This is an archive of past discussions about Attack on Pearl Harbor. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.
Please explain why all the battleships sunk were supposedly "obsolete". --Kurt Leyman 14:44, 18 April 2007 (UTC)
I do not believe that the term was being used on the battleships. This discussion was recent, but got archived. Talk:Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor/Archive_4#By_the_numbers Notice that I had the same question as you, but we resolved it amicably.
"I do not believe that the term was being used on the battleships" No, that is exactly what the term was used to describe. And I say that whoever claims that all the battleships sunk were obsolete is badly confused. --Kurt Leyman 13:43, 19 April 2007 (UTC)
I guess you will have to take that up with Trekphiler then, you guys are the experts, I am just an interested outsider. CodeCarpenter 13:58, 19 April 2007 (UTC)
As noted (& archived, apparently), they were too slow to operate with carriers, hence obsolete. Trekphiler 04:09, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
"Obsolete" sounds like they were slated for scrapping. Was the ability to keep up with carriers considered a requirement for battleships at the time? Maybe some other word would be better, e.g. obsolescent, out-of-date, aging?
I think it's odd to refer to them as 'obsolete' - they were representative of the US Navy battleships available at the time, which were all fairly old because of the restrictions of the Naval Treaties, which compelled people to keep old battleships in service. The same is true of the IJN's battleships and the British battleships. In spite of its age the Pearl battlefleet had a vital mission - to prevent Japan from having unrestricted freedom of maneuver in the Pacific. Not the sort of job you give to obsolete ships... The Land 10:55, 23 April 2007 (UTC)
This use of obsolete arises in a kind of anticipatitory foresight imputed to then contemporary observers. No one in 1940/41 foresaw the carrier task force which became the most significant naval fighting force of the Pacifi War. Many of hte battleships in Pearl were in fact too slow to fully participate in the faster operations of those Task Forces. However, they were not -- at that time -- regareded as obsolete, and their loss, even though it turned out to be temporary, was regarded with horror by the US and with considerable satisfaction by the japanese.
From a certain perspective even the aircraft carriers missed by the Japanese were obsolete since they would be unsuitable for jet aricraft of a later time.
The perspective from which fleet sunk or damaged at Pearl was obsolete is an odd one, and presumes a kind of foresight from which to lookback at current events on which to hang its hat. From such a perspective most everything is obsolete; I'm looking forward to flying cars under automatic control. No traffic delays, and no worrisome having to control my obsolete car on the obsolete surface roads. I don't think it's a perspective from which we editors are entitled to write in WP articles. ww 18:43, 23 April 2007 (UTC)
I would disagree. The perspective is now. The fact the BatFor was "not -- at that time -- regareded as obsolete" is irrelevant, IMO; so is the fact carriers "would be unsuitable for jet aricraft of a later time", since I'm unaware of any navy operating carrierborne jets in 1941. By comparison to USN's latest BBs, they were slow & old; the newest (Iowa?) class were capable of escorting carriers. And (as I think I noted) cruisers served as main escorts, not BBs, anyhow. I'd agree "obsolete" in the lead might be too much, but it deserves mention. That "No one in 1940/41 foresaw the carrier task force" is irrelevant, & factually wrong; the Kido Butaiwas a task force, & IJN's carrier operations (copied by USN) pioneered. As I said (well above), it's now this article is written from, not 1941; if you intend to eliminate everything not known to both sides in 1941, you're going to have a pretty short article. Did the U.S. know of Japan's plans? No. Did the Japanese know about Hypo? No. Delete both. I'm sure there's more that should be deleted on that basis. Moreover, I've never read a historiography that adopts such a position; all are written from the modern POV, retrospectively, which is what I'm saying. And I covered this above. Didn't you read it? Trekphiler 17:53, 2 May 2007 (UTC) (Oops. Appears it was archived. It's all in there. 17:58, 2 May 2007 (UTC))
Yes, but the logical extension of your argument would be to label all past warships as being obsolete. Sorry to split hairs. Darkmind1970 13:16, 15 June 2007 (UTC)
Wrong again, & would you read what I said, for a change? The BBs were obsolete by the standards of the time, not by ours, which isn't what I meant, nor what I said. Trekphiler 03:06, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
Sorry if this is wrong, I'm probably thinking of the wrong battle >_< but wasn't Pearl Harbor regarded as one of the worst military blunders ever? I'm not an expert at all, so I'm probably wrong...I'm not changing it because of that. Redsox7897 22:43, 24 April 2007 (UTC)
Not really, the Japanese won the battle its just that they failed to destroy the carriers, which were their main target. Good friend100 01:40, 25 April 2007 (UTC)
Going to war with America might have been a strategic blunder, but the attack on Pearl Harbour was a brilliantly-executed success... it's not often that you find eight battleships destroyed or damaged (along with hundreds of aircraft) on one side and no significant loss on the other! The Land 09:38, 25 April 2007 (UTC)
"the attack on Pearl Harbour was a brilliantly-executed success"? Since when? It missed every important target: carriers, tank farm, Hypo, & (most important) the Sub Base. Read the article. Trekphiler 17:36, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
It was a unmitigated disaster for the Japanese. If they had destroyed the facilities and sank the carriers, then it would have been a victory. As it was, they just started a war that they had no hope of winning.--216.168.95.142 18:07, 5 July 2007 (UTC)
The opening paragraph states that 5 battleships were destroyed. This is wrong, as all but two would see action again during the war. Not sure about the best way to rephrase the line, however. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 128.194.66.82 (talk • contribs)19:45, 3 May 2007.
Agreed. It is a little ambiguous (or just plain wrong). Four battleships were sunk (the Utah was considered auxiliary, not a battleship - but that could be splitting hairs). The three destroyers were in dry dock when they were heavily damaged but they were all repaired. No cruisers were sunk or destroyed. One minelayer was sunk and was salvaged and converted to a repair ship. -- Mufka(user)(talk)(contribs) 21:36, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
I changed it to "sunk", but that isn't entirely accurate either. "Put out of action"? -Will Beback · † · 21:58, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
How about "188 aircraft were destroyed and five battleships, one minelayer, and three destroyers were sunk or severely damaged." -- Mufka(user)(talk)(contribs) 22:15, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
That sounds accurate to me. -Will Beback · † · 22:26, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
I'd definitely say four battleships - Utah was not a battleship when she was attacked, she was a target ship. And 'sunk' means what it says on the tin: even if a ship is refloated it was still sunk. The Land 11:33, 4 May 2007 (UTC)
Should the Utah be classified separately - excluded? Is it oversimplifying to just say "nine US ships were sunk or severely damaged." -- Mufka(user)(talk)(contribs) 12:26, 4 May 2007 (UTC)
I think so - nine ships, even nine warships, can be a fairly minor loss. The strategic impact of Pearl Harbor was the damage to the battleships. The Land 14:25, 4 May 2007 (UTC)
Regarding the number of sunk battleships, AFAIK the 5th battleship counted as sunk was never the Utah, but the beached Nevada, which was not refloated until February 12th 1942. ( here are some pictures showing the extend of the damage). Nevfennas 22:16, 4 May 2007 (UTC)
" The strategic impact of Pearl Harbor was the damage to the battleships."? Don't be ridiculous. The strategic impact was attacking the U.S., then missing all the important targets. The battleships at Pearl were expensive junk, & their total loss would have had no effect on the war. I'd argue the effort spent to raise them, except to recover bodies, was a total waste. Trekphiler 00:55, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
Destroying the battleships was certainly one of the top Japanese objectives for the attack. The destruction of the US Pacific battlefleet was what was needed to give Japan a 12-18 month opportunity to conquer SE Asia unmolested. The view you suggest is one that deserves to be covered but is very retrospective. It's part of the reason why this article was de-featured a few weeks ago. The Land 09:01, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
"very retrospective"? Of course it is. It's written in 2007, not 1941. It's called historiography. See my comments on it above (if it's not archived...).
"The destruction of the US Pacific battlefleet was what was needed"? Not of the battleships, for reasons noted, & carriers weren't hit at all. My view is the historical one; yours is the erroneous one Japan adhered to by assigning BBs top priority. See the doctrine page's references to guerre de course, War Plan Orange, & the IJN page for the flaws in that position.
"It's part of the reason why this article was de-featured a few weeks ago." Really? Then I suggest somebody needs to examine their definition of historiography, because it's not typically written from a POV contemporary with the events it describes. Trekphiler 07:41, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
Perhaps you can find some sources for these views? We can argue about it as much as we want but that's not the point of Wikipedia. The Land 07:47, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
"Perhaps you can find some sources for these views?" Which "views" did you have in mind? That "historiography is not typically written from a POV contemporary with the events it describes"? I've never seen any historiography, on any subject, that was, not even Morison. (I exclude the likes of Herodotus as written contemporaneous with events.) Or "yours is the erroneous one Japan adhered to by assigning BBs top priority"? I'm unaware of any surviving USN BB serving as TF escort; they were assigned to gunnery support. Also, Yamato, which was faster than the USN survivors, couldn't do the job, either; she was too slow, also. Or do you suggest CV TFs weren't the main striking power of the war? (My guess is, you're unaware of the importance of submarines. Most people are.) Sources? Take a look at the pages I mentioned; I put a few there. Or you can look at the List of military figures by nickname page; I put all of those up (I think; some may have been added). Or I can tell you I've been reading in the field for over 25yr; want a list of every book I've read? (That I can't do...) Trekphiler 09:48, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
No, I want you to name reliable sources which discuss Pearl Harbor and describe the battleships as 'obsolete', or unimportant targets, or that they weren't the Japanese fleet's main objectives. There's no need to get worked up about it. The Land 10:03, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
"'obsolete', or unimportant targets"? Offhand? I'd try Wilmott's Barrier & the Javelin, Blair's Silent Victory, or Morison's 14 volume history of USN in WW2 (& I think I footnoted to that effect before somebody deleted it...); might also look at Nimitz's memoir & Peattie & Evans' Kaigun (but I doubt it). "weren't the Japanese fleet's main objectives"? Where did I say that? You'll note, if you bother to read, I said IJN made a fundamental error making them main objectives; that's also implied by Wilmott, among others (but offhand, I can't recall who expressly said BBs were obsoleted by TFs or only detailed to gunnery). I repeat, take a look at the pages I mentioned, with sources therein. Trekphiler 10:17, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
Trying to refocus this discussion - the article as it stands says "It [Pearl Harbor] only had a small strategic military effect". That's the kind of thing which I am objecting to, and which led to the article bing de-featured. Do you mind if I take that out? The Land 18:49, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
I'd be inclined to see what you mean to replace it with, if anything, first. Beyond bringing the U.S. into a war with Japan, the attack accomplished nothing of lasting strategic value to Japan. If you can demonstrate differently, I'd be very interested in your sources; what I've seen wouldn't support it. Trekphiler 09:28, 28 May 2007 (UTC)
The original US-plan for a war against Japan (best known as War Plan Orange) called for the Pacific Fleet to operate toward the Philippines. From a Japanese POV (not knowing the details) such a move could have started just a few days into the war. The japanese counter-strategy called for weakening the fleet along the way in a war of attrition and finally defeat it in a decisive engagement. Implementing this strategy would have required the use of most units of the Imperial Navy, which would have to be kept in readiness and position for an engagement in the Central Pacific. By taking out the battleships that threat was removed and those ships were free to be used in the conquest of the british and dutch colonies. Though the japanese carriers and battleships didn't play a big role there, the cruisers and destroyers did, fighting in engagements like the Battle of the Java Sea and Battle of Sunda Strait. Had the japanese had far less naval forces at their avail in that area, their progress would have been slowed down as they could not have adequately protected as many simultaneous invasion-forces against ABDA. So regardless of the feasibility of Plan Orange, had the attack on Pearl Harbor failed (e.g. Nagumo aborting after being discovered early in the approach) the US-Battleships would have influenced the war even by just sitting in the habor doing nothing. Nevfennas 20:10, 28 May 2007 (UTC)
You've evidently missed my point. The BatFor, fleet in being or hazards to navigation, would have played no part in the subsequent action. Lex, Big E, & Yorktown would have, just as they did at Coral Sea & Midway, & for the same reason: they could engage at 175nm, as against about 10nm for 16" guns (under ideal conditions, & assuming slow BBs were even in company with fast, fleet CVs, which I seriously doubt).
You undermine your argument calling attention to cruisers & DDs; they would have been detailed to carrier escort in any case. Do you really believe IJN felt able (or inclined) to ignore CV TFs? I seriously doubt it. As for IJN main force being held in readiness for "decisive battle", do you really believe it wasn't? Why do you think Ozawa et al. were so timid in the Solomons & Bismarcks? Because they were waiting for a decisive gun duel, which was never going to happen because carriers were the dominant fleet unit, & because submarines had (or damn well should have, had Nimitz gotten off the dime) turned them into floating batteries for lack of fuel. Even in 1944, Combined Fleet HQ was dreaming of it, tho by that time, it had to be near their own bases, because fuel was so scarce. (Left unanswered was why Spruance or Halsey would oblige; even Halsey wasn't that stupid.)
As for the Japanese strategy (if it can be dignified as such), it presumed a 70% strength relative to the USN at war's start balanced attrition en route, taking account also USN would be short on fuel & ammo; this ignored underway replenishment, in which IJN was incompetent, & which developed in the period between the acceptance of the 70% ratio (London Treaty?) & war's start, thus making the IJN "decisive battle" doctrine nonsense & many of the same assumptions in War Plan Orange more or less moot. So did carriers becoming main fleet units, which the Japanese had done by turning the BatFor into hazards to navigation, tho actually, Furious had done it in 1918, but nobody realized it yet, including Yamamto (viz his stupid dispositions at Midway).
More to the point, you've fallen into the same fallacy IJN commanders did, praying for a "decisive battle". Once Japan captured islands, War Plan Orange made it unlikely, since recapture of island bases would take higher priority, & in that event, it was submarines & interdiction of supplies that took precedence (contrary to the popular view of almost everybody, most of whom don't bother to think it thru; certainly IJN didn't, with far less excuse); battles around islands (cf Midway) would involve CVs more than BBs in any case, except in case of gunnery support (which was Yamamoto's big mistake there), which could be supplied by cruisers. As at Guadalcanal, it would be airpower that would determine their ability to operate, not the number of BBs. Did I miss anything? Trekphiler 09:58, 9 June 2007 (UTC)
I think so. Apparently I did not succeed in making clear what I was aiming at. I was referring explicitly to the phase of the japanese conquest of Southeastasia, which lasted until April 1942. My point is simply that during this time the japanese would have concentrated much more of their forces in the Central Pacific, had the BB not been taken out. Wether the cruisers and destroyers would have been detailed as CV escorts or fighting with the BBs doing torpedo-runs doesn't matter, as long as these forces would have been in the Central Pacific and not supporting the invasion of the british and dutch colonies. I completly agree that the japanese kept their main forces in reserve after Midway, my point is they would have felt obliged to do the same from the beginning if they had not attacked PH. Finally I do not fall for the same fallacy IJN commanders did, I basically agree with your assessment of Plan Orange. But the IJN commanders did fall for it, saw a threat were no credible threat of that magnitude existed and acted accordingly. Had the US-BBs not been taken out they would not have been a real threat and could have caused little harm, but the japanese actions against what they perceived a real threat would have had real consequences to Japans disadvantage. Nevfennas 07:40, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
I think we've got a failure to communicate, because I don't see it made any difference. I agree it would have been to Japan's disadvantage to keep more force at Truk (which wasn't just after Midway, just more pronounced after), but I doubt it would have mattered to ops in DEI or Malaya, as weak & disorganized as the Allies were there. Recall, even tho IJN was scattered across the Pacific & Indian Oceans, they had the intiative (& consequenet shock/surprise), the Allies couldn't muster the force to stop them, & couldn't coordinate it when they did (viz Doorman's fiasco). My main point is, Japan's decision to focus on BBs was founded on a faulty doctrine obsolete since 1918. Trekphiler 18:05, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
Item 1 on the list of items needed for restoration has been accomplished. Thanks to J. D. Redding for the suggestion on how to reduce the TOC. CodeCarpenter 15:18, 18 June 2007 (UTC)
The second issue has been resolved, regarding inline links. Thanks go to Marskell for explaining what needed to be done. CodeCarpenter 16:32, 19 June 2007 (UTC)
Actualy, they already appear to have been a standard cquote format. In addition the Medal of Honor list has been commented out, and the comments about Vietnam and other countries getting independence after WWII. CodeCarpenter 17:48, 19 June 2007 (UTC)
I adjusted quotes, and adjusted picture locations for smoother viewing without alot of whitespace following a image with a short paragraph. CodeCarpenter 20:42, 19 June 2007 (UTC)
The article listed the strength of 1st Destroyer Squadron as "1 destroyer". I corrected to 9 destroyers; it was the senior formation to the subordinate desdivs, hence it should include all of them. I added a {{Fact}} tag, because I'm unclear if IJN used destroyer leaders or light cruisers as flotilla leaders; can somebody who knows (or has Pearl Harbor Papers or Willmott handy) confirm & correct, if needed? Trekphiler 19:09, 21 June 2007 (UTC)
The caption reads "Captain". IIRC, he was only a Commander at the time. Is there a policy on whether to use contemporary or final ranks? Trekphiler 02:58, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
CodeCarpenter, you ask for more details or a link. I chose "notorious" because of the series of screwups attached, so much they've made it into film, used in the sense "well known". Trekphiler 20:13, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
I understand that. However, from the sense of "well known, ill-famed, or infamous", , I would have thought some mention in detail would have occurred earlier in the article, rather than just this passing glance. You are an expert in the field, so to you it is notorious. I am a person with hardly any knowledge of the event, so some mention of the memo in more detail would be helpful. In addition, the word is usually used in a negative manner. The message was not notorious, the loss of it's urgency was. As you know, I am just trying to bring the article back up to FA status, so i am trying to isolate and remove parts that might confuse the first time reader, the eighth grade student, or the person that was not even aware of the attack until they encountered this article. Not worth a big battle, but I figure I explain my position a little more fully. "a" versus "that morning's notorious" (The message is not even mentioned in his wiki page, BTW, should it be?) does not seem like a big loss to me. CodeCarpenter 16:07, June 26, 2007 (UTC)
I note that the change was reverted. Does anyone else have an opinion on the "notorious" usage? CodeCarpenter 20:42, 29 June 2007 (UTC)
It's notorious among specialists & buffs; I'm not picky about it being taken out (except to ask if any school kid, or college student for that matter, who's seen "Tora! Tora! Tora!" won't wonder why more isn't made of it). Maybe a link to the conspiracy page (the group widely believing Marshall was out of touch on purpose)? As for mention on Marshall's page, I don't think it deserves it; it isn't notorious for his involvement, but for the screwed up way it got sent & its slothmail delivery. And I only changed it because it's already in "Tora! Tora! Tora!"; I figured that's been on cable enough for most people to have seen it. Maybe not... Trekphiler 01:56, 30 June 2007 (UTC)
Not removed, just moved into the previous paragraph. In each case, they fit in with no problems, IMO. I guess since nobody else is making changes for the FA return, i will have to tackle "listishness" next. CodeCarpenter 20:42, 29 June 2007 (UTC)
One of the items was to reduce the size of the article. Since that was pointed out, it has actually gotten larger, despite multiple deletions. Can I suggest a moritorium on additional verbiage until we get this page cleaned up? CodeCarpenter 20:42, 29 June 2007 (UTC)
The only list that I could find worthy of removal was the Order of Battle, since that was covered not only in the previous paragraph, but also on a separate wiki page. I will consider it done unless others remove more. The first and second waves have lists of attackers, but I felt they should stay. I do not feel strongly about it, though, so feel free if you have good reason. CodeCarpenter 20:58, 29 June 2007 (UTC)
If it is, then I think it would be good to include the sound file in the article. Sort of like is in the 9/11 article.Borisblue 05:33, 2 July 2007 (UTC)
Because the POV comments were many in the review, I am splitting these 16 items out to 7a-7p, to be worked on individually. I am merging the repeats, and summarizing the suggested changes here, but the original comments can be found at FAR Comments
a. The article is written from the point-of-view of the USA.
b. The background section is a potted history of Japan, and the USA is scarcely covered at all.
c. The 'strategy', 'plans', 'organization' of the Imperial Japanese navy get sections but only the 'preparedness' of the USA.
d. A list of the winners of the Medal of Honor (NOTE: Already Removed)
e. The heroics of American servicemen with little material about heroic behaviour of anyone on the Japanese side or honours granted. (NOTE: Nine minisub martyrs is mentioned, award from Hitler mentioned.)
f. The Meiji Restoration and the 9/11 attacks have little direct relevance to the article. The article could be much shorter and better for it.
g. "Many paragraphs of the sections on the impact of the attack strike me as dubious." Not sure what can be done about this other than EVEN MORE citations.
h. There are a number of 'citation needed' templates; there is plenty of contestable material which lacks citation. (UPDATE: 7/2/2007 All have been either cited or removed.)
i. "Why did it result in a U.S. declaration of war" (Gee, because American soldiers were killed and a bunch of American installations were attacked and because later that day Japan declared war on the US?)
j. The opening paragraph could use a sentence or so describing Japan's intentions or goals in the attack. "Why did Japan attack?" (We will need a citation to state the purpose in few words, article is long already.)
k. I count four phrases in this section directly referring to the significance of the attack to the US, but none for Japan.
l. This is an article about a single given attack, not about the entire background of Japan's rise to militarism or the causes of WWII.
m. By explaining all of this, and not devoting equivalent background to US events, it implies an assumption that the reader knows US history and that Japanese history is esoteric and not widely known. Therein lies the Americanocentrist bias.
n. Considering the length and detail of the lead-up (prelude, background, preparations) section, I wonder if perhaps this should be moved to come after the section on the attack itself. I certainly understand the logic behind a more chronological approach (as it stands now, prelude -> event -> aftermath), but as it stands now, a reader has to scroll down several pages (or skim or read through quite a bit of prelude/background material) before coming to the central core topic of the article. Could this work better by presenting the Attack section right after a far briefer causes/background section, following it up with the lengthier discussion of both prelude and aftermath? (This suggestion has merit. If this article were a movie, the audience would need to wait an hour before the bombs started dropping.)
o. "Japanese views of the attack" should be merged along with other views to be more standard and global.
p. "views today" portion can be merged or removed.
I am hoping that this set of changes can be done over the next couple of weeks. CodeCarpenter 14:26, 2 July 2007 (UTC)
Also I think more should be said about the Second Sino-Japanese War and its effect on pushing Japan into attacking the US. It was precisely Japan's inability to bring the war in China (which began in 1937) to an acceptable conclusion that snowballed into international condemnation and economic sanctions. In comparison Japan suffered little economically and politically in the early 1930s when China readily settled with Japan in numerous incidents. There was absolutely no need for international intervention because separate peace were made between the two., but the situation was different in 1941 when the war had gone on for four years already. Blueshirts 18:32, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
As I've said above, I do think a ref to 11 Sept is warranted, for historical perspective (& as reply to those who've read Clausen). Re the POV redaction of "strategic blunder" of Hitler declaring war, I've never seen a historiographer who thought it was anything else. Want a source? Try Morison's 14v history of USN ops, for a start; I think Willmott's Barrier says it, too. Trekphiler 23:29 & 23:32, 14 July 2007 (UTC)
Today I saw the documentary "Zeitgeist - The Movie",
which on youtube.com is devided into it's chapters.
I'm refering to "Zeitgeist - The Movie: Federal Reserve (Part 3 of 5)" (can be found on youtube.com under this title).
Some of the matierial seems "questionable". Amongst them is an alleged warining of Australia detecting a Japanese fleet on December 4th.
I've nerver heard of this, and a quick google didn't show anything ither.
Perhaps someone would like to write something about this or create / expand Zetigeist - The Movie.
Allthough (or because) it is well done and has a powerfull message, compared to the previously mentioned partialy "questionable" material, this might be a hidden goldmine for some of the great researchers / dirtdiggers here on wikipedia.
- the mentioned chapter and part.
- streaming of the entire movie -
(1 hour, 57 minute)
The USS Arizona is the image left buring in your mind's eye ... JIMO. J. D. Redding 19:23, 8 June 2007 (UTC) (PS., but the diagram is a good one for the infobox ... the USS Arizona should more centered ... again JIMO)
Well, right now the Arizona picture is near the bottom of the article. I agree that it should be in the info box. It was in the infobox for multiple years until it was moved out in 2006. I made an edit to place it in the info box, but it was reverted with a comment about Neutral Point of View. This seems overly sensitive (and of what, I'm not sure) to me. Encyclopedia Britannica uses this picture as the lead in their article, do you suppose they are pushing some dark point-of-view by doing so? --Paul 01:49, 9 July 2007 (UTC)
I deleted this:
"They decided:
Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defence and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war ... [and is] ... resolved to go to war with the United States, Great Britain and Holland if necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and Holland.
as redundant. This had just been summarized in the article; there's no need for a block quote, too. Trekphiler 23:35, 14 July 2007 (UTC)
I've had a trim of the lead section - there were many unneccessary words there, so I've taken them out. Can you check many make sure I've not removed anything genuinely necessary? The Land 21:28, 20 July 2007 (UTC)
I have waited a couple of weeks (actually three), and during that time, the article has continued to increase in size. I know that this is going to cause some problems with folks, but there are many chunks that are tangential to the article (the recent reference to Cryptonomicon being one example) that will need to be chopped to get this article back down below 64K. We are talking about a 30-40% chop. And this should include minor items that are what can be considered trivia for the purposes of this article. The fact that the Arizona still leaks small bits of oil, or the expanded coverage of the japanese internment comes to mind. Both of these can be in their main articles rather than here. There needs to be some form of fairness to this, but rather than one wholesale chop, I suggest each chop be individual, so that they can be reverted/discussed independently. This will include many of the commented out pieces, which have stayed for a while, but still take up space in the word count. Please understand (assume good faith) that any chops I make are not from POV, just a desire to get the article down in size. We have gotten through most of the FAR complaints, and this step would be a significant one in getting the article back to Good Article and then FA status. Of course, just like with each of the other steps, anyone that wants to help is more than welcome. CodeCarpenter 15:03, 23 July 2007 (UTC)
I don't have much free time to help with this now, but I support a lot of chopping. The current article is so bloated and unfocused that it is hard to get an understanding of the "Attack on Pearl Harbor" by reading it. --Paul 15:41, 23 July 2007 (UTC)
First chop was easy. The removal of commented out sections from previous cleanups. Only 2K in savings though. CodeCarpenter 21:28, 24 July 2007 (UTC)
Well, about half of your chops have been eaten up by additions this afternoon. Guess I'll help, but it won't be pretty. --Paul 01:54, 25 July 2007 (UTC)
I think we should add {{fact} tags to each section as we go along to keep track of what needs footnotes. --Paul 02:29, 25 July 2007 (UTC)
Maybe this is a start? I deleted:
"It only had a small strategic military effect because the Japanese Navy failed to sink U.S. aircraft carriers or destroy the Submarine Base, but even if this had been achieved, it would not have helped Japan in the long term. The attack firmly drew the United States and its massive industrial and service economy into World War II, and the U.S. sent huge numbers of soldiers, weapons, and supplies to help the Allies fight Germany, Italy, and Japan, contributing to the utter defeat of the Axis powers by 1945"
as unnecessary or untrue. There is no causal relationship between the attack & U.S. entry into WW2, despite the common belief. I also deleted, " the attack on Pearl Harbor had finally drawn the United States into the war, " for the same reason. I deleted
"In terms of military history, the attack on Pearl Harbor marked the emergence of the aircraft carrier as capital ship, replacing the battleship as the striking arm of the fleet. However, not until later battles, notably Coral Sea and Midway, did this breakthrough become apparent to the world's naval powers."
as irrelevant or untrue. The attack proved nothing about carriers; not til the sinking of PoW & Repulse did navies really believe heavies were at risk from aircraft, & Coral Sea & Midway don't bear on Pearl Harbor, really. In addition, I'd take out the repeated references to E, Lex, & Sara not being present; I've already deleted a ref to Sara being in San Diego, which is about 1000mi from where she was, Puget Sound (tho the same ref had her in both places...). I'd put back some of what was in the lead, myself; there's criticisim of the lead not offering enough explanation for the reasons for the attack, which it used to have, before it was deleted. Trekphiler 16:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC) (I've put it back. 17:51, 27 July 2007 (UTC))
With the objective of reducing length, I deleted
"===Industrialization===
"After the Meiji Restoration, the Empire of Japan embarked on a road of rapid economic, political, and military expansion in order to achieve parity with their European and North American counterparts. This rapid industrialization demanded resources unavailable on the Japanese home islands. Part of the Empire's strategy included extending Japan's territorial and economic control to increase access to populations, bases, and natural resources.
"In its drive to match the Western powers, Japan rapidly developed its military and economy under the slogan "National Wealth and Military Strength." Military and economy was increasingly seen as vital to the Japanese nation, its interests and as deterrent against the Western countries. Military personnel started to play a greater role in national policy and then in government, especially after the early years of the 20th century. Assassination, attempted coup, and internal pressure were some of the tactics used by extreme elements in the military and elsewhere in Japanese society. From about 1910 through the 1930s, Japan became extensively militarized, in particular building a large and modern navy, the third largest in the world at the time, and a large and modern army.
"===Expansion===
"Japan's expansionist policies brought her directly into conflict with neighboring countries and empires, initially with Korea, China and Russia. This ranged from deliberate attacks (e.g., the Panay incident), war (against Russia and China around 1900, as part of WWI, and against China again beginning in the early 30s), to diplomatic reactions (leaving the League of Nations, threatening postures over various incidents) and trade restrictions (mostly by others in reaction). The largest were the First Sino-Japanese War with China in 1894, in which Japan took control of Taiwan, and the Russo-Japanese War with Russia in 1904, by which Japan gained territory in and around China, including the Korean peninsula. After World War I, the League of Nations awarded Japan custody of most of Imperial Germany's possessions and colonies in East Asia and the Pacific. In 1931, Japan imposed the puppet state of Manchukuo on eastern Manchuria by force. And starting in 1937, Japan escalated its long-simmering conflict with mainland China by the allegedly staged incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War.
"===Condemnation===
"The attacks against China were condemned by the League of Nations, the U.S., the UK, Australia, and the Netherlands. All but the League had territorial interests in Southeast Asia or the Philippines. These nations had already become aware of Japanese military power and willingness to use it, for instance after the Russo-Japanese war when the Japanese destroyed almost all of the Russian navy, particularly their Baltic and far eastern fleets. In response to diplomatic pressures there and for their actions in China during the first war with China, Japan resigned from the League of Nations. Imperial Japan also didn't like the proposals of the London Naval Treaty where Osami Nagano blasted the navy power ration between the major countries. Then in July 1939, the U.S. terminated the 1911 U.S.-Japan commercial treaty, an action which showed official disapproval and, more concretely, allowed the U.S. to impose trade restrictions as an additional pressure measure. Nevertheless, Japan continued the war in China and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, which formally ended World War I hostilities between the two countries and declared common interests. In 1940, Japan also signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy forming the Axis Powers."
and
"Plus the military leaders like Hideki Tojo were more willing to take military actions and by stating that the time has run out and negotiations didn't bear any fruit, while the Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe saw himself losing his argument of more negotiations and possible concessions to avert possible war."
and
"They decided:
Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defence and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war ... [and is] ... resolved to go to war with the United States, Great Britain and Holland if necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and Holland.
(again..., for reasons cited above), and
"In training, each crew would fly over the 5000-foot (1500 m) mountain behind Kagoshima, dive down into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to an altitude of 25 feet (7 m) at the piers. Bombardiers would release a torpedo at a breakwater some 300 yards (270 m) away.[1] "
and
"On a beach in Kagoshima Bay, Lieutenant Heijiro Abe, commander of ten high-level bombers, used lime to draw an outline of a battleship in the sand. He ordered his men to drop dummy bombs on it. Only he knew it was the outline of the battleship California.[2]"
and
Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia ... Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
and
"===Japanese American internment and anti-Japanese sentiment===
{main|Japanese American internment|Anti-Japanese sentiment}}
"The tactics of the attack as was outlined that if a surprise wasn't achieved, the attack was scheduled in the order of the fighters planes, diver bombers, level bombers and the torpedo bombers. All units were scheduled to storm the skies almost simultaneously and launch the attacks. The initial attack units were planneed to increase the number of torpedo bombers.[4]
as redundant & incoherent. Trekphiler 23:46, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
I readded a small paragraph to the chapter for the 'background' of Pearl Harbor and modified it to make more sense. One has to give some context for the reasons Japan went to war--like the growing international revulsion at Japanese activities in China in the 1930's, Japanese resentment at the limitations of the Washington Naval treaties and increasing nationalism/militarism, etc--in order to provide the setting or "the road" towards Pearl Harbor. If you remove the paragraph, all you basically have is a link to the 'Causes of WWII' which makes no sense. One has to scroll through dozens of unrelated articles like Hitler's attack on Poland, Nazism, and German aggression in Europe just to reach the section on Japan and Asia. Even Encyclopaedia Brittanica gives a background for Pearl. As an Aside, I attached the photo of the USS Shaw exploding. This image is a popular 'feature photo' within the Wikipedia community as this tag shows: Other than this I agree that the Pearl Harbor article is somewhat poorly written. I have done some editing of my own to make sense of the material. Regards, Leoboudv 10:47, 28 July 2007 (UTC)
I shortened the «background» section to the essential. There is no need to refer to minor incidents such as the «Panay attack» or two times to Sino-japanese wars. --Flying tiger 03:12, 29 July 2007 (UTC)
The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.
Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.
After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.
If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked.[6]
and
"On this one battle rests the fate of our nation. Let every man do his utmost.[7]"
and
"On a beach in Kagoshima Bay, Lieutenant Heijiro Abe, commander of ten high-level bombers, used lime to draw an outline of a battleship in the sand. He ordered his men to drop dummy bombs on it. Only he knew it was the outline of the battleship California.[8]"
as irrelevant, and this
"The attack was divided into waves of around 170 airplanes and each air squadrons were decided to overwhelm the skies at the same time to inflict much damage as possible during the time. Most of the torpedo bombers fitted with Type 93 torpedos to make their attacks taking advantage of the surpise against the ships and other High Value Units (HVU), after which the dive bombers and then the level bombers (fitted with the armor piercing bombs) made their attacks, while the fighter combat units maintaining aerial control during the other planes' attacks and making their attacks using machine guns[9]."
as redundant, incoherent, & (in the case of HVU) wrong; HVU was never an IJN term. Trekphiler 14:03, 12 August 2007 (UTC)
The timing of a third strike meant aircraft would probably have to recover after dark. Night operations from aircraft carriers were in their infancy in 1941, and neither Japan nor anyone else had developed reliable techniques and doctrine.
because it's correct as it stands. Even as late as 1944, Mitcher's (?) order to turn the lights on to recover his birds was bold & unusual; recall Spruance risked disaster at Midway, had he encountered IJN surface forces, 'cause he couldn't fly his birds at night. Yeah, it sounds peculiar now, but they didn't have MLS & ILS & radar in the nose then... Trekphiler 00:59, 28 July 2007 (UTC)
That may be the case but it still probably needs a citation. The Land 08:37, 28 July 2007 (UTC)
Agreed; I just can't find one... Trekphiler 14:03, 12 August 2007 (UTC)
"inflicting over 4,000 casualties."? What's that include? Everybody with a hangnail? Trekphiler 16:33, 21 August 2007 (UTC)
How does one find the exact size of the Attack on Pearl Harbor article? Is there a button or option you can click. As an aside, the article may--or may not--be 100 kilobytes long but this is a special article...whose impact is similar to the 9/11 attacks or the 2005 London bombings. One should expect an extra-long article. I have removed some unnecessary material recently, however. Leoboudv 09:00, 31 July 2007 (UTC)
The article length is 100kb at the moment, as one can see from the edit page screen. More relevant for 'is this article too long?' is to check the prose size of the article (copy-and-paste the body of the article from a non-edit page into an edit page or wordprocessor and see what length it comes up with). I make the prose size 64k, which is still on the long side. The topic probably justifies a longish article, but skimming the article I still think there is some duplication or irrelevancy that can be removed to make it shorter. The Land 11:32, 31 July 2007 (UTC)
As an aside, what takes up more space--inages, URL links or the text itself. I would have thought the first took up the most memory. However, if you wish to reduce the article by 33% to 64 kb, it may be an impossible task. The problem is a lot of things were caused or led to Japan's attack: the US oil embargo on Japan after the latter's advance into Indo-China, increasing Japanese nationalism and aggression against China in the 1920's and 1930's, the US entry into WWII and subsequent deportation of Japanese Americans from the US West Coast,etc. There are many personalities who were involved or affected by the attack: Tojo, Nagumo, Yamamoto, Genda, Fuchida, Kimmel, Short, Frank Knox, Cordell Hull, let alone FDR and you need photos or images of most of these people to give some flavour to the article. You also need photos of destroyed ships/planes to show the massive scale of destruction wrought by the Japanese attack. A bar of 64K seems a bit too low for an article of this import. Maybe 90 kb is more reasonable because then only 10% of the material would have to be be removed. This is just a suggestion. What do you think? Leoboudv 00:11, 1 August 2007 (UTC)
As I said, at the relevant measure of size the article is 64k now, but needs to be shorter WP:LENGTH refers. The Land 00:16, 1 August 2007 (UTC)
Dear Land and other contributors,
Thanks for the reference to WP Length. Personally, I liked their rule of thumb ratio which applied to articles between 60-100 KB. I note their statement here: "60 KB:[Article] Probably should be divided (although the scope of a topic can sometimes justify the added reading time)" while if an article is 100 KB, it must be divided. The 60-100 KB rule of thumb wld seem to apply to Pearl Harbor. It has a massive scope but limiting it to less than 100 KB is quite doable--ie: you just remove 2-3 KB of the present 102 KB article. BTW, what takes up more byte space; written texts, images or the URL references? Thank You. Leoboudv 04:54, 1 August 2007 (UTC)
Per WP:LENGTH the only relevant measure is readable prose, which should be 6,000 to 10,000 words, or 30 to 50 KB. Images, and embedded references are irrelevant when assessing article length. For instance, the San Francisco, California article is over 100K in total length, but only 43K or so readable prose. The Pearl Harbor article is in excess of 72K and 11,000 words in readable prose. It really needs to be cut by 20 to 30 percent. --Paul 02:32, 2 August 2007 (UTC)
I'm not sure why the other image was removed. It wasn't my intention to replace the first one, and I think that more images is better (within reason). If a proper caption can be written, putting it back into the article really isn't a bad thing. Consequentially 15:57, 17 August 2007 (UTC)
Disagree. Images should illustrate the text. We are also struggling with cutting about 20% of the material out of the article to get it down to a size where it can be resubmitted for an FA. If you wanted to start an article on WWI posters, it would make sense to have multiple images. It doesn't really make sense here. --Paul 16:17, 17 August 2007 (UTC)
I haven't been around for this article, so I'm not much weight. Still, if the image is relevant to the text, it can help to give more than one example of whatever it is your talking about. I imagine that you're going to trim down the impact section, and it doesn't make sense to have more column inches of picture than column inches of text. But on a philosophical level, why not include (free use) images when there's enough text to merit it? Consequentially 19:24, 17 August 2007 (UTC)