through may have been lost.^[9]

Additions to be added

Totenkopf s panzer regiment had lost the use of forty-five of their tanks in the day's fighting. Among those vehicles that were placed out of service were all ten of their Tiger tanks due to mine damage or ^[10]

Hauser had shifted the axis of the II SS Panzer Corps to the northeast away from Oboyan and toward Prokhorovka to allow his units maneuvering room (kampf im freien Gelande - operational freedom).

Leibstandarte Das Reich Totenkopf

Things not yet mentioned:

• Soviet industry far exceeded that of Germany.
• Soviet tank production of T-34s during 1943 was a remarkable 1,300 a month.^[11] H p. 117
• 5th Guards Tank Army make up: 260 T-70s, 530 T-34s ^[12] Brand p. 7
• 5th Guards Tank Army losses were made up in two weeks time.^[13]

• Hitler decided beforehand to go to the offensive, dismissing the backhand approach N p. 11
• Hitler was fearful of an Allied invasion in the west. After the fall of Tunisia he was particularly concerned of an allied invasion in the south of France. LH p. 230
• No withdrawal - or courtmartial, or worse, by Hitler. LH p. 216
• More than half of the German armour lost were lost due to artillery fire. P.
• Mines were used extensively, slowing the attack. Vehicles that suffered mine damage were often repaired and brought back into service.
• The Germans were proficient at recovering their damaged tanks and towing them back for repair work.
• They made use of field crews who would repair damaged tanks.
• Hitler had a predilection for large, powerful weapons. His preferred method of fighting was through the use of superior arms and fighting units to defeat the enemy to the point of annihilation. Thus he was always attempting to create envelopments and battles of annihilation as at Cannae. LH
• Hitler was not one for subtlety or art in war, nor did he embrace maneuver warfare. He much preferred envelopments and battles of annihilation based on Hannibal's Battle of Cannae. LH p. 179 This was not the way of the panzer men. LH p. p. 180
• Once he had captured a territory, he was utterly unwilling to give it up, demanding the ground be defended to the last man. Such a rigid defensive stance meant that over the course of the war many units were not allowed to withdraw from positions until they no longer could, and as a result they were surrounded and eliminated. LH: Runstedt p. 210, Heinrici 215-216, Tippelskirch p. 217, Dittmar p. 219
• The Soviets preferred tank was the T-34. Large numbers were produced, at about 1,500 a month. In the salient the T-34 made up the greatest share of Soviet armour, but they also used T-70 light tanks and large numbers of lend lease tanks, including U.S. manufactured M3 Lees, and British built Churchills, Matildas and Valentines. H p. 172
• The 5th Guards Tank Army had (about) 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s. p.
• The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 793 main battle tanks and 57 assault guns,(FN 24) 261 of which were T-70 light tanks.(FN 23)
• Halder was relieved and replaced by Kurt Zeitzler in September 1942. LH p. 57
• Allied supply of motor-transport made a big difference in the east LH p. 222
• Russian units could operate without the normal supply requirements of similar units from the west. LH p.226

• Vastness of Russia resulted in broad frontages that could not possibly be held by a single division. The result was that forces could sweep past or around you. LH p.

• Runstedt on the Atlantic Wall. LH p. 236
• Large numbers of T-34s were produced, about 1,500 a month in 1943.

Alignment of forces in the southern attack:

XLVIII Panzer Corps * 167th Infantry Division * II SS Panzer Corps

3rd Pz * GD * 11th Pz || 167th ID || LAH * DR * T

Attempting to protect the East flank was Army Group Kempf 6th Pz * 7th Pz * 19th Pz * 168th ID

F.W. von Mellenthin comments

• Blitzkrieg warfare: "The war dragged on into 1942, but the time for blitzkrieg tactics had passed." p. 358
• "The German victories of 1940 were due primarily to the skillful application of two principles of war: surprise and concentration." p. 12
• "It was vital to take advantage of the enemies confusion and give him no opportunity to regain his balance." p. 13
• "The skillful use of surprise was very important. p. 24
• "It achieved mobility by the combination of firepower, concentration and surprise, together with the latest modern arms: airpower, parachute and armour." p. 25
• von Mellenthin on forward control: Panzer troops must be commanded from the front. p. 24

• "It is useless to throw armour against well prepared defensive positions, manned by an enemy who expects an attack and is determined to repulse it." p. 20-21

• "Manstein had the best brain in the German General Staff but his manner was blunt. He said what he thought and did not attempt to disguise his opinions even when they were not flattering to his superiors." p. 10
• Manstein's desire for mobile operations rejected by Hitler. p.
• Manstien argued strongly against Citadel but was overruled p. 218
• German forces excelled at mobile operations. p.

• Development of the Pakfront. p. 230
• Panzerkiel or "Tank Wedge" p. 231
• Panzerglocke or "Tank Bell" p. 231
• Mobile defense p. 270
• Russian capacity at camouflage p. 294
• "The Russians are masters in the art of camouflage." p. 219
• Russian tank design: simplicity, stressing armament, armour and mobility p. 301
• Russian development of Tank and Mechanized Armies p. 301

• Rommel's preparations and intentions for D-Day p. 281
• Problems of fighting in the west in the face of allied air superiority: "The normal principles of armoured warfare did not apply in this theater." p. 317
• "The Ardennes offensive drives home the lesson that a large scale offensive by massed armour has no hope of success against an enemy who enjoys supreme command of the air." p. 342

On Kursk:

• The Russians were aware of what was coming and had converted the Kursk front into another Verdun. Even if we should hack our way through the minefields and bite off the salient little would be gained. p. 217
• The losses were certain to be enormous and it was unlikely that many Russian divisions would be caught in the sack. p. 217
• All and all, it was not good tank country. p. 219

Miscellaneous:

• OKH was located at Lotzen, East Prussia p. 213
• The Panther was the 'dernier cri' in armour. p.213 The 'dernier cri' means the latest scream or latest fashion.
• German officers often had a copy of General de Caulaincourt's "With Napoleon in Russia" p.

Heinz Guderian

• removal of African tank troops ^[14]
• replacing losses versus creating new formations ^{[15] [16]}
• Guderian was captured by the U.S. Army on May 10, 1945. Despite claims in the Soviet Union and Poland that Guderian was a war criminal, he was released from captivity on June 17, 1948. Heinz Guderian died on May 17, 1954.

• the challenge of a duel with Kluge ^[17]
• 1st Panzer Division is sent to Greece to protect against an invasion by the English, June 1943 ^[18]

• After the war the Soviet Union accused Guderian of war crimes and demanded he be turned over to them. The U.S. opposed this move and did not deliver him. Guderian testified before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

Quotes:

• "Klotzen, nicht Kleckern !". (Boot'em, don't splatter'em) - Guderian's favourite quotation.
• "Es gibt keine verzweifelten Lagen, es gibt nur verzweifelte Menschen". (There are no desperate situations, there are only desperate people).
• "Fahrkarte bis zur Endstation". (Ticket to the last station) - Shouting to his Panzertroops when they were roaring past him, meaning that they should go as far as they could.
• "Man schlägt jemanden mit der Faust und nicht mit gespreizten Fingern". (You hit somebody with your fist and not with your spread fingers) - Meaning that you should concentrate your Panzers for one mighty push in one direction and not distribute them.
• "Der Motor des Panzers ist ebenso seine Waffe wie die Kanone". (The engine of the Panzer is a weapon just as the main-gun).
• "Der Kampf gegen die eigenen Oberen macht manchmal mehr Arbeit als gegen die Franzosen". (It is sometimes tougher to fight my superiors than the French) - When he got orders to stop and wait for the following infantry and tried to persuade his superiors that this would mean throwing away the victory.

• Guderian on forward control. p. 32
• Guderian on specifications for panzers, and design elements insisted upon, problems with resuming military manufacturing. p. 27

• Hitler diluted the strength of the panzer divisions, expanding the panzer arm from ten divisions to twenty, but without having the materiel to do so.
• French tanks were used to build up the new units, but these were of inferior quality. p. 143
• German estimates of Soviet strength were accurate, provided by General Kostring in Moscow. They were ignored by the German supreme command. p. 151
• Hitler had criticicized German leaders on 1914 for fighting a war on two fronts, but willing did so himself in 1941. p. 142
• German success in the west had befuddled the minds of the German command. p. 142
• German high command had estimated 8 to 10 weeks for the campaign in Russia. p. 142, p. 151
• Germans in Russia were initially received as liberators. p. 159
• Lack of winter clothing, OKH limited planning p. 151
• Supply problems, poor roads, weather.
• German tank force at outset of invasion was 3,200 units p. 143
• German production was 1,000 tanks a year. p. 144
• Germans reviewed the Russian campaigns of Napoleon and Charles XII of Sweden.

On Kursk

• Declared at the May 4th conference on Citadel that "the attack was pointless" p. 307
• Six days later, Guderian pulled Hitler aside on May 10th and asked to speak frankly with him. He urged Hitler to give up the idea of the attack. (“I urged him earnestly to give up the plan of attack. The great commitment certainly would not bring us equivalent gains.”) (Guderain p. 308)

Miscellaneous:

• Guerian's view on envelopment operations p. 159
• Rommel's view on envelopment actions
• Geyr had command of the XXIV Panzer Corps p. 157

Hans von Luck on Guderian:

• In the middle of February we were transferred to Dernau on the Ahr, hence practically in to the western front. Rommel visited every unit. He told us that he was proud to be permitted to lead a panzer division. Guderian too came to inspect and talk to us. "You are the cavalry" he told us. "Your job is to break through and keep going." We would thrust in a straight line to the west, to the Belgian frontier east of Liège, hence rar to the north of the French border. Luck p. 36

Newton review of German staff account of the battle

• Muddy season precluded either side from taking action till May. Busse p. 12
• A major stumbling block was the amount of time needed to re-equip the panzer divisions with tanks. Busse p. 12
• Delays were due to waiting for panzers, particularly the Panzer V Panther. Busse p. 12

• Model needed time, more forces and suffered from poor communitation and supply build up due to partisan threat. The 9th Army lagged behind in the build-up, re-organization, troop training and stock piling of supplies.
• Hitler delayed the battle to July 5th. Busse p. 12
• It was impossible to change Hitler's mind. Busse p. 17

Caulaincourt on Napoleon's retreat from Moscow

• The Cossacks were the finest light cavalry. p. 178. Napoleon makes same statement p. 198
• Overburdened carts on the retreat, inhumanity. p. 198
• Threat of winter
• Lack of winter clothing and other winter provisions, no shoes for the horses so that they could walk in ice and snow. p. 155
• Attempt to engage Kutusov just prior to the retreat. p. 168
• Winter quarters intended at Ofcha or Witepsk. p. 190
• They found nothing on their return trip through Russia. Supplies hoped for in Smolensk p. 189

Quotes by Napoleon as recorded by Caulaincourt:

• "I am no Don Quixote." p. 283
• "We are victims of the climate." p. 285
• "I stayed too long in Moscow." p. 286

• Hungar The danger lay in hunger. p. 198
• Cold.
• Men froze to death all along the trail back.
• Army became disorganized p. 189
• The French fought hard and with great courage, but did not keep a good watch and lacked the discipline needed to stay an army intact. The men would go off in search of food and fodder, and often would be attacked by the Cossacks.
• Kutusov and Rostapchin at odds, did not like each other, Rostapchin burned the city.
• Attack before Viasma, disintegration of the First Corps. (Nov 3rd?) p. 197

Others

Shimon Nivah

Durchbruch – penetration of the oppositions defenses. Kesselschlacht – encirclement and annihilation. Note: this is not a blitzkrieg manauver.

“Blitzkrieg is commonly defined as a hyper-violent pattern, designed to defeat the opposition by means of surprise, speed and superiority of material and fire.” (Niveh p. 106)

“The vagueness surrounding the idea of blitzkrieg tends to increase when one turns to more recent interpretations.” (Shimon Naveh “In Pursuit of Military Excellence” p. 106)

The German summer offensive of 1942 greatly surprised the Russians in its execution and direction. The fact that the Russians were aware the Germans would likely attack in 1942 does not negate the fact that the operation as executed resulted in surprise, disorder and destruction.

The rain and mud of the rasputitsa brought a pause to the fighting, and both sides began planning and making preparations for their summer campaigns.^[19]

Showalter: Blitzkrieg 1939 through 1941. By 1943 things had changed, and the panzer forces were not only diluted in strength by Hitler's desire to create more formations, but weakened by attritional losses that were not being made up, and by changes in the manner the force was used. It became necessary to use the panzer divisions in defensive roles, and as such they were unavailable to perform the tasks that Guderian had originally envisioned for them.

The anti-aircraft units working with the panzer forces were controlled by the Luftwaffe. They were often incorporated into attacking whatever objective the army units had, and over the course of the previous spring they had become significantly degraded. They were bolstered, and given the task fo protecting key areas from air attack, these being crossroads and assembly areas.^[20]

A Raupenschlepper-Ost (a fully tracked gun tractor designed in response to the poor roads of Russia) is seen behind a motorcycle shortly before the Kursk offensive.

Panzer IIIs of the 11th Panzer Division

The commander of a Tiger I attached to 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich

The crew of a Panzer III from the SS "Das Reich" division resting after a rainstorm during the Battle of Kursk^[21]

A group of Panzer IIIs

German Sdkfz 251 halftracks, in the smoke, with two tanks looming in the background.

Soviet artillery pass a knocked out Pz IV.

Images to consider for the article

• 
• 
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  Manstein with Speidel
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  Werner Kempf (right)
• 
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  Hans Becker of 1 SS
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  Traffic control
• 
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  Tiger recovery
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  Searching for aircraft
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  Anti-aircraft fire
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  Firing anti-aircraft
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  Soviet prisoners
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Sowjetunion.- "Unternehmen Zitadelle". Deutscher Oberfeldwebel (Hauptfeldwebel-Spieß) und "Fremdländischer" in der deutschen Wehrmacht; PK 637

Soviet plans and preparation

Prelude

A panzer battalion of "Das Reich" was in Germany training on the new Panther, and so a unit was made up to replace it using captured Soviet built T-34s.^[22] These are inspected by Himmler prior to the offensive

After two months of delay the Germans launched their attack. They had added 188 Panthers, 90 Ferdinand tank destroyers. Captured T-34s were used to replace a battalion of tanks in 2nd SS Panzer Division, Das Reich, whose were back in Germany retraining on the Panther.

^[23]

Additions completed

• Added: Lack of infantry. Newton p. 25
• Added: Losses sustained in the winters of 1941/42 and 1942/43 meant that the Germans had a marked shortage in artillery and infantry (470,000 men below establishment levels). LH p. 191, Healy p. 43
• Added: One goal Hitler held out for Citadel was the capture of large numbers of Soviet prisoners for slave labor in their armaments industry. Healy p. 90
• Added: Three month quiet period prior to the battle. Healy p. 132
• Added: Fourth Panzer Army repulsed all attacks of July 12-13 without losing a foot of ground. Newton p. 24
• Added: Thunderstorms, muddy ground N p. 21
• Added: Hoth had intended to turn to the NW and drive on Prokhorovka Newton p. 7, Healy 301-302
• Added: The Russian mobile forces were pulled out of the salient. LH p. 212
• Added: German shortfalls and inability to build-up stockpiles of essentials in POL (Petrol, Oil, Lubricants) meant that the Luftwaffe was limited in their ability to fly sorties over the battle area during the duration of the battle. Healy p. 103
• Added: Luftwaffe operations in June were greatly curtailed in order to conserve limited resources. H p. 104
• Added: Luftwaffe typically would raid opposing airfields at the outset of an operation to help gain air superiority. Soviet reserves were extensive, and the Germans knew whatever aircraft they could destroy on the ground would be replaced in a days time, thus making these efforts futile. The Luftwaffe opted to direct their air effort to the direct support of the ground forces. Healy p.

• Added: The Soviets preferred tank was the T-34, and they attempted to concentrate these in their mobile formations. Also in seervice with their armoured formations were large numbers of T-70 light tanks. The 5th Guards Tank Army had roughly 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s. In the salient itself the Soviets also made use of large numbers of lend lease tanks, including U.S. manufactured M3 Lees, and British built Churchills, Matildas and Valentines, but the T-34 still made up the greatest share of Soviet armour.^[6]

References

Notes

1. Clark 2012, p. 187. sfn error: no target: CITEREFClark2012 (help)
2. Glantz 1986, p. 24. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz1986 (help)
3. Glantz & House 2004, p. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantzHouse2004 (help)
4. Willmott 1990, p. 300. sfn error: no target: CITEREFWillmott1990 (help)
5. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137, it describes the German attack in the southern side as a "classical blitzkrieg attack.". sfn error: no target: CITEREFZetterlingFrankson2000 (help)
6. Mellenthin 1956, p. 217. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMellenthin1956 (help)
7. Healy 2008. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHealy2008 (help)
8. Nipe 2010. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNipe2010 (help)
9. Newton 2002. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNewton2002 (help)
10. Brand 2000. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBrand2000 (help)
11. Kasdorf 2000. sfn error: no target: CITEREFKasdorf2000 (help)
12. Guderian 1938, pp. 205. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGuderian1938 (help)
13. Guderian 1952, p. 308. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGuderian1952 (help)
14. Some historians, including Clark, Glantz and H.P. Willmott, describe the planning of Operation Citadel to be akin to a blitzkrieg style of attack.^{[lower-alpha 1][lower-alpha 2][lower-alpha 3][lower-alpha 4]} Others consider only the southern attack to be a blitzkrieg style attack.^{[lower-alpha 5]} However most commentators, including participants who wrote about the battle after the war, do not characterize the planning or execution of the attack as a blitzkrieg style attack. These include Theodor Busse, Erhard Raus, Friedrich Fangohr, Peter von der Groeben, Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein. Said von Mellenthin "The German command was committing exactly the same error as in the previouos year. Then we attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to attack the fortress of Kursk. In both cases the German Army threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians on ground of their own chosing."^{[lower-alpha 6]} In addition, a great number of military historians do not view the battle as a blitzkrieg, including, but not limited, to Healy, Nipe, Newton, Brand and Kasdorf.^{[lower-alpha 7][lower-alpha 8][lower-alpha 9][lower-alpha 10][lower-alpha 11]} Of them all, the most striking commentary came from Heinz Guderian, the most prominent of Germany's "tank men", who strongly opposed the operation on the grounds that it violated his principles for the use of armour.^{[lower-alpha 12]} Guderian predicted the offensive could only achieve a limited result, at a cost too great to justify the effort, saying "The great commitment would certainly not bring equivalent gains."^{[lower-alpha 13]} The course of events proved him to be correct.

Citations

1. Willmott 1984, pp. 141–142. sfn error: no target: CITEREFWillmott1984 (help)
2. Connor 1987. sfn error: no target: CITEREFConnor1987 (help)
3. Watt 2008, p. 670. sfn error: no target: CITEREFWatt2008 (help)
4. Healy 2008, pp. 340–342. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHealy2008 (help)
5. Healy 2008, p. 342. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHealy2008 (help)
6. Healy 2008, p. 172. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHealy2008 (help)
7. Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 168. sfn error: no target: CITEREFTaylorKulish1974 (help)
8. Clark 2012, p. 204, provides similar but more specific figures. sfn error: no target: CITEREFClark2012 (help)
9. Showalter 2013. sfn error: no target: CITEREFShowalter2013 (help)
10. Nipe 2011, p. 350. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNipe2011 (help)
11. Healy 2008, p. 117. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHealy2008 (help)
12. Brand 2003, p. 7. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBrand2003 (help)
13. Healy 2008, p. 118. sfn error: no target: CITEREFHealy2008 (help)
14. Guderian 1952, p. 304. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGuderian1952 (help)
15. Guderian 1952, pp. 297, 303. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGuderian1952 (help)
16. Balck 2000. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBalck2000 (help)
17. Guderian 1952, p. 308. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGuderian1952 (help)
18. Guderian 1952, p. 310. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGuderian1952 (help)
19. Clark 2012, p. 178. sfn error: no target: CITEREFClark2012 (help)
20. Newton, 2000 & pp. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNewton2000pp (help)
21. Clark 2012, pp. 308–309. sfn error: no target: CITEREFClark2012 (help)
22. Nipe 2010. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNipe2010 (help)
23. Töppel 2001, pp. 33–34. sfn error: no target: CITEREFTöppel2001 (help)

Bibliography