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Political ideology From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Korean nationalism[a] can be viewed in two different contexts. One encompasses various movements throughout history to maintain a Korean cultural identity, history, and ethnicity (or "race"). This ethnic nationalism was mainly forged in opposition to foreign incursion and rule. The second context encompasses how Korean nationalism changed after the partition in 1945.[how?] Today, the former tends to predominate.[5]
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Historically, Korean nationalism, or its earliest concept can be found as early as Silla, who expressed its unification as a unification of Samhan. Other examples of this would be Goryeo, whose name signifies that it is a direct descendant of Goguryeo, as they took its exact name as its own. The same goes for Joseon, who took its name from Gojoseon.[6]
However, the current concept of Korean nationalism came to be emphasized in order to resist Japanese influence during Japanese Occupation. The central objectives of Korea's nationalist movement were the advancement and protection of Korea's ancient culture and national identity from foreign influence, and the fostering of the independence movement during Japanese rule.[7] In order to obtain political and cultural autonomy, it first had to promote Korea's cultural dependency. For this reason, the nationalist movement demanded the restoration and preservation of Korea's traditional culture. The Donghak (Eastern Learning) peasant movement, also known as the Donghak Peasant Revolution, that began in the 1870s, could be seen as an early form of what would become the Korean nationalist resistance movement against foreign influences. It was succeeded by the Righteous Army movement and later a series of Korean resistance movements that led, in part, to the current status of the two Korean nations.
Nationalism in late 19th century Korea was a form of resistance movements, but with significant differences between the north and south. Since the intrusion by foreign powers in the late 19th century, Koreans have had to construct their identity in ways that pitted them against foreigners. They have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions over the past century, but all of them have been some form of resistance against foreign influences. During the colonial period, the Korean nationalists carried on the struggle for independence, fighting against Imperial Japan in Korea, China particularly Manchuria and China proper and Far East Russia. They formed 'governments in exile', armies, and secret groups to fight the imperial Japanese wherever they are.
Korea was divided at the 38th parallel between north and south by the Allied powers in 1945 as part of the disarmament of Imperial Japan, and the division persists to this day. The split is perpetuated by rival regimes, opposing ideologies, and global politics; it is further deepened by a differing sense of national identity derived from the unique histories, polities, class systems, and gender roles experienced by Koreans on different sides of the border. As a result, Korean nationalism in the late 20th century has been permeated by the split between North and South. Each regime espouses its own distinctive form of nationalism, different from the opposing side's, that nonetheless seeks to encompass the entire Korean Peninsula in its scope.
With regard to Korean nationalism, the reunification of the two Koreas is a highly related issue. Ethnic nationalism that is prevalent in Korean society is likely to play a significant role in the unification process, if it does occur. As Gi-Wook Shin claims, "Ethnic consciousness would not only legitimize the drive for unification but it could also be a common ground, especially in the early stages of the unification process, that is needed to facilitate a smooth integration of the two systems."[8]
Korean reunification (남북통일) refers to the hypothetical future reunification of North and South Korea under a single government. South Korea had adopted a sunshine policy towards the North that was based on the hope that one day, the two countries would be re-united in the 1990s. The process towards this was started by the historic June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future. However, there are a number of hurdles in this process due to the large political and economic differences between the two countries and other state actors such as China, Russia, and the United States. Short-term problems such as a large number of refugees that would migrate from the North into the South and initial economic and political instability would need to be overcome.
Korean ethnic nationalism (Korean: 민족주의; Hanja: 民族主義; MR: minjokchuŭi) or minjok nationalism emphasizes descent as a key part of Korean identity. A number of scholars argue that it exists in both North and South Korea.[9][10][11][12][13] It is centered on the notion of the minjok (민족; 民族), a term that had been coined in Imperial Japan ("minzoku") in the early Meiji period. Minjok has a similar meaning to the German "volk", officially translated as "nation", "people", and "ethnic group",[14][4] or "race".[10][15][16][17] A number of scholars have argued that this concept has influenced Korean society and politics,[18] and has influenced Korean reunification sentiment.[19]
In the colonial period, the Imperial Japanese's assimilation policy claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of common origin but the former always subordinate. The pure blood theory was used to justify colonialist policies and to replace Korean cultural traditions with Japanese ones in order to supposedly eliminate all distinctions and achieve equality between Koreans and Japanese.[20] As was previously done with the Ainu and Ryukyuans, Japan's extensive policy of cultural genocide included changing Korean names into Japanese, exclusive use of Japanese language, school instruction in the Japanese "ethical system", and Shinto worship.[20] This policy was an attempt of forced assimilation, in which Korean language, culture, and history were suppressed.[21] Around the 1920s, the term "white-clothed people" (백의민족; paegŭiminjok) developed as an ethnonationalist term for Korean people. The term was a reference to the historic Korean practice of wearing white clothing. It also arose in response to unsuccessful Japanese attempts to end the practice.[22][23]
Shin Chae-ho (1880–1936), the founder of the nationalistic historiography of modern Korea and a Korean independence movement activist, published his influential book of reconstructed history Chosŏn sanggosa (The Early History of Joseon) from 1924 to 1922. In it, he proclaimed that Koreans are descendants of Dangun, the legendary ancestor of Korean people, who merged with Buyo of Manchuria to form the Goguryeo people.[24] Dangun nationalism (단군 민족주의; 檀君民族主義) is based around this principle.[25] In the March First Movement, the Korean Declaration of Independence marked the date of declaration as Dangun-era, and the identity of the Korean minjok and the subject of independence were set as 'the descendants of Dangun'.[26]
After the liberation of Korea in the 1940s, despite the split between North and South Korea, neither side disputed the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation based on a firm conviction that they are purest descendant of a legendary progenitor and half-god figure called Dangun who founded Gojoseon in 2333 BCE based on the description of the Tongguk t'onggam (1485).[20]
From 1945 until 1950, minjok nationalism was a factor in Korean reunification sentiment, especially among political centrists. This has been dubbed "centrist [minjok] nationalism" (중도파 민족주의). For example, centre-right Kim Kyu-sik formed the National Independence Federation (centered around the minjok) and opposed the construction of a South Korean independent government promoted by Syngman Rhee; centre-left Lyuh Woon-hyung also opposed far-left proletarian internationalism and argued that "Korean minjok'" interests were more important. Centrist nationalists tried to prevent the division of the Korean Peninsula through the Left-Right Coalition Movement.[27]
One South Korean scholar argued that ethnic nationalism served as a useful tool for the South Korean government to make its people obedient and easy to govern when the country was embroiled in ideological turmoil, especially during the presidencies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, when nationalism was incorporated into anti-communism.[28]
Noted Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers argues in his 2010 book The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters that the North Korean ideology of a purest race arose from 20th century Japanese fascism. Japanese collaborators are said to have introduced the notion of racial unity in an effort to assert that Japanese and Koreans came from the same racial stock. After Japan relinquished control of Korea, Myers argues, the theory was subsequently adjusted to promote the idea of a pure Korean race.[29]
South Korea is a highly homogenous society, but has in recent decades become home to a number of foreign residents (4.9%), whereas North Korea has not experienced this trend. A number of its foreign residents are ethnic Koreans ("Overseas Koreans") with foreign citizenship. Many residents from China, post-Soviet states, the United States and Japan are who may meet criteria for expedited acquisition of South Korean citizenship.[30][31] In recent decades, discussions have continued to be held both abroad and in Korea on the topics of race and multi-culturalism.[32][31]
Emma Campbell from the Australian National University argues that the conceptions of South Korean nationalism are evolving among young people and that a new form is emerging that has globalised cultural characteristics.[33] According to Campbell's study, for which she interviewed 150 South Koreans in their twenties, the desire for reunification is declining. However, these who are in favor of a Korean unification state reasons different from ethnic nationalism. The respondents stated that they only wanted unification if it would not disrupt life in the South or if North Korea achieves economic parity with the South. A small number of respondents further mentioned that they support a "unification on the condition that it did not take place in their lifetime."[33] Campbell argued that her interviews showed that many young South Koreans have no problems to accepting foreigners as part of uri nara.[33]: 492
Those of mixed race are sometimes referred to as honhyeol (혼혈; 混血) in South Korea.[34]
The South Korean nationality law is based on jus sanguinis[20] instead of jus solis, which is a territorial principle that takes into account the place of birth when bestowing nationality. In this context, most South Koreans have stronger attachment to South Koreans residing in foreign countries and foreigners of South Korean descent, than to naturalized South Korean citizens and expatriates residing in South Korea.[20] In 2005, the opposition Grand National Party suggested a revision of the current South Korean nationality law to allow South Korean nationality to be bestowed to people who are born in South Korea regardless of the nationalities of their parents but it was discarded due to unfavorable public opinion against such a measure.[31]
A poll by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 2015 found that only 5.4% of South Koreans in their twenties saw North Koreans as people sharing the same bloodline with them. The poll also found that only 11% of South Koreans associated North Korea with Koreans, with most people associating them with words like military, war or nuclear weapons. It also found that most South Koreans expressed deeper feelings of "closeness" with Americans and Chinese than with North Koreans.[35] According to a December 2017 survey released by the Korea Institute for National Unification, 72.1% of South Koreans in their 20s believe reunification is unnecessary.[36] Moreover, about 50% of men in their 20s see North Korea as an outright enemy that they want nothing to do with.[37] Steven Denney from the University of Toronto said, "Younger South Koreans feel closer to North Korean migrants than, say, foreign workers, but they will feel closer to a native born child of non-Korean ethnicity than a former resident of North Korea."[38]
Unlike pan-Korean nationalism, state-aligned nationalism (Korean: 국가주의; Hanja: 國家主義; MR: kukkajuŭi), state nationalism, statism or patriotism (Korean: 애국주의; Hanja: 愛國主義; MR: aegukchuŭi) is a nation building based on 'state/country' (국가) identity; it appears in South Korea as ROC nationalism emphasizing the "Republic of Korea" identity and in North Korea as DPRK nationalism emphasizing the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" identity.
In North Korea, ethnic nationalism is incorporated as part of the state-sponsored ideology of Juche. The Juche Idea teaches that "man is the master of everything and decides everything",[39] and a central role in the group of man is a Suryong, or "central leader". Juche is a component of North Korea's political system. The word literally means "main body" or "subject"; it has also been translated in North Korean sources as "independent stand" and the "spirit of self-reliance". The idea of Juche places the Korean people above any other ethnicities in that it is superior to others traditionally, historically, and culturally, but that it is useless without the role of the Suryong[40] It also argues that the reason why the Korean people is the most superior is that it was lead by Kim Jong Il, who stressed the concept of the idea of Korean Ethnic National Superiority(조선민족제일주의朝鮮民族第一主義) in multiple speeches.[41][42]
The Juche Idea gradually emerged as a systematic ideological doctrine in the 1960s. Kim Il Sung outlined the three fundamental principles of Juche as being:
Brian Myers observed that unlike South Koreans, North Koreans generally believe that their (North Korean) state and the "Korean race" (English: 민족, minjok) are analogous due to the work of propaganda. Thus they strengthen each other rather than undermining the other like in South Korea:[43][44]
Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing. In this respect North Korea enjoys an important advantage over its rival, for in the Republic of Korea ethnonationalism militates against support for a state that is perceived as having betrayed the race.
— Brian Reynolds Myers, North Korea's state-loyalty advantage (2011)[45]
One such nationalistic effect of the propaganda is the North Korean's perception on the origins of the North Koreaan flag. Contrary to how the North Korean government have stated on this matter, Park Il, a Koryo Saram who worked as a translator for the 25th Army of the Soviet Union, recalled that Doobong Kim, the vice chairman of the Interim People's Committee, who was summoned by general Lebedv explained the meaning of the taoist symbol in the middle and the four markings on each corner to Lebedv, who dismissed this by responding that "These symbols represent East Asian feudalism", and that "Today seems to mark the very day that the decision to abolish the Taegukki has been made". Park also reminisced that after a few months, he had received a call from Moscow where the design for the flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was explained to him in Russian, which he then translated to Korean. Furthermore, the Taegukki was used in North Korea until July 10, 1948.[46][47] Myers also argues that North Koreans who may not particularly admire their country's leaders will still be patriotic towards their state.[48]
State-based nationalism (국가주의) in South Korea is weak, compared with the more salient race-based nationalism (민족주의).[43][44] As a result, some commentators have described the South Korean state in the eyes of South Koreans as constituting "an unloved republic".[45][49] Whereas in North Korea, most of its citizens view their state and race as being the same thing,[43][44] most South Koreans on the other hand tend to see the "Korean race" and their (South Korean) state as being separate entities due to the existence of a competing Korean state in North Korea. According to Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers, a professor at Dongseo University, while race-based nationalism in North Korea strengthens patriotism towards the state and vice versa,[45] in South Korea it undermines it:
Anglophones tend to use the words nation and state more or less interchangeably, but when one nation is divided into two states, it's important to stick to the [South] Koreans' own practice of distinguishing clearly between nationalism (minjokjuŭi) and patriotism / state spirit (aeguksim, kukka chŏngsin, kukkajuŭi, etc). Historians do this even in English when discussing the Weimar Republic, where nationalism undermined support for the state — and for liberal democracy — just as it does in South Korea today.
— Brian Reynolds Myers, "On Experts and Exegetes" (September 6, 2017), Sthele Press[50]
Due to traditional state support for race nationalism fostered during the 20th century, South Koreans have come to view positive achievements as being a result of inherent racial characteristics, whereas negative events are attributed to the incompetence and malevolence of the South Korean state:[44][45][51]
South Korean nationalism is something quite different from the patriotism toward the state that Americans feel. Identification with the Korean race is strong, while that with the Republic of Korea is weak.
It is said that one of the reasons the South Korean state during the 20th century decided to extol race-based nationalism over state nationalism was that being an authoritarian military junta at the time, it did not want to extol republican principles that might be used to criticize it in turn.[45]
In the 20th century, South Korea's right-wing dictatorship implemented anti-communistic ethnic nationalistic policies while suppressing anti-imperialistic ethnic nationalism, while the opposing forces advocated anti-imperialistic ethnic nationalism. South Korean leftist is does not recognize that the past right-wing military dictatorships are "ethnic nationalism" (민족주의; ethnic-ism), and refers to them as "state nationalism" (국가주의; state-ism).[52][53] Today, state nationalism is advocated by some conservative forces, including the New Right Movement,[44] while left-leaning forces are more inclined to anti-imperialistic ethnic nationalism.[54][55][56]
South Koreans' lack of state-based nationalism (or patriotism) manifests itself in various ways in the country's society. For example, there is no national holiday solely commemorating the state itself and many South Koreans do not know the exact date their country was founded.[45] The closest analogue, Constitution Day, ceased to be a national holiday in 2008.[44] The Liberation Day holiday, which is celebrated each August, shares its date with the establishment of the South Korean state. However, celebrations during the holiday choose to forgo commemorations of the South Korean state or its establishment in favor of focusing and extolling other aspects.[45] As a result, many South Koreans do not know the exact date their own state was established,[45] in contrast to North Koreans, who do.[44] In contrast, a holiday marking the mythological formation of the "Korean race" in 2333 BC is commemorated with a national holiday in South Korea each October.[45]
The "Hell Chosun" phenomenon and a desire among many South Koreans to immigrate have also been cited as an example of South Koreans' general lack of nationalistic patriotism towards their state.[49] The lack of state-based nationalism manifests itself in diplomacy as well; the lack of a strong, resolute response by South Korea to North Korea's attacks against it in 2010 (i.e. the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong) has been attributed to the former's lack of state-aligned nationalistic sentiment, as these attacks were viewed as mere affronts against the state.[57][58][48] In contrast, Japanese claims to South Korean-claimed territory are seen as affronts against the Korean race and are thus responded to with more vigor from South Koreans.[58]
Even state symbols that are ostensibly state in nature, such as the national anthem, state emblem, and national flag contain racial nationalist references (such as the mugunghwa flower) instead of republican or state ones.[45] Thus, the South Korean flag is often seen by South Koreans as representing the "Korean race" rather than merely South Korea itself.[59][60] As a result, the vast majority of South Koreans will almost always treat their national flag with reverence and respect, compared to other countries where citizens would desecrate their own national flags as political statements or in protest.[45] This weak state-based nationalism was reflected in the pre-2011 South Korean military oath and pre-2007 pledge of allegiance, both of which pledged allegiance to the "Korean race" over the state.[61][10][11][44]
One of the reasons put forth to explain South Koreans' lack of support or affinity for the South Korean state is due to a popular misconception that only North Korea purged its regime of pro-Japanese collaborators of the colonial period and that South Korea did not, while in reality the former did not do so.[43][44][62][48] Another reason given is that South Koreans view their interactions with their state in negative contexts, such as when having to report for mandatory military service or paying fines.[45] Other factors include the term 국가주의 in South Korea, which is considered a negative context, such as Japanese Shōwa statism and Park Chung Hee's authoritarian politics,[63] while the term 민족주의 is considered a positive context, such as the anti-Japanese resistance independence movement in Japanese colonial era and the anti-American/anti-dictatorship democracy movement in the 1980s.[64]
In 2007, the U.N. Committee on the International Convention Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination urged better education on the pure blood theory, especially for judicial workers such as police officers, lawyers, prosecutors and judges.[65][66] In 2007, the South Korean government passed the Act on Treatment of Foreigners.[67][68][69] Later in 2007, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination praised the Act on Treatment of Foreigners, but also expressed a number of concerns. The committee was concerned "about the persistence of widespread societal discrimination against foreigners, including migrant workers and children born from inter-ethnic unions, in all areas of life, including employment, marriage, housing, education and interpersonal relationships." It also argued that the terminology such as "pure blood" and "mixed blood" were prevalent in South Korea.[70]
Existing provisions in South Korean criminal law may be used to punish acts of racial discrimination, but were never used for that purpose[70] until 2009, when the first case of a South Korean citizen verbally insulting a foreigner was brought to court.[71] Another legislation aimed at improving the integration of ethnic minorities into South Korean society, the Support for Multicultural Families Act was passed in 2008[72] but revised in 2011.[69][73] According to 2009, statistics published by South Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, there were 144,385 couples of international marriage in South Korea as of May 2008. 88.4% of immigrants were female, and 61.9% were from China.[74] Recently[when?] it has been argued that South Korean society had already become a multicultural society, although foreigners make up for 3.4% of the South Korean population.[75] As of 2011, ten ministries and agencies of South Korean government are supporting international couples and foreign workers in the country.[76]
A poll from 2015 found that Koreans tend to amalgamate Korean ethnic nationalism with classism, resulting in a "hierarchy", viewing immigrants from more affluent countries less negatively than those who came from poorer countries.[77]
Scholar B. R. Myers argued in a 2010 New York Times editorial that there was relatively little public outrage in South Korea over the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan earlier that year, which he attributed partly to a feeling of sympathy towards North Korea among South Koreans, resulting from a closer identification with the Korean race than with the South Korean state.[43] Myers also stated that racialized nationalism in South Korea undermines the South Korean citizenry's patriotism towards South Korea by increasing sympathy towards North Korea, thus threatening the country's national security in the face of North Korean aggression, a sentiment shared by Korea Times columnist Jon Huer.[78][needs update] He stated that South Koreans' racialized nationalism "is no problem when you have a nation state like Japan or Denmark, but is a problem when you have a state divided".[79] Myers has also stated that conversely, North Korea does not suffer from this dilemma as by and large the North Korean people tend to equate the "Korean race" and the country of North Korea as being one and the same, unlike in South Korea where the "Korean race" and South Korea are largely seen as different entities.[80]
Contemporary Korean nationalism, at least in South Korea, often incorporates anti-Japanese sentiment as a core component of its ideology,[81] even being described by some scholars as constituting an integral part of South Korea's civil religion.[82]
The legacy of the colonial period of Korean history continues to fuel recriminations and demands for restitution in both Koreas. North and South Korea have both lodged severe protests against visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which is seen as glorifying the Class A war criminals whose remains are held there. South Koreans claim that a number of Korean women who worked near Japanese military bases as comfort women were forced to serve as sex slaves against their will for Japanese soldiers during World War II which had been a persistent thorn in the side of Japan-South Korea relations from the 1990s to the 2010s. Disagreements over demands for reparations and a formal apology still remain unresolved despite the previous agreement and compensation in 1965, South Koreans started peaceful vigils in 1992 held by survivors on a weekly basis. Recent Japanese history textbook controversies have emerged as a result of what some see as an attempt at historical negationism with the aim of whitewashing or ignoring Japan's war crimes during World War II. These issues continue to separate the two countries diplomatically, and provide fuel for nationalism in both Koreas as well as anti-Japanese sentiment.
According to Robert E. Kelly, a professor at Pusan National University, anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea stems not just from Japanese atrocities during the occupation period, but also from the Korean Peninsula's division.[11] As a result, Kelly says, South Koreans take out their anger, whether rising from Korean division or otherwise, against Japan,[11] as due to the racialized nature of Korean nationalism it is considered gauche for South Koreans to be overly hostile towards North Korea.[83][43][44][needs update] This view is supported by another professor, Brian Reynolds Myers of Dongseo University.[43][44][verification needed] Theoretical explanation for the link between Korean division and persistent anti-Japanese sentiment has been offered in scholarship utilizing an ontological security framework.[84]
The Liancourt Rocks dispute has been ongoing since the end of World War II after the United States rejected Korea's claim to give sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks islands, known as Dokdo or Tokto (독도/獨島, literally "solitary island") in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, to Korea in the 1951.
Since 1954, the South Koreans have administered the islands but bickering on both sides involving nationalism and lingering historical acrimony has led to the current impasse. Adding to this problem is political pressure from conservative politicians and nationalist groups in both South Korea and Japan to have more assertive territorial policies.
With the introduction of the 1994 UN Law of the Sea Convention, South Korea and Japan began to set their new maritime boundaries, particularly in overlapping terrain in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), where some exclusive economic zone (EEZ) borders was less than 400 nautical miles (700 km) apart.[85] Tensions escalated in 1996 when both governments declared a 200-nautical-mile (400 km) EEZ that encompassed the island, which brought Japan-South Korean relations to an all-time low.
This has not only complicated bilateral relations but heightened nationalist sentiments on both sides. In spite of generational change and the passage of time, the institutionalization of Korean collective memory is causing young Koreans to be as anti-Japanese, if not more so, than the older generation.[86][verification needed][87] For Koreans, "historical memory and feelings of han (resentment) run deeply and can influence Korea's relations with its neighbors, allies, and enemies in ways not easily predicted by models of policy-making predicated on realpolitik or other geo-strategic or economic concerns."[9][verification needed][88]
Due to Korea's colonial past, safeguarding the island has become equivalent to safeguarding the nation-state and its national identity. A territory's value and importance is not limited to its physical dimensions but also the psychological value it holds as a source of sovereignty and identity.[89] Triggered by perceptions and strong feelings of injustice and humiliation, Korean nationalistic sentiment has become involved in the dispute. The island itself has become to symbolize South Korean national identity and pride, making it an issue even more difficult to resolve.[90] South Korea's claim to the island holds emotional content that goes beyond material significance, and giving way on the island issue to Japan would be seen as compromising the sovereignty of the entire peninsula. The dispute has taken on the form of a national grievance rather than a simple territorial dispute.
The South Korean government has also played a role in fanning nationalism in this dispute. President Roh Moo-hyun began a speech on Korea-Japan relations in April 2006 by bluntly stating, "The island is our land" and "for Koreans, the island is a symbol of the complete recovery of sovereignty."[91] The issue of the island is clearly tied to the protection of the nation-state that was once taken away by Japan. President Roh emphasizes this point again by saying:
"Dokdo for us is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust chapter in our history with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea's sovereignty."[91]
Later on in his speech Roh also mentions the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese history textbook controversy, saying that they will be dealt with together.[92] Having placed the Liancourt Rocks issue "in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan" and "the safeguarding of [Korea's] sovereignty", compromise becomes impossible.[93] As the French theorist Ernest Renan said, "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort."[94]
The Liancourt Rocks dispute has affected the Korean and Japanese perceptions of each other. According to a 2008 survey by Gallup Korea and the Japan Research Center, 20% of Koreans had friendly feelings towards Japan and 36% of Japanese the same towards Korea. When asked for the reason of their antipathy, most Koreans mentioned the territorial dispute over the island, and the Japanese the anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea. This is in contrast to a 2002 survey (post 2002 FIFA World Cup) conducted by the Chosun Ilbo and Mainichi Shimbun, where 35% of Koreans and 69% of Japanese had friendly views of the other country.[95]
Anti-Americanism in Korea began with the earliest contact between the two nations and continued after the division of Korea. In both North Korea and South Korea, anti-Americanism after the Korean War has focused on the presence and behavior of American military personnel (USFK), aggravated especially by high-profile accidents or crimes by U.S. servicemembers, with various crimes including rape and assault, among others.
The 2002 Yangju highway incident especially ignited Anti-American passions.[96] The ongoing U.S. military presence in South Korea, especially at the Yongsan Garrison (on a base previously used by the Imperial Japanese Army during Colonial Korea) in central Seoul, remains a contentious issue. While protests have arisen over specific incidents, they are often reflective of deeper historical resentments. Robert Hathaway, director of the Wilson Center's Asia program, suggests: "the growth of anti-American sentiment in both Japan and South Korea must be seen not simply as a response to American policies and actions, but as reflective of deeper domestic trends and developments within these Asian countries."[97]
Korean anti-Americanism after the war was fueled by American occupation of USFK troops and support for the authoritarian rule of Park Chung Hee, and what was perceived as an American endorsement of the brutal tactics used in the Gwangju massacre.[98] Speaking to the Wilson Center, Katherine Moon was noted by Hathaway as suggesting that "anti-Americanism also represents the collective venting of accumulated grievances that in many instances have lain hidden for decades", but that despite the "very public demonstrations of anger toward the United States [...] the majority of Koreans of all age groups supports the continuation of the American alliance."[99]
Historical Korean claims of Manchuria can be traced back to the late Joseon dynasty. It was common in late Joseon dynasty to write about old lands of Goguryeo, an expression of nostalgia for the north. In the early 20th century, Korean nationalist historians like Shin Chaeho, advocated a complete unification of Korean peninsula and Manchuria in order to restore the ancient lands of Dangun.[100]
Today, irredentist Korean nationalist historians have claimed that Manchuria (now called Northeast China), in particular Gando (known in China as Jiandao), a region bordering China, North Korea, and Russia, and home to the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture should be part of Korea, based on ancient Gojoseon, Goguryeo and Balhae control of the area.[101][102] The term Greater Korea, sometimes used in nationalist works, usually encompasses those regions located.[103][102] The claim for Gando is said to be stronger than the claim for the whole of Manchuria, due to later Balhae presence in Gando after the fall of the Koguryo kingdom, the current area population's consisting of 1/3 ethnic Koreans,[104] and the circumstances of the 1909 Gando Convention that relegated the area to Chinese control.[105] While the Manchurian claims have not received official attention in South Korea, claims for Gando were the subject of a bill introduced in 2004, at a time when China had been claiming that Balhae and Koguryo had been "minority states" within China and the resulting controversy was at its height.[106] The legislation proposed by 59 South Korean lawmakers would have declared the Gando Convention signed under Japanese rule to be "null and void".[107] Later that year, the two countries reached an understanding that their governments would refrain from further involvement in the historical controversy.[108]
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