Talk:Morgenthau Plan/Archive 1

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Archive 1

Archive 2

Plan to starve

You call the plan to STARVE 10 MILLION GERMANS TO DEATH "reconstruction"? 203.221.110.57 20:19, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I certainly don't - but could you contribute a cite for that please? No neo-Nazi or Holocaust denial websites may apply. GCarty 09:25, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Yes, I can site wikipedia - as a matter of fact this article ( what does 40% of the German population amount to? ). Read the first few paragraphs - good enough for wikipedia I hope? I missed that Morganthau wanted to sterilize all Germans - kind of genocide but he was also willing compromise and starve them. Sounds like the Germans may have gotten accused of what was done to them.

It's now "neo-Nazi" to say that the Morgenthau Plan was evil? People said this in 1946. US senators said this. Are they Nazis now too?

From pages 350-351 (in the Paul Y. Hammond study, “Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy”) of American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Ed. Harold Stein, University of Alabama Press, 1963):

“After a brief trip to Normandy, Morgenthau held a meeting on August 12 [1944] with several American officials in England to acquaint himself with is government’s thinking about the treatment of Germany. . . . After the intermission, Morgenthau opened the discussion with a brief and unordered statement of his views. ‘From all the evidence I have been able to gather in both the United States and England,’ he has been quoted as saying, ‘I am not at all convinced that a realistic program is being followed which will result in Germany’s inability to wage war again.’ [n.120] . . . Serious consideration should be given to the reduction of Germany to an agrarian economy, he stated, so that Germany would be a land of small farmers with no large-scale industry, comparable to the farm plan in Denmark. Since the United States would be unwilling to keep troops in Germany for a very long period to control her, this seemed to be the only way to prevent her further aggression. . . . While Morgenthau had at this meeting evidently approached the subject of his current concern with considerable restraint, in the course of the ensuing conversation he revealed the extent of his commitment to the agrarianization thesis. When confronted with the problem of what to do with the population which could not be supported by farming in Germany, he suggested dumping it in North Africa.”

Well, after what jews had done to Germany, they had every reason to fear that she might regain her strength. But since society was not willing to simply kill all Germans, despite all the propaganda lies, that were told by the jews and their minions, they came up with a better plan and wrote the history, like they wanted it to be, so that every white man, especially the Germans, had to feel guilty. Corporations became the new governments and money was their religion. Who controlls the money?

But more and more people are awakening, seeing all the evil, that they brought upon the world. Maybe this is the beginning of a new era. Free of this greedy manipulating pest. The collaps of your money system, will mean the end of your control over the world. Finally real freedom is close. The traitors in our governments better start hiding. When you loose control you will get your punishment soon enough.

Role of Harry Dexter White

The Morgenthau Plan was drafted by Harry Dexter White for his boss at Treasury, Henry_Morgenthau,_Jr. The plan was never adopted, but it was leaked and the Germans certainly knew of it. I believe this is in book referenced on the main page, Reviews of Dietrich The Morgenthau Plan.

Some speculate the Soviet Union influenced the content of the plan via its alleged influence on Harry Dexter White. In this scenario, their goal was to fashion an inflammatory plan that, when leaked, would stiffen German resistance on the Western Front. The Soviets feared its Allies would reach a separate peace with Nazi Germany. The role of the Morgenthau Plan was to make that less likely by enraging the Germans.

Perhaps the referenced book has more details on this. If factual, it would be an important addition to the main page.

One can now click on Harry Dexter White to get more information about the Soviet connections. It probably doesn't belong here, unless we can be certain that Morgenthau was motivated not just to make the Germans pay but to slow the advance of the Western Allies by stiffening German resistance. We don't know who leaked the Plan to the US media or why.Bdell555 18:46, 22 August 2005 (UTC)

Deleted: "The fact Morgenthau's attitude towards the Germans aligned so closely with Stalin's may have been influenced by his close friend and advisor, Harry Dexter White, who was indicted before a Senate Committee on a charge of passing US Government secrets to Moscow in 1948 but who committed suicide ^[1]. "

While White was certainly a "close advisor" of Morgenthau, I seriously doubt if they were "close friends." The social gap between the two was far too great.

White was never indicted. His death, 4 days after testifying to a Congressional committee was wildly speculated to either have been a suicide or assassination. He'd already had several heart attacks, so the speculations were likely for political spin purposes. DEddy 15:29, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

The article will eventualy need a section on Harry White. As Beschloss writes in my copy of "The Conquerors" (ISBN 0-7432-4454-0): pg. 153 "Since White was the chief spur to one of Franklin Roosevelt's chief advisers on postwar Germany, wether or not White was secretly acting on behalf of the Soviet Union is no small matter."

When shown, by D.M. Ladd a top Hoover assistant, the FBI evidence against White in January 1952 Morgenthau was horrified. To Morgenthau "there seemed "no question but that White was working for the Russians."".

Also on page 153 Beschloss goes on to describe the testimony of Henry Morgenthau III that Morgenthau spent the rest of his life wondering if White had manipulated him, he was never able to resolve the issue in his mind.

From pages 424-25 of Henry Morgenthau III, ‘’Mostly Morgenthau: A Family History’’ (New York : Ticknor & Fields, 1991): "Morgenthau was not privy to any of the information about White which the FBI had transmitted to the Truman White House. All that he knew was already public knowledge. With the 1948 presidential election in the offing, little attention was paid to White's prior association with Morgenthau. But as the unresolved mystery persisted amid the general anti-Communist hysteria, Morgenthau was bothered by the gnawing suspicion that he might have been duped by White. . . . " —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.240.177 (talk) 18:14, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

There can be little doubt that White pushed very hard for the Morgenthau plan, but, as Beschloss says on page 156 (slightly paraphrased), we may never know what motivated Whites actions. His own filosofy; Soviet bribes or other preassure; an allegiance to the Soviet Union; or an arrogance that he knew best how to deal with the Soviets. --Stor stark7 22:03, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

Despite a massive effort, the FBI never did nail down hard evidence against White. So-called "evidence" presented by Ladd was simply crumbs of data selectively spun the way Hoover wanted. That a group of White's personal friends (primarily Greg Silvermaster) were collection venues for Soviet espionage is pretty certain. Still unknown is just what information was in fact passed. While the FBI would be likely to unambiguously present that White himself was passing information, entirely negelected in this cloud of accusations is "dumpster diving" activities of people around White.

Just how can it unequivocally be said "There can be little doubt that White pushed very hard for the Morgenthau plan."? It was Morgenthau's idea, not White's. White was more interested in the Bretton Woods plans... which were focused on avoiding a repitition of the Versailles fiasco (see: The Economic Consequences of the Peace). DEddy 18:23, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Tricky question, I had to do a bit of reading to se why I wrote that sentence (There can be little doubt that White pushed very hard for the Morgenthau plan).

One reason is that the plan may have originated with Harry White. Beschloss writes on pages 70,71 regarding the flight Morgenthau and White took to Europe on August 6-7 1944. He says that White was "eager to ensure a weak post war Germany", and used this opportunity to provoke Morgenthau by giving him a State Department memorandum on "property rights" in post war Germany. A memorandum "...that he knew would provoke his boss". It noted the need for German industry to promote the revival of Europe, and hence the need for U.S. aid in shoring up the German industrial apparatus. Beschloss speculates "To make sure the memorandum struck Morgenthau with the maximum emotional punch, he may have planned to give it to his boss when he was tired and trapped aboard a noisy, droning airplane" . Morgenthau "read the document with rising anger", he felt that the memorandum in no way dealt with how to ensure that Germany never could wage war again. According to the fellow passengers on the plane Josiah DuBois and Fred Smith; "by the time we arrived in England, Morgenthau was convinced that something had to be done.", "Morgenthau was sure that the Germans were a war-loving race, and possibly incurable." Intriguingly, Beschloss says nothing more about what took place on the flight, nor does he give reference to where he got the quotes by the passengers.

John Dietrich on pages 17,24 of his book has some further interesting information to add on the subject of this flight in his book. He quotes Henry Morgenthau III, ‘’Mostly Morgenthau: A Family History’’ (New York : Tick nor & Fields, 1991), p.351, 353-354. "Morgenthaus son claims that the " so-called Morgenthau Plan seems to have been conceived in the mind of Harry Dexter White"". (ref to pg 351) DuBois told Morgenthau III that he overhead White’s and Morgenthau’s discussions on reparations from Germany during the flight and that by the time they landed Morgenthau had been completely convinced that the State Department plan was completely the wrong policy, and that it was at this point that Morgenthau started pushing for the plan that would bear his name. (ref to pg 353-354)

I didn’t come across any other obvious examples of Whites pushing in my quick book browsing right now, and the weather outdoors is to nice…. The link below will do as an example, I hope. --Stor stark7 09:45, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

An example of White’s pushing can be found in the interview with:

• James W. Riddleberger (Part 1), (Part 2) Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, 1944-47; counsellor of embassy, and chief, political section, American Military Government, Berlin, Germany, 1947-50

• WILSON: And White, too.

• RIDDLEBERGER: And Harry White. Of course, Harry White was the moving spirit. And, I think, Harry White really wrote the Morgenthau plan. At least, he was the one who explained it to us. You know where it was first unveiled, don't you?

• WILSON: No, I don't.

• RIDDLEBERGER: In Harry Hopkins’ office in the White House. Harry called a meeting, and I guess Dunn and [H. Freeman] Matthews and I went from State, Harry White and I don't remember anymore the others that were there from the Treasury, and Harry Hopkins and maybe somebody else from the White House. I don't recall. I think there is a memo on all this somewhere. And Harry White was the one who did all the talking, I mean, as far as the explanation of their plan was concerned.

____

• Sorry to get uppity here, but just where/how does Beschloss have credentials in this arena? (I confess to not having read "The Conquerors" yet.) The Bible on this topic is R Bruce Craig's "Treasonable Doubt" (ISBN 0-7006-1311-0)

I would direct impartial readers to the Washington Post's review of DEddy's "Bible" by Ted Morgan, available at http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/product-description/0700613110/ref=dp_proddesc_0/103-3831257-3293431?%5Fencoding=UTF8&n=283155Bdell555 04:01, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

• There are several basic issues here:

(1) LOTS of folks in Washington where hugely jealous of Morgenthau's access to FDR (& therefore White too since it was hardly a secret that White was Morgenthau's "brains"),

(2) White died just as the whole McCarthy witch hunt was beginning to heat up & was therefore not around to defend himself,

(3) White was well know to have a very abrasive personality (e.g. he didn't suffer fools, which would obviously lead to many bruised egos),

(4) Hoover was playing serious catch-up ball (Chambers has spilled his guts to Berle September 2, 1939 & when those meeting notes eventually got to the FBI, there was zippo followup), and

(5) there was tremendous jealousy between Treasury & State (since State wanted a tit-for-tat relationship with the Soviets, FDR simply went around State & set up an independant Lend-lease effort to get the Russians whatever supplies they asked for),

(6) like any good politician, Morgenthau was smart enough to know that pet ideas (e.g. the Morgenthau plan) if seen to have significant public antipathy, are to be dropped quickly & blamed on rogue underlings

FDR was the first to raise the "unconditional surrender" flag after the Casablanca conference (January 1943), taking Churchill by surprise since even then it was worrisome that "unconditional surrender" would be used by the German propaganda machine to stiffen the German public's resolve.

• White's objective was the IMF/World Bank (IBRD - International Bank of Reconstruction & Development) as the primary mechanism to avoid the financial distress caused by the Versaille Treaty disaster, buggering Germany I suspect he would have seen as a rear-guard distraction. The Bretton Woods Conference was in the July 1-15, 1944 period & White was intent on getting the Russians to join. The Russians did attend the conference, but did not ultimately join.

• The whole thing about White doing Stalin's bidding on a variety of issues is a total red-herring. There is ** NO ** evidence (Plenty of accusations, yes. Evidence no.) here other than increasingly escalating accusations from the likes of Elizabeth Bentley (in her 1948 testimony she never mentioned the Occuaption Currency Plates issue... in her 1954 testimony (White now conveniently dead) she told a truly amazing tale of White (on instructions from Moscow) turning over currency samples, it being sent to Moscow, the Russians found it couldn't be counterfited, the purloined samples were then returned to White (ummm... like he can have such stuff "checked out" for several weeks while it's shipped to Moscow & back via diplomatic pouch?... I just don't see the Bureau of Printing & Engraving & it's subcontractors working that way), with the escalated demand that the Russians now wanted the actual plates & inks.

• If White were such a dedicated Stalinist, just where did he pick it up? The record is entirely silent on the assumption behind the accusations. DEddy 17:38, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Michael Beschloss Seems to have reasonable credentials, he spent at least 4 years researching the book, and he waited several years for archives to be opened before finishing it. It is a 2002 book about the Morgenthau Plan mainly. Whites spy activities are a side note. Beschloss takes no position, just states the different sides, and as I quoted says that we may never know the full truth.

I have not read Craig’s book, and possibly never will as the topic doesn’t really interest me. I think I’ll settle for this CIA review. . The reviewer, while praising the book, does not seem entirely convinced by all of Craig’s arguments, especially regarding VERONA.

I can’t really debate the subject of wether White was a communist agent further as I lack both the inclination, relevant literature, and most importantly, time. Please feel free to write a section in the Morgenthau Plan article on White’s relationship to the Morgenthau plan if you have any relevant information on that specific topic. Discussions and evidence on whether White was an agent belong in the White article or in it’s own specialised article. I must however contradict you on your point (6). Morgenthau didn’t distance himself from the plan and blame it on White. Morgenthau remained a champion of his plan till the day he died. Time Magazine Sep. 22, 1967 Vengeance v. Vision Review of YEARS OF WAR, 1941-1945; FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES by John Morton Blum. And. Beschloss pg 252: "Until his death in 67, Morgenthau never relaxed his intense faith in his tough plan for post-war Germany." . When told that the plan had been a mistake by the historian who was writing his authorized biography he responded. "You’re too young to know whether the Morgenthau Plan was a mistake. And I’ll bet you--though I won’t be around to collect--that you’re going to have to fight Germany again before you die." --Stor stark7 19:21, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

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You're correct, Morgenthau didn't back away. I was confusing FDR. At one of the Quebec conferences [] (I think the first) FDR allowed/encouraged Morgenthau to pitch the plan. Churchill quickly shot it down, the plan was leaked to the press & things rapidly went south. Morgenthau's biographer, Blum I believe was convinced that White was the bad apple. I've got the "Morgenthau Diaries" but they're nigh on unreadable. Zzzzzzzz

Thanks for the pointer to the CIA review of "Treasonable Doubt"... I don't think I'd seen it before.

re "I can’t really debate the subject of wether White was a communist agent further as I lack both the inclination, relevant literature, and most importantly, time." Umm... then if you can't put in the time, please to not just regurgitate popular spin. There is a HUGE body of (largely bad/bogus) popular literature on this topic, primarily sucking up to the Cold War/"Russians are coming" paranoia mindset. When you look at the source materials that these long running accusations against White are "based" on, it really gives one pause to think. It's as (un)substantive as the whole WMD thing today. DEddy 19:58, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Actualy it was the Second Quebec Conference. I've recently created the article, and haven't had time to flesh it out, so it remains rather uninformative. I've added two useful external links to it though. Actualy FDR got Churchill to sign the plan, aparently in exchange for economic aid. In the State Department book in the external links section you can read both Morgenthaus original proposal, and the changed proposal that was agreed upon by Churchill and FDR. --Stor stark7 ^Talk 20:14, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

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Snip to another section of the interview...

• RIDDLEBERGER: Just completely impractical, and I thought it would be dismissed out of hand, but it wasn't, it took a battle royal.

This old question of flooding the German coal mines was not decided until very late and Morgenthau had great influence. I recall very well a meeting in Stettinius' office shortly before the armistice. We couldn't get agreement between State and Treasury over this issue. In the meantime Morgenthau muscled into this committee, or he set up another one, gave it another name, but it was essentially the same committee, and insisted upon writing directives that would have compelled the occupying powers to flood the German mines.

Unless one were in on the early days of the Morgenthau plan, it's hard to visualize now the scope of it. I was there at the original unveiling which was done by Harry White in Harry Hopkins' office in the White House and we had before us a map of Germany.

Just to give you one example of what the thinking was, Harry White had this map of Germany and he had line drawn a line, I would say from about Kiel to Basel, and he had some name attached, West Germany or something like that. Then across the middle of the eastern part he had drawn another line to split the rest of Germany. What was west of the Kiel-Basel line incorporated the principal industrial area of Germany, with exception of Silesia and Berlin itself, including all the Ruhr, and all the big industrial cities of West Germany.

In all of that region west of this line, the mines were to be flooded and put out of operation, the factories were to be leveled, and this territory was to be converted into what White called a "pastoral economy" whatever that means. Its population was to be expelled and pushed east of this line, to be settled in the eastern part of Germany, which would be carved into two states; one north German state and one south German state with a prohibition on uniting. At first I didn't take any of this very seriously, but it became apparent that White meantt it and he said Mr. Morgenthau was in favor of it.

I said, "Harry, my impression is, although I can't tell exactly as you have not followed any provincial boundaries, but at least 30 million to 35 million people live in this area that is to be completely pastoralized." And then I said, "You're going to push all of the Germans out, is that correct?"

And he said, "Yes," he said, "most of them in any case."

I said, "You know land is rather valuable in Europe. Do you think this area will remain empty with no population?"

"Oh," he said, "no, no, we realize something has to be done there. We thought we'd resettle Yugoslavs on it."

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Like the Protcols of Zion the Morganthau Plan seems to be one of those documents that was written before the fact appearing to be almost clarvoiyant. Most of the Morganthau Plan seems to have happened - probably just by accident, ditto the other "plan".

Is that for real?

Is that true about the Russians and Mr. White, or is that just so much McCarthyism?

While difficult to precisely know at this distance in time, it's more McCarthyism than reality. White as Morgenthau's AIDE drafted the plan, but statements that he (White) AUTHORED the plan is speculation. If Morgenthau didn't want the plan drawn up, White & his staff wouldn't have written it.

Absent in the "White was dancing to Stalin's tune..." spin is the undeniable fact that Morgenthau had been in the Levant in WWI when his father was ambassador to the Ottoman Empire & had witnessed the results of the Armenian genocide.

White died in 1948 and was therefore not around to defend/explain his actions. Morgenthau was protected by his extensive personal diaries. DEddy 21:48, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

Goebbels "Court Jew?"

Is it possible that this plan was a propaganda scheme conjured up by Joseph Goebbels himself? It was Joseph Goebbels who organally called for Germany to have great relations with the Soviet Union, however he stopped publicly preaching this after 1933. Was this all one big plot to Sovietize Germany by making the Soviets seem like the "ideal" invaders? This is just my theory but, it makes sense, Goebbels was a master of propaganda, why couldn't he influence a high ranking American official into becoming his pawn?

Bwa ha ha ha ha... oh, wait, you were being serious, weren't you? Considering Morgenthau kept on advocating harsh treatment of Germany after the war had already ended, I think you're giving Goebbels far too much credit, bordering on tinfoil-hat theories. --Cubelodyte 21:10, 15 June 2007 (UTC)

map graphic

I had to remove this. Besides being in Dutch, it is just plain wrong. It is a map of 1937 Germany and the allied occupation zones. Morgenthau would have had the Saar go to France, and Silesia to Poland. I've got a copy of Morgenthau's map in front of me but I don't have a scanner right now. I've seen another map on the web that looks accurate but I will leave it to someone else to put that up if desired.

I have made extensive edits to this page. I believe it is more NPOV since it is essentially a chronicle of what key Western leaders said and wrote at the time. I think JCS 1067 should be in there because it was actually implemented. The Morgenthau Plan that wasn't signed by Roosevelt and Churchill should get less attention than what was signed, since the unsigned version was even further away from ever being implemented.Bdell555 18:46, 22 August 2005 (UTC)

Further Work

This article needs some more chapters. But I'm getting tired and will probably back off for a while.

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Possibly it should be partitioned in to one pre-surrender and one post-surrender part. The first focusing the original plan, and the second the repercussions of the Morgenthau and his government people's influence on ockupation policy.

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The part about Morgenthau being influenced by his "colleague" white, who turned out to be working as an agent for he russians should probably be analysed, to se how much of the plan was the communists work. There can otherwise be no doubt that he was motivated by rage at what was happening to the Jews. I've also seen some "apologist" claims that he was an "agrarian romantic" and that this motivated his plan, this must be analyzed in order to se if it is correct or should be openly discredited as dissinformation.

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It needs a separate chapter detailing how the policy of destruction gradualy changed.

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It needs mention on how Neo Nazi groups use the plan to diminish the Nazi crimes; see the other side did bad things too... It's tough to find information on the plan without ending up on dubious sites. Although what they write about this topic might be true, using such references would cast doubt on the articles accuracy, therefore I've sought to only use original source documents, with the difficulties, and possibly miss interpretations of relationships, that that entails.

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It needs mention on how knowledge of the plan has been suppressed. this link mentions for instance that former proponents of the plan later distanced themselves from it, and probably were only to pleased to see to it that it was forgotten (suppressed?)... (Maybe I overinterpret, but...) http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/kindbrgr.htm

And then there is the neo nazi bit. I have the feeling that since the events surrounding the history of the plan are useful to the nazis, there are "uppright" people that actively lie to give the impression that the plan had less impact than it actualy had (Not yet sure how much impact it had though, not much info out there). Thats the feeling I've gotten trying to figure this thing out. Especially when looking at sites like the German Wikipedia. They seem very selective about what they write... Of cource the Germans would be more touchy than most when it comes to such subjects. Their Morgenthau-Plan article contains a link to the German government site for "political education" that states something like this (translated by someone at this page:http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=21292) "The Morgenthau Plan disappeared in the drawers already at the end of September 1944 without ever having been formally discussed by the competent bodies. For the later policy of occupation and in regard to Germany the Morgenthau Plan was without any significance"

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Then there is the issue of where Morgenthaus ideas, and the U.S government people devoted to them, left off, and where the French with desire for economic expansion at the expense of Germany took up. When the U.S. administration started to change policy it was mainly the French and the Russians that wanted to continue carving up Germany. Might merit it's own article. The French were certainy loath to let Saar go in the fifties, and I suspect It took a lot of U.S/Brittish resistance in the late fourties to prevent them from annexing it completely instead of as now letting it reside as semindependent but with total control of its resources by France.

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Maybe Project Paperclip should merit some mention as example that intellectual property was plundered as weell as teritorial and facilities. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4443934.stm

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The Morgenthau plan contained the territorial amputatons of East Prussia and part of silesia in the east, and of Saar and the Ruhr in the west. As we know, saar spent some time away from germany, and Ruhr nearly joined it (at least I found a document showing Ruhr was still being seriously dicussed in 1947). In the east all of silesia, East Prussia and some other terirotial chunks were ockupied with some pretty hefty ethnic cleansing as a result; maybe 12 Million people, 15 million including the Sudeten population and Germans living elsewhere in the east. Basically, The russian ockupation zone was divided in two equally large halves, one that becane East Germany, And one that Became divided between Poland and Russia as Russia expanded its lebensraum west, and compensated Poland at the expense of Germany. 15 million people, possibly the largest ethnic cleansing ever, actually, not that you'd get to read about it in school or anything....Hmmmm.... OK off topic. The Point is, how much did the morgentahu plan influenc the resulting teritorial anexations in the east. Where they already dealed up between Roosevelt and Stalin before the plan was penned, or did the plan serve as direct inspiration for the anexation and the resulting ethnic cleansing?

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And to finish off for a while, some Churchill war cabinet notes that maybe someone can se if they can make sense of, and if they are relevant for this article, as I'm to tired to bother really.

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf

W A R C A B I N E T M I N U T E S

W.M. 35(45). 22nd March 1945.

Reparations and Dismemberment.

• J.A.

Sent caveat to Yalta: recd re-assuring reply from P.M. Now afraid R. taking difft. view. Think we shd. clear our minds. My feeling is maximum reparations/maximum dismemberment are incompatible. Believing fundamentally tht. the 2 policies are exclusive , I fear tht. Russian appln of their doctrine in their Zone may leave us with an area which is not viable. Greatly fear tht. if we don’t soon safeguard our position, matters may so develop tht. we find ourselves alone in W. (U.S. having withdrawn) respons. for an area wh. is a deficit area having to provide imports with no prospect of getting out w’out leaving a chaos wh. wd. be a disgrace. Don’t want to short-circuit F.O. memo to A.P.W. Profitable to have a discn of genl. principles first on this.

• A.E.

Some of these problems will arise with or w’out dismemberment. Russian Zone: if they take machinery they must give food fr. their Zone to ours. Remember

(a) R. at Yalta v. keen on dismemberment. U.S. went long way with them. The word is now in the Terms/Surrender. You can get reparations in kind even from 3 countries – R. view.

Diff. to conclude on this – without full discn of A.P.W. memo. Either A.P.W. shd. take both: or special Cab. shd. take both

• P.M.

We put it in only as a matter to be explored.

• A.E.

By my Cttee in London.

• P.M.

Some parts of larger G. wd. bloom if relieved of heavy burdens laid on them by Russia. Also freed of mill-stone of armaments. R. has not bn. thro’ our experience of Reparations – no bitter memories. Also they can absorb a good deal more than we can. Delusion to think our economy will benefit much. U.S. expect nothing except securities in their control. R. on other hand are resolved to take all the machinery they can use. At least tht. wd. remove G. competn & leave the way open to us. Wd. help our export trade. Ditto, later on, with Japan.

• J.A.

Don’t oppose the principle. My trouble (see para. 4): R. will get productive surplus area while our Zone is deficit.

• A.E.

But occupn is separate from issue of separate States.

• L.P.

Look how it will develop. R. will crush the East to peasant level. In the West, we can’t level out the industrial area: it will remain depressed on a high level of civilisation while their Zone is contented at a low level.

• J.A.

Tendency will be for each occupying area to concentrate on own Zone.

• P.M.

Was not intended tht. mil. occupn shd. be linked with reparation – were meant to be handled as separate issues. During mil. occupn there will be a central authy. Dismemberment may prove impracticable. My personal view is “isolate Prussia” because historically they have bn. the cause of all the trouble. Wd. look for one State centred on Vienna – 30 m. or so. And wd. treat these people more easily than those in Prussian Zone. Stalin likes that idea. I wd. like to bring in Hungary too. But U.J. wants to keep that w’in his influence: belt of States friendly to USSR. Attempted to reach no concln at Yalta.

• L.P.

Then what of the rest, Hanover etc.,

• P.M.

Under international control.

• O.L.

Imposs. to discuss this Memo. without also discussg. F.O. Memo to A.P.W. Discrimination makes it impossible to discuss w’out bringing in reparation. Can’t disentangle the two.

• M/L.

Reparations go beyond capital goods?

• P.M.

R. want annual supply on consumable goods too.

• M/L.

That will raise the cry tht. we shall finance G. to make those goods – that leads to war potential in G. & repercussions on our economy. Not worried over the “once for all” it’s the “annual” that is dangerous, as leading to financing G. to enable them to supply. Back to Dawes Plan & loans. Effect on B. standards.

• O.L.

We shd. stick at potash & timber, wh. we can’t supply ourselves: & not run on into man. goods.

• Ch.

All we can get fr. G. = export markets. Don’t let anyone take reparations in man. goods. Otherwise we shall re-build her industry. Their necessary imports are v. small. They produce 2.300 cal. p. head today. Let them live on that: or raise it to 2.500 when troops return. Concentrate on stopping anything necessitating re-buildg. their industry. More diff. for them to run industrial econ. if dismembered: but I don’t care because I don’t want manuf. goods from them. No need to prevent trade betwn. one part of G. & another.

• H.O.

But 80 m. people in G. who must live. If the industry is destroyed can 80 m. live on the ag. wh. is left?

• P.M.

Taking off the mil. load will help a lot. Her standard ought to be lower.

• H.O.

A Germany in econ. dissolution & semi-starvation will eventually command world compassion. Indeed, may hurt B. trade.

Let’s concentrate on

a) prevent re-armament.

b) control war potential.

If we go beyond that & seek to smash their economy

a) we shall have v. great diffy. as occupying power &

b) will harm B. commercial interests.

R. sentiment is running away with them. I agree with C/E. Memo.

• P.M.

Agree there will come a time when condn of G. labouring class will excite compassion etc. A majority view here in 5 years probably. But our problem is the immediate crisis at end/hostilities; & R. attitude then. All we’ve agreed so far is to investigate chance of dividing G. on historical lines. But even the theoretical study of this is likely to take 2 years. That is some long way off. No decision on that at once. Immediate organisation = occupied Zones with a central authy controlling them & seeking unified treatment & policy throughout. That regime can continue for 2 years.

• F.O.

need strong techn. Cttee to study this under the F/ Minister Cttee (i.e. A.E., Winant & the Russian). Then much considn and prob. public discussion.

Not wedded to dismemberment: wd. try for it: but may be convinced by the study to be made tht. it is impracticable.

Reparations. Be sure R. will take machinery from Ruhr & Saar as well as Silesia.

• H.O.

Rough on us if they strip our Zone.

• A.E.

We must take the line tht. what they take from our Zone in machinery must be balanced by supplies of food from their Zones.

• M.A.P.

Which turns our Zone into a vast soup kitchen.

• P.M.

Put it then tht. R. must not be relieved from responsibility for condns they create by removal of the machinery.

• M.A.P.

Reparations start at once: you can’t wait until solution of dismemberment has bn. found.

• P.M.

Zone –settled.

Dismembt : to be studied by Cttee here.

Reparations: to be studied at Moscow. We have to choose a delegate.

• J.A.

“Prolonged study.” Isn’t there a great danger tht. future will be largely determined by what happens in early stages. Longer you delay the more unlikely dismemberment will be.

• A.E.

Needn’t be so v. long over it. We’ve got a plan. We cd. put it to W. Cab.

• B.B.

Meanwhile U.S. are acting. They’ve seized G. patents & are negotiating.

We shd. do the same.

• P.M.

In Reparations sphere.

• P.M.

Agree our delegate to Reparations Conf. Moscow must be chosen & instructed.

• H.O.

Put both Reparations & Dismemberment to A.P.W. Cttee & ques. wtr there is a link between them?

• J.A.

If dismembermt. is postponed, agree won’t arise at once.

• P.M.

Wdn’t agree that there is a link between Reparations & Dismemberment. They are both being considered in different places.

R. in Moscow

D. in London.

• E.B.

Cdn’t A.P.W. put up alternative Rpts on Reparations

a) from unified

b) from dismembered Germany.

Wdn’t be asked to report on Dismemberment.

Adjourn discussion until next week.

Stor stark7 02:04, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

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http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_4_transcript.pdf

C.M. 89(46). 21st October, 1946.

1. India.

P.M. Read terms of proposed message to Viceroy – congratulations. on formation of interim Government. Agreed.

2. Parliament.

H.M. Business for the week. [Exit W.W. Enter G.T. & F.W.B. & O.S.

3. Germany.

E.B. H.M.’s memo. covered in principle: & H.D.’s met: by my memo. Haven’t considered J.S.’s. Hampered in B. Zone –

a) by Russian refusal to treat G. as economic whole. They have taken heavily from current production & will continue up to $10 billions

b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart speech. They supported Russian & French case – to point of reducing steel production to 5.8 m. tons. And during Loan talks, couldn’t oppose them too strongly.

c) French. policy – detach Ruhr: & decline any agreement without prior consent to that. Now generally realised our policy on that was correct.

d) At outset, I took the line – let’s get in & put the Zone on self-supporting. basis. Was told this would Spell disaster for Western Europe.

Looking back, not sure it was right to let this political consideration outweigh the economic arguments. I refer to coal exports from Ruhr. Looking back it’s obvious this policy would rundown economy of B. Zone. In Paris, at CFM time, tried to get B. Zone on self-supporting basis. France then wouldn’t play because of c) above. Then announced that., failing agreement to treat Germany as a whole, we should be forced to make our Zone self-supporting. Next Day, U.S. agreed we couldn’t be expected to go on making contn at £80-100 m. p.a. They forced us to 5.8 m. – but all experience has shown we were right on APW Cttee in our figure of 11 m. Molotov then said they would. accept increase of level of industry – but subject to unacceptable conditions. U.S. proposal to merge Zones. We knew it would. cost us more for a time. When estimates worked out, figure was larger than assumed. Conference held in Paris – after long discussions have now submitted memo. Before this was completed I had seen Byrnes (before Stuttgart speech) & asked whether this meant he would overthrow Morgenthau policy. He said yes – with Truman’s authority. Stor stark7 17:14, 29 April 2006 (UTC)

Somewhat off topic: Byrnes was no friend of Germany -- at Potsdam he gave away more of Silesia than the Poles or Russians expected. So in that light, his later position of "concern" for Germany was somewhat selective. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.217.231 (talk) 08:44, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

War Cabinet meetings

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf

C.M. 18(45). 7th August, 1945.

Review of Foreign Affairs.

• E.B.

Berlin Protocol. a) C.F.M. Vital need = good Secretariat. e) War Crimes: Agreemt. to be signed to-morrow. Hope trials h) Balkans: Commn on oil equpmt: powers of B. & U.S. repns on b) Reparations. R. removals v. drastic. On percentages – had to yield to R. pressure, largely because U.S. willing to make concessions. c) German Fleet. Subs. – satisf. solution. Merchant Fleet: 1/3rd subject to U.S.S.R. satisfying Polish claims. d) Koenigsberg: Final settlement reserved to Peace Settlement: but will be fait accompli before then. will go on. U.S.’s anxieties about Hess. f) Austria: no reparations agreed. g) Poland W. Frontier: discussions with repns of P.P.G. Want to talk with C/R. & B/T. – insist tht. Poles live up to undertakgs: then trade ?exch will open from that area. C.C.’s must see this new formula is carried out. i) Transfer of Populations. V. serious problems. Conduct of D.P.’s. j) Inland Waterways. R. reluctant to duscuss. U.S. & B. think it important. But R agreed to serve on I.T.O.

• P.M.

Was there throughout. Not much done before our return. E.B. did v. well at short notice inpickg. up unknown threads. Diffy – whatever your ideas the facts keep moving on – e.g. Poland’s W. Frontier.R. ideas of repns – same delusions as we had in 1918. Don’t care,either, what happens to W. Europe.Not done too badly.

• E.B.

R. pressure tht. Ruhr be declared part of Germany. Many ideas about that – considered on A.P.W. Cttee. Now to be examined by C.F.M. We shall have to watch our security.

• E.Sh.

Moscow agreemt. tht. 8 yrs. 50 m. tons G. coal to be ready for export. Shall have to raise that issue.

• P.M.

Food & fuel for Berlin this winter. Surplus food areas & Silesian mines both under R. control. Got nearer to agreemt. with R. on this – thro’ decision to treat G. as economic whole.

• A.B.

Brutal behaviour by Czechs. in clearing out Germans.

• P.M.

Cdn’t do more than we did on this – askg. Govts. to hold their hands.

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http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf

C.M. 7(45). 11th June, 1945.

3. Reparations.

• P.M.

R. will demand v. large figure – if only as excuse for not w’drawing labour. Wd. also prevent Fr. & Dutch from bidding too high

• O.L.

Above G. pre-war exports by £1 m. p.a. from occupation Zone.

• J.A.

Rpt. drafted under War Cab. Directive annexed. Dom. Govts. not yet informed – shd. have summary.

• P.M.

S.G. shd. go out, with genl. indicn of our views, & hear what they have to say. The G. will be relieved fr. maintaining mil. power: & can deny themselves too.

• Ch.

a) Only reparations worth havg = G. export markets. Directive takes a/c of that, but shd. state it specifically.

b) Also wd. like to omit last sentence in para 15.

If we count against R. claim the labour they take, we cd. get the total figure up to $20 billion. $16.000 m. value cd. be assigned for 4 m. slave labour.

• P.M.

At Yalta R. made it clear tht. their claim was exclusive of labour.

• Ch.

Try to get it in. It wd. be to our advantage because we don’t want for labour.

• J.A.

We all agreed tht. labour shd. be taken into a/c. But we cdn’t find a way of evaluating it w’out risk of much dispute. We thought therefore it wd. be better to use this in general argument. e.g. as in U.S., U.K. etc. J.A. Can only be settled after much techn. discn on the spot.

• Ch.

Why not put fwd. a lot of man-values: [ Exit H.O. Total figure can’t be fixed because we don’t know what G. current capacity is.

• O.L.

We do know that coal in Ruhr & Saar is 4% o normal. And on that all their industrial prodn is based.

• Salter.

a) Imposs. to fix target total. Experience of last war. We can fix the percentage shares of unknown total.

b) Agree with Ch. about export trade. But doubt wtr. we shd. base our policy on tht., still more professing it. Base on (agreed) policy of destroying war potential & we’ll get most of the advantages qua exports trades. Otherwise, we shall get odium fr. allother claimants when they see they aren’t getting what they expected.

x/ Para. 10. insert “consisting mainly of …”

• J.A.

This para. is compromise betwn. Ch. & Salter.

• O.L.

Agree with Salter. Publ. opinion wdn’t let you go on for long in a policy aimed at killing G. export trade. Kill her war potential indies & you will in fact have substantially L.S.A. No need to say we want to kill G. exports. Thing is not to build up reduced her export trade. B.B. Supported Salter. Baruch has put out Ch. ideas & they have bn. denounced in U.S. as immoral & impractical.

• P.M.

Don’t believe Ch. policy wd. withstand publ. criticism. G. exports to pay for reparations.

• J.A.

Ch. objective will be secured anyhow. Better to stick to hard line – we take as much as we can get, provided they have a reasonable livelihood.

Provided: first charge maintenance of occupying troops & payment for essential imports. Ch. O.K. if you limit her imports. Want S.G. to have exports in mind – not necessary to profess it.

• P.M.

Let us hear what R. has to say – and U.S. too. And let S.G. keep us informed. We want a guarantee from R. tht. food produced in G. shall be shared thro’ G. as a whole. This shd. be taken as part of reparations talks.

Also think a figure shd. be discussed for labour – & argue tht. it shd. count towards total reparations/ Discuss with R. - & educate them, on experience of last war. Operation Socrates. But never let us commit ourselves to a total figure.

• P.J.

One ques. on which it may be diff. to stall for so long – i.e. destruction of war potential. E.A.C. askg. for a line. S.G. shd. know where he stands on that.

• O.L.

Criterion shd. be – can you hold to a decision in face of public opinion.

• J.A.

Agree with Salter we shd. try to settle percentage claim. If R. got 50% we cd. justify 25%.

• Salter.

Apart from advantage to export trade – wd. it not help us to use G. labour in bldg. houses here for the early years of bldg. programme. Wd. help bldg. industry here to avoid boom & slump.

• P.M.

Big ques. on which H/C. will have to express a view after Election. Personal view = much against. Employment: social etc., objections. Salter. Then make by alteration in para. 10 – x/ overleaf. reparation for it. General agreement with both these points: { receive rpts. from S.G.

• O.L.

Better contn to housg. in prefab. timber houses made in Germany.

• R.K.L.

a) On labour – para. 12 (c). Such a declaration shd. not include any policing responsibility.

b) Annex II. definition of “booty” to be narrow. Then try to get subject to letting U.S. take the lead in moving to have a declaration at all under (a).

c) Dom. Govts. Don’t want to face them with a fait accompli. Wd. like them to have an opportunity to comment.

Agreed: Directive to go there with liberty to comment.

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http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_2_transcript.pdf

W.M.(43) 53rd Meeting. 13th April, 1943.

II. Foreign Secretary’s Account of his Mission to Washington.

• A.E.

Politial ques. Main point U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. President troubled - feels Litvinov’s posn in Moscow less influential than Maisky: also troubled about his Amb. in Moscow: wants send Davies back when well enough to go. They don’t tell R. as much as we do abt. day-to-day dipl. events. I suggested eg. U.S. Amb. Moscow shd. give them full a/c our talks.

USSR. Terr. claims. Reconciled to Baltic States - fait accompli. Wd. like plebiscite as conscience clause.

Polish frontier. If P. got E. Russia & something in E. Siberia, P. wd. well to accept the Curzon Line. Tactics: we, U.S. & R. shd. agree fair solution & get P. to accept it: better than letting negotns between R. & P to get into mess.

Finland: no anxiety: thought terms reasonable. But Welles nervous re want assistce. pact ? Protectorate. I said take this up with R.

Public feeling in U.S. twds R. No sentiment as here, but on whole not unreasonable, even in Rep. Party. “We shan’t be any worse off for havg. tried to come to terms with them.” Hoover line is difft. - wd. like closer relations between U.K. & U.S. in order to keep away fr. R.

Our attitude to R. - v. curious about it.

French: Hull loathes de G. & intrudes him into every conversation. Much complaint too about our failure to put U.S. view on French. I concentrated therefore on future. One diffce - U.S., even if G. & de G. come together, don’t want to see one central Fr. authy. - prefer to deal with several. I said we wd. like one, even tho’ we don’t recognise it as a Govt. All the others came out as Govts., wh. puts them in diff. posn. Diff. see why U.S. take this view - unless because want to internationalise some Fr. possessions. Even if we go into Fr., they don’t want a Fr. authy. to go in they wd. prefer us to take responsib. for civil adminn.: i.e. opposite view to that on wh. they act in N. Africa.

Pol. side of mil. opns. - agree gone ill in N. Africa. State Dpt. don’t have our close relns. with C.O.S. etc. Agreed shd. try to work out machinery for closer contact. Cd. we send out F.O. man to help Dill? - said we’d consider. Change mainly reqd. is on U.S. side.

Trend of U.S. opinion - away fr. isolation. My contacts confirmed view of Pres. etc. Welles hoped Senate wd. pass resoln soon givg. Pres. more latitude in pursuit of his policy. Pres. thinks this is best development - avoid Wilson’s separation fr. Senate until faced with Treaty. Bringing Congressme etc., into Conferences. Eve of my departure I was shown by 2 members of F.A. Cttee of Congress draft of such a resoln.

Basis of U.S. co-opn. World-wide basis essential - also China wd. have to come in:

a) U.S. hatred of Japan (not same feeling v. Hitler):

b) fears of China lapsing into chaos.

c) China as counterpoise to R. in Far East. (Pro-China feeling helps him to bring on opinion favouring war v. Hitler) Elaborn of organ. cannot be left wholly to U.K. & U.S. This leads Pres. to play up U.N. on every occasion. Form. (1) Genl. Assembly, covering all, mtg once or twice a year = Assembly of L/N. (2) Adv. Council - 4 Govt. Powers (incl. China) & 6 or 8 others to be chosen prob. by Continents. v. near Council of L/N. (3) Executive of 4 Gt. Powers exercising wide powers delegated by (2). Attached to this an offl. like Sec. Genl. of L/N. “Moderator” Authy. to communicate with (3) or (2) on issues requiring their attendce. Talked to Welles re Council of Europe. He thought room for this Sub-Cttee of (2). Subjects to be discussed - wd. they deal with 155

pol. ques: he felt prob. not. See no special diffy. except (3): I believe most will have to be done by (2).

Germany. V. tough attitude. Welles vehemently in favour of dismemberment. They’ve gone into it v. carefully. (P.M. “Liberation of minor components”!) In our mil. occupn we shd. proceed jointly in each area (BA.R.). G. wd. be broken up in mil. occupn into areas approx. to eventual break-down into parts. Pres. agreed, less vehemently. Hull hadn’t made up his mind. I agreed tht. this solution shdn’t be excluded & we wd. consider details. Argument (Welles) - G. bound to have a grievance: therefore give her a good one. “Don’t maltreat your enemy by halves.” (P.M.)

Barvaria: N.Western: Prussia (less E. Prussia etc.): Ruler under internatt. supervision.

Austria sep. at first, tho’ later with Bavaria: Saxony.

• P.M.

Centripetal tendency of G. will be strong. Poss. ??? in time to implement other ideas. E.g. Confedn. of Danube, as central European bloc. If Wurtemburg joined, it wd. be poss. To go easier with G. states wh. close to Vienna via Berlin. Czechs. wd. like to join with Poland, if they made proper arrangement with R. If not, they wd. turn twds. Vienna.

Stor stark7 14:06, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

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Truman Presidential Library Interviews

This old question of flooding the German coal mines was not decided until very late and Morgenthau had great influence. I recall very well a meeting in Stettinius' office shortly before the armistice. We couldn't get agreement between State and Treasury over this issue. In the meantime Morgenthau muscled into this committee, or he set up another one, gave it another name, but it was essentially the same committee, and insisted upon writing directives that would have compelled the occupying powers to flood the German mines.

Unless one were in on the early days of the Morgenthau plan, it's hard to visualize now the scope of it. I was there at the original unveiling which was done by Harry White in Harry Hopkins' office in the White House and we had before us a map of Germany.

Just to give you one example of what the thinking was, Harry White had this map of Germany and he had line drawn a line, I would say from about Kiel to Basel, and he had some name attached, West Germany or something like that. Then across the middle of the eastern part he had drawn another line to split the rest of Germany. What was west of the Kiel-Basel line incorporated the principal industrial area of Germany, with exception of Silesia and Berlin itself, including all the Ruhr, and all the big industrial cities of West Germany.

In all of that region west of this line, the mines were to be flooded and put out of operation, the factories were to be leveled, and this territory was to be converted into what White called a "pastoral economy" whatever that means. Its population was to be expelled and pushed east of this line, to be settled in the eastern part of Germany, which would be carved into two states; one north German state and one south German state with a prohibition on uniting. At first I didn't take any of this very seriously, but it became apparent that White meantt it and he said Mr. Morgenthau was in favor of it.

I said, "Harry, my impression is, although I can't tell exactly as you have not followed any provincial boundaries, but at least 30 million to 35 million people live in this area that is to be completely pastoralized." And then I said, "You're going to push all of the Germans out, is that correct?"

And he said, "Yes," he said, "most of them in any case."

I said, "You know land is rather valuable in Europe. Do you think this area will remain empty with no population?"

"Oh," he said, "no, no, we realize something has to be done there. We thought we'd resettle Yugoslavs on it."

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/riddle2.htm

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QUESTION: It is correct to say that the primary goal of U.S. occupation policy was German economic unity and self-sufficiency? Was this the British aim also?

HARKORT: In the beginning period of American occupation the first goals were the shattering of all national socialist structures, the prosecution of the guilty individuals, re-education towards democracy and the preservation or restoration of an administrative residuum in an area where government and administration had completely collapsed. Only vague ideas existed at first about the prerequisites for economic viability, even at a very low standard of living. Quite early already one must have realized that the Morgenthau Plan was impracticable in a highly industrialized, densely populated country where cities and factories were largely in ruins and where expellees and refugees poured in by the millions. But holding on to Directive JCS 1067 (of April 1945) over two years shows how slow the trend was to distance oneself from the illusions of the very beginning.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/harkortg.htm

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QUESTION: The level-of-industry controversy?

HARKORT: Directive JCS 1067 of April 1945 was valid for the American Zone over more than two years. The first industrial plan of 1946 called for the dismantling of 1,500 manufacturing plants; heavy industry was to be limited to 50-55 percent of the 1938 level. The second industrial plan -- nearly concurrent with Marshall's Harvard Speech -- lowered the dismantling numbers to 849, a little later down to 700, and further reductions followed in 1949 (Wallich, p. 348). [Henry C. Wallich, Mainsprings of the German Revival (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955)]. It seems that the actual dismantling action was not executed very promptly; otherwise many deletions from the dismantling list would have come too late.

Industrial plans are understandable as procedures for dismantling decisions. What is not understandable is why there was a long-standing belief on the American side that it was possible to introduce a genuine market economy for Germany (this must have been the intention, why otherwise decartelization?) and, at the same time, to physically limit the most important branches of the industry. Such limitations, had they continued to exist, would have prevented the development of the market-oriented economic system in postwar Germany.

The juxtaposition of foreign aid and dismantling, incomprehensible when viewed from a more distant point in time, was justified by the American Government with the reasoning that the Germans did not need the factories on the dismantling list in the foreseeable future.

QUESTION: At what stage, in your view, was it recognized that German recovery was essential to full European recovery?

HARKORT: The waiver of implementation of the Morgenthau Plan and its toned-down offshoots -- (Directive JCS 1067, Potsdam Conference, Industrial Plans) -- points out the beginning of the realization that without including Germany we cannot make Europe viable again. In the Harriman Report of November 1947 this is stated quite clearly (p. 117): "No part of the economic aid requested by the CEEC (the later OEEC) countries is more fundamentally necessary to the recovery of Western Europe than the aid asked for the rehabilitation of German industry, agriculture and transport."

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/harkortg.htm

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MCKINZIE: Of course, I should explain, one reason that I keep asking you about the positions that your office was taking is that I am aware that you got documents of a kind of conflicting nature. You got the Morgenthau business from the Treasury Department on one hand, and on the other hand there was residue of all of that planning that was done in the State Department by Leo Pasvolsky’s people, which did envision a rather early return of Germany into some sort of European economy. Dean Acheson says in his book that he didn't realize that Europe without a reconstructed Germany was analogous to a body without a heart. He and other people had felt that perhaps Great Britain could assume the economic role that had been played by Germany previously, and somehow this was all your heritage or the legacy that was dumped into your office.

KINDLEBERGER: I would allow no member of my staff to use the cliche "the heart of industrial Germany" for the Ruhr. I wasn't worried about that. If Acheson did it he was out of line. No, it's true that we very quickly became aware of the role of Germany in Europe. The Germans had problems of their own. The coal question is one I spoke of. Very quickly it became the repair of mining machinery in Poland--Poland acquired Silesia, the Silesian mines.

As all the capital equipment of Europe was very far depreciated it needed to be replaced and renewed and the Poles couldn't do it. How are you going to get Polish mining going without helping the German machinery industry. And we found ourselves in this very fast.

So what we tried to do was to convert the Morgenthau doctrine in U.S. economic policy toward Germany into a statement which said, "The Germans have sinned. They have gotten way out of line and they have hurt people, therefore, we are going to pull them down quickly to the level of the neighboring countries and it's going to be short, sharp, quick, surgical," but then we let them go. Now the Russians never would agree to this as far as I know, and we had to agree that there were some industries which they could not operate. But that was the interpretation and I think that's a reasonable way to sort of thread your way. We also would add, by the way, in the spring of ‘47 when food was scarce, that the Germans were last in line. Food got terribly scarce worldwide and the Marshall plan I think was in large part a response to a very bad harvest.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/kindbrgr.htm

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LIGHTNER: Yes. Well, I'm being a little long-winded and perhaps it isn't necessary to give all this background. We started earlier to talk about what we in the State Department did to counteract the Morgenthau plan philosophy which was strongly reflected in the basic military directive, JCS-l067.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lightner.htm Stor stark7 23:06, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

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http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/draperw.htm

Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper Jr. Chief, Economics Division, Control Council for Germany, 1945-46; Military Government Adviser to the Secretary of State, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1947; Under Secretary of War, 1947; Under Secretary of the Army, 1947-49; and United States Special Representative in Europe, with rank of Ambassador, January 1952 - June 1953.

DRAPER: As I've said before, the occupation became the actual Government of Germany. When we moved up from Versailles, our offices were first in Frankfurt, and then in July of 1945 we moved to Berlin.

First the tripartite Control Council, then when the French joined us, the quadripartite Control Council was the Government of Germany. It was simply that. Each of our national army organizations in our own zones of Germany were supreme, subject only to the quadripartite policy decisions. So my job, under those general policies and in line with the Morgenthau doctrine that had been directed to us from Washington as the U.S. economic policy for Germany, was to run the economy of our zone of Germany. That meant the agriculture, the industry, and the trade (in or out of Germany although there was no trade outside of Germany at that time), and to try to keep the country from starving and from going berserk.

The crops that year were quite good, and there was

[29]

also considerable food we found that the Wehrmacht had stored, which we took over. So there was no immediate danger of starvation that particular fall or even that winter.

///

HESS: You have mentioned the Morgenthau plan. I also understand there was a Draper plan, and it was your belief that the German economy could not be restored under the agriculture and light industry plan of Henry Morgenthau. Tell me about your plan.

DRAPER: I never heard of a Draper plan in Germany. Later on there was one that was called that in Japan.

The Morgenthau plan was unfortunate; it was based on vengeance plus the theory that the Germans had started World War I; perhaps they had, but they were paying for

[40]

it anyway, and they had certainly started World War II. And Mr. Morgenthau was of the opinion that Germany should be prevented from having the where withal to ever start another war, and he persuaded President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill to agree to his proposals. He believed that if the Germans were limited to growing food and to light industry and were not permitted any substantial amount of steel production or other basic industrial production, and not permitted to build ships or any of the other things that are required for war, even when on a peacetime basis, that they would be kept perpetually and forever in a condition impossible for them to wage war.

That also would be in a condition which would become impossible for the Germans to exist unless somebody helped them and provided the necessities of life. It became evident to us very quickly that this was the case, and that if we carried out literally the terms of the very famous Morgenthau directive, the United States would have to support Germany for the rest of time or as long as that policy stayed in effect. And so, we had to wiggle here and waggle there and do the best we could without openly breaking our directive to permit the German economy to begin to function. We argued with

[41]

this one and argued with that one here in Washington and in Germany, wherever we had the chance, and bit by bit, we recouped or revised the situation so that it became possible.

A Dr. Calvin Hoover from Duke University came over. He was a very fine international economist, who is still alive. Although he only had a limited period of service, a few months, we asked him under the directive to draft up a potential possible level of industry plan. He did that very effectively, but from the point of view of the directive, and so under duress, under pressure. And it was his plan that with some modifications was finally adopted by the quadripartite government for Germany. The levels were changed some.

We were more hardboiled than anybody except the Russians. The British were the most sensible. The French were even better than we were, although they were pretty severe, too. The Russians went even beyond the Morgenthau plan. They were basing their tough attitude on the fact that their whole country had been ravaged and millions of their people killed. They had been invaded, and you have a certain point of view when that happens. They were there to take it out on Germany, I guess, and we were pretty near as bad, although we hadn't been invaded.

[42]

Anyway, the level of industry was finally determined on a level that didn't last long; it wasn't realistic. It took about two years to change. It was after I was back in Washington as Under Secretary before that directive was finally officially revoked.

In the meantime, we didn't pay as much attention to it as perhaps we should from the point of view of military discipline. There were several efforts to pull me back and have me charged with not carrying out the directive.

General Clay always defended me. He knew perfectly well that such a policy couldn't last just as well as I did. We fought it out and finally persuaded Washington. General Marshall himself defended me in testimony before a Congressional Committee. So, it finally worked out. The real turning point came when the currency was devalued or revalued in 1948. At that time we gave the Russians the opportunity to do the same to revalue the mark in their sector, in their zone; they refused. I was back in Washington before this -- when they walked out of the four power council meeting -- the Kommanditura. A few days later they declared the blockade of Berlin.

HESS: Which we will get to in just a minute. Did you ever discuss the Morgenthau plan with its author, with Henry Morgenthau?

---

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lewisgw.htm

Oral History Interview with Geoffrey W. Lewis With Department of State, 1946-70, formerly Deputy Director of the Office of German Affairs,

LEWIS: Personally, I thought from the beginning that this plan to make Germany a pastoral nation and to reduce its living standard or keep its living standard low was a real political pipedream. I could see why this was very attractive to everybody in the rest of the European countries and to many people here in the United States, and I could see how the passions aroused by this terrible Nazi operation, headed by Hitler, could bring about that sort of thing. But I think a lot of that thinking was done with somebody's stomach and not with their head, because it just seemed to me always to

[29]

be a pie in the sky, a pipedream. I thought it was not only foolish to think that this could be done, but very unwise to try to do it. What we were going to do, have a nation of refugees and paupers sitting on the United States Treasury for ever and ever, on and on?

Some people thought that would happen anyway. Well, all right, that's one thing. But to plan for it to happen seemed to me very, very unwise in the long run. And of course, as it turned out, events and pressures of one sort or another worked things around so those plans were, if not formally given up, just forgotten.

///

MCKINZIE: Were there, so far as you're concerned, any major errors in German policy in this period from 1946 to 1953? Do you think that there were, from the point of view of subsequent

[88]

events and in your own philosophy about how Europe should relate to the United States, any important decisions which should have been otherwise?

LEWIS: Well, I'm trying to think of the major ones. I think that the admission of Germany to NATO was delayed too long; I think it would have been better to have done that more quickly.

MCKINZIE: Could they have gotten anything done more quickly?

LEWIS: Well, now that's another thing. I don't know whether they could have or not. That brings us back to the question: did we use the clout that we allegedly had in as effective and prompt a manner as we should have? Maybe ideally it should have been done, but I have doubts as to whether it could have, under the

[89]

circumstances. I can't think of anything, bearing in mind the practicalities of a given situation, that went far amiss. I think we hung onto the so-called [Henry] Morgenthau plan longer than we should have, the pastoralization of Germany. We wasted a lot of time, a lot of energy, a lot of money, and a lot of political support from the rest of Europe by fiddling around so long with that. The British were wiser than we; they had much more reason to be suspicious and fearful of Germany than we ever had, but they were practical enough to see that this was a totally crazy policy. And I think we should have abandoned it sooner. But that brings you back to the question, given the internal politics of the United States -- who was running things, and who was exerting influence -- could we have? I don't know whether we could

[90]

have or not, but I wish we could have. I think it cost us a lot in terms of prestige and financial support.

---

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/knappjb.htm

Oral History Interview with J. Burke Knapp Economist, Federal Reserve Board, 1940-44; adviser on German economic affairs, U.S. Department of State and German Military Government, 1944-45; special assistant to the chairman, Federal Reserve Board, 1945-48; director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State, 1948-49; economic adviser U.S. delegation to NATO

The next chapter in my career followed my joining the State Department in the beginning of 1944, to work on plans for postwar Germany. This was a planning period that was concerned, first of all, with the occupation of Germany and the establishment of quadripartite control of Germany, and then the long-run task, as it was envisaged,

[47]

of reincorporating Germany in a world community. I was concerned with economic planning in a broad sense -- I was, in this role, getting beyond finance, money, banking, and fiscal affairs and into questions of industrial development, agricultural development, production, employment, and the whole range of the problems of the German economy.

At the time that I went into the State Department there was already developing a great controversy between the State Department and the Treasury, with the Department of the Army, for the time being heavily preoccupied with fighting the war, in a sort of a middle position and a waiting position. The controversy centered on what came to be known as the Morgenthau plan. Henry Morgenthau, who felt extremely bitterly about Germany, advocated that when the time came and Germany surrendered, it should be, in his phrase, "pastoralized." Germany should be denied the right to develop any kind of industry beyond light

[48]

consumer goods. Heavy industry in Germany should be suppressed; the coal mines should be flooded, and coal, which was the major German industrial resource, should be denied to future generations of Germany. Germany should be reduced to a pastoral state; an agricultural economy with a little light industry. If Germany could be held in that state of subjugation, the threat of a new rise of Nazism, militarism, and aggression in Germany could be permanently extinguished.

Now, I suppose it's obvious now, with the benefit of hindsight, how ridiculous such a thesis was. Indeed, there were many at the time who regarded this as a perfectly ridiculous proposition, and the State Department took issue with this in a very fundamental way. It took the view that this was a totally unrealistic policy and that other and better ways would have to be found to integrate Germany into the world community, specifically that the planning for the

[49]

postwar occupation of Germany in the economic and financial sense should be to restore order, to begin giving employment, and to establish control over war industries. Germany was never again to be a manufacturer of armaments or of aircraft, but an outlet would have to be given to this very talented people to find a way in the world and to develop a normal economic life, subject only to your rather narrow restrictions (as compared with the Morgenthau concept to neutralize Germany as an aggressive force). This cleavage ran very deep through Washington and frustrated a lot of postwar planning, because until that sort of an issue got settled, a lot of planning was being done in a vacuum and without much conviction that it would really be employed.

Well, nonetheless, that was the atmosphere in which I was working. I personally felt that this Morgenthau plan was totally ridiculous. Yet, the advocates of the Morgenthau plan built it

[50]

up to the point where anybody that contested it was obviously crypto-Nazi or was at least failing to do his patriotic duty to see that nothing like this ever happened again. It was a very difficult atmosphere in which to work, but we did get ahead with our planning effort in the State Department, including the economic and financial aspects.

//

Take the questions of financial administration in Germany, which was part of the economic task. The advocates of the Morgenthau plan said, "The Allied Powers should assume no responsibility for money and banking." If there was to be a tremendous inflation as a

[55]

result of these occupation marks, and if the banking system collapsed, so much the better. "Let the Germans stew in their own juice. Banking and finance is very important in building up an economy, and our task is not to restore the financial and banking mechanisms. The less they are restored, the more we are assured that Germany will collapse into this state of pastoralization."

Of course, that meant that all of the planning we were doing in the State Department on these matters seemed, at the time at least, to be threatened with frustration by the application of the "hands-off" Morgenthau plan.

I spent a year, approximately, on this planning work, and then I was sent overseas in an odd capacity. By this time (this was now in early 1945) the Supreme Allied Command had been established in Versailles, pending the move into Germany. General [Dwight David] Eisenhower was

[56]

the Supreme Commander, and he had as his political adviser a State Department officer, Ambassador Robert Murphy. I was sent over to be economic adviser to the political adviser, that is to say, the economic adviser to Bob Murphy. We worked in Versailles, and then I was sent on some advance missions into parts of occupied Germany. Actually on V-E Day I was in Essen where the great Krupp works was burning to the ground. As the advocates of the Morgenthau plan would say, "It was never to be rebuilt."

---

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/riddle2.htm

Oral History Interview with James W. Riddleberger

Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, 1944-47; counsellor of embassy, and chief, political section, American Military Government, Berlin, Germany, 1947-50; acting political adviser to commander-in-chief, U.S. Forces, Germany, 1949-50

HESS: Do you know what President Roosevelt's attitude was when he first heard about the plan? What seemed to be his attitude?

RIDDLEBERGER: I think it's very hard to say what his real attitude was. He indignantly denied, subsequently, that he signed this memorandum, which he had approved at Quebec. Most of this story was written up in Cordell Hull's book.

The Secretary of State was Cordell Hull and he had just sent me the memorandum from the President telling him that he had approved the Morgenthau plan at Quebec. This paper was before me at the same time the press started to call to tell me the President denied signing it. Well, that was a rather awkward situation.

HESS: How did you get out of that?

RIDDLEBERGER: His denial, of course, had to stand, as Roosevell was President and so I had to deal with that as best I could.

---

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/riddle1.htm

WILSON: Your relations between State and the Army were, I gather, fairly good.

RIDDLEBERGER: Fairly good, yes. Our relations were good. It was Morgenthau with whom our relations were strained.

WILSON: Yes. And I gather that there was some continuation of Treasury opposition afterwards.

RIDDLEBERGER: Oh, yes. It even went into the early stages of the occupation.

WILSON: Yes.

RIDDLEBERGER: Particularly on the reparations and that side of things. And [General Lucius] Clay was faced with a pretty delicate situation there for a long time. The Treasury officials being there, you see. And, of course, Truman took care of that after a while by getting rid of Morgenthau. That was his solution for that.

WILSON: And White, too.

RIDDLEBERGER: And Harry White. Of course, Harry White was the moving spirit. And, I think, Harry White really wrote the Morgenthau plan. At least, he was the one who explained it to us. You know where it was first unveiled, don't you?

WILSON: No, I don't.

RIDDLEBERGER: In Harry Hopkins’ office in the White House. Harry called a meeting, and I guess Dunn and [H. Freeman] Matthews and I went from State, Harry White and I don't remember anymore the others that were there from the Treasury, and Harry Hopkins and maybe somebody else from the White House. I don't recall. I think there is a memo on all this somewhere. And Harry White was the one who did all the talking, I mean, as far as the explanation of their plan was concerned.

---

Oral History Interview with John D. Hickerson

Director for European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1947-49; Assistant Secretary of State, 1949-53

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hickrson.htm

HICKERSON: Well, we have a German section in the State Department. Some of the time I was their boss, when I was Acting Director of European Affairs. They were quite good. We had so many frustrations and difficulties; for instance, the Morgenthau plan, the pastoral state, all such perfect nonsense as that. I can't tell you how poor Mr. Hull grieved over that.

You must remember that Morgenthau got himself invited up to the second Quebec Conference in 1944, and he actually set up that pastoral state plan and got FDR's initials on it and Churchill's. Mr. Hull hadn't been asked to go, and wouldn't go unless he was asked. And when he found out, he put all of us to work. He prepared himself for a meeting with FDR. That meeting took place in September 1944, right after the conference. Mr. Stimson, Secretary of War, was incensed about this thing and stood right with Mr. Hull on it.

---

Joseph D. Coppock economic adviser, International Trade Policy, Department of State, 1945-53; http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/coppockj.htm

I don't know just when the change of attitude shifted the other way, but I would guess that it came in the course of '46 or '47. That was the '46-'47 winter, which was bad; it became clear to some that you simply couldn't have a stripped down, poverty stricken Germany. Here I would say that Kennan and Nitze, and the political officers in the Department, were right. Emergency aid and then the Marshall plan were the answers.

Well, let's see, where were we?

MCKINZIE: Well, we had gotten off on the problems of Germany. I didn't want to interrupt you there.

COPPOCK: I don't know the exact timing, but certainly whatever support there had been for the pastoral Germany disappeared pretty largely during 1946, because it became very evident that the overriding question was which side Germany was going to be

[57]

on in the postwar situation. The threat of the Russians was evident enough, very evident indeed to those of us who had been through the OSS experience and were in the State Department. And all this time we hoped for, but did not expect, a cooperative Russia.

---

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clayl.htm

Oral History Interview with Lucius D. Clay Advanced through grades to general, 1947; deputy to General Eisenhower, 1945; deputy military governor, Germany (U.S.) 1946; commander in chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and military governor, U.S. Zone, Germany, 1947-49; retired 1949.

MCKINZIE: Do you have any thoughts after this passage of time as to what went wrong with the European Advisory Commission? Should it have existed in the first place?

CLAY: It was created in the first place at a period when some of the Allies, and particularly the British, felt that there was a real prospect that the Russians would meet us on the English Channel; that the subdivision of Germany and establishing of boundaries for withdrawal would in effect save Western Europe from being run over by the Russians. Mr. [Winston] Churchill had grave misgivings about the English Channel. He wanted to come up through the Mediterranean and that soft underbelly. The result was that he was very desirous of creating these boundaries. It is interesting that in '44 before the European Commission was ever formed, the British already had maps showing the boundary line between East and West Germany.

//

MCKINZIE: It also makes it difficult, doesn't it, in matters of policy setting, because you had JCS-1067, which was as I understand it, a compromise between the War Department and the Department of State on how...

CLAY: JCS-1067 would have been extremely difficult to operate under. If you followed it literally you couldn't have done anything to restore the German economy. If you couldn't restore the German economy you could never hope to get paid for the food that they had to have. By virtue of these sort of things it was modified constantly; not officially, but by allowing this deviation and that deviation, et cetera. We began to slowly wipe out JCS-1067. When we were ordered to put in a currency reform this was in direct controvention of a provision of JCS-1067 that prohibited us from doing anything to improve the German economy. It was an unworkable policy and it wasn't changed just without any discussion or anything by those of us who were in Germany. It was done by gradual changes in its provision and changes of cablegrams, conferences, and so on.

MCKINZIE: You must have had some backstopping in Washington to be able to do that.

CLAY: At that time I happened to have been very close to Mr. Byrnes, having worked for him. I could go to Mr. Byrnes (he was very close to the President), and he would go to the President. We'd get this thing resolved in short order.

MCKINZIE: Did you discuss with Mr. Byrnes the deteriorating situation with the Soviets before he made his very famous speech, now called the Stuttgart speech, in September of 1946?

CLAY: I urged him in the first place to come to Stuttgart. I had written him a letter about my own views of the situation and it was that letter which he used as the basis for this speech. He visited me in Berlin and we went over together. He had that passage in there, "as long as any other foreign country's troops are in Germany we're going to be there," which was the most important part of the speech. He tried all of that morning to get hold of the President by telephone to get his approval, and then left word that he was going to put this in if he didn't hear anything to the contrary. I'm sure that whatever he said there he had assurance that President Truman approved.

At that time their relationships were very close.

MCKINZIE: In the winter of 1946-47, you were under a directive that the German standard of living couldn't be any higher than that of France, in particular. Do you recall when you began to think in terms of rebuilding Germany as a part of solving a larger problem?

CLAY: In 1946 we got authority, as we brought food into Germany, to sell it to the Germans for German marks. We could use this money as we saw fit; for our own support, but also to aid and help the German economy. When we put in the currency reform in 1948, I saw a Germany where the people were working; which was going to come back quicker than the rest of Western Europe. I, of course, saw that that would never be allowed to happen.

My interest in having a revived Western Europe came from my realization that we could not have an economic recovery in Germany unless it was done as a part of all of Western Europe. It was about this time that the congressional committee came over studying the Marshall plan, the Herter Committee. We preached this to this committee all the time. As a matter of fact, one of the members of that committee, who spent a whole month in Germany at that time, was Everett Dirksen. He came back a very strong supporter of an economic program that would apply to all of Western Europe, including West Germany.

I would say that this came to me, in a reverse sense, in '46. I began to realize that we couldn't develop Germany faster than Western Europe. On the other hand, if we left an economic vacuum in Germany, Western Europe could never come back.

MCKINZIE: When they finally did get around to establishing a Marshall plan and developing the OECD, they had to come up with country requirements. At one point you argued that what they really were doing was trying to rebuild other nations first, at Germany's expense.

CLAY: I put up quite an argument, because the initial reaction of the Americans in charge of the Marshall plan was that they were going to say what Germany could get. Germany was not going to be allowed to express a voice. My contention was that we as military government had to speak as a government, and eventually transfer that right to the Germans.

As a matter of fact, as the first European committees were set up, we as military government became members. They wouldn't let Germans become members, but we went down with our German experts with our own people actually being the delegates.

---

Oral History Interview with Paul H. Nitze

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/nitzeph1.htm

[Henry, Jr.] Morgenthau had still a different point of view. His central interest, of course, was the defeat of Hitler and the rescue of the Jews, and penalties to the Germans for their treatment of the Jews.

MCKINZIE: Is it also safe to say that Morgenthau was extremely conservative, financially and economically, in the kind of advice he was giving the President?

NITZE: I don't think that was the deciding principle about Morgenthau. I think that it was basically a hatred for Hitler and his group. The differences between these three were so great. Harry Hopkins was then, I guess, Secretary of Commerce and living in the White House but acting as Secretary of Commerce. And Harry was unable to resolve these differences between Hull, Wallace, and

[7]

Morgenthau;

---

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/andrewss.htm

Oral History Interview with Stanley Andrews During World War II and the Truman Administration, served as an agricultural officer with American Military Government in Italy and in Germany, 1943-46; advisor to Secretary of Agriculture, 1947; Chief of Food, Agriculture and Forestry Division of the American-British Control Group in Germany, 1948-49;

Well, anyhow in eleven days I was in Germany and we had less than eight days of food reserves to 50 million people. We didn't have any money to buy it. There were 300,000 people, women with babies in their arms, in the streets of Dusseldorf chanting, "We're starving, we want food."

Well, I reported in to General Clay. I said, "General Clay this is critical, and," I said, "you've got to give me a free hand."

He said, "What the hell's the idea?"

[178]

"Well," I said, "I've got to communicate with Washington and the United States Department of Agriculture and I can't get through your damn bureaucracy."

Well he said, "What you're doing, you're taking my entire responsibility."

"Well," I said, "that's the way it's got to be. I can't handle this without it."

"Well," he said, "damn you, Andrews, if you embarrass me I'm going to shoot you." He's rough.

And so I said, "Okay, if I embarrass you, you fire me in a minute." I said, "I'm nothing but a damn civilian anyhow and it doesn't make any difference; you won't hurt my record."

I got in touch with Tracy Voorhees, the Under Secretary of the Army, and we went over to the Department of Agriculture and bought a hundred million dollars worth of food which we would pay for later. Commodity Credit shipped it and we had a hundred ships on the high seas in 21 days to Germany.

Well, we didn't have any money to pay for it. And so we had to go to Congress to get an appropriation. Both Voorhees and I could be put

[179]

under a jail for the next thousand years for that, but we had to take the chance. If Congress refused us the money we were in jail, there's no way around that.

---

Historical Context of Franko German conflict

http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/saar.htm

This link gives a historical context to the events of which the Morgenthau Plan made a brief appearence in.

I do feel sorry for the Germans of Elsass-Lothringen, first they find themselves in the way of the French "drive towards the Rhine" and are invaded and occupied in the 1650's. Then they (the areas where the people still speak German) are brought back to a German nation by Bismark in the 1870s. Then they are conquered by the French again in 1919, then back to germany in 1940, then back to France in 1945. And this time with some heavy duty suppression of German in schools, and prohibition on newspapers carrying more than a few articles in German etc.

I bet the French government would have made quit a lot of noice if the Canadians had decided to use the same language suppression policies in Quebec.

And I also bet the population of Elsass-Lothringen wish there hadnt ever been any iron ore in their land, so people wouldnt have made such a fuss about owning them. Stor stark7 21:11, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

All Honorable Men

I've just read James Stewart Martin's book All Honorable Men, published 1950 by Litle, Brown and Company. Boston.

It is a heavily POV work, the aim of the book seems to be to, as he says on the next to last page, The occupation of Germany must be put back on track. He is not at all pleased that the original policies in occupied Germany had been reversed.

He speaks a lot on how Clay and Draper thwarted his and others efforts to "decartellise" Germany, and their efforts to "bring a balance in the economy of Germany which had far to much heavy industry for its own good"(my summation).

It is nevertheless quite facinating to se how the Morgenthau camp argued, and a glimptse into events, however sanitised.

For instance he mentions that German industry had dealt very cleverly with protecting its patents in the event of war using U.S. firms as caretakers, bound by agreements. A result of this was that while U.S. fighter aircraft had to make do with carburator engines for their fighters, the German fighter engines ran quite efficiently on injection engines. For the U.S to use the german injection technology they would have had to violate the patent laws... Of course, when the war was over the U.S legally took all patents owned by Germans or German companies.

Another hillarious example was that all ships that set sail for England quite naturally took out hefty insurances. The problem was that German insurance companies where heavily intermixed in international insurance. So, when the insurance letter, contining time of departure etc, was sent to the insurer in Switzerland it promptly found its way to the German U-boat fleet. The U.S didnt catch on until sometime well into 1942. The U.S.response was to switch from telegraphing the letter to sending it by mail. It took a while to realise that that didn't help one bit...

Another intresting part is what he call the "Christmas-tree" economy. German companies and factories were standing idle awaiting the occupation forces verdict as to if they were to be destroyed; dismantled and shipped abroad as reparations; or be allowed to resume normal operations. Many companies then sought refuge in wrapping themselves in foreign flags. American Bosch claimed intrest in German Bosch, and suddenly they had been all decked out with priorities and ornamented like Christmas trees. They in turn had satelite industries which naturaly also had to be decked out with do not touch signs. Having aquired this they could demand coal shipments from the authorities in order to start their operation again.

He mentions that the United States Bombing Survey had found that German industry was in operating condition except for coal supplies and transportation. Actual destruction of physical plants had amounted to some 15 to 20 percent of expanded wartime capacity. the rest of the machines and equipment could operate if they had coal to burn and transport to bring raw materials. Germany unlike most other countries was heavily dependent on coal for its energy needs. Up until April 1944, the 421,656 tons of bombs dropped by the Allied strategic air forces did not even take the starch out of the German economy (sic). In the six months from April to September 1944, another 757,364 tons of bombs were dropped, with heavy emphasis on transportation facilities and oil production and storage installations. These targets alone took 336,599 tons with the remaining 420,774 scattered in "area bombing" of cities and miscelaneous industrial targets. This led to a two-thirds reduction in the supply of finished oil products. In the first quarter of 1945, the shortage of coal set the limit to the operation of the German economy, and the lack of transportation facilities set the limit to the supply of coal.

When the Potsdam agreement had been in effect for two months, Dr. Don Humphrey, advicer in the economics division, circulated a memorandum dated October 15, 1945, saying that the intentions of the Potsdam directive should be reversed, the coal produced by the German miners should be kept and used industrially in Germany instead of being furnished to countries like France.

I've also finally gained an understanding as to why such emphasis was put on reparations in the form of dismantled factories. Reparations in the form of goods and products would have required letting the German economy start up and begin to grow again. Reparations in the form of (as he calls them) "surplus" factories not only avoids this, it also makes it harder to ever occur. page 181 reparations from current production would leave a dangerously large number of industrial plants inside Germany. page 239 The committee overlooked the purpose of the reparations program which was to shift some heavy industry to other parts of Europe, while lighter industries were to be rebuilt in Germany. Stor stark7 20:01, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

Forced Labor

Se this talk page. Talk:Forced_labor_of_Germans_in_the_Soviet_Union#Forced Labor of Germans in the West Stor stark7 08:52, 16 April 2006 (UTC)

Eisenhower and Morgenthau

Dietrich is refering to a Stephen Ambrose book for Eisenhowers free release of a thousand copies of the Morgenthau Plan to the military officials in occupied Germany. John Dietrich. The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (2002) pg. 27.

Eisenhower later insisted that the free distribution did not "constitude approval or disapproval of the views expressed.". Ambrose concludes that "There can be little doubt, however, that at the time, Eisenhower definitively did approve, just as there can be little doubt that in the August 1944 conversation Eisenhower gave Morgenthau at least some of his ideas on the treatment of Germany."

Dietrich references the following: Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, p.422.

Stor stark7 16:24, 16 April 2006 (UTC)

Rheinwiesen camps

The Pow policy as part of Morgenthau plan ?. In 1945 millions of pows captured in last months of the war were held in pow-camps. many were later send to forced work in belgium and france. the allieds invented in 1945 a policy that stated that they are not pow anymore just disarmed enemy forces to avoid to be forced to use the geneva convention ( with would result in red cross comitee controls of these pow camps. Link with pictures of the camps (in german) :

• (main page with pictures of many pow camps)
• (in english)

--Dugell 18:19, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

This was only true for a short time. The US stopped sending pows to France because of France's inhumane treatment. POWs in Canada remained until the trans Canadain highway was finished in the mid 1950s - 10 years then released ( wanted that highway done first - great workers and cheap ), but Canada at least feed them and of course German was totally destroyed ( an excuse I guess).

JSS 1067 was ambiguous

A little history here: Paul Hammond says: "the most prominent questions which remained unanswered by JCS 1067 concerned the economic treatment of Germany. It authorized the occupation authorities to assume control of industrial, agricultural, utility, communication and transportation facilities, supplies, and services only for purposes of demilitarization, prevention of disease and unrest, prosecution of the Japanese war, and the preservation and protection of facilities and supplies for purposes of relief, restitution, and reparation. While this was clearly an attempt to make the "German authorities," rather than the American occupation, responsible for the successful functioning of the German economy, in contrast to the provisions of CCS 551, it raised questions which remained unanswered elsewhere in the text: How could "German authorities" be held responsible for anything unless they had some independence of action, which was evidently not contemplated? Here was a new problem of responsibility for the Army. How stringent would the life of the German populace be under this directive? The answer to this question depended upon the military interpretation of "disease and unrest" (which would determine how much the occupation forces would do to help) and by how much "the German people and the German authorities," with whom responsibility for any other positive actions was to rest, would be capable of doing. But how could the Germans act except with the approval and support of the occupation authorities? Undoubtedly they could not, and yet they were to be responsible for what they did or failed to do. Apparently, German efforts would have to come from local initiative, for "all dealings in so far as possible should be with municipal and provincial government officials rather than with Central government officials." But of the economic problems specifically left to the German authorities—"price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing or transportation" —most of them could be accomplished only on a national (or, as it turned out, zonal) basis. Clearly, the relationship between occupation forces and viable indigenous government remained an unsettled question. ... JCS 1067 looked ahead to a unified, tripartite administration of occupied Germany (the later Potsdam Conf. provided for a fourth, French zone), while at the same time it envisaged decentralization of the political structure of Germany. ... For the time being, however, Eisenhower was provided with a policy statement on Germany which followed the Morgenthau Plan in some respects, but which was ambiguous enough to place in question the degree to which Morgenthau's views were to be carried out; which provided the Supreme Commander a maximum degree of discretion, and which absolved him, as best it could, of responsibility for the collapse of Germany. ..."The British, it will be remembered, had rejected JCS 1067 as a Combined Chiefs of Staff document. " in American Civil-Military Decisions 1963. Page 390ff Rjensen 17:57, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

More history: after FDR died, Morgenthau lost power fast. Hammond again: " April 26, the second revision of JCS 1067 was approved by IPCOG, and sent to JCS for clearance; JCS forwarded it to Eisenhower on April 28. However, at that time the War Department was attempting to deal with a question from Eisenhower as to whether the production of synthetic oil in Germany would be permitted. Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, wrote Hilldring on April 28 warning that unless German facilities for the production of synthetic rubber, synthetic oil, magnesium, and aluminum were kept intact and operated to some degree like other basic industries in Germany, it would be necessary to import these products from outside Germany, presumably the United States. In fact, he maintained, steel, iron, and heavy industry production should be maintained until requirements for a minimum German economy and for liberated areas were determined. Otherwise, heavy import burdens might result. 381 In the light of Eisenhower's inquiry and Somervell's recommendations, the Joint Chiefs recommended that the draft be changed to allow the zone commander to waive prohibition of the production of synthetic rubber and oil, magnesium, and aluminum without clearance through JCS. Morgenthau, seeing the proposal as representing an unduly liberal treatment of Germany, protested to Stimson, but to no avail. 382 IPCOG promptly accepted the amendment, which was dated May 10. The approval of President Truman was obtained on May 11 and this "Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany," known as JCS 1067/8, was issued to Eisenhower on May 14. " [p 425] "By mid-July, when the conference began, some major changes had occurred in the respective positions of these agencies. The State Department's star had risen, and the Treasury's was in descent. The change had begun when the mantle of the Presidency had unexpectedly fallen on Harry S. Truman on April 12, 1945. Simultaneously, the Secretary of the Treasury's special and intimate relationship with the President was eliminated and the White House began to depend more upon conventional State Department channels for the formulation of foreign policy." [p 431] "Stimson and he were relieved to learn that Morgenthau would not represent the Treasury at Potsdam. Twice before Potsdam Stimson expressed to the new President with considerable candor his version of the struggle over the Morgenthau Plan, including his view that Roosevelt had completely repudiated it. The second time had been in person, during final preparations for the President's departure for Germany. He came away thinking that Truman agreed with his position on Germany, an impression that could not have been entirely wrong, since Truman had just asked him to be on hand at the impending conference. Thus while the War epartment's role was becoming more significant, Treasury's was declining." [432] Rjensen 18:10, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

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From: Truman Library - Lucius D. Clay Oral History Interview

www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clayl.htm

MCKINZIE: With all due honor to some very capable people who served under you in Germany, how did you assess the quality of the Armed Forces in 1946, 1947, and 1948? There are those people who say that the Civil Affairs Branch particularly was….

CLAY: This depends on your definition. We certainly went in there with a great number of people who were either members of the Communist party or tended in that direction. This was not the place nor the time for them. It did create some problems that took a long time to correct. Many of these men had come to us on Treasury teams. We ran into a tremendous opposition on the part of the Treasury if we attempted to change or remove any of these people.

---

From pages 78- 79, The Morgenthau Plan (John Dietrich, NY: Algora Publishers, 2002):

“Walter Dorn wrote . . . that JCS 1067 was ‘largely a Treasury document.’ [n.18: Earl F. Ziemke, The United States Army in the Occupation of Germany, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1975, p. 105]”

“Morgenthau’s son conceded that the Morgenthau Plan was ‘implanted’ in JCS 1067 and that it lived on . . . ‘In the summer of 1945, after Morgenthau’s resignation, the Morgenthau Plan enjoyed a short afterlife implanted in the regulations for administering the military German occupation, JCS 1067. This was in part the handiwork of Morgenthau’s former assistant, Colonel Bernard Bernstein, and other Treasury hands planted in Eisenhower’s staff. . . . ‘ [n.24: John Morton Blum, Years of War 1941-1945 From the Morgenthau Diaries, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1967, p. 457] Henry Morgenthau III may contend that without his father’s guidance the [JCS 1067] directive was ignored, but, due to the large number of ex-Treasury officials working as Civil Affairs officers during the early stages of the occupation, it was frequently carried out to the letter. [n.25: Henry Morgenthau III, Mostly Morgenthau: A Family History, Ticknor & Fields, New York, 1991, p. 407.]”

NOTE: The above reference to JCS 1067 being implemented for a "short" time is incorrect, since JCS 1067 was in effect for 2 years, from 1945 to 1947. The "short time" text from Morgenthau's son's book (above) is repeated: "In the summer of 1945, after Morgenthau’s resignation, the Morgenthau Plan enjoyed a short afterlife implanted in the regulations for administering the military German occupation, JCS 1067."

Konrad Adenauer

Konrad Adenauer, speech in Berne (23rd March, 1949) from, Spartacus Schoolnet

We live in disturbed times. New problems arise every day, developments never stand still. Despite the number and variety of problems, every responsible person must realize that for the present and coming generation there is now only one main problem, and it is this: the world has seen the formation of two power-groups. On one side there is the group of powers led by the United States of America and united in the Atlantic Pact. This group defends the values of Christian and Western civilization, freedom, and true democracy. On the other side there is Soviet Russia with her satellites.

The line dividing these two groups of powers runs right down the centre of Germany. Twenty million Germans live under Soviet rule, about 43 million in the orbit of the Atlantic bloc.

These 43 million Germans in the area of the Atlantic bloc possess the most important mineral deposits and the greatest European industrial potential. But this area, the three Western zones of Germany, is in a state of disorder that is in the long run untenable. Even today a very considerable part of these 43 million live in such abject housing conditions, such a state of legal bondage as may have been imaginable in the Balkans a hundred years ago but would hardly have been thought possible in central Europe for centuries.

It is impossible to understand the present condition of Germany without a brief survey of what happened after 1945. The unconditional surrender of the German armed forces in May 1945 was interpreted by the Allies to mean a complete transfer of governmental authority into their hands. This interpretation was wrong from the point of view of international law. By it the Allies in practice assumed a task which it was impossible for them to fulfil. I consider it to have been a grave mistake. They would have been unable to solve this task with the best will in the world. There was bound to be failure and this failure badly affected the prestige of the Allies in Germany. It would have been wiser if the Allies had, after a short intermediate state due to the confusion left by the war, let the Germans order their affairs and had confined themselves to supervision. Their attempt to govern this large disorganized country from outside, often guided by extraneous political and economic criteria of their own, was bound to fail. It brought about a rapid economic, physical, and psychological disintegration of the Germans which might have been avoided. It also seems that intentions such as had once been manifested in the Morgenthau Plan played their part. This continued until the Marshall Plan brought the turning point. The Marshall Plan will remain for all time a glorious page in the history of the United States of America. But the change was very slow and the economic, physical, moral, and political decline of Germany which had begun with the unconditional surrender took great efforts to reverse.

excerpts from old Time articles

www.time.com

Oct. 2, 1944

After a couple of days of cloudy rumors, the news broke over the weekend. The Roosevelt Cabinet was violently split, over the gravest problem now before all Allied Governments: what to do with postwar Germany?

Again there had been no real advance planning on a huge problem that had been visibly approaching for a long time. Again there had been some hasty last-minute improvisation, and the plan that was handiest and most attractive at the moment had been seized on.

The plan that had been put forward, by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, had roused the violent objections of Secretaries Cordell Hull and Henry Stimson. The President was said to be leaning toward the Morgenthau side.

The Morgenthau plan was the first reported by the Wall Street Journal's Alfred ("Mike") Flynn, and expanded by Associated Pressman John M. Hightower. Far & away the most drastic yet proposed for the future of Germany, it was just barely above the level of "sterilize all Germans." It would reduce Germany from a prewar industrial giant to a fourth-rate nation of small farms. Its points called for:

¶ Removal from Germany of all industrial machinery which any liberated country wants; obliteration of the rest of German industry.

¶ Permanent closing of all German mines—if any are left after territorial changes.

¶ Cession of the Saar and other Rhineland industrial areas to France; cession of East Prussia to Poland.

¶ Breakup of all large land holdings into small farms.

¶ Withholding of any economic aid whatsoever to Germany; no food, clothing or other relief supplies to be furnished to the German people; no reconstruction of railroads or factories within Germany to be permitted.

¶ Prolonged occupation by Russian, British and American troops, perhaps for a generation.

¶ No reparations—since Germany would have nothing to pay them with, and would be allowed no way to earn payments in the future.

This was indeed a Carthaginian peace. But Henry Morgenthau believes that Germany must be destroyed, as Carthage was. When he visited the battlefields last October, General Eisenhower showed him a booklet outlining Allied Military Government directives to soldiers for the occupation of Germany. This was strictly a military document drafted by the War Department. Henry Morgenthau, fanatical Naziphobe, was much exercised over several passages which to his mind were indications of a too lenient attitude. He lifted these passages and put them in a memorandum to the President.

---

Oct. 9, 1944

Henry Morgenthau's devastating plan for Germany (TIME, Oct. 2) was dead—or was it? Franklin Roosevelt took a sideswipe at the U.S. press for even reporting it.

At his press conference, the President announced that he had written a letter to Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley. The letter was a full set of instructions for FEA policies when the war in Europe is over, including a section on "Control of the War-Making Power of Germany."

As if there had been no Cabinet battle over the Morgenthau plan, almost as if there had been no previous New Deal plans for Germany at all, the President urged FEA to accelerate its plans for the economic control of postwar Germany. FEA should see to it, the President said, "that Germany does not become a menace again."

Asked a newsman: Did this mean that the Cabinet split was healed?

That was all a newspaper story, replied F.D.R.

"No foundation to the stories at all?"

Every story that came out, said the President with some asperity, was essentially untrue in its basic facts.

The newsmen, recognizing an old Rooseveltian device, let the matter drop. Once again, the President had used the press as a whipping boy; once again he had thrown the ball to a new Governmental agency after three others had quarreled. To bottle up further leaks, the President ordered Secretaries Morgenthau and Stimson not to talk, and both called off scheduled press conferences.

But the highest sources in Washington insisted that the Morgenthau plan was not only still alive, but would yet turn out to be the final plan, though modified. According to these sources, his plan had been "bought" by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at Quebec, despite heavy objections from Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. After the hubbub has died down, Henry Morgenthau's proposals supposedly will then reappear as the official U.S. proposal.

---

The Price to Pay

Apr. 2, 1945

The Policy. While neither of Franklin Roosevelt's envoys had anything to say last week, the general outlines of U.S. reparations policy had begun to take form. To Washington insiders it seemed clear that proponents of the Morgenthau plan for Germany, rather than having lost everything at Yalta, had won at least half a victory. It was also clear that the final reparations plan would depend largely on the extent of destruction inside Germany. Stemming from that point, Washington thinking was running along these lines:

¶ Germany should be made to pay heavily from her vast stores of raw materials— coal, potash (badly needed to fertilize Europe's wasted farmlands), timber, etc; she should also pay with some of her food.

¶ Neither the U.S. nor Britain is minded to invest money to help Germany restore her smashed-up industrial plants; these would have to be repaired by the German people themselves, living on standards probably below even what they maintained during the war.

¶ Germany should be made, it was thought in Washington, to return the machinery and facilities she has stolen from the ravaged countries of Europe, and she should be left, in her period of recovery, to find her own markets as best she can.

Finally, Washington knew that no U.S. official now was thinking in terms of a strong, centralized Germany again. U.S. official opinion, forming gradually, was moving along a strong policy line. Germany would have to face her debts, pay them in kind—and in full.

---

Victory In Europe

Housekeeping in Hell May 14, 1945

Nevertheless, stern measures have been laid out. The latest plan for its control, "revised directive 1067," laid on President Truman's desk only ten days before war's end, followed closely the Morgenthau or "goat pasture" plan. Southern Germany would largely revert to agrarian economy. All industry capable of producing armaments (a broad definition) would be destroyed or transferred, the remainder controlled by the occupation forces. The educational system would be overhauled.

Said FEA's Leo Crowley, who had a part in drafting "revised directive 1067": "We are going to have a tremendous policing job and we will be busy at it for years. I predict that some people will get mighty tired of it, and there will be a campaign to get us out of Germany."

---

Firing Commences

Aug. 11, 1947

It was the first broadside of the 1948 presidential campaign. Before 1,300 cheering Ohio Republicans in Columbus, U.S. Senator Robert A. Taft† opened his "campaign last week by raking the Truman Administration from prow to poop, blasting its domestic policy and its foreign policy and praising the Republican Congress for crimping the powers of the executive. He exposed himself to the hot fire of counterattack, but that would hardly dismay Ohio's Taft.

New Trail. During the 80th's sessions, Bob Taft had walked more or less silently and uncomfortably in the footsteps of Michigan's Arthur Vandenberg on matters of foreign policy. He followed that trail no longer. "I am not happy," he cried, "about the country's foreign policy."

U.S. policy was "befuddled." He said: "Through the agreements made at Teheran and Yalta by President Roosevelt, and at Potsdam by President Truman, we practically abandoned all the ideals for which the war was fought. . . ." Blazing his own trail through the thickets of diplomatic history, he reached these conclusions: "We created an impossible situation in which freedom is suppressed throughout large sections of Europe and Asia. In Germany our policy has been dominated by the harsh and impractical Morgenthau plan, even though the Government pretended to repudiate it. Our German policy has wrecked the economy of Europe and now we are called upon for cash from our taxpayers to remedy the breakdown."

---

Topside Teammates

Jan. 28, 1952

Legs Without Heads. Draper's first headache in his new job will be combatting a misconception about him in Europe —and in the leftish reaches of U.S. politics. Because he was the man who in 1946 carried out the U.S.'s revised economic policy toward Germany—throwing out all traces of the Morgenthau Plan—he became tagged as "pro-German." He was accused of not doing enough to break up German industry; now that German industry is needed in the reconstruction of Western Europe, that criticism lacks its old force, but the prejudice against him persists.

---

Oct. 5, 1983 FOREIGN RELATIONS Challenge & Response

It is a shortened/censored? version of the Jul. 28, 1947 Pas de Pagaille!

The committees to study Europe's needs and resources under the "Marshall approach" got down to work this week in the Grand Palais, one of the few really ugly buildings in the center of Paris.

Coal was the central issue at Paris.

And coal meant the Ruhr and Germany.

Without Ruhr coal, and without the German industrial output which depends on Ruhr coal, the rest of Europe cannot recover. To help remedy that paralysis, the U.S. last week issued a new directive to Germany's occupation chief, General Lucius D. Clay, superseding Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (which had directed the U.S. commander to take "no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany..."). The new directive said: "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany." The U.S. suggested that the permissible level of industry in Western Germany be raised by boosting steel production from 5.8 to 12 million tons a year.

When they heard that, the French promptly raised the roof, almost threatened to sabotage the Paris conference.

The Communists hastened to aggravate these fears; L'Humanité cried: "Let French Mothers Again Tremble!" The British made difficulties too. They did not like a U.S. suggestion that their plans to socialize Ruhr mines be postponed.

Last week, it looked as though many Europeans were far ahead of their own leaders in understanding that it was more important to make the "Marshall approach" work than to keep Germany down. Said Henri-Albert Joinville, 46, a road repair man: "The Marshall plan was quite simple when it started and now the politicians are trying to make it complicated. It is still simple for me. We are in trouble. If we don't get help, there may be anarchy in France. Now let's get ahead.

Pour l'amour de Dieu, pas de pagaille!

[For God's sake, let's not mess around!]."

France wants more coal and is entitled to it, but will not permit the necessary industrial production to feed and supply the German miners to produce more coal. Britain, which wants both greater coal and industrial production, wants both under her control and socialization program."

Quite Simple. Last week, it looked as though many Europeans were far ahead of their own leaders in understanding that it was more important to make the "Marshall approach" work than to keep Germany down or to keep somebody's schemes from getting hurt.

I removed strange map

I removed a very strange map. There was no "Russia" in 1945. --Molobo 20:02, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

Um.. yes and no. Yes, their was no Russian Federation or Czarist Russia in 1945, but rather the was the Soviet Union. However, since the Soviet Union was commonly referred to simply as "Russia" in the west at the time, it would not have been uncommon for the Soviet Union to be labeled "Russia" on a western map. So, it's not so strange that you'd see a 1945 map with "Russia" on it. Welcome to the wonderful world of contemporary historical perspective. Enjoy your stay. ;) Allthenamesarealreadytaken (talk) 15:26, 6 April 2009 (UTC)

Original Research

Much of this article seems to be original research rather then facts. While they are no doubt some statements the attempt to join them to form an opinionated view presented on Wiki constitutes synthesis of data and is OR. I shall try to restore neutrality to the article in the future. --Molobo 20:11, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

In view of your recent wikistalking of me and your random acts of vandalism, I’ve come to the conclusion that you are a WikiTroll. The fact that you were recently blocked for the astounding timeframe of one entire month , would seem to amply confirm this conclusion. I expect nothing but POV from you, despite your attempts to lure the unwary with fine words. --Stor stark7 20:42, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

I suggest you confirm with the rule of civility. I am saddened by your view of my person as I seek objectivity on wiki. Your edits seem too much of OR to be acceptable. You are creating articles out of private statements and give impression this were official policies. --Molobo 20:49, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

I suggest then that you acquire the books on the suggested reading list, or equivalent, and I shall enjoy a dialogue. There is as far as I know nothing in the article that is not at least in principle supported by the books. --Stor stark7 20:56, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

There is as far as I know nothing in the article that is not at least in principle Wiki is for facts not about statements being "in principle". --Molobo 21:01, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

I was referring to your synthesis allegation!

Everything in the article has a source. As you see there were no references when I started improving the article. I’ve been adding references and notes as I go along, and in the end I expect that everything will be referenced. Luckily I’ve a job and a social life, so it’s slow work in progress. --Stor stark7 21:10, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

Everything in the article has a source. Statements yes, but they are brought together to create an impression of policy. --Molobo 21:11, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

And what, pray tell, did you think the book “The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy ” was all about? --Stor stark7 21:16, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

You skillfull manipulate data and statements to create a certain vision for example here:. Herbert Hoover asserted that that ration was hardly more than the ration which caused thousands in the Nazi concentration camps to die from starvation.. Which is a total manipulation in itself as the quote is given without context of the situation. Germans were free and could provide food for themselfs unlike people in concentration camps. The deaths were the result of slave work and abuse combined with starvation. Giving such a statement without giving the context or the information that such comparision is wrong seems to me a manipulation. Curiously I don't see information that antisemitic and neonazi ideologists have used this plan in their conspiracy theories. --Molobo 21:17, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

What was it you sait about trying to be civil?

Germany had not been self-supporting when it came to food for a long time. They used to have to purchase large amounts of food from abroad.

At this point in time the Germans were not in a condition to provide food for themselves. Large number of German former soldiers were in Allied work camps, the German economy was being artificially suppressed by the Allies meaning they had no money to buy food from abroad. The U.S.S.R refused to send food from it’s half of Germany, which had been the main agricultural area of the nation. The ”West” Germans were utterly dependent on food provided by the U.S. and Britain.

As for the neo-nazi connection I’ve been planning to insert a chapter on the plans contemporary effects once the rest of the text begins to be more finished. It will appear in time, never fear, and well referenced. -Stor stark7 21:33, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

Large number of German former soldiers were in Allied work camps, the German economy was being artificially suppressed by the Allies meaning they had no money to buy food from abroad. Which doesn't compare to concentration camp. There were no genocidal intentions from Allies in regards to German people and every German citizen was free to pursue food on his initative, I am sure Allied soldiers were quite willing to sell food. As to Soviets I recall they were plagued by prostitution in their zone so this deals went all the time.While the statment of Hoover can be sourced it is his private opinion and not a historic fact.Comparision to concentration camp is fully inacceptable and untrue and explanation should be in order, we don't need revisionism on Wiki. It has its own article and should stick there. --Molobo 21:46, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

You are getting incoherent. I am sure Allied soldiers were quite willing to sell food.. Sounds like OR on your part to me. John Dietrich devotes at least 19 pages to the subject. As for Hoover, he and his team were on a Presidential mission. He was not alone in writing the report, and it was an official U.S. publication he created. Furthermore I resent your revisionism allegations. --Stor stark7 21:59, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

Now now, OR ? Ok I will cite reports about the swarms of German prostitutes plaguing Soviet soldiers who complained at their constant harassment during their soldiery duties. Anyway I shall write a sentence explaining the different context of the situation if you are unwilling to correct the false impression that conditions were comperable. Furthermore I resent your revisionism allegations. It's your unfortunate method of presentation that leads to such comparisions. Please be more carefull in the future. --Molobo 22:06, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

molobo what an completly unacceptle statement. soviet and polnish soldiers were known for systematical massrapes in the german eastern provinces (as part of a policy of ethnical cleansing,(the goal was to force the at that time predomiantly female population in that ares to flee away from there) they didn´t need to pay for sex. the systematically terroized the german female population. in german sources at least 8 million rape casses are registered. theses soldiers just took what they want, there was no law applied stopping that. this makes are large difference to the territories occupied in the west of germany. Only in the french zone many massrapes in the first 3 monthes of the occupation were known (mostly comitted by french colianl soldiers from marroc and algeria). After these 3 month the public order were restored by the french miltary (later french soldiers were executed in public, if they were not following the new orders how to deal with the german civil populaton). --Dugell 18:01, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Indeed. "German prostitutes plaguing Soviet soldiers who complained at their constant harassment during their soldiery duties". Given that Soviet soldiers raped millions of Germans this claim of yours, molobo, is simply astounding in its shamelessness. You could start educating yourself by reading "The Fall of Berlin" by Antony Beevor but, really, pretty much any non-Soviet historian who covers what happened when the Red Army rolled into East Prussia would inform you. You were blocked for a month and then a year for repeatedly engaging in what Wiki admin called a "highly disruptive revert rampage" apparently motivated by some deep seated hatred of Germans. Why not give it a rest.Bdell555 05:40, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

Disputed Harry White paragraph

"The fact Morgenthau's attitude towards the Germans aligned so closely with Stalin's may have been influenced by his close friend and advisor, Harry Dexter White, who was indicted before a Senate Committee on a charge of passing US Government secrets to Moscow in 1948 but who committed suicide (John Morton Blum, "From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941 - 1945 (Boston, 1967) p. 338). Anti-semitic groups have called much attention to Morgenthau's Judaism."

Contains multiple factual errors:

(1) White testified to a House committee, not Senate (there's a BIG difference)

(2) he was never indicted

(3) he did not commit suicide, but died of a heart attack 4 days after his testimony to HUAC (?)

(4) there is no reference to the above allegations on page 338 of Blum's "Years of War" DEddy 15:42, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Says you; who cant even post on the talk page but posts on the user page. What can you possibly know if you cant even post on the talk page? The text has been here for a long time before you removed it, who ever added it probably knew what they were talking about unlike you who cant even post on the talk page but posts on the user page. And others seem to agree that the text is correct. Ironplay 23:48, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Please to explain the significance of "who cant even post on the talk page but posts on the user page." I fail to grok the significance or distinction. I am more than willing to admit I'm a Wiki newbie & accept guidance from an old hand.

"And others seem to agree that the text is correct."... Ummmm. The age of a statement carries weight in its truthfulness & accuracy? Who "others?"

Please to address issues 1 thru 4 raised above.

Would you like to see the text of page 338 from "Years of War?" I guarantee there is no reference to any of the first 3 points, since page 338 is describing when Morgenthau & White were in England in August 1944, 4 (four) years BEFORE events 1 thru 3. DEddy 03:06, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

I am the one who originally added that material. I made no factual error. It is true that White testified to HUAC and was found dead days later. However, I could cite authoritative sources that it was a suicide by sleeping pills; any claim that White died of a heart attack would have to state "apparent" heart attack. The fact White testified to a House committee does not change the fact that it was the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that indicted him. Among other things, the Senate concluded that "The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the Treasury Department, and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division". I did not cite Blum's work as evidence that White was indicted by the Senate. The obvious cite for that, if one were necessary, would be the US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary [Subcommittee on Internal Security], Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, Part 23, 84th Congress, 2d Session, 1956. Blum's work is rather cited as evidence for the first clause of the "disputed" sentence.Bdell555 03:05, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

SISS... that's the McCarren committee, right?... well that says enough as to an extreme rightwing attitude. I'm not a legal scholar, but I assume it is not possible to indict a dead person.

Since you've found source for that Senate document, could you post the URL here in the talk page, please?

I'm afraid I can't follow the reasons to cite or not to cite Blum that you offer... please to clarify DEddy 16:40, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

Now I've gone back & looked at page 338 in Blum again... it's talking about the August 1944 trip Morgenthau & White took to England. Totally unrelated to any events in 1948 or 1956. DEddy 16:57, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

I might add that if you are going cut out the Blum citation, you ought to have corrected how Blum is cited again later, since later he is just cited with the page number.Bdell555 03:40, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

Note also the conclusion of Senator Moynihan's 1997 Commission: "The complicity of Alger Hiss of the State Department seems settled. As does that of Harry Dexter White of the Treasury Department". http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa7.htmlBdell555 05:04, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

A very short book on the greater topic of goverment secrecy by Senator Moynihan is NOT a Senate indictment of Harry White. Bruce Craig's book "Treasonable Doubt" was not published until 2004. DEddy 12:32, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

I have heard that Germany/Hitler ( and the Japanese ) tried to surrender years before the war ended. The Morganthau Plan seemed to be leaked to them just in time to make sure they fought to the bitter end. This same thing happened in WW1 - minus the Japanese. Most of the deaths in the war I believe happened after the surrender attempts - military and civilian. But as Madeline Albright would say - it was worth it.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 159.105.80.63 (talk • contribs) 20:52, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

I suspect a very good - definitive - book on the Morganthau Plan is the book of the same name by David Irving. It was published only in German as I understand. Does anyone know of an English translation? Any of his books, even if you don't like him will have footnotes and original sources that are voluminous.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 159.105.80.63 (talk • contribs) 18:33, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

Neutrality tags

This article seems to be rather slanted. Most of the references are to one book and many contentious statements are not referenced at all. The links to Time magazine do not work, at least for me. The article contradicts itself and is unclear on many points. Was the Morgenthau Plan seriously considered as policy or was it the private idea of Morgenthau himself? The article says both. How much did it influence JS 1067, and to what extent was JS 1067 actually followed? The implementation section is biased, using questionable interpretation of mostly primary sources to create a misleading picture. For example, it says that:

• Automobile production was to be set at 10% of its [pre-war] 1936 level, etc.

If one actually looks at the source, it is considerable more complex that 'etc', with most industries faring far better than automobiles.

• Over a period of years American policy eventually started to change away from this policy of industrial destruction. The main turning point was the speech "Restatement of Policy on Germany" held in Stuttgart by the United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on September 6, 1946.

This is contradictory; how can a policy 'eventually' change over a 'period of years' when the 'turning point' is only a year and a half later?

As a further point, this talk page is absolutely festooned with primary sources and what seems like original research.--Nydas^(Talk) 14:08, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

I think I’d better deal with your issues one by one if I may.

• Most of the references are to one book

And that is bad? There are not so many books that focus on the particular subject available. The books in the “further reading” list are the only ones I’m aware of, and I’ve been looking for a while. I can recommend them, quite entertaining reading.

• The links to Time magazine do not work

They do now, all fixed.

• The article contradicts itself and is unclear on many points. Was the Morgenthau Plan seriously considered as policy or was it the private idea of Morgenthau himself?

Please point more specifically to the alledged contradictions. The plan was indeed considered seriously, so seriously that in late 1944 a version (the one using the word “pastoral”) was signed by Churchill and Roosevelt. Publicly Roosevelt later pretended he had never signed it. JCS 1067 was the creation of Morgenthau, which replaced the earlier much milder occupation directive, the SHAEF handbook, with it. Although Morgenthaus opponents managed to insert some loopholes into the final version that was effected, it was still essentially his work.

“On May 10, 1945 Truman signed the JCS 1067. Morgenthau told his staff that it was a big day for the Treasury, and that he hoped that "someone doesn't recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan."[17]”

• and to what extent was JS 1067 actually followed?

To quite some extent. Beyond having strong backing in the U.S., “In occupied Germany Morgenthau left a direct legacy through what in OMGUS commonly were called "Morgenthau boys". These were US Treasury officials whom Eisenhower has "loaned" in to the Army of occupation. These people ensured that the occupation directive JCS 1067, which had been heavily influenced by Morgenthau and his plan, was interpreted as strictly as possible. They were most active in the first crucial months of the occupation, but continued their activities for almost two years following the resignation of Morgenthau in mid 1945 and some time later also of their leader Colonel Bernard Bernstein, who was "the repository of the Morgenthau spirit in the army of occupation".[2] Although I believe you can find some amusing examples of pasive resistance against the Morgenthau boys in Freda Utleys book.

• The implementation section is biased, using questionable interpretation of mostly primary sources to create a misleading picture.

You are right that the Implementation section needs rewriting. I created that section when I was new to Wikipedia and not completely up and running on policy. Since then I’ve acquired the literature needed to rewrite it and remove the primary sources, but I’ve just not been able to bring myself to deal with it. To lazy, to many other interesting topics to deal with. Guess I’ll have to try to find the time to do it though.

Please provide evidence that the “picture created” is misleading.

• For example, it says that: “Automobile production was to be set at 10% of its [pre-war] 1936 level, etc.[9]” If one actually looks at the source, it is considerable more complex that 'etc', with most industries faring far better than automobiles.

Which is probably why the sentence immediately preceding the sentence that you chose to quote states “most industries were to have their production halved.”.

• This is contradictory; how can a policy 'eventually' change over a 'period of years' when the 'turning point' is only a year and a half later?

Simple, the same way that you cant suddenly get a running train to go in the opposite direction just because you‘ve had a change of mind about the direction. First you start breaking, the train keeps going in the same direction for a while but starts slowing down, then when the train has finally halted, you can start running the engine in the opposite direction.

The speech “Restatement of policy on Germany” took place in September 6, 1946.

“In July 1947 JCS 1067, which had directed the U.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "…take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany", was replaced by JCS 1779 which instead stressed that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany." [13]”

In 1951 the dismantling in the Ruhr, that had been set in motion by policy at Potsdam, was finally halted. Please forgive me, but I just can’t resist the mischievous urge to provide a poignant primary source about the dismantling here, from 30, October 1949 letter to Robert Schumann. Seems the Allies needed a litle push in the end to better their ways. Seems rather silly to me actually, giving Marshall plan loans to Germany so Germany can buy new factories in the U.S. while at the same time its Allies are dismantling factories that eventually will have to be rebuilt using the loans. Maybe it was good for the U.S. economy.

• As a further point, this talk page is absolutely festooned with primary sources and what seems like original research.--

Yeah I know about the primary sources, I collected whatever primary and secondary sources that I could find on the net that mentioned the Morgenthau plan and used them early on to try to understand what the hell was going on during the occupation. Don’t need them now though since I acquired Dietrichs book, as well as having read some other books. Still, primary sources are, although frowned upon, allowed on talk pages, and besides they might be useful for other editors searching for inspiration about which topics to write about. I first heard about GARIOA when reading the interviews, which piqued my intrest and sent me searching for proper sources.

Please be more specific about the OR part. --Stor stark7 ^Talk 18:54, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

It, uh, was a plan made in Washington, D.C, U.S.A. Uh,... can we agree, here...?

Jesu.

While you argue over what niceties deserve to dance on the heads of what pins, you -- all of you, who have talked and talked and talked here, and who haven't edited the fundamental error out of the very opening line of the article -- all of you, who didn't think it worth your time to mention to anyone who wandered by, that the *Morgenthau Plan* wasn't a British, nor a French, nor a German, nor a Japanese plan -- NO! It was a U.S.A. plan!! OMG!!!1!!!! WTF????!/!!!

It's now in the opening line of the article.

Hell, I just wandered by.

Continue to dance on whatever pins you choose. Ignore the elephants.

cheers,

Madmagic 06:54, 14 August 2007 (UTC)

Interesting Morganthauplan maps (german wikipedia)

can somebody get translate the maps and upload it--Lokuspokus 19:42, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

Morgenthau plan map

Image:

Morgenthau plan map small danube federation variant

File:Map-D-1939mod2334neu.GIF

Morgenthau plan map great danube federation variant

Note: this map doesn't reflect the 1943 incorporation of South Tyrol into the DR

Another interesting map

It could help to grasp the dimension of ethnical cleasing by the morgenthauplan.

Areas with predominantly German speaking populations in 1910.

--Lokuspokus 19:55, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

Note: this map doesn't reflect the 1943 incorporation of South Tyrol into the DR —Preceding unsigned comment added by ANRC (talk • contribs) 04:56, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

Mention the Formal Title

The formal report was titled "Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III" but this was never mentioned in the article.

Reverted edits by User:Molobo

1. "In early 1947 four million German soldiers were still being used as forced labor in the UK, France, and the Soviet Union to repair damage made by Nazi Germany to those countries."

This is Original Research.

Nope, are you claiming those countries weren't harmed by Nazi Germany ?--Molobo (talk) 14:28, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

Of course not. But making causal connections between things is OR. Colonel Mustard (talk)

What OR? I am not supportive of forced labor, but it is obvious that the labor was used for reconstruction (and obvious who was responsible for devastation that necessitated the reconstruction). I am sure that a ref for that can be found quickly and as I noted earlier this article is in need of much referencing.--_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 02:23, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

The sentence reeks of OR and POV pushing, Piotrus and Molobo. A level headed wikipedian would have settled for writing "as war reparations". Although I would be very interested to know if they were credited for any reparations sum, i.e. if it helped settle the German account, or if it was just gratuitous exploitation of slave labor. Especially since there were many German slaves in Poland for many years after the war too, were they credited as German reparations, if so for which sum?--Stor stark7 ^Speak 05:04, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

2. JCS 1067 explicitly prohibited U.S. occupation authorities from providing any economic or reconstruction assistance of any kind to the German people, that would allow it maintain the current economic levels originated in its war-level production.

This is Original Research, not to mention Stating The Bleeding Obvious, expressed in such a way as to justify the proposals set out in the Morgenthau plan. People can judge this for themselves.

I disagree, it's good to be precise.

That's not being precise, that's putting a slant on bare facts without having a good secondary source - original research. Colonel Mustard (talk)

I agree, OR--Stor stark7 ^Speak 05:04, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

3. That paragraph about Stalin and proposed executions is a bit odd but it is sourced. Deletion was not explained.

No source connects this to MP.

I deleted it again because it seems gratuitous. Colonel Mustard (talk)

4. "However the report made no mention of food situation in Eastern Europe which was devestated much more then West Europe due to Nazi Germany's attempt to exterminate nations in that region."

There are no sources given for these huge statements - it's common knowledge that Nazi Germany devastated Eastern Europe - but, the food supply situation? Source? 'Attempt to exterminate nations'? Source?

What ? You want a source that Nazis exterminated Jews, Poles ?

No, but I want a source concerning the food situation in Eastern Europe, and its level of devastation relative to that of Western European nations. Colonel Mustard (talk)

Perhaps we should reference and discuss the Hunger Plan here? --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 02:23, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

And the point of that would be? It is a shocking article, but how exactly do you see that it does relate to this article Piotrus?

What does it say of the food situation post war? Does state how many calories the large agricultural regions taken from Germany were producing for the Poles? Were caloric intakes in eastern Europe affected by the Morgenthau plan? In Germany the morgenthau plan led to a severe lack of fertilizer for the remaining farms, a lack of agricultural machinery since metal and machinery production was suppressed heavily, and to a lack of funds for purchase of food from abroad. --Stor stark7 ^Speak 05:04, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

5. "However West Germany avoided paying 640 billion dollars of war reperations Nazi Germany inflicted on Poland^[2]."

This has nothing to do with the Morgenthau plan.

Colonel Mustard (talk) 14:09, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

The whole paragraph is devoted to MP and war reperations, I see no reason to hide that the largest reparation was avoided by Germany.--Molobo (talk) 14:28, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

The largest reparation? Who says? A declaration by the Sejm in 2004 seems to me to be irrelevant to the Morgenthau Plan. Colonel Mustard (talk) 14:45, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

The largest reparations? The Soviet took pretty much everything movable there was from their occupation zone of Germany, and in Potsdam the allies decided that "The USSR undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations." Polish claims on the former Soviet Republics certainly dont relate to this article in any way.

Besides, even if we were to keep that paragraph, we would have to add something such as this for balance:

"But the new Polish territory ripped from Germany, stretching to within 35 miles of Berlin, included coal and iron in German Silesia, the transportation centers of Breslau and Küstrin and some 200 miles of Baltic seacoast, with the great port of Danzig and Berlin's seaport, Stettin. In industrial value, at least, Poland was the gainer; what Russia had taken from her was largely agricultural." --Stor stark7 ^Talk 21:25, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

--Stor stark7 ^Talk 21:25, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

Poles got nothing from the Soviets; and the Recovered Territories, as you noted, were indeed stripped from anything of value by the Soviets before being turned over to Poland. So the "industry" that Poland gained was quite theoretical.--_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 02:23, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

Hmm, that's strange. The "theoretical" coal industry around Wałbrzych was quite productive, ditto for the "theoretical" pottery industry in Bolesławiec or the "theoretical" railroad industry in Wrocław (formerly Linke-Hoffmann) or the "theoretical" shipyards around Gdansk. For a land stripped from anything of value you can also find quite a lot of old railroads "Made in Germany"... apart from the fact that no one can strip a land from its natural ressources, and these "recovered territories" were formerly one of Germanys main producers of agricultural and mineral goods. Karasek (talk) 19:29, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

If they were stripped, how come the mines were back in operation so soon, Piotrus? And so what if the Poles received nothing from the Russians, (an unproven assertion by you), the Germans paid their share of the reparations to Poland through the russians, in accordance with the treaty at Potsdam. If the Russians never paid the Poles then I suggest you and Molobo take your arguments to some Russia reparations related article. I have never claimed that the so called "Recovered territories" (Polish communist propaganda term still being used by some) were stripped bare. I have stated that the Russians bled the DDR, I said nothing on the territory annexed by Poland. Also, in in mineral richness the new territories far surpassed the old ones. It turns out that the Poles they were very much economic winners in the territory trade with Russia.

Note also that the Poles at Potsdam, succeeded in Pushing Stalin to grab extra much German territory for them

(So this was not something that just happened to Poland, the Poles were very active and pushed hard for as much territory as possible...) The Soviets took their share of reparations from the DDR, and also administered the Polish share. Germany paid its due in reparations through the reparations to the Soviets, see the Potsdam agreement. Poland and the Soviets then regulated their internal debt through trade agreements. If Poland claims it never received the reparations from the Russians (still waiting for evidence for that), then they should go after the Soviets, not the Germans, whom they even signed a treaty with stating that compensation had been accomplished.

But all of this is irrelevant, what exactly have reparations or no reparations to Poland from Germany via the Soviet Union to do with the Morgenthau plan? It seems like ethnocentric POV pushing to insert Poland into each and every article about unrelated issues by Molobo and Piotrus. Quite a circus.--Stor stark7 ^Speak 05:04, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

Karesek-the devestated ruin that Poles received after centuries of Germanisation is rebuilt even today, it was this much destroyed during fights with Nazi resistance against Allied forces. Even today one can see bullet holes in buildings, or bombed out ruins. Almost every city was rebuilt from scratch, and as to claims about resources which Germany btw used for its essential war production-they were simply taken to SU rather then used in Poland.--Molobo (talk) 20:53, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

Molobo, your comment is already rebuffed in the text preceding but I'd like add something: "As he shows, the city's infrastructure was destroyed not only by the terrible violence of the last weeks of the war, but by postwar looting and vandalism and in particular by the more organized forms of démontage practiced both by the Soviets and by the Polish authorities in Warsaw. Astonishingly, in the early 1950s, up to 165 million bricks per year were collected and taken to building sites in Central Poland, while Wroclaw's dwindling stock of habitable housing fell into neglect and disrepair (p. 198). This state-sponsored spoliation in turn increased feelings of impermanence about Poland's position in the newly-acquired western territories, while doing little to discourage ordinary Poles--even law-abiding ones--from helping themselves to whatever unclaimed property they could lay their hands on, an activity known in popular parlance as Szabrownicy." I wonder how come you'd never heard of that?--Stor stark7 ^Speak 19:32, 4 September 2008 (UTC)

Article lacks historical background

We need to explain to readers what motivated policymakers to come up with the plan. In other words, what happened that they felt such plan was needed to implement on Germany.--Molobo (talk) 01:01, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

A good starting place is the Treaty of Versailles, to include the victors's refusal to let the Alpendeutsche (high percentage of what became 1919 Austria) become part of Bavaria, in violation of Wilson's 14 points. Not having Czechoslovakia become a Switzerland type government also helped in the later development of the Morgenthau Plan. Morgenthau's plan assumed that the Russians would agree to the boundaries of the sliced up Germany [as shown on his posted map in the article] into a North Germany Nation, a South Germany Nation, and the "International Zone" encompassing the Ruhr, etc. It is more likely that the Russians would have agreed to (1) Polish borders at the Oder-Neisse Line; (2) the Russians having a 50% share in Morgenthau's Map's "International Zone" in order to remove as much of "their" portion of the Ruhr industrial machinery as possible to Russia/Soviet Union; (3) that the reduced North German Nation become two occupation zones, one Russian & one British (The Russian zone coinciding with what became a fact of history, namely the 1945 Russian Occupation Zone of Germany, which was west of the Oder-Neisse Line); (4) the British having a reduced occupation zone of the North German Nation, wedged between the International Zone and the Russian Occupation Zone; (5) the South German Nation divided into 3 or 4 Occupation Zones. The Russians would have been the most aggressive of the Occupying Powers in turning their respective North German Nation and South German Nation occupation zones into pasture land, except for some "light industry", a formula Morgenthau wanted for his created nations of North Germany and South Germany. Also, the International Zone, after being turned 100% to pasture land (i.e., not even light industry), was proposed as a partial settlement area for "Yugoslavs", since all the Germans found in the new International Zone were to be ethnically cleansed -- maybe the Yugoslavs could have later developed some "light industry" in what was called the "International Zone". Maybe an eventual better name for the former Ruhr, etc. area would have been, "International Zone of Yugoslav Resettlement". Also, see below for Morgenthau's "position" on having the Soviet Union "police" the two new German nations of North Germany and South Germany. If Morgenthau had prevailed in his ideas for relatively short time withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, the two new German nations would have eventually become known to the West as "Communist North Germany" and "Communist South Germany". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.217.231 (talk) 23:44, 26 July 2008 (UTC)

"Morgenthau himself had long harbored an admiration for the Soviets. Like many liberals in the post-World War I era, he had a rather romantic view of the Soviets as liberators of the Russian people from czarist tyranny." (Henry Morgenthau III, Mostly Morgenthau: A Family History. Ticknor & Fields, New York, 1991, p. 313)

From pages 361-362 (i.e., in the Paul Y. Hammond study, “Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy”) in the book, American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Ed. Harold Stein, University of Alabama Press, 1963): "On [August 26, 1944] . . .the Treasury committee which Morgenthau had appointed upon his return from England completed a draft memorandum entitled 'Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany' . . . Once Germany was disarmed, it was expected that her neighbors (including [the Soviet Union], but not including Great Britain) would take primary responsibility for policing and administering her. U.S. troops would be withdrawn 'within a relatively short time.' "

See also the Discussion page from History of Germany since 1945, especially under the heading, "Civilian Deaths due to Occupiers", and the paragraph which begins, "Glad to be of assistance. As regards the Morgenthau plan, . . . " —Preceding unsigned comment added by ANNRC (talk • contribs) 09:54, 20 October 2008 (UTC)

Some minor changes but the text remains manipulative

I made some minor changes, but the text remains a manipulative one. For instance it makes a lot of unconnected claims with no relation to the plan to prevent Germany from starting WW3. Another example-while the population of agricultural Poland and Ukraine was mass murdered by German state and thus it is natural that food harvest in Europe was low, the article presents the situation one sided, singling out German situation as dire, without noting that it was far better then in Poland or Soviet Union and the death rates as well as food situation were result of German actions. --Molobo (talk) 20:22, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

Molobo, once again I see a number of self-assured claims from you. What are your sources for your claims? Actually the food situation in Germany was "far worse than anywhere else in Europe", according to Hoovers study.. Ergo the Poles were better off than the Germans, despite your statements to the contrary. And as to the rest I presume you're familiar with the source, the paper "The United States and the refusal to feed German civilians after World War II"? And I presume you've read enough of the article to have seen that the occupation directive (JCS 1067) that the Americans were taking their general instructions from until mid 1947 was largely the Morgenthau plan? Or failed to note that the same Hoover in 1947 estimated that unless U.S. policy was radically reversed it would lead to a cumulative total of 25,000,000 dead Germans?--Stor stark7 ^Speak 19:24, 4 September 2008 (UTC)

Influence on policy

Morgenthau's Plan for two German rump nations was never agreed to by anyone. The place where most of the balance of his Plan was implemented was in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany. Given the opportunity, the Soviets would have enthusiastically participated in reducing Germany to a pastoral state and starving 25 million Germans to death. Caveat: Inasmuch as the German Communists who followed the Soviet Army to Germany from Moscow had little effect on the 2 years of Soviet raping in their Occupation Zone, the German Communists would have been no obstacle in a mass starvation program (the Soviets could easily claim that about 97% of the Germans were unrepentant Nazis anyway). —Preceding unsigned comment added by ANNRC (talk • contribs) 09:53, 9 September 2008 (UTC)

Roosevelt's Support for the Plan

"The fact Morgenthau's attitude towards the Germans aligned so closely with Stalin's may have been influenced by his close friend and advisor, Harry Dexter White, who was indicted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on a charge of passing U.S. Government secrets to Moscow in 1948 but who died of a heart attack shortly after testifying before the House.[33]"

Fair warning... I'm going to delete this allegation for (1) White was never indicted (he did testify 4 days before his death), and (2) the "footnote" to "Years of War" is 100% bogus. The referenced page is about the Morgenthau-White trip to England in 1944 & has nothing to do with White's 1948 testimony. DEddy (talk) 23:19, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

The fact Morgenthau's attitude towards the Germans aligned so closely with Stalin's may have been influenced by his close friend and advisor, Harry Dexter White, who was indicted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on a charge of passing U.S. Government secrets to Moscow in 1948 but who died of a heart attack shortly after testifying before the House.^[3] DEddy (talk) 00:45, 13 November 2008 (UTC)

1. John Morton Blum, "From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941 - 1945 (Boston, 1967) p. 338
2. Poles Vote to Seek War Reparations, Deutsche Welle, 11 September 2004
3. (John Morton Blum, "From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941 – 1945" (Boston, 1967) p. 338)